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EDITED BY
REX A. WADE



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**DOCUMENTS OF SOVIET HISTORY. VOLUME 2. TRIUMPH
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PREFACE

Researchers who need documentary materials on the history of the Soviet Union previously have not had a single source to which they can turn. They—scholars, students, journalists, government employees, others—have had to hunt through a large number of diverse works, usually specialized by time period, topic or the organization which produced them. To do this successfully often requires considerable prior knowledge of the subject and about the document(s) needed, more than most users would have. Even then many sources, especially for the period before World War II, can be found only in the largest and most specialized libraries and thus are not available to most potential users. If found, many of the documents are incomplete, while others lack the contextual information needed by most readers today. Some important documents, of course, are available only in Russian.

This collection brings together the major documents of Soviet history in a multi-volume set which will cover the period from 1917 to the 1990s. It seeks to select the most important documents, those which best explain the development and policies of the Soviet Union. This includes not only those pertaining to politics, but also those concerning culture and the arts, education, the family, international relations, economics, and other aspects of Soviet society and history. A distinct effort has been made to go beyond government and party pronouncements, which all too often are the sole content of document collections. At the same time it must be recognized that such materials are an exceptionally important part of the documentary record and must be heavily represented. Given the nature of the Soviet system, certain leaders loom especially large and authoritative in some periods and their writings and statements are therefore heavily represented in the respective volumes. Both opposition and unofficial voices also play a role at times, and they too are represented.

Only contemporary documents are used, that is, those originating at the time. Memoirs and other retrospective writings, including “diaries” which have been rewritten, are not included. In making the selections for this collection I have attempted to select documents that (1) have long run significance for understanding the Soviet Union in that they set forth fundamental policies and principles, (2) mark important events of Soviet history and development, (3) illustrate the debates on major issues, or (4) suggest the temper of the times. Given these objectives, selection generally ignores whether a document is well-known or rare, although in some instances the latter characteristic can tip the balance in favor of inclusion. I acknowledge that no two people would make exactly the same selection out of

the thousands of documents available, but I believe that the majority would agree on the inclusion of most of those found here and hope that all will find this selection reasonable as well as valuable.

Each volume in this set covers a differing number of years. Some years and periods produced a larger number of important debates, decisions and documents than did others, and therefore the time span of each volume depends on the number of important documents (and their length) in given years. This seems preferable to forcing the documents artificially into a uniform number of years for each volume. There are practical limitations on the size of such a collection, however, and space does impose its own restraints on selection; "importance" must be defined at least in part by the amount of space available. This collection is projected to run about twelve volumes, which length seems a good compromise between the effort to include a larger number and wider range of important documents than any general collection has done hitherto, and the exhaustion of both editor and users.

The documents are arranged chronologically rather than grouping them by topic. While each method has advantages, the chronological approach is preferred for a collection such as this. It gives a better sense of historical development and in many instances makes clearer how events and issues crowded in upon one another, influenced each other, and how the leaders had to grapple with many pressing problems simultaneously. Moreover, a single document often relates to several topics. For readers wanting material on a specific topic, the subject index should lead them to all documents on that subject as well as to shorter references within other documents. A listing of documents by main topics also is included for quick reference.

A headnote is provided for each document for the purpose of placing the document in its historical framework, to indicate its significance and the more important issues it raises, and to make the necessary clarifications for readers. These headnotes are rather more extensive than in most document collections, on the assumption that most readers will have little knowledge of the historical context of the document.

One of the important principles guiding this collection is to publish each document in its entirety whenever possible. Deletion by editing for space can cause unintended shifts in meaning, and might exclude exactly those portions which a given reader needs. In some cases documents which simply are too long to be included in full, yet are too important to leave out, have been edited in order to include them. Such instances are noted in the headnote to each document and marked in the text by standard ellipses (...). Readers should be aware that some Soviet writers had a fondness for using ellipses for effect in their writings and so, in order to avoid confusing those with editor's omissions, the abridgement of a document is always noted in the headnote. Some peripheral matter, such as the names of signatories of formal government decrees, laws and treaties, usually are not included unless there is a special reason to do so. These were generally a formality and take up a great deal of space better used for additional documents. When the signature of a particular official is of importance, it either is included or indicated in the headnote.

All parenthetical references in the documents are those of the original author; my very few editorial clarifications within texts are marked by brackets []. All notes at the foot of the page are ones appearing in the original document; Lenin in particular was fond of footnotes (and of italics for emphasis). Many documents have passages in italics or bold print, and these are given as per the original. These usually were included in translations. I have attempted to reinstate them where they were dropped by the translator from the Russian original, keeping in mind that in some instances there are different Russian versions, especially of early proclamations.

Within documents, the spelling and usage of the original translators generally has been retained. There seems to be little profit in trying to force general stylistic uniformity on the translated documents. Some especially archaic or confusing usages, such as *commissionary* for *commissar*, *workmen's* for *workers'*, etc., have been replaced by the more common modern term. British and American spelling are retained according to the respective translators, except where the cold logic of the modern computer has homogenized them beyond the intent of the editor. Minor corrections—obvious grammatical and spelling errors, archaic or confusing terminology, a word or two of retranslation, etc.—have been made “silently,” that is to say, without noting it in every instance. All substantial modifications of translations are noted.

Russian names and words in the headnotes are given in the slightly simplified Library of Congress transliteration style familiar to readers of English, with diacritical marks and hard and soft sign omitted, and the *sky* rather than *skii* ending for family names (Trotsky, Lunacharsky). Within the documents they are generally given according to the translators' usage except in instances where names had been transliterated in an unusual manner. To alleviate possible confusion, variant name spellings are listed in the index with cross-reference to the standard spelling.

For the benefit of those unfamiliar with Russian and the variations possible when it is transliterated into Latin alphabet, introduction to some of the more common ones might be helpful. One set of variations comes from two Russian letters, one of which is transliterated variously as *iu*, *yu*, or *ju*, and the other as *ia*, *ya*, or *ja*. Another common variation comes from the insertion of the letter *y*, most often before *e* to make *ye* or instead of *i* in connection with another vowel. Another common insertion is the letter *t* in front of *ch*. The apostrophe mark (') may be used to indicate the Russian soft sign or it may be omitted. Most readers are familiar with the three main sets of variations of name ending: the *-sky*, *-skii* or *-ski*; the *-ov* (*ev*), *-of* (*ef*) or *-off* (*eff*); the use of *-a* or *-aya* in some family names to indicate a woman (Stepanov/Stepanova, Krupskii/Krupskaia), which translators may or may not use. There are other variations, but these are the most common ones and the ones most likely to bother a reader of this volume.

The various party and government names used by different Russian authors and translators deserves special attention. The government formed in October 1917 was called the Council of People's Commissars, but is often referred to by the Russian acronym *Sovnarkom* and sometimes by the English initials CPC. It was approved by

the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which also created an executive body to act for the Congress between its meetings—the Central Executive Committee, which is often referred to in documents by its initials, CEC (English) or TsIK (Russian). It also is important to keep these initials distinct from the initials sometimes used for the Central Committee of the Communist Party (C.C. or CC in English and TsK in Russian). The term “soviet” means in Russian “council;” many authors retain the Russian word *soviet*, now familiar to English readers, but some use *council* in the title of institutions containing that term. The Glossary will help readers unfamiliar with these and other Russian terms of the period, as will the headnote to documents containing them.

Sometimes there are variant dates for documents, among them the date when a resolution was introduced and when it was passed, the sending and receiving dates of a document, or the date when a law was passed by the Council of People's Commissars, when it was published in the newspapers, and when it was published in the official gazette of laws. Thus readers may find a given document dated differently in different sources. In most cases the earliest verifiable date when action was taken or a document created has been used.

Many of the documents given herein are being published for the first time in their complete form in English, and some for the first time in English at all, and yet others for the first time in a readily available source. The source for each document is given immediately following the document. A short form reference is used, and the reader who wishes can find the full citation in the list of sources cited. For some documents both an English and a Russian language source are given. For a single document this means that an English translation existed but with some deletions and that the missing passages have been added by the editor from the Russian source in order to make the document complete. In a few instances where two documents are given under one heading the two source references (of whatever language) refer to the different sources for the respective documents.

Rex A. Wade

INTRODUCTION

By 1920 the Bolsheviks had triumphed over their domestic foes, military and political. Lenin and the Communist Party found themselves victorious, however, over a prostrate and devastated country, a country weary from years of war and social strife, its economy shattered, with famine looming on the horizon. Widespread discontent found expression through strikes, continued peasant armed resistance in the countryside, and most dramatically by the Kronstadt uprising of March 1921.

The Communist leaders' initial reaction to the problems of the country was to tighten still more the party's control over political, economic and social life. Quasi-military methods learned in the Civil War were applied to other areas, a tendency which saw its most direct application in the "labor armies" advocated by Leon Trotsky. At the same time the internal party debate over the nature and purposes of political power, begun in October 1917, resumed now that the threat from their civil war foes faded. The question of the relationship of the party to its working class base, especially the trade unions, and of the role of the workers in the workers' state agitated the party. The years 1920-1921 saw vigorous debates as various factions argued against the dominant party line on the intertwined political and economic issues; the "Workers' Opposition" was the most famous of these. At the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921 a weary Lenin moved to put an end to internal party disputes by forbidding factions. This was to prove one of the most fateful resolutions of party history, providing the vehicle and justification for suppression of minority views not only in 1921 but thereafter. While the leadership tightened control inside the party, it also moved to suppress the last remaining legal non-Communist political parties.

State building proceeded rapidly during this era. Some of the minority nationality areas which had broken away after 1917 were forcibly reannexed to the new state. Steps were taken toward integrating into a new union the several Soviet republics which had been formed as ostensibly independent states but which were effectively controlled from Moscow via the Communist Party (although the final creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics came later, in 1923-1924). State building was to be seen also in the efforts to build up an orderly, permanent system of law codes, judicial procedures and administration. Although the new laws and codes of 1921 and 1922 formally applied only to the RSFSR (the Russian Republic) and not to other areas such as Belorussia or Central Asia, in most cases they either were extended to become the law for the USSR when it was created or provided the model which the other republics used for their laws and codes. In general centralization of political power, although far from what it would become, proceeded apace.

If these were years of military and political triumph, they saw a major retreat on the economic and social front. To deal with popular discontent and to encourage economic recovery, Lenin introduced a New Economic Policy (NEP) at the same Tenth Party Congress which had cracked down on debate inside the party. NEP allowed limited restoration of private ownership and entrepreneurial activity, and relaxed the harsh socialization drive associated with the earlier War Communism. The policies to stimulate peasant enterprise and productivity were the keystone of NEP, but policies allowing some private trade and easing nationalization of industry were important as well. A side effect of this was the relaxation of some of the overt legal discrimination against middle class and professional elements and a temporary easing of policies aimed at a thorough social restructuring, although the latter remained the announced goal of the regime and ideological attacks on "the bourgeoisie" continued to be a staple of the press and of party pronouncements.

The easing of military pressures allowed both the party and citizens to give more attention to social and cultural matters. The early 1920s saw a continued flourishing in the arts, despite censorship. It also was a period when other important cultural and social issues could be discussed, such as the role and status of women and their presumed better place in the new society to be built. Indeed, schemes for education and other cultural work now seemed especially relevant. The decade after 1917 was a time for "revolutionary dreams," for bold visions of the future, whether artistic, economic, about the family and role of women, or whatever, and the end of the Civil War encouraged many to believe that now conditions would allow their realization. However, the dominance of Communist Party ideology indicated that it likely would be the party which would determine which visions would be allowed to be tried out, and that it would itself again turn to its own major cultural and social restructuring programs when circumstances permitted. Indeed, the party's new attention to such issues was signalled by its intervention in the case of Proletcult in 1920. Steadily thereafter the party intruded itself more and more into this sphere.

Internationally as well as domestically it was a period of both triumphs and retreats. In 1920 hope for a rapid worldwide spread of the revolution still burned brightly, but by 1922 it was becoming clearer that the world revolution would take longer than expected. The attack by Poland was beaten back and the last vestiges of foreign intervention ended. By 1922 the fledgling Soviet state managed to break out of its diplomatic isolation and was invited for the first time to a major international conference, even though not yet fully recognized by the major powers. During this period the Russian Communist leaders began to tighten their control over the Communist International (Comintern) in anticipation of its future role in world revolution and in the service of the Soviet state.

This tension-filled era was a critical one in the development of the Soviet system. The Tenth Party Congress, which approved both the social-economic relaxation of NEP and the political crackdown inside the party, was one of the most important of the party's history. It was, moreover, the last one in which

Lenin fully participated. This was the final period of Lenin's political activity and control of the party. Although he lived until January 1924, a series of strokes, starting in May 1922, progressively forced him to curtail his activity and prevented him from exercising his usual dominant role. The Lenin era came to an effective end with 1922, but his legacy lived on in the party and system he created. There is, perhaps, a fitting symbolism in the fact that the last year of Lenin's effective leadership also was the year that Joseph Stalin received the office that he would use more than any other to build his own dominance over the party and which came to represent actual party and state leadership for the rest of Soviet history: General Secretary of the Communist Party. This, one of the most far-reaching actions of this era, passed almost unnoticed, documented for the world only by a small announcement in *Pravda* on Communist Party affairs.

1 THE YEAR 1920

THE MILITARY SITUATION AT THE OPENING OF 1920

2 January 1920

By the end of 1919 the opposing White Armies were in retreat, and the Soviets had in effect won the Civil War. However the final operations lasted throughout 1920, largely due to the outbreak of the war with Poland. Given its importance, this review of the war during 1919, and the military situation at the beginning of 1920 is an appropriate introduction for this volume. This account was published in Izvestiia, 2 January 1920.

A YEAR OF WAR

This last year was a year of intense struggle on the revolutionary front, but it seemed at times that the final victory of the Soviet Government was becoming uncertain. In the beginning we had only two theatres of war, one in the north and the other in the east. Nevertheless the danger to be faced seemed to be great. The eastern front had cut off Siberia and Turkestan, had moved to the Volga and the Kama and its tributaries, and in places was already on this side of those two rivers. Although the pressure from the north was not very great, nevertheless it was dangerous, and threatened to allow the two groups of the enemy to unite and form a single front from the Murmansk road and Archangel to Orenburg and the Caspian Sea. This uneasiness was all the more logical because at that time intervention was being considered, and our military apparatus was only in the period of formation and did not provide us with a sufficient guarantee of safety.

The eastern front had formed the year before last. Its kernel consisted of Czecho-Slovak regiments inspired by the White Guards and supported by foreign embassies in their fight on the Russia of the worker and peasant. Around this kernel there gathered other inimical elements composed of ex-officers, ex-junkers, land-holding *bourgeoisie* and local Cossacks. And although the numerical strength of the White army was not large, still that army was successful in the beginning, because it was faced by poorly organized Red Guards. It held the line of the Ural mountains with the Yekaterinburg mining district as the center. Its south wing entrenched itself rather strongly in the district of Orenburg, and the center was placed on the lines of the rivers Belaya and Ufa, and threatened the city of Ufa. Here the enemy fortified himself rather well, and began to gather new strength.

Meanwhile the northern front, formed in the same year by the expeditionary forces of the Allies in Archangel who were later joined by other White Guard elements, gradually grew in width, crossing the Murmansk road not far from Lake Onega, and moved its left wing to the Pechora River and its left tributary, the Izhma. The chief pressure of the enemy was directed along the Northern Dvina River, its tributary Vaga, and the Archangel railroad. At first he planned to pierce our position in the district of Vologda or Kotlas, and tried to establish tactical connections with the army of Admiral Kolchak in the vicinity of Perm.

But tremendous distances between places and impossible roads, together with the defense put up by the Red Army did not allow the operation to develop. It died out naturally, one might say, because of the expenditure of muscular energy on the part of the enemy. From that time on, the great northern theatre of war lost its primary strategic importance.

It still retained the serious role of a sector of the flank, both during the general attack of the Siberian armies and during the attacks of the Finns on Petrograd, when the latter were joined by the enemy at the beginning of last year and occupied the inter-lake district to the west of Lake Onega, between Onega and the Olonets range.

Spreading out along the western ranges of the Urals, the reorganized army of Admiral Kolchak directed the efforts of its right wing and its center to a movement in the direction of the northern part of the Kama River, and the district of Ufa. Here there were many hard fights of an indecisive character on the roads near Perm and Osa, near Kungur and Krasnoufimsk, near Birsik, near Ufa, and at last near Sterlitamak. The first few months of 1919 were passed in such encounters which were more or less occasioned by chance, and took place especially in the mountainous district of Yekaterinburg.

The conditions of struggle in the Yekaterinburg sector are in reality unfavorable to the development of attacking measures on any large scale. The vicinity is a row of more or less wide valleys rimmed with mountains. At the foot of the latter there are railroads which radiate from Yekaterinburg, and other means of communication. There are also factories and settlements. In other words there is a series of defilations with ready made points of defense. Moreover, the railroad lines, as has been said before, meet in Yekaterinburg, a fact that gave the staff of the enemy a great advantage in the matter of attack, notwithstanding that at the beginning of the year he was numerically weaker than we were. All this allowed the enemy command with its Ural section to hold our armies back until it had finished the formation of new armies in its rear.

At the beginning of April the Eastern front suddenly came to life. Formidable masses of troops were advanced to the front, and the enemy seemed to have made clear his intentions of advancing on the whole line of operations towards Perm and the Volga along the Volga-Bugulminsk and the Samara-Zlatoust roads. His left wing began to press energetically between Sterlitamak and Orenburg in order to reach the Samara-Orenburg and the Saratov-Ural lines. Ufa was soon taken. Then came the turn of Perm, and then, after unsuccessful battles near the Osa and Kungur we evacuated the entire basin of the Kama River as far as Yelabuga, and also the Belaya River and Ufa.

Soon it became evident that the center of the enemy attack was west of Ufa, along two lines leading to the Volga near Simbirsk and Samara. At the same time both wings of the White army continued the pressure on our troops near Vyatka and also to the north-west of the Orenburg-Ural line. Here and there they advanced comparatively far. On the north they were west of Glazov, and their southern wing captured the cities of Buzuluk, Uralsk, Nikolsk, and Yershov, and threatened Samara and Saratov. But Orenburg did not surrender, remaining like a red island in a raging white sea. Later this was of great importance in the development of our counter-attack.

The situation was becoming dangerous. Not only because the enemy, after occupying Bugulma, Buguruslan and Buzuluk, was but 100 miles from the Volga and its bridges. This had happened many times before. But more because of the impetus of his movement and the seeming preparations of the White forces to attack in other theatres of war. It became clear that the armies of Kolchak were only a chain ring in the plan of a concentrated general attack from all directions on Soviet Russia on the part of the enemy.

In fact, after the German evacuation of the occupied provinces of what was once the Russia of the Czar and parts of Ukraine, revolutionary struggle began everywhere. In Ukraine the Reds were quickly victorious. But the hetman's army was not destroyed. Its kernel and most of all its officers went to Kuban and the southern part of the Army of the Don, and with the energetic cooperation of the Entente served as the nucleus for the quick formation of a strong southern army under the command of General Denikin. At the same time, General Yudenich was able to create a strong army corps on the border the government of Pskov. In doing so, he took advantage of similar conditions in Esthonia, Finland,

and Latvia. It became known that Polish and Lithuanian attacks were in preparation. The position taken by the border countries showed that they were only waiting for a favorable moment to attack.

In a word one could see the separate rings of the White chain that was supposed to cut off Soviet Russia from Siberia, Turkestan, the Caucasus, the southern provinces, the north, and the Baltic Sea; to deny it bread, fuel and raw material, and to contain it within the frontiers of the time of Czar Ivan III.

Two circumstances spoiled the success of this plan. In the first place the various groups of the enemy did not co-ordinate their operations from a strategic point of view. The result achieved was not one of complete constriction as the enemy desired, but a succession of independent, although powerful blows. And what is still more important, the Red Army seemed to be reborn in the moment of the greatest danger, reborn from the very top to the very bottom. The ghost of defeat brought the army and the people closer together, and the army, like the ancient Antaeus, drew new strength by touching the earth. Past defeats were useful. The muddy water caused by them had left the army only its healthy elements. There was a filtration of the command and the commissary; the ammunition supply, food, and clothes came more regularly, and what is most important, one general plan of action became visible for the first time in the command.

Taking advantage of the fact that the attack of Denikin was stopped for a while, and that on all other fronts, except in the north where an attempt had been made to reach Kotlas by way of the Dvina, everything was quiet, our command directed the full force of its blows at the enemy in the east.

Its plan was to push back the forces of General Dietrichs on the Ufa sector, and at the same time to sever his communications with Yekaterinburg, by pressure towards Sarapul and Krasnoufimsk. Then, if the operation was successful, the plan was to pass on and strategically surround both groups. As far as the left wing of the White army is concerned it was first planned to restrict our operations to a frontal attack, so as to surround the White army on the Ural-Orenburg line. The enemy had by this time spread considerably, centering his reserves partly behind his center. The point of attack towards Krasnoufimsk was rather sparsely defended, and the attack was successful.

Without giving time to the enemy to regroup his forces, the Red column began to move forward towards the line of Yekaterinburg-Cheliabinsk, threatening the communications of both armies of the enemy, which were especially open to attack in the central sector. The enemy began to retreat, but could not succeed in doing so in an orderly manner, or by occupying one position of prepared defense after another, for the northern and central groups of the Red Army, seeing the moral and physical exhaustion of the enemy and the failure of his plan of attack caused by our victory at Krasnoufimsk, developed the maximum amount of energy in their attack. The quickly defeated White vanguard flowed swiftly backward, leaving the main forces open to attack. In turn they also, not being able to withstand our pressure, began to retreat slowly, trying to hold us back in a series of rearguard encounters mostly in the northern sector, where the development of the Krasnoufimsk wedge had put the enemy army in as bad a position as in the center. Soon Ufa and Perm were recaptured, and then Yekaterinburg and Cheliabinsk.

With the capture of Ufa our command began to take strong measures against the south-east sector. Even before that we had attacked along both railroads towards Orenburg and Uralsk. Now a third group was moved from Sterlitamak and Verkhne-Uralsk in the north towards Orenburg and Orsk. This finished the matter. The end was hastened by a victory of the Turkestan Red Army which had defeated a White column defending the railroad from Orenburg to Tashkent. The road to Turkestan and cotton was now open. Only a small part of the local White Guards occupied the Trans-Caspian railroad, closing the way to Krasnovodsk. They are being cleaned out at present.

Meanwhile the operations of Denikin's army had become more and more real in their form. His central group seemed to be moving into the Don coal mine district, trying to cut off the Red troops near the sea of Azov by a left flank movement. At the same time they began to press strongly in the Don sector along the Kharkov-Balashov line with the clear purpose of attacking the Soviet armies on the southwest near Kamyshin and Tsaritsin. The plan of the enemy was to clear the central part of the Volga of Red troops, to take possession of it, and to enter into close communication with the Ural White army which still managed to hold its positions, resisting all our attacks. Having captured Kamyshin and Tsaritsin the White Guards were not able to help the Ural army, which had already been forced by us to retreat, leaving Uralsk to us, and which had been defeated at Erikov by our left wing and was holding a line north of Alexandrov-Gai near Novo-Uzensk. The successful manoeuvre of the volunteer left wing column of our army saved the situation, leaving our command free of the worry of having to do with a united South Ural front, and with the possible loss of Saratov.

Just when the movements of Denikin's armies began to take form, and the armies of Admiral Kolchak had reached the zenith of their successes, that is, at the end of April and the beginning of May, a new attack of the enemy began to show on the northwest front, aimed at Petrograd. Having decided to capture the capital, Yudenich took measures to weaken the unity of our position in the west and southwest of the city. With this goal in view the Finnish White Guard group in the Murmansk sector began to press energetically along the eastern shore of Lake Ladoga in the direction of the northern branch of the railroad, thinking of capturing it at Zvanka, and then to move along the Nikolayevsk road, helping therewith the armies of Kolchak, especially his right wing. But after it had captured the Lodeynoye Field, it was stopped and forced to retreat. The attempt of the White command to act in unity had failed.

Nevertheless, this attack which began with a strong blow at Yamburg, continued to develop favorably to the enemy. For many reasons which were given at that time in all newspapers, the Red columns were speedily retreating, especially north of the Baltic road. Soon the vanguard of the enemy was only thirty miles from the capital. The fortress of Krasnaya Gorka, captured by the counter-revolutionists, was a great menace both to Kronstadt and the fleet. But it was this very fact that showed what little forces the White Guards had when they attempted their adventure. They did not possess the few necessary battalions to hold Krasnaya Gorka, and the fortress was recaptured by us after a heavy artillery attack by our fleet, through the brave attack of a comparatively small number of sailors.

This success seemed to be the signal for an entire change in military affairs. The enemy began to retreat quickly before our blows. He managed to remain a short time at Yamburg, but was quickly driven from there, and later from Pskov, and had to satisfy himself with holding Narva and Gdov, wedging outwards a little between them towards the southeast and Luga. Both sides held their positions for four months or until the new attack of General Rodzianko on Petrograd in the beginning of October.

Meanwhile conditions on the southern front were becoming more and more serious. Even at the end of May the strength and resources of Denikin were very apparent. It became self-evident that he would not stop with the capture of the Don Region, the Don coal mines, and the southern sea provinces, but that he would begin a general attack on the north, the northeast and the northwest, where Kharkov, Poltava, Voronezh, Yekaterinoslav and Kiev would serve him as stopping places.

Tired with its fighting of many months' duration and suffering besides from local partisans, the Red Army began to retreat. The Kharkov sector gradually became open, especially in one place where the White army succeeded in driving a wedge into our positions a little outside the city. The further development of the White attack in this direction led

them through Chuguev to Volochansk, and finally forced us to evacuate Kharkov. Soon after the enemy occupied Kursk, Yekaterinoslav, and a little later, Poltava, which was surrounded from the north in the neighborhood of Lebedin.

Having captured the central section of the Kiev-Voronezh railroad, and developing the success of the Poltava-Lebedin group, the command of the enemy decided to attack both Voronezh and Kiev. The struggle for these cities, especially for Voronezh, was already of a more difficult nature, but the proportionate strength of the sides was such that we were forced to evacuate both cities.

The central White army continued its movement north on a wide front in the general direction of Bryansk, Orel, and Yelatz, that is, in the direction of the important railroad centers in central Russia. Its advance was greatly helped by the continual cavalry raids of General Mamontov, who had broken our lines near Novokhopersk and Borisoglebsk, and who had attacked Tambov and Kozlov, and later moved north on Skopin, destroying railroads, and bringing disorganization into the work of our transport in the rear. Notwithstanding this, the movement of the White Guard in the direction of Bryansk-Orel-Yelatz was of an altogether different character from its advance on Kursk. It was at once noticeable that our enemy was growing weaker and more tired, and our military strength was increasing. And although Orel fell finally, it was clear that this was due to the law of inertia, and a sort of unfitness on the part of our command in the matter of counter-attack. A change was imminent.

Orel, exactly like Voronezh, served as a dam that held back the White current. For a little while longer the enemy showed activity, trying to take Yelatz so as to attack the Red Army in the rear from Tambov and Penza, and to unite with the Voronezh column, which was attacking us in the direction of Kozlov, but these were merely last and unsuccessful efforts. The Red Army had managed to fill its ranks with replacements, and having been regrouped, had passed from the defense to the attack on the wide front between Orel and Yelatz. At the same time the Soviet cavalry was sent to attack the enemy's cavalry vanguard near Voronezh.

The fact that we had torn the initiative from the hands of the enemy and that we were numerically superior, broke like lightning on the tired foe. Orel and Voronezh were taken by us in almost one day (October 20), and this moment saw a complete change in the nature of our operations.

Even the inspired attack of Rodzianko on Petrograd did not help Denikin. The capital lived through two or three weeks of danger, but the population was quiet and worked hard in putting the city into a state of defense, even fortifying the outlying suburbs, and then the enemy rolled back, even more swiftly than in May, before the blows of the garrison and of the replacements sent from the center. The reserves of our southern armies were untouched and continued to pursue their work.

After the capture of Orel and Voronezh, the Red Army began to move on Kursk from two sides—on the north, from the surrounding railroads, and on the east from Voronezh. The enemy defended himself vigorously in all encounters, often passing into short energetic counter-attacks. But little by little, before our steady attacks, his forces were disorganized into separate groups and columns, and the fighting developed into a series of encounters between small detachments. Most of these encounters ended favorably for us. They allowed us to keep the advantage of the initiative and make use of manoeuvres on the field of battle. The fall of Kursk, and then of Kharkov and Poltava, and our latest successes are the results of the numerous little victories of our independent columns, which are at once used to advantage by our command.

When the center of the enemy first trembled and then began to retreat, it dragged with it both wings, that of the Dnieper and that of the Don. In both places the defensive strength of the enemy was broken. He is forced to evacuate a tremendous stretch of country, on one

side covering the right frontier of Ukraine, and on the other the southern part of the Don region and the roads to Rostov and Tsaritsin, which are important to him strategically, for they guard the way to the Caucasus. In the center the enemy is striving to defend the region of the Donetsk and Yekaterinoslav, but without any success. Yekaterinoslav was taken by us on the last day of last year.

While the southern Red Army was living through a crisis, Soviet troops also had a hard time in the east, where they had passed Kurgan and Yalutorovsk. Covering up with his rear guard, General Dietrichs collected new forces and moved them against our outspread and somewhat tired columns. The manoeuver was successful. We were forced to retreat, but very little in all, a matter of sixty miles at the most. During this time, the Red Army, having succeeded in moving up its reserves, passed into a general attack on the whole front. It quickly defeated the columns of the enemy, and then captured Tobolsk, Ishim, and Petropavlovsk, and without giving the enemy any rest attacked in the direction of Omsk, which it took at the beginning of November.

This moment marks the beginning of a general pursuit of the enemy, who retreated eastward. We are pressing him continuously, taking a tremendous number of prisoners, cannon, machine guns, and an amount of war material and food that beggars all description. In Nikolayevsk, the downfall of the enemy was especially shown in high relief when seventy separate detachments and their senior staffs, refused the order to evacuate the city, and surrendered to us.

At present, in Siberia we are faced only by the pitiful remnants of the White armies, which are trying to organize the defense of Krasnoyarsk. The regions of Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk and a part of the region of Semirechensk are already clean of White Guards.

In the great struggle that marked the last year, the Polish-Lithuanian front deserves a special place. Because of its central position between the armies of Yudenich and Denikin it could have played a great part, binding them into one complete unit; or it could at least have attempted to unite with one of them, for instance the southern army, in this way taking advantage of the moment when the latter was occupying Chernigov. But the Polish command did not try hard to unite with either of the White Guard leaders, being satisfied with operations on a small, provisional scale. Satisfied with its first successes, which enabled it to take the government of Minsk, and part of Vitebsk and Polotsk, the Polish-Lithuanian army remained in one place, allowing us to better conditions in case of having to conduct a general defense. This is the cause of the effort to take Dvinsk and move toward Polotsk, Vitebsk, and Mohilev.

During the past year, the Red Army lived through a great life. It may be said that during these twelve months it has been entirely reborn, having become, from the viewpoint of military organization, completely modernized, completely European, and even successful in developing new men for higher service.

Soviet Russia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (3 July 1920), pp. 7-10, with modifications.



ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FIRST LABOR ARMY

15 January 1920

On 10 January the commander of the Third Army in the Urals, sent a telegram to the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense asking that his army be transformed into a labor army.

This supposedly was his own initiative or that of members of his army, but timing which coincided with the debate about labor policies, and especially Trotsky's proposals for militarization of labor, suggests that Trotsky or his subordinates may have had a hand in the request. See Trotsky's theses on labor armies of 16 December 1919 in volume one of Documents of Soviet History. In any case, the government approved the request and the Council issued this decree establishing the labor army (drafted by Trotsky). Other labor armies soon followed. See also Trotsky's order to the army on the same day in the next document.

DECREE OF THE COUNCIL OF WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' DEFENSE ON THE FIRST REVOLUTIONARY LABOR ARMY

1. The Third Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is to be utilized for labor purposes. This army is to be considered as a complete organization; its apparatus is neither to be disorganized nor split up, and it is to be known under the name of the First Revolutionary Labor Army.

2. The utilization of the Third Red Army for labor purposes is a temporary measure. The period is to be determined by a special regulation of the Council of Defense in accordance with the military situation as well as with the character of the work which the army will be able to carry out, and will especially depend on the practical productivity of the labor army.

3. The following are the principal tasks to which the forces and means of the Third Army are to be applied:

First:

- a) the procurement of food and forage in accordance with the regulation of the People's Commissariat for Food, and the concentration of these in certain depots;
- b) the procurement of wood and its delivery to factories and railway stations;
- c) the organization for this purpose of land transport as well as water transport;
- d) the mobilization of necessary labor power for work on a national scale;
- e) constructive work within the above limits as well as on a wider scale for the purpose of introducing, gradually, further works.

Second:

- f) for repair of agricultural implements;
- g) agricultural work, etc.

4. The first duty of the Labor Army is to secure provisions, not below the Red Army ration, for the local workers in those regions where the army is stationed; this is to be brought about by means of the army organs of supply in all those cases where the President of the Food Commissariat of the Labor Army Council (No. 7) finds that no other means of securing the necessary provisions for the above mentioned workers are to be had.

5. The utilization of the labor of the Third Army in a certain locality must take place in the locality in which the principal part of the army is stationed; this is to be determined exactly by the leading organs of the army (No. 6) with a subsequent confirmation by the Council of Defense.

6. The Revolutionary Council of the Labor Army is the organ in charge of work appointed, with the provision that the locality where the services of the Labor Army are to be applied is to be the same locality where the services of the Revolutionary Council of the Labor Army enjoys economic authority.

7. The Revolutionary Council of the Labor Army is to be composed of members of the Revolutionary War Council and of authorized representatives of the People's Commissariat for Food, the Supreme Council for Public Economy, the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, the People's Commissariat for Communication, and the People's Commissariat for Labor. A specially appointed representative of the Council of Defense will serve as chairman of the Council of the Labor Army.

8. Final decisions concerning internal military organizations and defined by regulations of internal military services and other military regulations are to be made by the Revolutionary War Council, which introduces into the internal life of the army all the necessary changes arising in consequence of the demands of the economic application of the army.

9. In every sphere of work (food, fuel, railway, etc.) the final decision in the matter of organizing this work is to be left with the representative of the corresponding sphere of the Council of the Labor Army.

10. In the event of radical disagreement the case is to be transferred to the Council of Defense.

11. All the local institutions, Councils of National Economy, Food Committees, land departments, etc., are to carry out the special orders and instructions of the Council of the Labor Army through the latter's corresponding members, either in its entirety or in that sphere of the work which is demanded by the application of the mass labor power.

12. All local institutions (Councils of National Economy, Food Committees, etc.) are to remain in their particular localities and carry out, through their ordinary apparatus, the work which falls to their share in the execution of the economic plans of the Council of the Labor Army; local institutions can be changed, either in structure or in their functions, on no other condition except with the consent of the corresponding departmental representatives who are members of the Council of the Labor Army, or in the case of radical changes with the consent of the corresponding central department.

13. In the case of work for which individual parts of the army can be utilized in a casual manner, as well as in the case of those parts of the army which are stationed outside the chief army, or which can be transferred beyond the limits of this locality, the Army Council must in each instance enter into an agreement with the permanent local institutions carrying out the corresponding work, and as far as that is practical and meet with no obstacles, the separate military detachments are to be transferred to their temporary economic disposal.

14. Skilled workers, insofar as they are not indispensable for the support of the life of the army itself, must be transferred by the army to the local factories and to the economic institutions generally under direction of the corresponding representatives of the Council of the Labor Army.

Note: Skilled labor can be sent to factories under no other condition except with the consent of those economic organs to which the factory in question is subject. Members of trade unions are liable to be withdrawn from local enterprises for the economic needs in connection with the problems of the army only with the consent of the local organs.

15. The Council of the Labor Army must, through its corresponding members, take all the necessary measures towards inducing the local institutions of a given department to supervise, in the localities, the army detachments and their institutions in the implementation of the latter's share of work without infringing upon the respective by-laws, regulations, and instructions of the Soviet Republic.

Note: It is particularly necessary to take care that the general State rate of pay is to be observed in the remuneration of peasants for the delivery of food or the preparation of wood or other fuel.

16. The Council of the Labor Army is required to conduct a regular accounting of the amount of labor performed by the army on the basis of these regulations, about the feeding of the workers and about labor productivity. The Central Statistical Department in agreement with the Supreme Council for Public Economy and the War Department is instructed to draw up an estimate defining the forms and period of registration.

17. The present regulation comes into force with the moment of its publication by telegraph.

*President of the Council of Defense,
V. Ulianov (Lenin).*

Soviet Russia, Vol. 2, No. 22 (29 May 1920), pp. 547-548 and *Sobranie zakonov i rasporiazhenii Rabochego i Krestianskogo pravitel'stva*, No. 3, Art. 15, (1920), pp. 11-12.



ORDER TO THE THIRD RED ARMY—FIRST LABOR ARMY

15 January 1920

The same day that the establishment of labor armies was sanctioned, (see preceding document) Trotsky sent this order to the Third Army, which was being transformed into a labor army. It elaborates on the functions and purposes of the labor armies, beyond that given in the above decree itself.

ORDER TO THE THIRD RED ARMY

The Third Red Army has fulfilled its military task. But the enemy has not been destroyed on all fronts. The hired troops of the Entente menace Soviet Russia from the west. White Guard bands still occupy Archangel. The Caucasus is as yet not liberated. For these reasons the Third Revolutionary Army remains under arms, preserves its organization, its internal unity, and its war spirit in the event of the Socialist fatherland calling it to new military feats.

But imbued with a sense of duty, the Third Revolutionary Army is eager to waste no time. During those weeks and months of respite which fell to its share, it decided to utilize all its means and forces for the economic uplift of the country. Remaining a fighting force, the terror of the enemies of the working class, it at the same time became the Revolutionary Army of Labor.

The Revolutionary War Council of the Third Army enters into the Council of the Labor Army. In this Council, the members of the Revolutionary War Council will join the representatives of the chief economic institutions of the Soviet Republic. They will secure the necessary guidance for the various spheres of economic activity.

The starving workers of Petrograd, Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, the Urals, and all the other industrial centers are in dire need of provisions. The chief task of the First Revolutionary Labor Army is the systematic collection of all surplus bread, meat, fats, and forage in the locality; the exact registration of the food provisions collected; energetic and rapid concentration and dispatch to factories and railway stations, and loading into wagons.

Industry is in need of fuel. The most important task of the Revolutionary Labor Army is the cutting and sawing of timber, and its delivery to factories and railway stations.

The workers in the preparation of fuel are in need of living accommodations. The Revolutionary Labor Army must build, where necessary, a number of barracks, and secure for the workers and for those who may subsequently take their places comfortable living accommodations.

Spring is approaching, the time of field work. The output of new agricultural implements of our exhausted factories is very small. But there is a great quantity of old implements in need of repair, in the possession of the peasantry. The Revolutionary Labor Army will offer its workshops and smithies, locksmiths and carpenters for the repair of agricultural machines and implements. When the field work begins the Red "Shots" and the Red cavalymen will show that they are able to follow the plough, to till the Soviet land.

The proletariat and the peasantry of the Urals and Siberia live and work in close connection with the worker-soldier of the Third Army. Part of the labor army, its Red soldiers, its commanders and commissars, must establish comradely relations of friendship and collaboration with all the workers.

All the members of the army, from the highest to the lowest, must bear an attitude of fraternity, and attention to the trade unions, to the local councils and to the small and large executive committees, clearly bearing in mind that these are the organizations of the laboring masses. Work in all localities must be carried on in agreement with these latter, the army undertaking to explain to them the importance of the work which the Soviet Government has directed it to do and to appeal to them for active support of this great initiative.

It should be the first task of the Red Army to take all possible measures that in the locality of its work not a single factory should suffer from a scarcity of food. All honest Red Army soldiers who try to do as much work as a factory worker—must at the same time see that the workers obtain through the army apparatus an equal amount of food.

Untiring energy in work as in battle! All skilled workers and specialists in the army must be registered and kept ready so that the entire army machine begins work in its new field simultaneously, harmoniously, smoothly, and rapidly, without interruption or delay.

We must have an exact registration of the force that is expended and of the results that are obtained; and careful and honest control over all appliances and over material expended. Not a pound of Soviet bread, not a log of the national wood is to be left unregistered or wasted. All this must go to form the basis of the Socialist edifice.

The commanders and commissars are responsible for the work done by their men, as they are on the field of battle. Discipline is to remain as stringent as ever. It is not to be weakened even by a hairbreath. The communist circles are to be an example of efficiency and perseverance in work.

The unity between the various parts of the army must be strictly preserved. Watchfulness must in no case be weakened. The fitness and hardness of the workers must not be relaxed.

The commanders and commissars are to send exact labor operation communiques on the amount of corn gathered, loaded and transported, of the cubes of wood cut and sawed, and of all other works. These communiques are to be published in the daily paper *The First Labor Army* with the exact mention of every regiment and every separate labor group so that the most diligent and zealous of the regiments may enjoy the respect they deserve while the backward, slovenly, and lazy ones should be made to strive to improve and rise to the level of the former.

The political department of the army is to carry on its work with redoubled energy, educating a warrior in the worker and preserving the worker in the warrior.

Hundreds of thousands of printed appeals and speeches must be distributed to make clear to the most backward of the Red Army soldiers and all the surrounding workers and peasants, the idea of the great work which the Third Army is entering upon. The Revolutionary Tribunal of the army punishes loafers, parasites, shirkers, and plunderers of the people's property. A strict registration should be made so as to prevent all dishonest leave-taking. A deserter in work is just as dishonest and contemptible as a deserter on the field of battle. Both are to be severely punished.

Most conscious and intelligent fighters, foremost workers, revolutionary peasants, Red Army soldiers, ahead to first places! Let your untiring energy and self-sacrifice be an example to the others, enthusing them to take the same role.

Let the rear be diminished to its minimum; all superfluous men to the front line of labor!

Begin and end your work, wherever possible, with the sounds of Socialist hymns and songs, for your work is not the toil of slavery, but a supreme service to the Socialist Fatherland.

Soldiers of the Third Army, now the First Labor Army! Your initiative is indeed a great cause. The whole of Russia will become aquiver with life in response to you. This present moment the Soviet radio-telegraph is carrying to the world the great news that the Third Army by its own free will has changed into the First Labor Army. Soldier-Workers, do not put to shame the red banner!

*The President of the Revolutionary
War Council of the Republic.*

L. Trotsky.

Soviet Russia, Vol. 2, No. 24 (12 June 1920), pp. 592-593.



THE MANPOWER CRISIS AND COMPULSORY LABOR

22 January 1920

By the beginning of 1920 Soviet Russia faced a wide ranging economic crisis. One serious problem was how to get work done. Given the absence of adequate consumer goods to provide work incentives, their own hostility to the market, and encouraged by the success of "military methods" during the war, some leading Communists turned toward the use of militarized labor and central command to solve the problems of creating a socialist economy. Trotsky was the foremost advocate of this approach and despite criticism managed, with Lenin's backing, to get a set of theses he had drawn up adopted by the Central Committee. These provided the basis for a whole range of compulsory labor laws in 1920. In a sense this was an extreme form of "War Communism" at a time when the military threat was receding.

THE MANPOWER CRISIS AND HOW TO SOLVE IT

1. The sharp economic decline of the country, resulting from the imperialist war and the counterrevolutionary attacks on the Soviet state, finds its direct expression in excessive shortages or disruption of such basic factors of production as technical equipment, raw materials, and, first and foremost, fuel and labor power.

2. There is no reason to expect any immediate importation from abroad of any quantity of machinery, of coal, or of skilled workers, and this is not only because of the blockade, about which no predictions can be made at the moment, but also because of the extreme economic exhaustion of Western Europe.

3. Therefore, the principal lever capable of improving the national economy is the labor force, its organization, distribution, and rational utilization.

A. The Industrial Proletariat

4. The industrial proletariat, in whom political power is principally concentrated, must from now on devote its entire attention and every effort to the organization of the economy and take part directly in the process of production.

5. For this purpose it is necessary to reassemble the disrupted ranks of skilled and trained workers by recalling them gradually from the army, the food detachments, Soviet institutions behind the front, Soviet farms and communes, and, first and foremost, from the ranks of speculators.

6. The release and concentration of professionally trained workers must be attained by the combined operation of measures designed to improve their food-supply conditions and their general standard of life; by a more accurate registration of these workers and greater trade-union influence upon them; and, finally, if necessary, measures of administrative coercion.

7. The implementation of these measures, as well as the entire effort of industrial development, is conditioned upon the organizational consolidation of the trade unions, by placing at their disposal an adequate staff of responsible and reliable workers, capable of enforcing principles of iron discipline.

8. Simultaneously, extensive measures must be taken for the professional training of the younger generation, fourteen years of age and over, in order to secure the necessary reproduction of skilled workers. With this in view, the Commissariat of People's Education must create an organization, powerful and authoritative, in which representatives of all the institutions concerned must take part.

B. Unskilled Labor Force

9. Under present economic conditions the employment in industry and in transport of unskilled workers, i.e., the peasants, is made necessary to a degree far greater than ever before.

- a. The country's mechanical equipment is worn out and can be replaced only by human labor;
- b. The country's fuel position is critical and must depend on such labor-consuming work as wood procurement;
- c. Cultivation of Soviet farms will require large numbers of peasants;
- d. Clearing streets and roads of snow, loading and unloading freight, construction, etc., will require large numbers of unskilled labor.

10. The present conditions of the country are of such a character that industry, transport and economic life generally cannot obtain the necessary labor force without the introduction of *compulsory labor*.

C. Universal Compulsory Labor

11. Socialist construction repudiates the liberal capitalistic principle of "freedom of labor," a principle which in bourgeois society signified freedom for some to exploit others, and freedom for others to be exploited. Insofar as the fundamental problem of social organization is to overcome the external physical conditions hostile to man, socialism demands that all members of society should be *compelled* to take part in the production of material values; at the same time socialism aims at the establishment of the most rational, i.e., the most economical and generally the most attractive form of socialization of labor. The principle of universal compulsory labor, firmly established in the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, must now be applied on a wide and all-embracing scale.

12. The full realization of the principle of universal compulsory labor, within the framework of a general economic plan, can only be accomplished by perfecting the entire administrative and economic apparatus of the state, and by the universal introduction of labor books, showing the exact place of each citizen, male or female, in the economic system, as well as in the national defense system of the Soviet Republic.

13. The transition to the general application of compulsory labor must take place at once, in forms which may be lacking in precision but which are capable of securing the necessary labor force for the socialized economy.

14. With this in view it is necessary to determine the number of workers who are needed at present and who, depending on the amount of available foodstuffs and machinery, can be put to work immediately to solve the most critical problems of the present time (1920).

15. At the same time a special decree must be issued to specify which economic needs and requirements should be classified as local and regional, to be taken care of by means of local compulsory labor.

16. The organization of compulsory labor, which is to cover both sexes, must take into consideration the peculiarities of the various regions; and the distribution of manpower between national and local compulsory work should, as far as possible, be carried out uniformly throughout the country, in order to lessen the harm to the peasant economy.

17. In the immediate future compulsory labor is to be applied mainly to those age groups least affected by mobilizations for military service. As far as possible, women should be brought into this work.

18. Local machinery for carrying out compulsory labor of both national and regional importance should be built on a combination of local departments of the Commissariat of War, the Administrative Department of the Executive Committee, and the Labor Section [of the Commissariat of Labor].

19. This local organization (Committee for Universal Compulsory Labor), which will be immediately subordinate to the Executive Committee, will receive orders for requisite labor, both from the center for carrying out national plans, and from the local Executive Committee for the economic needs of its district. The task of the Committee for Universal Compulsory Labor is to coordinate local demands with requirements arising from the center, which, as a rule, should be given first priority.

20. At the center, a committee for compulsory labor is to be established, composed of representatives of the Registration and Distribution Section of the Commissariat of Labor, of the Commissariat of the Interior, of the Mobilization Department of the All-Russian General Staff, and the Central Committee [for Compulsory Labor] will be of an interdepartmental nature and will be attached to the Council of Defense. All state institutions, both central and local, are under obligation to carry out the orders of the Central Committee that relate to questions of compulsory labor.

D. Militarization of the Economy

21. In a society which is in a transitional phase of its development and which is burdened with the inheritance of a distressing past, the passage to a planned organization of socialized labor is inconceivable without compulsory measures being applied to the parasitic elements, to the backward sections of the peasantry, and even to the working class itself. The weapon of state compulsion is military force. Therefore the militarization of labor, in one form or another, is inescapable in a transitional economy based on universal compulsory labor. The element of compulsion is bound to be more sparingly applied in proportion as the socialist economic system becomes more developed, as the conditions of work become more favorable, and as the education level of the growing generation improves.

22. The militarization of the economy, in the given conditions of Soviet Russia, is to be understood in the sense that problems affecting the economy (labor intensity, careful handling of machinery and tools, conscientious use of materials, etc.) must be treated by workers and state institutions as if they were problems of military combat. The entire urban and rural population must recognize that the prevention of labor desertion, self-seeking, unpunctuality in work, carelessness, laziness, and abuse are problems of life and death to the country as a whole. These short-comings must be brought to an end as rapidly as possible, even if the most severe measures are necessary.

23. To this end a propaganda campaign must be undertaken which, using concrete and constantly renewed material concerning our economic breakdown and particular successes in overcoming it, must educate the widest masses of the working people in a spirit of watchful and enterprising social supervision of all phenomena and facts relating to the

country's economic life, with a view particularly to drawing non-Party conferences of workers and peasants into the fight against improvidence, bureaucratism and red-tape. The leading roles in this work should be assigned to the Party and the trade unions.

24. Formal militarization of individual enterprises or whole branches of industry, which are especially important at the present time, or are particularly in danger of disruption, will in each case take place by special decree of the Council of Defense and will have as its primary aim the temporary "freezing" of workers to their enterprise, as well as the introduction within the enterprise of strict discipline, giving the administration wide disciplinary powers, if the restoration of the enterprise can be achieved in no other way.

25. The summoning of large masses of unskilled and unorganized workers to perform compulsory labor in such fields as food and fuel gathering, construction, loading and unloading, etc., requires, especially at the outset, a form of organization which approaches the military type.

26. The essentials of labor organization and the necessary discipline, both internal and external, required for the hundreds of thousands, even millions of people, mobilized for compulsory labor, can be supplied only by leading, class-conscious, determined, and energetic workers, especially those who have gone through the school of war and are accustomed to handling masses and leading them under the most difficult conditions.

27. Basically, the establishment of compulsory labor involves the same problems of organization and of principle as underlie the establishment of the Soviet State as a whole and the creation of the Red Army: to make sure that the less class-conscious and more backward peasant masses are placed under natural leaders and organizers from among the most class-conscious proletarians, who are in most cases professionally trained. Inasmuch as the army represents the most important experiment in a mass Soviet organization of this type, its methods and procedures (with all necessary modifications) must be carried over into the field of labor organization by utilizing the experience of those workers who will be transferred from military to economic work.

E. Labor Armies

28. Military units, including large army formations, which are being released from combat duty, should be given labor assignments. This will serve as a transition stage in the introduction of universal compulsory labor, and is the reason for the conversion of the Third Army into the First Labor Army, an experiment which will be extended to other armies.

29. The essential conditions in the employment of army units and whole armies for labor are the following:

- a. The tasks imposed on the labor armies must be strictly limited to the simplest types of work, such as gathering and accumulating food supplies.
- b. Organizational relationships must be established, with the relevant economic organs, to prevent the disruption of the economic plans of these organs and the disorganization of the centralized economic machinery.
- c. Close contact and comradely relations must be established with the workers of the region, and, if possible, food rations of the two groups should be equalized.
- d. An ideological struggle must be carried out against the prejudices of the petty intelligentsia and trade unionists who regard the militarization of labor and the employment of military units in the production process as a return to the Arakcheev regime. It is necessary to explain the inevitability and the progressive character of military compulsion aimed at economic improvement on the basis of universal compulsory labor, and to clarify the progressive character of the gradual rapprochement between the organization of labor and the organization of defense in a socialist society.

F. Food Supply

30. In framing economic plans and programs, the first and most important problem in mobilizing and employing and establishing the Soviet regime in newly occupied regions

is the *concentration in the hands of the Soviet State* of several hundred million *funts* of bread, meat, fish, fats, i.e., of a food reserve sufficient to meet the needs of the industrial proletariat, of Soviet employees, and of the peasants mobilized for compulsory labor in the current year. The creation of food-supply bases in the most important industrial regions will serve as a firm guarantee for the realization not only of the current economic plan, but also of the whole process of socialist construction.

31. Organizing public catering for the industrial workers and Soviet office-workers, starting with the urban and factory centers, is—on the basis indicated in the preceding point—an urgent task for the People's Commissariat of Food, in co-operation with the local soviets and trade unions, and using the relevant apparatus of the War Department. An extensive arrangement of public opinion to check on participation by citizens in production, while releasing for productive labor a colossal amount of energy, especially female energy, which is at present being expended, on a 'retail' basis, in the individual serving-up of bits of bread.

Bunyan, *The Origins of Forced Labor in the Soviet State*, pp. 95-101 and Trotsky, *How the Revolution Armed*, Vol. 3, pp. 63-71.



DECLARATION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND THE POLISH NATION

28 January 1920

The government of newly independent Poland worked throughout 1919 to create a group of states, including an independent Ukraine, on Russia's western frontier which would be able to contain a smaller, weakened, Russian state. They did not, therefore, support the Whites, who insisted upon a united Russia despite their own disputes with the Communists. With the Soviet victory in the Civil War, Poland took a more hostile attitude, eliciting several Soviet proposals for peace negotiations to settle outstanding issues. The following declaration summarized the official Soviet position. War broke out in April.

DECLARATION

Poland is now confronted with a decision that for many years to come may have grave repercussions on the lives of both nations. Everything shows that the extreme imperialists among the Allies, the colleagues and agents of Churchill and Clemenceau, are at present making every effort to draw Poland into a baseless, senseless, and criminal war with Soviet Russia.

Conscious of its responsibility for the fate of the Russian working masses and anxious to prevent the new and countless disasters, sacrifices, and devastation threatening the two nations:

1. The Council of People's Commissars declares that the policy of the RSFSR towards Poland is based not on any accidental, transient, or diplomatic considerations, but on the inviolable principle of national self-determination, that it has unconditionally recognized and recognizes without any reservation the independence and sovereignty of the Polish Republic and that this recognition has from the first moment of the formation of the independent Polish State been the basis of all its relations with Poland.

2. While affirming that the last peace proposal of 22 December (1919), made by the Council of People's Commissars, which entertains no aggressive intentions whatever, declares that the Red Armies will not cross the present line on the White-Russian front, passing near the following points: Drissa, Disna, Polotsk, Borisov, Parichi, and the Ptich and Belokorovich railway stations. As regards the Ukrainian front, the Council of People's Commissars declares in its own name and in the name of the provisional Ukrainian Government that the Soviet armies will not engage in military operations to the west of the present line, running near Chudnov, Pilyava, Derazhnia and Bar.
3. The Council of People's Commissars declares that the Soviet Government has not entered into any agreements or pacts, with Germany or with any other country, aimed directly or indirectly against Poland, and that the character and spirit of the Soviet Government's foreign policy preclude the very possibility of such agreements, or of any attempt to exploit a possible conflict between Poland and Germany or Poland and other countries to infringe Poland's independence and its territorial integrity.
4. The Council of People's Commissars declares that in so far as the essential interests of Poland and Russia are concerned there is not a single question, territorial, economic, or other, that might not be settled peacefully, by negotiation, mutual concessions, and agreement, as is now being done in the negotiations with Estonia.

While instructing the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to request from the forthcoming session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in February a formal ratification by the supreme organ of the Republic of Soviet policy towards Poland as here stated, the Council of People's Commissars considers on its part that by this categorical declaration it is fulfilling its duty towards the Russian and Polish nations' interest in peace, and hopes that all questions in dispute will be settled by agreements between Russia and Poland concluded in a spirit of good-neighbourliness.

Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, Vol. 1, pp. 179-180.



COMPULSORY LABOR

29 January 1920

By this decree the Soviet government established the militarization of labor approved in earlier Communist Party decisions—See especially 22 January above. A committee to implement this, known as Glavkomtrud (Main Committee on Labor), was established soon afterwards.

DECREE OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS ON COMPULSORY LABOR

Taking its stand on the Fundamental Law of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Code of Labor Laws, which require that those capable of working be drawn into socially useful work, in the interests of the socialist society, the Soviet of People's Commissars has resolved to introduce the following measures for the purpose of securing in the shortest possible time the required labor for industry, agriculture, transport, and other branches of the national economy:

1. In conformity with [the principle of] compulsory labor to enact the following:

- a. To call upon the entire working population to perform, in addition to their normal occupations, various kinds of compulsory labor, of an occasional or regular nature, such as procurement of fuel, agricultural work (both in state farms and sometimes in peasant farms), construction work, road repair, snow clearing, hauling, and so forth. (*Note:* In the performance of the above duties, livestock and vehicles are also subject to mobilization if this is found necessary.)
 - b. To utilize Red Army and Navy units for the purpose of work.
 - c. To withdraw skilled workers from the army and to transfer workers from agriculture and *kustar* [handicraft] enterprises to work in state enterprises, institutions, and other economic establishments.
 - d. To enlist persons without regular occupations into useful public work.
 - e. To reallocate the available labor in accordance with requirements.
 2. The Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense is charged with the general direction of compulsory labor measures.
 3. [The Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense] is to establish a central committee of universal compulsory labor [*Glavkomtrud*] which is to be subordinate to the Council of Defense and which is to include representatives of the People's Commissariat of Labor, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, and the People's Commissariat of War. In the provinces there should be established *Guberniya*, *Uezd*, and—if necessary—City Committees on Compulsory Labor. These are to be subordinate to the corresponding Executive Committees [of Soviets] and are to include representatives of the Commissariat of War, the Administrative Section [of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs], and the Labor Section [of the Commissariat of Labor].
 4. The Council of Defense is charged with the duty of proclaiming mobilizations for compulsory labor, which have an all-national significance, and which are listed in paragraph 1 of the present decree. The Council of Defense should also empower the *Guberniya* Executive Committees, the City Executive Committees, and the *Uezd* Executive Committees to proclaim mobilizations for compulsory labor for local needs and in accordance with special instructions of the Central Committee on Compulsory Labor.
- Note:* Orders issued by the Council of Defense, as well as orders of the Executive Committees, are published locally in the form of orders of the *Guberniya*, City, or *Uezd* Committees on Compulsory Labor.
- 5A. *Guberniya*, City, and *Uezd* Committees [of Compulsory Labor] are authorized to hand over to the People's Court those guilty of:
 - a. Evading registration for and appearance to perform compulsory labor;
 - b. Deserting from work, as well as inciting others to do likewise;
 - c. Using false documents, as well as fabricating such documents for the purpose of evading compulsory labor;
 - d. Supplying, in official capacity, deliberately false information for the same purpose;
 - e. Damaging tools and materials deliberately;
 - f. Organizing work carelessly and using mobilized labor unproductively;
 - g. Complying in the above acts and concealing those guilty.
 - 5B. In especially malicious cases and in cases of repeated offenses the Committees on Compulsory Labor have the right to hand over the culprits for trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal.
 - 5C. In cases of minor infractions of labor discipline the Committees on Compulsory Labor have the right to punish the offenders—by assigning them to punitive labor units or imprisoning them for periods of not longer than one week, by decision of the *Uezd* Committee, and for two weeks by decision of the *Guberniya* Committee.

SOLVING THE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM

1 February 1920

The following memorandum from Lenin to Trotsky about transportation problems illustrates the tendency of the Bolshevik leaders, and Lenin especially, to resort to what would later be called "storming" tactics in solving a particular problem even though they might have negative consequences for other parts of the economy or society. This approach, so common during the early years of the regime under Lenin, became standard in the Stalin era.

CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL
OF WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' DEFENCE
OF THE R.S.F.S.R.

Copy of Copy
Moscow, Kremlin
1.2.1920
No. a-1610

To: Moscow-Comrade Trotsky.

The situation with regard to railway transport is quite catastrophic. Grain supplies no longer get through. Genuine emergency measures are required to save the position. For a period of two months (February-March) measures of the following kind must be put into force (as well as devising other measures too of a comparable kind):

I. The individual bread ration *is to be reduced* for those not engaged on transport work; and *increased* for those engaged on it.

Even if thousands more perish, the country will be saved.

II. Three quarters of the senior Party workers from all departments, except the Commissariats of Supply and of Military Affairs, are to be drafted to railway transport and maintenance work for these two months. The work of the other Commissariats is correspondingly to stop (or to be cut down tenfold) for these two months.

III. Within a 30-50 verst wide zone along each side of the railway lines military law is to be introduced for the purpose of conscripting labour for clearing the tracks; and three quarters of the senior Party workers from the volost' and *uezd* executive committees of the corresponding regions are to be transferred to the volost's in this area.

Chairman of the Council of Defense
V. Ulianov (Lenin)

Meijer, *The Trotsky Papers*, Vol. 2, p. 23.



ELECTION RULES, MOSCOW SOVIET

9 February 1920

Rules published in the newspaper of the Moscow Soviet included many provisions special to the era: voting primarily by place or type of work, unequal representation, open—i.e. not secret ballot—voting, and categories of excluded people. Also noteworthy is the short time required for notice of elections—twenty-four hours.

RULES FOR THE ELECTION OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET
Sanctioned by the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet on
9 February 1920

I. THE RIGHT TO VOTE.

The right to vote and to be elected to the Soviet independently of sex, religion, nationality and domicile, is possessed by every citizen, aged eighteen, earning his living by productive and socially useful work and not employing others with a view to deriving benefit from their work, such as:

1. Workers and employees in factories, industrial and municipal establishments and railways of the Moscow region;
2. Soldiers of the Red Army and policemen of Moscow;
3. Workers in the building and transport trades;
4. Workers and employees in hospitals and medical institutions (doctors, nurses, servants, etc.);
5. House workers (porters, furnacemen, servants, firemen, plumbers);
6. Employees in Soviet institutions and in business establishments;
7. People engaged in education, the arts and literature.

Note. Those who are deprived of this right by the 65th article of the Constitution of the Russian Federative Soviet Socialist Republic are:

- (a) People employing the work of others with a view to deriving benefit there from;
- (b) People living on a revenue which is not earned by their personal work, such as interest from capital, rents, business revenues, etc.;
- (c) Tradesmen and commercial agents;
- (d) Monks and priests of every religion;
- (e) Employees and agents of the former Police, special Corps of Gendarmerie and Secret Service, and the members of the family which has reigned in Russia;
- (f) People recognised by due process as mad or idiotic and people who are under wardship;
- (g) People condemned for infamous crimes and misdemeanours.

II. ELECTORAL PROCEDURE

1. Elections are conducted under the direction and control of the Central Electoral Commission, appointed by the Moscow Soviet, and one of the five Members of the Local Electoral Commissions is appointed by the Executive Committees of the Local Soviets.
2. Elections are conducted in the factories, industrial, municipal, and railway enterprises, Trade Unions, and Red Army units by General Meetings called by the Factory Committees, Boards of Trade Unions, Commissars of the Army units and by Special Electoral Meetings called by the Central or Local Electoral Commissions.
3. The election day is announced:
 - (a) In factories and enterprises by a Special Notice fixed at least 24 hours before the Elections; and
 - (b) In Trade Unions by the announcement in the newspapers at least three days beforehand.
4. The Election Day must be announced at least 24 hours beforehand by the Central and Local Electoral Commission.
5. Electoral Meetings are valid when at least one-third of the electors are present. If this cannot be obtained, a second meeting is called, which is considered as valid whatever be the number of electors present.
6. Electors vote for Lists of Candidates, which must be announced at least 24 hours beforehand. These Lists of Candidates are presented by groups of electors to the Factory Committees or Trade Unions.
7. Records of the proceedings of the Elections must be taken and sent to the Local Electoral Commission signed and sealed by the Factory Committee, or the Military Commissar, or the Chairman and Secretary of the Meeting.

8. Candidates who have secured the majority of votes are considered as elected to the Moscow Soviet.
9. Voting is open.

III. REPRESENTATION

1. Workers and employees of factories, railways, tramways, electricity, sewage, water-works, hospitals, ambulances elect their representatives at the place where they are working in the following proportion: Enterprises where there are from 100-500 workers: one representative; over 500 workers: one representative for every 500 workers.
2. Transport workers elect at their respective garages, parks, offices. *Note.* Enterprises where there are less than 100 workers combine in order to be able to elect a member to the Moscow Soviet.
3. House and building workers, firemen, artisans elect at Special Election Meetings called by the Local Electoral Commissions, one representative for each 500 persons present at the meeting.
4. Soviet employees, clerks, business employees, people working in education, the arts and literature elect at their respective Trade Unions at Special Electoral Meetings one representative for every 500 persons present at the meeting.
5. The Moscow Council of Trade Unions sends to the Soviet one representative from every 5,000 members.
6. Trade Unions enrolled in the Moscow Council of Trade Unions and having not less than 2,000 members elect two representatives to the Soviet.
7. Army units counting from 100 to 500 soldiers elect one representative; over 500—one from every 500. A fraction of over 200 enables to have an additional representative [This in original-R.W.].

British Labour Delegation to Russia, 1920, *Report*, pp. 58-59.



ONE MAN VERSUS COLLEGIAL MANAGEMENT

31 March 1920

Part of the ongoing debate about economic organization and the trade unions—one involving important ideological as well as economic issues—was the question of whether factories should be administered by a single head or collegially. The trade unions and many others supported the latter while Lenin and some other Party leaders campaigned for individual management. This speech by Lenin at the 9th Party Congress not only advanced his arguments in favor of individual management but related it to several of his other guiding principles: the importance of leadership and discipline, the importance of a new ruling class learning from the old—an argument he used in the cultural sphere as well—the importance of “transmission belts” from the Party leadership to the population, and others. Lenin was successful and the Congress’s resolution on 5 April unequivocally stated that the collegiate approach must give way to “full and unconditional one-man control.” Because Lenin’s speech occurred in the context of ongoing debates at the Congress, it opened with refutations of comments made by other speakers, but quickly moved to the main issue.

[Speech of V. I. Lenin]

Comrades, first two brief remarks. Comrade Sapronov continued to accuse me of forgetfulness, but the question he raised he left unexplained. He continued to assure us that the

flax requisitioning decree is a violation of the decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. I maintain that you cannot hurl unsupported accusations, very serious accusations, at a Party Congress in that way. Of course, if the Council of People's Commissars has violated a decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee it should be put on trial. But how is it that from February 10 to this day no complaint has been received that this decree is a violation? All we get is an absolutely unsupported accusation of the sort that are handed out easily enough, but such methods of fighting are not to be taken seriously.

Comrade Milyutin says that there are practically no points of difference between us, and that therefore it looks as if Lenin opposes squabbling and himself provokes this squabble. But Comrade Milyutin is distorting things somewhat, which he ought not to do. The first draft of the resolution, compiled by Comrade Trotsky, was then edited corporately in the Central Committee. We sent this draft to Comrades Milyutin and Rykov. They returned it with the statement that they would give battle on it. This is what actually happened. After we had developed agitation and obtained allies, they organised an all-round opposition at the Congress; and it was only when they saw that nothing would come of it that they began to say they were almost in agreement. That is so, of course; but you must carry it through to the end and admit that your agreement means that you failed completely after the opposition came forward here and tried to consolidate itself on the issue of corporate management. Only after Comrade Milyutin had spoken for fifteen minutes, and his time was up, did it occur to him that it would be well to put the matter on a practical footing. He was quite right there. But I am afraid it is too late; although Comrade Rykov has still to close the discussion, the opposition cannot be saved. If the advocates of corporate management had during the past two months practised what they preached, if they had given us even a single example—not by saying there is a certain director and an assistant, but by an inquiry promoting a detailed investigation of the problem, comparing corporate management with individual management as was decided by the Congress of Economic Councils and by the Central Committee— we would have been much the wiser; at the Congress we would then have had something more than not very relevant discussions of principle, and the advocates of corporate management might have furthered matters. Their position would have been a strong one if they could have produced even ten factories with similar conditions managed on the corporate principle and compared them in a practical manner with the state of affairs in factories with similar conditions, but managed on the individual principle. We could have allowed any speaker an hour for such a report, and he would have furthered matters considerably. We might perhaps have established practical gradations in this question of corporate management. But the whole point is that none of them, neither the Economic Council members nor the trade unionists, who should have had practical data at their disposal, gave us anything, because they had nothing to give. They have nothing, absolutely nothing!

Comrade Rykov objected here that I want to remake the French Revolution, that I deny that the bourgeoisie grew up within the feudal system. That is not what I said. What I said was that when the bourgeoisie replaced the feudal system they took the feudal lords and learned from them how to administer; and this in no way contradicts the fact that the bourgeoisie grew up within the feudal system. And as for my thesis that, after it has seized power, the working class begins to put its principles into effect, nobody, absolutely nobody, has refuted it. After it has seized power, the working class maintains it, preserves it and consolidates it as every other class does, namely, by a change of property relations and by a new constitution. That is my first and fundamental thesis; and it is incontrovertible. My second thesis that every new class learns from its predecessor and takes over administrators from the old class, is also an absolute truth. And, lastly, my third thesis is that the working class must increase the number of administrators from its own ranks, establish schools, and train executives on a nation-wide scale. These three theses are indisputable, and they fundamentally contradict the theses of the trade unions.

At the meeting of the group, when we examined their theses, and when Comrade Bukharin and I were defeated, I told Comrade Tomsy that article 7 in the theses is the result of complete theoretical confusion. It says:

"The basic structural principle of the regulation and management of industry, the only one that can ensure the participation of broad masses of non-party workers through the trade unions, is the existing principle of corporate management of industry, from the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council down to the factory managements. Only in special cases, and by mutual agreement between the Presidiums of the Supreme Economic Council and the All-Russian Central Trade Union Council, or the Central Committees of the trade unions concerned, should one-man management be permitted in certain enterprises, but only on the obligatory condition that control be exercised over the administrators by the trade unions and their bodies."

This is sheer nonsense, because everything—the role of the working class in winning state power, the interrelation of methods—everything is muddled! Such things cannot be tolerated. Such things drag us back theoretically. The same must be said of the democratic centralism of Comrades Sapronov, Maximovsky and Osinsky. Comrade Osinsky forgets that when he comes forward and claims that I call democratic centralism nonsense. You cannot distort things in that way! What has the question of appointments, of endorsement by local organisations, got to do with it? You can have things endorsed by collegiums and you can also appoint collegiums. That has nothing to do with the case. They say that democratic centralism consists not only in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee ruling, but in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee ruling through the local organisations. What has corporate management or individual management got to do with it?

Comrade Trotsky recalled his report made in 1918 and, reading the speech he then made, pointed out that at that time not only did we argue about fundamental questions but a definite decision was taken by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. I dug up my old pamphlet *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government*, which I had completely forgotten, and find that the question of individual management was not only raised but even approved in the theses of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. We work in such a way that we forget not only what we ourselves have written but even what has been decided by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and subsequently dig up these decisions. Here are some passages from this pamphlet.

"Those who deliberately (although most of them probably do not realise it) promote petty-bourgeois laxity would like to see in this granting of 'unlimited' (i.e., dictatorial) powers to individuals a departure from the collegiate principle, from democracy and from the principles of Soviet government. Here and there, among Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, a positively hooligan agitation, i.e., agitation appealing to the base instincts and to the small proprietor's urge to 'grab all he can,' has been developed against the dictatorship decree....[all ellipses are Lenin's-ed.].

"Large-scale machine industry—which is precisely the material source, the productive source, the foundation of socialism—calls for absolute and strict *unity of will*, which directs the joint labours of hundreds, thousands and tens of thousand of people. The technical, economic and historical necessity of this is obvious, and all those who have thought about socialism have always regarded it as one of the conditions of socialism" ...this is the only way in which "strict unity of will can be ensured....

"But be that as it may, *unquestioning subordination* to a single will is absolutely necessary for the success of processes organised on the pattern of large-scale machine industry. On the railways it is twice and three times as necessary....

"And our whole task, the task of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which is the class-conscious vehicle of the strivings of the exploited for emancipation, is to appreciate this change, to understand that it is necessary, to stand at the head of the exhausted people who

are wearily seeking a way out and lead them along the true path, along the path of labour discipline, along the path of co-ordinating the task of arguing at mass meetings *about* the conditions of work with the task of unquestioningly obeying the will of the Soviet leader, of the dictator, *during* the work....

"It required precisely the October victory of the working people over the exploiters, it required a whole historical period in which the working people themselves could first of all discuss the new conditions of life and the new tasks, in order to make possible the durable transition to superior forms of labour discipline, to the conscious appreciation of the necessity for the dictatorship of the proletariat, to unquestioning obedience to the orders of individual representatives of the Soviet government during the work....

"We must learn to combine the 'public meeting' democracy of the working people—turbulent, surging, overflowing its banks like a spring flood—with *iron* discipline while at work, with *unquestioning obedience* to the will of a single person, the Soviet leader, while at work."

On April 29, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution fully endorsing the basic propositions set forth in this report and instructed its Presidium to recast them as theses representing the principal tasks of the Soviet government. We are thus reiterating what was approved two years ago in an official resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee! And we are now being dragged back on a matter that was decided long ago, a matter which the All-Russian Central Executive Committee endorsed and explained, namely, that Soviet socialist democracy and individual management and dictatorship are in no way contradictory, and that the will of a class may sometimes be carried out by a dictator, who sometimes does more alone and is frequently more necessary. At any rate, the attitude towards the principles of corporate management and individual management was not only explained long ago, but was even endorsed by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In this connection our Congress is an illustration of the sad truth that instead of advancing from the explanation of questions of principle to concrete questions, we are advancing backward. Unless we get away from this mistake we shall never solve the economic problem.

I should also like to say a few words about certain remarks of Comrade Rykov's. He asserts that the Council of People's Commissars is putting obstacles in the way of the amalgamation of the commissariats running the economy. And when Comrade Rykov is told that he wants to swallow up Comrade Tsyurupa, he replies, "I don't care if it is Tsyurupa that swallows me up, as long as the economic commissariats are amalgamated." I know where this leads, and I must say that the attempt of the Supreme Economic Council to form a sort of separate bloc of the economic commissariats, separate from the Council of Defence and the Council of People's Commissars, did not pass unnoticed by the Central Committee, and met with disfavour. The Council of Defence has now been renamed the Council of Labour and Defence. You want to separate yourselves from the Commissariat of the Army, which is giving its best forces to the war and is an institution without which you cannot even carry out labour conscription. And we cannot carry out labour conscription without the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs either. Take the post office; we cannot send a letter without the Commissariat of Posts and Telegraphs. Take the People's Commissariat of Health. How will you conduct the economy if seventy percent are down with typhus? What it amounts to is that every matter must be co-ordinated and referred to an economic commissariat. Is not such a plan absolutely absurd? Comrade Rykov had no serious argument. That is why it was opposed and the Central Committee did not support it.

Further, Comrade Rykov joked about a bloc with Comrade Holtzmann, which Comrade Trotsky seems to be forming. I should like to say a few words on this. A bloc is always needed between Party groups that are in the right. That should always be regarded as an

essential condition for a correct policy. If Comrade Holtzmann, whom, I regret to say, I know very little, but of whom I have heard as a representative of a certain trend among the metalworkers, a trend that particularly insists on sensible methods—which I stress in my theses, too—if it is on these grounds that he insists on individual management, that, of course, can only be extremely useful. A bloc with this trend would be an exceedingly good thing. If the representation of the trade unions on the Central Committee is to be increased, it would be useful to have on it representatives of this trend too—though it may be wrong on certain points, it is at least original and has a definite shade of opinion of its own—side by side with the extremist champions of corporate management who are battling in the name of democracy but who are mistaken. Let them both be represented on the Central Committee—and you will have a bloc. Let the Central Committee be so constituted that, with the help of a bloc, a field of operation may be found that functions all the year round, and not only during the week a Party Congress is held. We have always rejected the principle of regional representation, because it leads to a lot of regional cliquism. When it is a question of closer fusion with the trade unions, of being alive to every shade of opinion in the trade unions, of maintaining contacts—it is essential for the Central Committee to be constituted in such a way as to have a transmission belt to the broad masses of the trade unions (we have 600,000 Party members and 3,000,000 trade union members) to connect the Central Committee simultaneously with the united will of the 600,000 Party members and the 3,000,000 trade union members. We cannot govern without such a transmission belt. The more we won back of Siberia, the Kuban area and the Ukraine, with their peasant population, the more difficult the problem became, and the more laboriously the machine revolved, because in Siberia the proletariat is numerically small, and it is weaker in the Ukraine too. But we know that the Donets Basin and Nikolayev workers have bluntly refused to defend the semi-demagogic corporate principle into which Comrade Sapronov has lapsed. There can be no question but that the proletarian element in the Ukraine differs from the proletarian element in Petrograd, Moscow and Ivanovo-Voznesensk—not because it is no good, but for purely historical reasons. They did not have occasion to become so steeled by hunger, cold and strife as the proletarians of Moscow and Petrograd. We therefore need such a bond with the trade unions, such a form of organisation of the Central Committee, as would enable it to know every shade of opinion, not only among the 600,000 Party members, but also among the 3,000,000 trade union members, so that it may be able at any moment to lead them all as one man! Such an organisation is essential. That is the basic factor, the political factor without which the dictatorship of the proletariat will not be a dictatorship. If we are to have a bloc, let it be a real bloc! We should not be afraid of it, but should welcome it and practise it more vigorously and more extensively right in the central institutions of the Party.

Lenin, Vol. 30, pp. 472-479.



TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY

31 March 1920

The policies of labor mobilization pursued by the Communist Party in 1920 met widespread opposition within and without the party. The Mensheviks—still maintaining a precarious legality and a foothold in some unions and soviets—put this resolution forward at the Third

Trade Union Congress. Its critique of the then current labor policies, especially forced labor, reflected the opinion of many disillusioned workers and foreshadowed the Workers' Opposition movement within the Communist Party—see below. Compare to the Communist Party resolution in the next document.

[Menshevik Resolution on Trade Unions]

1. The Trade Unions in a capitalistic society are the fighting organs of the working class. Their direct task is the defence of the general interests of the Proletariat as the class of hired workers, as well as the defence of the special interests of its different spheres in the domain of the organisation of Labour and its defence from exploitation. Their class collaboration with Socialist Parties as the political organisation of the Proletariat makes them at the same time essential factors in the struggle for the radical rebuilding of society on collectivist principles through the capturing of political power by the working classes.

2. At the time when the reign of capitalism is breaking up, in the era of the transformation of capitalistic industry into Socialism, the Trade Unions, by means of maintaining in its full force their important position as independent class organisations, and as representatives of the interests of workers of different trades and professions, and of all the working classes in general, must at the same time play an active part in the reorganisation of the social and economic forms of industry and in the management of public property.

3. At the beginning of the International Social Revolution, all the problems presented to the Russian Proletariat must be guided principally by the struggle for keeping political power in the hands of the working classes under the hegemony of the Proletariat, and forwarding all measures that help to restore national industry, destroyed by the imperialistic and civil war, and to imbue it as much as possible with Socialist ideas.

4. The fulfilment of this problem is complicated and hindered by the bad state of public economy, resulting from continuous disorders. The social inferiority of modern Russia, the prevailing part played by the peasantry in economic public life, reinforced by the decay of industry, and, consequently, by the economic weakness of the Proletariat as a result of the continuous economic disorder, unavoidably lead to the adaption of revolutionary power to the interests of the peasantry, which often enough do not coincide at all with the interests of the Proletariat. This adaption is inevitable, as all revolutionary policy tends through suppression of the peasantry to defend the rights of the Proletariat solely, and would lead only to anarchy, the prolongation of war and the deepening of general delay and disorder. Such an adaptation of revolutionary policy to peasant interests makes the maintenance of independent class organization essentially necessary for the Proletariat.

5. The international situation of Russia, its economic inferiority, the great devastation caused by the war during the last five years, all compel the country to concede the claims of Foreign Powers and to accept the intrusion of large capitalistic industry in the guise of concessions. Under that form of economic relationship, class antagonism between Labour and Capital, and the economic class struggle between them, will always exist with the State being restricted by international connections in the matter of the defence of proletarian interests. Along with the intrusion of foreign capital there will be a growing adaptation of Russian private capital, to which the organs of State power have applied rather often at the present time. Finally, the extreme growth of private, small, and home industry, accompanying the disappearance of large industry now confined to national property, creates groups of hired workers whose interests stand in need of defence by the Trade Unions.

6. At the same time, the present economic policy of the Soviets, based solely on the tendency to resolve all economic problems through compulsory measures and bureaucratic administration, weakens still more the Proletariat engaged in large industrial undertakings. From this point of view, the Proletariat stands in great need of strong and independent

Trade organisations. The class independence of the Trade Unions does not mean either the neutrality of the Unions towards Capitalism and Socialism, or the neutrality of the Unions towards Capitalism and Socialism, or their neutrality towards the Socialist (the Soviet) Government in its struggle against Counter-Revolution and in its attempts to renew economic life on a socialistic basis. On the contrary, the Trade Unions by all means must be on the side of the Soviets in their fight against Counter-Revolution and Capital. The class independence of the Trade Unions means only that in the sphere of their special activity they are neither subordinate organs of the Government nor organisations dependent on the Socialist Party. It means only that the Unions pursuing their work with Socialistic class consciousness are able to defend before the Government the interests of the Proletariat quite independently from the views of the Government itself, and will express only the will of the organised Proletariat.

7. The policy of "Subordination to the State" exercised during the last two years, has led to the complete decay of the Trade Union Movement. The forced membership, the financial dependency on the State, the execution of the plans of the Government's chief organs, have killed the independent activity of the masses organised into Unions, deprived these Unions of their independence and energy, and transformed them into bureaucratic institutions with an indefinite circle of duties forcibly fixed by the Government.

8. The Trade Unions will only be able to accomplish their task of the defence and strengthening of the social and political position of the Proletariat if they take an active part in the development of the productivity of labour, in the revival of industry, and in the improvement of the efficiency of labour. The Trade Unions will not be able to achieve all this if they countenance the proposed labour discipline or if they fail to raise to its highest point their defence of labour and social welfare.

9. But this problem of the development of productive energy, the improvement of efficiency and labour discipline, cannot be resolved through the plans which the present Government is defending. The Government sees in the so-called Dictatorship and in Militarisation the only means of struggling with the decay of industry. The Trade Unions must reject these as plans which keep the working classes from exerting their influences on the organisation of industry and the inner arrangement of works and factories. The Trade Unions must defend the necessity for the most active participation of the working classes in the organisation and the direction of industry. This must be realized through the introduction of representatives of the Trade Unions—elected by their organisations and responsible before them—to all the organs directing industry as a whole as well as its different branches, different industrial territories, and large undertakings. Such participation is quite compatible with the transfer of technical administration of undertakings to single persons and with investing them with necessary independence.

If the part taken by representatives of the Trade Unions in the direction of industry should really lead to improved efficiency of labour and help all the working classes to take their share in the leading of economic life, our Unions, as the whole experiment of the Russian Soviets has shown, must keep their character as independent class organisations, based on the independence of the masses, and having the freedom necessary for their activity. Otherwise, the part taken by some of the representatives of the Unions on the Central Committees and other organs of economic administration will by no means serve as a guarantee against their bureaucratic degeneration.

10. Even if we do not deny in principle the Obligatory Work System as a means which, in case of need, the State can use in its struggle against industrial decay, we cannot agree that the State at this moment has no other means for rebuilding industry than the always inefficient obligatory work. Therefore, the mobilisation of the whole mass of simple workers, and still more the mobilisation of special working forces, could be accepted only in

those cases when all other means are already exhausted or when some catastrophic situation renders other measures impossible. We must look for these other means before such a complete change in the general direction of economic policy takes place. First of all, in public instruction, even at the price of great financial sacrifice by the State; in increased elementary stocks for the organisation of work in such branches of industry and in undertakings that are the most important at the present moment; as well as in the radical reform of the loans system, and in the adaption of salaries in the chief branches of industry to at least that minimum which will give to the workers the necessary means of existence. At the same time the Mobilisation of Labour should be carried on, when it is really necessary, only with the active help and under the control of the Trade Unions.

The Militarisation of Labour must, therefore, be decisively rejected as a method which unites extreme inefficiency of obligatory work with a great waste of working power and elementary stocks, deprives the worker of every possibility whatever of defending his lawful interests, and prevents the Trade Unions from performing their part in the organisation of national economy and in increasing labour efficiency.

11. The freedom of election to Boards of Administration and Works Committees, a regular system of representation at the Trade Unions Congresses and freedom of opinion for the Opposition, are necessary conditions for the normal development of the Trade Union Movement and the accomplishment of the problems presented to it. The creation of these conditions for the growth of a healthy Trade Union Movement demands the suppression of Political Terror, the abolition of privileges for the ruling Party, the establishment of Freedom of Speech, Press and Meetings for all the workers, the liquidation of the Party Dictatorship and the full observance of the Soviet Constitution as first steps to the establishment of real power of working classes.

British Delegation to Russia, 1920, *Report*, pp. 80-82, with modifications.



THE PARTY AND THE TRADE UNIONS

1 April 1920

The problem of the Communist Party's relationship to, and control of, the trade unions was a major preoccupation of the leadership in 1920 and 1921. It was the source of major debates within the party, the trade unions, the state, and the Communist International. It also was an issue for Communist parties elsewhere, although the terms were different. This resolution of the Ninth Party Congress emphatically stated that the unions were "not an independent organized power, but...one of the principal parts of the apparatus of the Soviet State guided by the Communist Party." Compare to the Menshevik resolution in the preceding document and see other documents on the unions and workers in this volume.

ON THE QUESTION OF THE TRADE UNIONS AND THEIR ORGANIZATION

I. *The general situation and the general tasks of the trade unions in the epoch of the proletarian dictatorship.*

Under the dictatorship of the proletariat the trade unions cease being organs which struggle against the capitalist ruling class as sellers of labour and are converted into the

apparatus of working-class rulers. The tasks of the trade unions are principally organizational-economic and educational. The trade unions must carry out these tasks not as a self-contained and organizationally isolated force but as one of the fundamental apparatuses of the Soviet state, guided by the Communist Party. Only this condition will ensure the maximum stability of the whole system of the proletarian dictatorship as well as maximum productivity.

II. *The Trade Unions and the Soviet State*

1. The Soviet state is an extremely variegated and all-encompassing form of workers' organization which is in practice building communism and involving ever-broader masses of the peasantry in this work. On the other hand, the Soviet state is a workers' organization which has at its disposal all the material instruments of compulsion. Being a proletarian dictatorship, the Soviet state is a lever of economic revolution. Therefore, there can be no possibility of any opposition between the trade unions and the organs of Soviet power.
2. Politics is the most concentrated expression of economics, its generalization, and its culmination. Therefore, any opposition between the trade unions, as the economic organization of the working class, and the soviets, as its political organization, is completely absurd and is a deviation from marxism in the direction of bourgeois—specifically, bourgeois trade unionist prejudices. Such an opposition is especially absurd and harmful in the epoch of the proletarian dictatorship when its whole struggle, its whole activity—both economic and political—must be unified more than ever before, must be concentrated and directed by a single will, bound together in an iron unity.
3. As a school of communism and a link between the vanguard of the proletariat, the Communist Party, and the most backward masses of the proletariat, those who are not yet entirely free of the old shop and trade union narrow-mindedness, the trade unions must educate, organize culturally, politically, and administratively, must raise these masses to the communist level and train them for the role of creators of the communist order which the Soviet state is bringing into being. In this the trade unions act as the historically determined form of the proletarian dictatorship.
4. Therefore, the first requirement is for a closer tie between the Soviet apparatus and the trade union apparatus. Since the Soviet power is the broadest possible organization and one which concentrates the whole social power of the proletariat, it is clear that with the expansion of communist consciousness and of the creative role of the masses, the trade unions must be gradually converted into auxiliary organs of the proletarian state, and not the other way around.
5. By adopting this course the trade unions will fulfil their most important function, the economic-administrative function, entering the Soviet organizations and saturating them, in this way becoming increasingly the foundation of Soviet economic apparatuses.

III. *The Trade Unions and the Communist Party*

1. The Communist Party is the organization of the vanguard of the working class, the leader of the proletarian movement and of the struggle for a communist order.
2. The party exerts its influence on the broad non-party strata of toilers through the communist fractions and cells in all other worker organizations, especially in the trade unions. The dictatorship of the proletariat and the building of socialism are ensured only to the extent that the trade unions, while formally remaining non-party, become communist in their essence and carry out Communist Party policy.
3. Therefore, each trade union must contain a disciplined and organized communist fraction. Each party fraction is a part of a local organization and subordinated to a party committee, while the fraction in the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions is subordinated to the Central Committee of the RKP. All decrees of the All-Russian Central Trade Union Council relating to the conditions and organization of work are binding on all trade

union organizations and on party members working in them and may not be repealed by any party organs other than the party Central Committee. The local committees, while entirely responsible for directing the ideological work of the trade unions, must in no way resort to petty tutelage over them. The relations between local party committees and trade union fractions are regulated precisely by the appropriate paragraphs of the party Rules.

IV. The Forms of Trade Union Participation in the Economic Apparatus of the Proletarian State

1. Since the trade unions organize the workers according to major production branches, and are thereby directly connected with production, and therefore extremely competent organizations in each production branch they form the underlying foundation of the economic organizations which direct industry.

2. This is manifested in the fact that the trade unions, without being an isolated organization and in no way being the complete and exclusive directors of the economy of the Soviet republic, none the less participate from top to bottom in the organization of production. However, no trade union organization interferes directly in the functioning of enterprises.

3. The lowest-level trade union cell is the factory committee. Without interfering in the administration of the enterprise, the factory committee fulfills the following functions: it helps to improve labour discipline and to this end uses all measures up to comradesly courts of discipline; in addition to general propaganda, it conducts propaganda for productive labour; it involves the workers in workers' inspection; it trains the workers and interests them in understanding the role of the factory (through reports and speeches, etc.); it helps in the selection of worker administrators, watches over the activities of rates and conflicts commissions, etc.

4. The trade unions participate in the factory administration by forming such administrations by agreement with the appropriate organs of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. In this the electoral principle yields to that of selection on the basis of the candidate's practical experience, technical competence, firmness, organizational capacity, and business sense.

5. The raion administrations and factory administrations consist of persons appointed by agreement between the central committee of the corresponding union, on the one hand, and the board of the glavk [central board] and the centre on the other, or (in the case of direct subordination to the Supreme Council of the National Economy) by agreement with the latter's presidium and with its final sanction.

6. The boards (presidia) of guberniia councils on the economy are appointed by agreement between the guberniia trade union council and the guberniia executive committee; the glavks and centres are appointed by agreement between the trade union central committee and the corresponding section of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. Finally, the latter itself, inasmuch as candidates to its presidium are appointed by the congress of economic councils, is formed with the very intimate participation of the trade unions.

7. Other leading economic organizations such as, for example, those in charge of the mobilization, distribution, registration, and protection of labour (Labour glavk and others) are formed in a similar way.

Thus, in all links of the industrial administration and in the national economic administration generally, the trade unions have a particularly important role, one which will steadily increase with the rising level of the working class as a whole.

V. Current Tasks of the Trade Unions

1. The defeat of the white armies and the peaceful construction efforts required by the unbelievably catastrophic condition of the economy demand an entirely unprecedented

concentration of the forces of the proletariat and the involvement of the broad peasant masses in social labour. Therefore, all apparatuses of the trade unions must take part in this intense and excessively difficult struggle for economic regeneration.

2. Accordingly, the methods and themes of trade union work must be radically changed. If the proletariat, as a class, is being confronted with the task of adopting the system of 'war work,' i.e., one of maximum accuracy, effectiveness, responsibility, rapidity, and intensity, together with selflessness and self-sacrifice on the part of the workers, then this must above all apply to the organs of industrial administration in general and, consequently, of the trade unions.

3. Like the guiding proletarian party, the trade unions must reorganize their own apparatus, first of all eliminating all remnants of slovenliness and introducing discipline and the strictest business spirit as well as complete accountability for the fulfilment of every assignment.

4. The trade unions must assume the task of explaining to broad working-class circles the full necessity of restructuring the apparatus of industrial administration, making it more elastic and businesslike; this can be attained only by a maximum reduction in the numbers of boards of administration and by the gradual introduction of direct one-man administration of production units.

In this agitation it is necessary to give special prominence to the following points:

a one-man management cannot be counterpoised to worker management; on the contrary, the most economic and widespread exercise of worker management requires one-man management, since a given number of worker-administrators is spread, in this case, over a large number of factories;

b one-man management in no way violates or limits either the rights of class or the 'rights' of the trade unions, for a class can rule in any suitable form whatever, and the form is determined by technical expediency; in each case, the ruling class as a whole 'appoints' the people who direct and administer;

c one-man management presupposes selection of competent people and assures a maximum of businesslike and responsible arrangements;

d one-man management, even in cases where a specialist is in charge, is in the final analysis a manifestation of the proletarian dictatorship, which not only sees to it that work proceeds along specific lines, but also exercises supervision in the form of worker commissars;

e one-man management does not rule out the enlistment of the broad worker masses in the concerns of management; it simply distinguishes the functions of immediate management from those of training, which latter should comprise an entirely separate branch of activity and a separate moment. On the other hand, it is completely incorrect to enlist the masses in management in the form of joint management bodies composed of three or five persons.

5. One of the particularly important tasks of the trade unions is to train the officers' corps of our industry from among the workers, i.e., the question of technical vocational training. Enlisting the broad working masses in this effort, training them, labour propaganda, etc., remain in the forefront, for without a solution of these tasks labour can not move forward, and without such an advance a rebirth of our country's economic life on socialist principles is impossible.

6. The Congress believes that today, more than ever before, the party must devote the most serious attention to strengthening trade unions, and above all to reinforcing their staffs with infusions of the most devoted and steadfast Communists, and preferably those who have been through the stern school of the Civil War. The party must give a resolute rebuff to all attempts whatsoever to reduce to nothing the role and importance of the trade unions.

MOBILIZATION OF WORKERS—THE MINE WORKERS

16 April 1920

The transformation of military units into labor armies was accompanied by frequent mobilization decrees which effectively drafted workers and former workers in a given field into assigned factories or mines. The following decree is typical. Bunyan, pp. 163-64, has compiled a list of twenty mobilization decrees in 1920, ranging from "Former Railway Workers" (30 January) to "Mobilization of Tailors and Shoemakers Who Worked in Great Britain and the United States" (October 1920).

DECREE OF THE COUNCIL OF LABOR AND DEFENSE

ABOUT THE MOBILIZATION OF MINE WORKERS

In connection with the liberation of the mining regions of the Republic and because of the acute shortage of skilled miners, the Council of Labor and Defense, by way of supplementing the *Sovnarkom* decree of 13 October 1919, relating to the mobilization of the mining-technical forces, herewith resolves:

1. Persons between the ages of eighteen and fifty who have worked in the mining industry declared mobilized.

Note: The registration of those subject to mobilization, as defined in the present paragraph, is in charge of the Subsections of Registration and Distribution of the Labor Force of the Department of Labor. The procedures to be followed are those provided in the *Sovnarkom* decree of 26 February 1920, relating to specialists in the petroleum industry.

2. Assignment of the mobilized workers to their places of work is the responsibility of the Section of Registration and Distribution of the Labor Force of the People's Commissariat of Labor, of the Commissariat of Social Insurance, in consultation with the Mining Council of the Supreme Council of National Economy, acting through the corresponding subsections of Accounting and Distribution of the Labor Force.
3. Petitions from mobilized persons, as given in paragraph one, to remain in their previous place of work, working not in their own specialization, are not to be approved.
4. Mobilized individuals who are subject to assignments by the Department of Registration and Distribution of the Labor Force of the Commissariat of Labor and the Commissariat of Social Insurance are sent with transportation documents by the Subsection of Registration and Distribution of the Labor Force to the War Commissariat to provide them with food, while on route to their destination, on the same general basis as Red Army commanders.
5. Responsible managers of enterprises, institutions, and establishments guilty of concealing or failing to report individuals in their service who were mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this decree are to be handed over to the court on charges of concealing deserters.
6. Individuals indicated in Paragraph 1 of this decree, who are in active military service in the Red Army or in rear institutions of the military establishment, are to be placed immediately at the disposal of the Mining Council of the Supreme Council of National Economy.
7. This decree goes into effect by telegraph.

Bunyan, *The Origins of Forced Labor*, pp. 160-161, and *Sobranie zakononii i rasporiazhenii*, No. 7, Article 132 (21 April 1920).



"LEFT-WING" COMMUNISM—AN INFANTILE DISORDER
APRIL 1920

This document, one of Lenin's most important writings, has been called his equivalent of Marx's Communist Manifesto or—perhaps more accurately—of Machiavelli's The Prince. The flavor and purpose is caught by the draft subtitle which termed it a "Popular Discussion of Marxist Strategy and Tactics." Here Lenin, along with the omnipresent polemical purposes, attempted to distill the essential lessons of the history of Bolshevism into fundamental principles applicable to Communist movements everywhere. He opened with an assertion of the universal significance and applicability of the Russian revolutionary experience and especially that of the Bolsheviks, including the "historical inevitability of a repetition on an international scale of what has taken place in Russia." This and a number of other themes were related to debates going on in the Communist International and to the effort of Lenin and the Bolsheviks to shape the latter into an instrument which reflected their views. Indeed, the work was written just before the Second Congress of the Comintern and was distributed in pamphlet form to the delegates. Certain issues before the Comintern, therefore, dominate the work. Much of the pamphlet is concerned with the question of cooperation with and working within various organizations such as trade unions and parliaments. Lenin not only insisted upon the importance of doing so—and thus the scathing attacks on "infantile" leftists who objected to such—but attempted to explain when, why, and under what circumstances Communists should cooperate or participate in such institutions and what they should try to accomplish. He argued vigorously for the necessity to engage in stratagems, subterfuges, and a willingness to use any tactic which would advance the end objective. In doing so Lenin laid out the lessons of the Bolshevik experience in a form which, in effect, made them basic rules for Communist behavior internationally. The Second Congress of the Comintern, in its resolutions, affirmed Lenin's positions on these issues. Written in April 1920 and printed as a pamphlet, it went through later printings which included various postscripts by Lenin; these were concerned mostly with minor adjustments or reevaluations of the internal affairs of various foreign parties and are not included here. Within passages quoted by Lenin there are frequent ellipses and interpolations in brackets; these are by Lenin unless otherwise indicated. There are a few deletions by the editor in the main text, which are clearly marked, but because of its importance, most of this lengthy pamphlet is given here.

V.I. Lenin

'Left-Wing' Communism—An Infantile Disorder

I

IN WHAT SENSE WE CAN SPEAK
OF THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

In the first months after the proletariat in Russia had won political power (October 25 [November 7], 1917), it might have seemed that the enormous difference between backward Russia and the advanced countries of Western Europe would lead to the proletarian revolution in the latter countries bearing very little resemblance to ours. We now possess quite considerable international experience, which shows very definitely that certain fundamental features of our revolution have a significance that is not local, or peculiarly national, or Russian alone, but international. I am not speaking here of international significance in the broad sense of the term: not merely several but all the primary features of our

revolution, and many of its secondary features, are of international significance in the meaning of its effect on all countries. I am speaking of it in the narrowest sense of the word, taking international significance to mean the international validity or the historical inevitability of a repetition, on an international scale, of what has taken place in our country. It must be admitted that certain fundamental features of our revolution do possess that significance.

It would, of course, be grossly erroneous to exaggerate this truth and to extend it beyond certain fundamental features of our revolution. It would also be erroneous to lose sight of the fact that, soon after the victory of the proletarian revolution in at least one of the advanced countries, a sharp change will probably come about: Russia will cease to be the model and will once again become a backward country (in the "Soviet" and the socialist sense).

At the present moment in history, however, it is the Russian model that reveals to *all* countries something—and something highly significant—of their near and inevitable future. Advanced workers in all lands have long realised this; more often than not, they have grasped it with their revolutionary class instinct rather than realised it. Herein lies the international "significance" (in the narrow sense of the word) of Soviet power, and the fundamentals of Bolshevik theory and tactics. The "revolutionary" leaders of the Second International, such as Kautsky in Germany and Otto Bauer and Friedrich Adler in Austria, have failed to understand this, which is why they have proved to be reactionaries and advocates of the worst kind of opportunism and social treachery.

II

AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION OF THE BOLSHEVIKS' SUCCESS

It is, I think, almost universally realised at present that the Bolsheviks could not have retained power for two and a half months, let alone two and a half years, without the most rigorous and truly iron discipline in our Party, or without the fullest and unreserved support from the entire mass of the working class, that is, from all thinking, honest, devoted and influential elements in it, capable of leading the backward strata or carrying the latter along with them.

The dictatorship of the proletariat means a most determined and most ruthless war waged by the new class against a *more powerful* enemy, the bourgeoisie, whose resistance is increased *tenfold* by their overthrow (even if only in a single country), and whose power lies, not only in the strength of international capital, the strength and durability of their international capital, the strength and durability of their international connections, but also in the *force of habit*, in the strength of *small-scale production*. Unfortunately, small-scale production is still widespread in the world, and small-scale production *engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale. All these reasons make the dictatorship of the proletariat necessary, and victory over the bourgeoisie is impossible without a long, stubborn and desperate life-and-death struggle which calls for tenacity, discipline, and a single and inflexible will.

I repeat: the experience of the victorious dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia has clearly shown even to those who are incapable of thinking or have had no occasion to give thought to the matter that absolute centralisation and rigorous discipline in the proletariat are an essential condition of victory over the bourgeoisie.

This is often dwelt on. However, not nearly enough thought is given to what it means, and under what conditions it is possible. Would it not be better if the salutations addressed to the Soviets and the Bolsheviks were *more frequently* accompanied by a *profound analysis* of the reasons *why* the Bolsheviks have been able to build up the discipline needed by the revolutionary proletariat?

As a current of political thought and as a political party, Bolshevism has existed since 1903. Only the history of Bolshevism during the *entire* period of its existence can satisfactorily explain why it has been able to build up and maintain, under most difficult conditions, the iron discipline needed for the victory of the proletariat.

The first questions to arise are: how is the discipline of the proletariat's revolutionary party maintained? How is it tested? How is it reinforced? First, by the class-consciousness of the proletarian vanguard and by its devotion to the revolution, by its ability to link up, maintain the closest contact, and—if you wish—merge, in certain measure, with the broadest masses of the working people—primarily with the proletariat, *but also with the non-proletarian* masses of working people. Third, by the correctness of the political leadership exercised by this vanguard, by the correctness of its political strategy and tactics, provided the broad masses have seen, *from their own experience*, that they are correct. Without these conditions, discipline in a revolutionary party really capable of being the party of the advanced class, whose mission it is to overthrow the bourgeoisie and transform the whole of society, cannot be achieved. Without these conditions, all attempts to establish discipline inevitably fall flat and end up in phrase-mongering and clowning. On the other hand, these conditions cannot emerge at once. They are created only by prolonged effort and hard-won experience. Their creation is facilitated by a correct revolutionary theory, which, in its turn, is not a dogma, but assumes final shape only in close connection with the practical activity of a truly mass and truly revolutionary movement.

The fact that, in 1917-20, Bolshevism was able, under unprecedentedly difficult conditions, to build up and successfully maintain the strictest centralisation and iron discipline was due simply to a number of historical peculiarities of Russia.

On the one hand, Bolshevism arose in 1902 on a very firm foundation of Marxist theory. The correctness of this revolutionary theory, and of it alone, has been proved, not only by world experience throughout the nineteenth century, but especially by the experience of the seekings and vacillations, the errors and disappointments of revolutionary thought in Russia. For about half a century—approximately from the forties to the nineties of the last century—progressive thought in Russia, oppressed by a most brutal and reactionary tsarism, sought eagerly for a correct revolutionary theory, and followed with the utmost diligence and thoroughness each and every “last word” in this sphere in Europe and America. Russia achieved Marxism—the only correct revolutionary theory—through the *agony* she experienced in the course of half a century of unparalleled torment and sacrifice, of unparalleled revolutionary heroism, incredible energy, devoted searching, study, practical trial, disappointment, verification, and comparison with European experience. Thanks to the political emigration caused by tsarism, revolutionary Russia, in the second half of the nineteenth century, acquired a wealth of international links and excellent information on the forms and theories of the world revolutionary movement, such as no other country possessed.

On the other hand, Bolshevism, which had arisen on this granite foundation of theory, went through fifteen years of practical history (1903-17) unequalled anywhere in the world in its wealth of experience. During those fifteen years, no other country knew anything even approximating to that revolutionary experience, that rapid and varied succession of different forms of the movement—legal and illegal, peaceful and stormy, underground and open, local circles and mass movements, and parliamentary and terrorist forms. In no other country has there been concentrated, in so brief a period, such a wealth of forms, shades, and methods of struggle of *all* classes of modern society, a struggle which, owing to the backwardness of the country and the severity of the tsarist yoke, matured with exceptional rapidity, and assimilated most eagerly and successfully the appropriate “last word” of American and European political experience.

III THE PRINCIPAL STAGES IN THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM

[This section is a general history of Bolshevism and attacks on various groups and individuals, ed.]

IV THE STRUGGLE AGAINST WHICH ENEMIES WITHIN THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT HELPED BOLSHEVISM DEVELOP, GAIN STRENGTH, AND BECOME STEELED

First and foremost, the struggle against opportunism, which in 1914 definitely developed into social-chauvinism and definitely sided with the bourgeoisie, against the proletariat. Naturally, this was Bolshevism's principal enemy within the working-class movement. It still remains the principal enemy on an international scale. The Bolsheviks have been devoting the greatest attention to this enemy. This aspect of Bolshevik activities is now fairly well known abroad too.

It was, however, different with Bolshevism's other enemy within the working-class movement. Little is known in other countries of the fact that Bolshevism took shape, developed and became steeled in the long years of struggle against *petty-bourgeois revolutionism*, which smacks of anarchism, or borrows something from the latter and, in all essential matters, does not measure up to the conditions and requirements of a consistently proletarian class struggle....

The conclusion is clear: to reject compromises "on principle," to reject the permissibility of compromises in general, no matter of what kind, is childishness, which it is difficult even to consider seriously. A political leader who desires to be useful to the revolutionary proletariat must be able to distinguish *concrete* cases of compromises that are inexcusable and are an expression of opportunism and *treachery*; he must direct all the force of criticism, the full intensity of merciless exposure and relentless war, against *these concrete* compromises, and not allow the past masters of "practical" socialism and the parliamentary Jesuits to dodge and wriggle out of responsibility by means of disquisitions on "compromises in general." It is in this way that the "leaders" of the British trade unions, as well as of the Fabian society and the "Independent" Labour Party, dodge responsibility *for the treachery they have perpetrated*, for having made a *compromise* that is really tantamount to the worst kind of opportunism, treachery, and betrayal.

There are different kinds of compromises. One must be able to analyse the situation and the concrete conditions of each compromise, or of each variety of compromise. One must learn to distinguish between a man who has given up his money and fire-arms to bandits so as to lessen the evil they can do and to facilitate their capture and execution, and a man who gives his money and fire-arms to bandits so as to share in the loot. In politics this is by no means always as elementary as it is in this childishly simple example. However, anyone who is out to think up for the workers some kind of recipe that will provide them with cut-and-dried solutions for all contingencies, or promises that the policy of the revolutionary proletariat will never come up against difficult or complex situations, is simply a charlatan.

To leave no room for misinterpretation, I shall attempt to outline, if only very briefly, several fundamental rules for the analysis of concrete compromises.

The party which entered into a compromise with the German imperialists by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had been evolving its internationalism in practice ever since the end of 1914. It was not afraid to call for the defeat of the tsarist monarchy and to condemn

"defence of country" in a war between two imperialist robbers. The parliamentary representatives of this party preferred exile in Siberia to taking a road leading to ministerial portfolios in a bourgeois government. The revolution that overthrew tsarism and established a democratic republic put this party to a new and tremendous test—it did not enter into any agreements with its "own" imperialists, but prepared and brought about their overthrow. When it had assumed political power, this party did not leave a vestige of either landed or capitalist ownership. After making public and repudiating the imperialists' secret treaties, this party proposed peace to *all* nations, and yielded to the violence of the Brest-Litovsk robbers only after the Anglo-French imperialists had torpedoed the conclusion of a peace, and after the Bolsheviks had done everything humanly possible to hasten the revolution in Germany and other countries. The absolute correctness of this compromise, entered into by such a party in such a situation, is becoming ever clearer and more obvious with every day.

The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia (like all the leaders of the Second International throughout the world, in 1914-20) began with treachery—by directly or indirectly justifying "defence of country", i.e., the defence of *their own* country, and fighting, together with *their own* bourgeoisie, against the revolutionary proletariat of their own country. Their bloc, first with Kerensky and the Cadets, and then with Kolchak and Denikin in Russia—like the bloc of *their confreres* abroad with the bourgeoisie, against the proletariat. From beginning to end, *their* compromise with the bandits of imperialism meant their becoming *accomplices* in imperialist banditry.

V

"LEFT-WING" COMMUNISM IN GERMANY.

THE LEADERS, THE PARTY, THE CLASS, THE MASSES

The German Communists we must now speak of call themselves, not "Left-wingers" but, if I am not mistaken, an "opposition on principle." From what follows below it will, however, be seen that they reveal all the symptoms of the "infantile disorder of Leftism."

Published by the "local group in Frankfurt am Main", a pamphlet reflecting the point of view of this opposition, and entitled *The Split in the Communist Party of Germany (The Spartacus League)*, sets forth the substance of this opposition's views most saliently, and with the utmost clarity and concision. A few quotations will suffice to acquaint the reader with that substance:

"The Communist Party is the party of the most determined class struggle..."

"...Politically, the transitional period [between capitalism and socialism]: is one of the proletarian dictatorship...."

"...The question arises: who is to exercise this dictatorship: *the Communist Party or the proletarian class?* ... *Fundamentally*, should we strive for a dictatorship of the Communist Party, or for a dictatorship of the proletarian class?..." (All italics as in the original.)

The author of the pamphlet goes on to accuse the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany of seeking ways of achieving a *coalition with the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany*, and of raising "*the question of recognising, in principle, all political means*" of struggle, including parliamentarianism, with the sole purpose of concealing its actual and main efforts to form a coalition with the Independents. The pamphlet goes on to say:

"The opposition have chosen another road. They are of the opinion that the question of the rule of the Communist Party and of the dictatorship of the Party is merely one of tactics. In any case, rule by the Communist Party is the ultimate form of any party rule. *Fundamentally*, we must work for the dictatorship of the proletarian class. And all the measures of the Party, its organisations, methods of struggle, strategy and tactics should be directed to that end. Accordingly, all compromise with other parties, all reversion to parliamentary

forms of struggle, which have become historically and politically obsolete, and any policy of manoeuvring and compromise must be emphatically rejected." "Specifically proletarian methods of revolutionary struggle must be strongly emphasised. New forms of organisation must be created on the widest basis and with the widest scope in order to enlist the most extensive proletarian circles and strata to take part in the revolutionary struggle under the leadership of the Communist Party. A *Workers' Union*, based on factory organisations, should be the rallying point for all revolutionary elements. This should unite all workers who follow the slogan: 'Get out of the trade unions!' It is here that the militant proletariat musters its ranks for battle. Recognition of the class struggle, of the Soviet system and of the dictatorship should be sufficient for enrolment. All subsequent political education of the fighting masses and their political orientation in the struggle are the task of the Communist Party, which stands outside the Workers' Union....

"...Consequently, two Communist parties are now arrayed against each other:

"*One is a party of leaders*, which is out to organise the revolutionary struggle and to direct it from *above*, accepting compromises and parliamentarianism so as to create a situation enabling it to join a coalition government exercising a dictatorship.

"*The other is a mass party*, which expects an upsurge of the revolutionary struggle from *below*, which knows and applies a single method in this struggle—a method which clearly leads to the goal—and rejects all parliamentary and opportunist methods. That single method is the unconditional *overthrow of the bourgeoisie*, so as then to set up the proletarian class dictatorship for the accomplishment of socialism....

"... There—the dictatorship of leaders; here—the dictatorship of the masses! That is our slogan."

Such are the main features characterising the views of the opposition in the German Communist Party.

Any Bolshevik who has consciously participated in the development of Bolshevism since 1903 or has closely observed that development will at once say, after reading these arguments, "What old and familiar rubbish! What 'Left-wing' childishness!"

But let us examine these arguments a little more closely.

The mere presentation of the question—"dictatorship of the party *or* dictatorship of the class; dictatorship (party) of the leaders, *or* dictatorship (party) of the masses?"—testifies to most incredibly and hopelessly muddled thinking. These people want to *invent* something quite out of the ordinary, and, in their effort to be clever, make themselves ridiculous. It is common knowledge that the masses are divided into classes; that the masses can be contrasted with classes only by contrasting the vast majority in general, regardless of division according to status in the social system of production, with categories holding a definite status in the social system of production; that as a rule and in most cases—at least in present-day civilised countries—classes are led by political parties; that political parties, as a general rule, are run by more or less stable groups composed of the most authoritative, influential and experienced members, who are elected to the most responsible positions, and are called leaders. All this is elementary. All this is clear and simple. Why replace this with some kind of rigmarole, some new Volapük? On the one hand, these people seem to have got muddled when they found themselves in a predicament, when the party's abrupt transition from legality to illegality upset the customary, normal and simple relations between leaders, parties and classes. In Germany, as in other European countries, people had become too accustomed to legality, to the free and proper election of "leaders" at regular party congresses, to the convenient method of testing the class composition of parties through parliamentary elections, mass meetings, the press, the sentiments of the trade unions and other associations, etc. When, instead of this customary procedure, it became necessary, because of the stormy development of the revolution and the development of the civil war, to go over rapidly from legality to illegality, to combine the two, and to adopt the "inconvenient" and "undemocratic" methods of selecting, or forming, or preserving

"groups of leaders"—people lost their bearings and began to think up some unmitigated nonsense. Certain members of the Communist Party of Holland, who were unlucky enough to be born in a small country with traditions and conditions of highly privileged and highly stable legality, and who had never seen a transition from legality to illegality, probably fell into confusion, lost their heads, and helped create these absurd inventions.

On the other hand, one can see simply a thoughtless and incoherent use of the new "fashionable" terms: "masses" and "leaders." These people have heard and memorised a great many attacks on "leaders," in which the latter have been contrasted with the "masses;" however, they have proved unable to think matters out and gain a clear understanding of what it was all about.

The divergence between "leaders" and "masses" was brought out with particular clarity and sharpness in all countries at the end of the imperialist war and following it. The principal reason for this was explained many times by Marx and Engels between the years 1852 and 1892, from the example of Britain. That country's exclusive position led to the emergence, from the "masses," of a semi-petty-bourgeois, opportunist "labour aristocracy." The leaders of this labour aristocracy were constantly going over to the bourgeoisie, and were directly or indirectly on its pay roll. Marx earned the honour of incurring the hatred of these disreputable persons by openly branding them as traitors. Present-day (twentieth-century) imperialism has given a few advanced countries an exceptionally privileged position, which, everywhere in the Second International, has produced a certain type of traitor, opportunist, and social-chauvinist leaders, who champion the interests of their own craft, their own section of the labour aristocracy. The opportunist parties have become separated from the "masses," i.e., from the broadest strata of the working people, their majority, the lowest-paid workers. The revolutionary proletariat cannot be victorious unless this evil is combated, unless the opportunist, social-traitor leaders are exposed, discredited and expelled. That is the policy the Third International has embarked on.

To go so far, in this connection, as to contrast, *in general*, the dictatorship of the masses with a dictatorship of the leaders is ridiculously absurd, and stupid. What is particularly amusing is that, in fact, instead of the old leaders, who hold generally accepted views on simple matters, *new leaders* are brought forth (under cover of the slogan "*down with the leaders!*") *who talk rank stuff and nonsense. Such are Laufenberg, Wolffheim, Horner, Karl Schroder, Friedrich Wendel and Karl Erler...in Germany. Erler's attempts to give the question more "profundity" and to proclaim that in general political parties are unnecessary and "bourgeois" are so supremely absurd that one can only shrug one's shoulders. It all goes to drive home the truth that a minor error can always assume monstrous proportions if it is persisted in, if profound justifications are sought for it, and if it is carried to its logical conclusion.*

Repudiation of the Party principle and of Party discipline—that is what the opposition has arrived at. And this is tantamount to completely disarming the proletariat in the interests of the bourgeoisie. It all adds up to that petty-bourgeois diffuseness and instability, that incapacity for sustained effort, unity and organised action, which, if encouraged, must inevitably destroy any proletarian revolutionary movement. From the standpoint of communism, repudiation of the Party principle means attempting to leap from the eve of capitalism's collapse (in Germany), not to the lower or the intermediate phase of communism, but to the higher. We in Russia (in the third year since the overthrow of the bourgeoisie) are making the first steps in the transition from capitalism to socialism or the lower stage of communism. Classes still remain, and will remain everywhere for years after the proletariat's conquest of power. Perhaps in Britain, where there is no peasantry (but where petty proprietors exist), this period may be shorter. The abolition of classes means, not merely ousting the landowners and the capitalists—that is something we accomplished with comparative ease; it also means abolishing the small commodity producers, and they cannot

be ousted, or crushed; we must learn to live with them. They can (and must) be transformed and re-educated only by means of very prolonged, slow, and cautious organizational work. They surround the proletariat on every side with a petty-bourgeois atmosphere, which permeates and corrupts the proletariat, and constantly causes among the proletariat relapses into petty-bourgeois spinelessness, disunity, individualism, and alternating moods of exaltation and dejection. The strictest centralisation and discipline are required within the political party of the proletariat in order to counteract this, in order that the *organisational* role of the proletariat (and that is its *principal* role) may be exercised correctly, successfully and victoriously. The dictatorship of the proletariat means a persistent struggle—bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative—against the forces and traditions of the old society. The force of habit in millions and tens of millions is a most formidable force. Without a party of iron that has been tempered in the struggle, a party enjoying the confidence of all honest people in the class in question, a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, such a struggle cannot be waged successfully. It is a thousand times easier to vanquish the centralised big bourgeoisie than to “vanquish” the millions upon millions of petty proprietors; however, through their ordinary, everyday, imperceptible, elusive and demoralising activities, they produce the *very* results which the bourgeoisie need and which tend to *restore* the bourgeoisie. Whoever brings about even the slightest weakening of the iron discipline of the party of the proletariat (especially during its dictatorship), is actually aiding the bourgeoisie against the proletariat....

VI

SHOULD REVOLUTIONARIES WORK IN REACTIONARY TRADE UNIONS?

The German “Lefts” consider that, as far as they are concerned, the reply to this question is an unqualified negative. In their opinion, declamations and angry outcries (such as uttered by K. Horner in a particularly “solid” and particularly stupid manner) against “reactionary” and “counter-revolutionary” trade unions are sufficient “proof” that it is unnecessary and even inexcusable for revolutionaries and Communists to work in yellow, social-chauvinist, compromising and counter-revolutionary trade unions of the Legien type.

However firmly the German “Lefts” may be convinced of the revolutionism of such tactics, the latter are in fact fundamentally wrong, and contain nothing but empty phrases.

To make this clear, I shall begin with our own experience, in keeping with the general plan of the present pamphlet, which is aimed at applying to Western Europe whatever is universally practicable, significant and relevant in the history and the present-day tactics of Bolshevism.

In Russia today, the connection between leaders, party, class and masses, as well as the attitude of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its party to the trade unions, are concretely as follows: the dictatorship is exercised by the proletariat organised in the Soviets; the proletariat is guided by the Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which, according to the figures of the latest Party Congress (April 1920), has a membership of 611,000. The membership varied greatly both before and after the October Revolution, and used to be much smaller, even in 1918 and 1919. We are apprehensive of an excessive growth of the Party, because careerists and charlatans, who deserve only to be shot, inevitably do all they can to insinuate themselves into the ranks of the ruling party. The last time we opened wide the doors of the Party—to workers and peasants only—was when (in the winter of 1919) Yudenich was within a few versts of Petrograd and Denikin was in Orel (about 350 versts from Moscow), i.e., when the Soviet Republic was in mortal danger, and when adventurers, careerists, charlatans and unreliable persons generally could not possibly count on making a profitable career (and had more reason to expect the gallows and torture) by

joining the Communists. The Party, which holds annual congresses (the most recent on the basis of one delegate per 1,000 members), is directed by a Central Committee of nineteen elected at the Congress, while the current work in Moscow has to be carried on by still smaller bodies, known as the Organising Bureau and the Political Bureau, which are elected at plenary meetings of the Central Committee, five members of the Central Committee to each bureau. This, it would appear, is a full-fledged "oligarchy." No important political or organisational question is decided by any state institution in our republic without the guidance of the Party's Central Committee.

In its work, the Party relies directly on the *trade unions*, which, according to the data of the last congress (April 1920), now have a membership of over four million and are formally *non-Party*. Actually, all the directing bodies of the vast majority of the unions, and primarily, of course, of the all-Russia general trade union centre or bureau (the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions), are made up of Communists and carry out all the directives of the Party. Thus, on the whole, we have a formally non-communist, flexible and relatively wide and very powerful proletarian apparatus, by means of which the Party is closely linked up with the *class* and the *masses*, and by means of which, under the leadership of the Party, the *class dictatorship* is exercised. Without close contacts with the trade unions, and without their energetic support and devoted efforts, not only in economic, *but also in military* affairs, it would of course have been impossible for us to govern the country and to maintain the dictatorship for two and a half months, let alone two and a half years. In practice, these very close contacts naturally call for highly complex and diversified work in the form of propaganda, agitation, timely and frequent conferences, not only with the leading trade union workers, but with influential trade union workers generally; they call for a determined struggle against the Mensheviks, who still have a certain though very small following to whom they teach all kinds of counter-revolutionary machinations, ranging from an ideological defence of (*bourgeois*) democracy and the preaching that the trade unions should be "independent" (independent of proletarian state power!) to sabotage of proletarian discipline, etc., etc.

We consider that contacts with the "masses" through the trade unions are not enough. In the course of our revolution, practical activities have given rise to such institutions as *non-Party workers' and peasants' conferences*, and we strive by every means to support, develop and extend this institution in order to be able to observe the temper of the masses, come closer to them, meet their requirements, promote the best among them to state posts, etc. Under a recent decree on the transformation of the People's Commissariat of State Control into the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, non-Party conferences of this kind have been empowered to select members of the State Control to carry out various kinds of investigations, etc.

Then, of course, all the work of the Party is carried on through the Soviets, which embrace the working masses, irrespective of occupation. The district congresses of Soviets are *democratic* institutions, the like of which even the best of the democratic republics of the bourgeois world have never known; through these congresses (whose proceedings the Party endeavours to follow with the closest attention), as well as by continually appointing class-conscious workers to various posts in the rural districts, the proletariat exercises its role of leader of the peasantry, gives effect to the dictatorship of the urban proletariat, wages a systematic struggle against the rich, bourgeois, exploiting and profiteering peasantry, etc.

Such is the general mechanism of the proletarian state power viewed "from above," from the standpoint of the practical implementation of the dictatorship. We hope that the reader will understand why the Russian Bolshevik, who has known this mechanism for

twenty-five years and has seen it develop out of small, illegal and underground circles, cannot help regarding all this talk about "from above" or "from below," about the dictatorship of leaders or the dictatorship of the masses, etc., as ridiculous and childish nonsense, something like discussing whether a man's left leg or right arm is of greater use to him.

We cannot but regard as equally ridiculous and childish nonsense the pompous, very learned, and frightfully revolutionary disquisitions of the German Lefts to the effect that Communists cannot and should not work in reactionary trade unions, that it is permissible to turn down such work, that it is necessary to withdraw from the trade unions and create a brand-new and immaculate "Workers' Union" invented by very pleasant (and, probably, for the most part very youthful) Communists, etc., etc.

Capitalism inevitably leaves socialism the legacy, on the one hand, of the old trade and craft distinctions among the workers, distinctions evolved in the course of centuries; on the other hand, trade unions, which only very slowly, in the course of years and years, can and will develop into broader industrial unions with less of the craft union about them (embracing entire industries, and not only crafts, trades and occupations), and later proceed, through these industrial unions, to eliminate the division of labour among people, to educate and school people, give them *all-round development and an all-round training*, so that they are *able to do everything*. Communism is advancing and must advance towards that goal, and *will reach it*, but only after very many years. To attempt in practice, today, to anticipate this future result of a fully developed, fully stabilised and constituted, fully comprehensive and mature communism would be like trying to teach higher mathematics to a child of four.

We can (and must) begin to build socialism, not with abstract human material, or with human material specially prepared by us, but with the human material bequeathed to us by capitalism. True, that is no easy matter, but no other approach to this task is serious enough to warrant discussion.

The trade unions were a tremendous step forward for the working class in the early days of capitalist development, inasmuch as they marked a transition from the workers' disunity and helplessness to the *rudiments* of class organisation. Then the *revolutionary part of the proletariat*, the *highest* form of proletarian class organisation, began to take shape (and the Party will not merit the name until it learns to weld the leaders into one indivisible whole with the class and the masses) the trade unions inevitably began to reveal *certain* reactionary features, a certain craft narrow-mindedness, a certain tendency to be non-political, a certain inertness, etc. However, the development of the proletariat did not, and could not, proceed anywhere in the world otherwise than through the trade unions, through reciprocal action between them and the party of the working class. The proletariat's conquest of political power is a gigantic step forward for the proletariat as a class, and the Party must more than ever and in a new way, not only in the old, educate and guide the trade unions, at the same time bearing in mind that they are and will long remain an indispensable "school of communism" and a preparatory school that trains proletarians to exercise their dictatorship, an indispensable organisation of the workers for the gradual transfer of the management of the whole economic life in the country to the working class (and not to the separate trades), and later to all the working people.

In the sense mentioned above, a *certain* "reactionism" in the trade unions is *inevitable* under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Not to understand this means a complete failure to understand the fundamental conditions of the *transition* from capitalism to socialism. It would be egregious folly to fear *this* "reactionism" or to try to *evade* or leap over it, for it would mean fearing that function of the proletarian vanguard which consists in training, educating, enlightening and drawing into the new life the most backward strata and masses of the working class and the peasantry. On the other hand, it would be a still graver error

to postpone the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat until a time when there will not be a single worker with a narrow-minded craft outlook, or with craft and craft-union prejudices. The art of politics (and the Communist's correct understanding of his tasks) consists in correctly gauging the conditions and the moment when the vanguard of the proletariat can successfully assume power, when it is able—during and after the seizure of power—to win adequate support from sufficiently broad strata of the working class and of the non-proletarian working masses, and when it is able thereafter to maintain, consolidate and extend its rule by educating, training and attracting ever broader masses of the working people.

Further, in countries more advanced than Russia, a certain reactionism in the trade unions has been and was bound to be manifested in a far greater measure than in our country. Our Mensheviks found support in the trade unions (and to some extent still do so in a small number of unions), as a result of the latter's craft narrow-mindedness, craft selfishness and opportunism. The Mensheviks of the West have acquired a much firmer footing in the trade unions; there the *craft-union, narrow-minded, selfish, case-hardened, covetous, and petty-bourgeois "labour aristocracy," imperialist-minded, and imperialist-corrupted*, has developed into a much stronger section than in our country. That is incontestable. The struggle against the Gomperses, and against the Jouhaux, Hendersons, Merrheims, Legiens and Co. in Western Europe is much more difficult than the struggle against our Mensheviks, who are an *absolutely homogeneous* social and political type. This struggle must be waged ruthlessly, and it must unfailingly be brought—as we brought it—to a point when all the incorrigible leaders of opportunism and social-chauvinism are completely discredited and driven out of the trade unions. Political power cannot be captured (and the attempt to capture it should not be made) until the struggle has reached a *certain* stage. This "certain stage" will be *different* in different countries and in different circumstances; it can be correctly gauged only by thoughtful, experienced and knowledgeable political leaders of the proletariat in each particular country. (In Russia the elections to the Constituent Assembly in November 1917, a few days after the proletarian revolution of October 25, 1917, were one of the criteria of the success of this struggle. In these elections the Mensheviks were utterly defeated; they received 700,000 votes—1,300,000 if the vote in Transcaucasia is added—as against 9,000,000 votes polled by the Bolsheviks. See my article, "The Constituent Assembly Elections and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," in the *Communist International* No. 7-8).

We are waging a struggle against the "labour aristocracy" in the name of the masses of the workers and in order to win them over to our side; we are waging the struggle against the opportunist and social-chauvinist leaders in order to win the working class over to our side. It would be absurd to forget this most elementary and most self-evident truth. Yet it is this very absurdity that the German "Left" Communists perpetrate when, *because* of the reactionary and counter-revolutionary character of the trade union *top leadership*, they jump to the conclusion that ...[elipses in original—ed.] we must withdraw from the trade unions, refuse to work in them, and create new and *artificial* forms of labour organisation! This is so unpardonable a blunder that it is tantamount to the greatest service Communists could render the bourgeoisie. Like all the opportunist, social-chauvinist, and Kautskyite trade union leaders, our Mensheviks are nothing but "agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement" (as we have always said the Mensheviks are), or "labour lieutenants of the capitalist class," to use the splendid and profoundly true expression of the followers of Daniel DeLeon in America. To refuse to work in the reactionary trade unions means leaving the insufficiently developed or backward masses of workers under the influence of the reactionary leaders, the agents of the bourgeoisie, the labour aristocrats, or "workers who have become completely bourgeois" (cf. Engels's letter to Marx in 1858 about the British workers).

This ridiculous "theory" that Communists should not work in reactionary trade unions reveals with the utmost clarity the frivolous attitude of the "Left" Communists towards the question of influencing the "masses," and their misuse of clamour about the "masses." If you want to help the "masses" and win the sympathy and support of the "masses," you should not fear difficulties, or pinpricks, chicanery, insults and persecution from the "leaders" (who, being opportunists and social-chauvinists, are in most cases directly or indirectly connected with the bourgeoisie and the police), but must absolutely *work wherever the masses are to be found*. You must be capable of any sacrifice, of overcoming the greatest obstacles, in order to carry on agitation and propaganda systematically, perseveringly, persistently and patiently in those institutions, societies and associations—even the most reactionary—in which proletarian or semi-proletarian masses are to be found. The trade unions and the workers' co-operatives (the latter sometimes, at least) are the very organisations in which the masses are to be found. According to figures quoted in the Swedish paper *Folkets Dagblad Politiken* of March 10, 1920, the trade union membership in Great Britain increased from 5,500,000 at the end of 1917 to 6,600,000 at the end of 1918, an increase of 19 per cent. Towards the close of 1919, the membership was estimated at 7,500,000. I have not got the corresponding figures for France and Germany to hand, but absolutely incontestable and generally known facts testify to a rapid rise in the trade union membership in these countries too.

These facts make crystal clear something that is confirmed by thousands of other symptoms, namely, that class-consciousness and the desire for organisation are growing among the proletarian masses, among the rank and file, among the backward elements. Millions of workers in Great Britain, France and Germany are *for the first time* passing from a complete lack of organisation to the elementary, lowest, simplest, and (to those still thoroughly imbued with bourgeois-democratic prejudices) most easily comprehensible form of organisation, namely, the trade unions; yet the revolutionary but imprudent Left Communists stand by, crying out "the masses," "the masses!" but *refusing to work within the trade unions*, on the pretext that they are "reactionary," and invent a brand-new, immaculate little "Workers' Union," which is guiltless of bourgeois-democratic prejudices and innocent of craft or narrow-minded craft-union sins, a union which, they claim, will be (!) a broad organisation. "Recognition of the Soviet system and the dictatorship" will be the *only(!)* condition of membership. (See the passage quoted above.)

It would be hard to imagine any greater ineptitude or greater harm to the revolution than that caused by the "Left" revolutionaries! Why, if we in Russia today, after two and a half years of unprecedented victories over the bourgeoisie of Russia and the Entente, were to make "recognition of the dictatorship" a condition of trade union membership, we would be doing a very foolish thing, damaging our influence among the masses, and helping the Mensheviks. The task devolving on Communists is to *convince* the backward elements, to work *among* them, and not to *fence themselves off* from them with artificial and childishly "Left" slogans.

There can be no doubt that the Gomperses, the Hendersons, the Jouhaux and the Legiens are very grateful to those "Left" revolutionaries who, like the German opposition "on principle" (heaven preserve us from such "principles!"), or like some of the revolutionaries in the American Industrial Workers of the World advocate quitting the reactionary trade unions and refusing to work in them. These men, the "leaders" of opportunism, will no doubt resort to every device of bourgeois diplomacy and to the aid of bourgeois governments, the clergy, the police and the courts, to keep Communists out of the trade unions, oust them by every means, make their work in the trade unions as unpleasant as possible, and insult, bait and persecute them. We must be able to stand up to all this, agree to make any sacrifice, and even—if need be—to resort to various stratagems, artifices and illegal methods, to evasions and subterfuges, as long as we get into the trade unions, remain in

them, and carry on communist work within them at all costs. Under tsarism we had no "legal opportunities" whatsoever until 1905. However, when Zubatov, agent of the secret police, organised Black-Hundred workers' assemblies and workers' societies for the purpose of trapping revolutionaries and combating them, we sent members of our Party to these assemblies and into these societies (I personally remember one of them, Comrade Babushkin, a leading St. Petersburg factory worker, shot by order of the tsar's generals in 1906). They established contacts with the masses, were able to carry on their agitation, and succeeded in wresting workers from the influence of Zubatov's agents.* Of course, in Western Europe, which is imbued with most deep-rooted legalistic, constitutionalist and bourgeois-democratic prejudices, this is more difficult of achievement. However, it can and must be carried out, and systematically at that.

The Executive Committee of the Third International must, in my opinion, positively condemn, and call upon the next congress of the Communist International to condemn both the policy of refusing to work in reactionary trade unions in general (explaining in detail why such refusal is unwise, and what extreme harm it does to the cause of the proletarian revolution) and, in particular, the line of conduct of some members of the Communist Party of Holland, who—whether directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, wholly or partly, it does not matter—have supported this erroneous policy. The Third International must break with the tactics of the Second International; it must not evade or play down points at issue, but must pose them in a straightforward fashion. The whole truth has been put squarely to the "Independents" (the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany); the whole truth must likewise be put squarely to the "Left" Communists.

VII

SHOULD WE PARTICIPATE IN BOURGEOIS PARLIAMENTS?

It is with the utmost contempt—and the utmost levity—that the German "Left" Communists reply to this question in the negative. Their arguments? In the passage quoted above we read:

"...All reversion to parliamentary forms of struggle, which have become historically and politically obsolete, must be emphatically rejected...."

This is said with ridiculous pretentiousness, and is patently wrong. "Reversion" to parliamentarianism, forsooth! Perhaps there is already a Soviet republic in Germany? It does not look like it! How, then, can one speak of "reversion?" Is this not an empty phrase?

Parliamentarianism has become "historically obsolete." That is true in the propaganda sense. However, everybody knows that this is still a far cry from overcoming it in *practice*. Capitalism could have been declared—and with full justice—to be "historically obsolete" many decades ago, but that does not at all remove the need for a very long and very persistent struggle *on the basis* of capitalism. Parliamentarianism is "historically obsolete" from the standpoint of *world history*, i.e., the *era* of bourgeois parliamentarianism is over, and the *era* of the proletarian dictatorship has *begun*. That is incontestable. But world history is counted in decades. Ten or twenty years earlier or later makes no difference when measured with the yardstick of world history; from the standpoint of world history it is a trifle that cannot be considered even approximately. But for that very reason, it is a glaring theoretical error to apply the yardstick of world history to practical politics.

Is parliamentarianism "politically obsolete?" That is quite a different matter. If that were true, the position of the "Lefts" would be a strong one. But it has to be proved by a most

*The Gomperses, Hendersons, Jouhaux and Legiens are nothing but Zubatovs, differing from our Zubatov only in their European garb and polish, and the civilised, refined and democratically suave manner of conducting their despicable policy. [Lenin's note-ed.]

searching analysis, and the "Lefts" do not even know how to approach the matter. In the "Theses on Parliamentarianism," published in the *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International* No. 1, February 1920, and obviously expressing the Dutch-Left or Left-Dutch strivings, the analysis, as we shall see, is also hopelessly poor.

In the first place, contrary to the opinion of such outstanding political leaders as Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, the German "Lefts," as we know, considered parliamentarianism "politically obsolete" even in January 1919. We know that the "Lefts" were mistaken. This fact alone utterly destroys, at a single stroke, the proposition that parliamentarianism is "politically obsolete." It is for the "Lefts" to prove why their error, indisputable at that time, is no longer an error. They do not and cannot produce even a shred of proof. A political party's attitude towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest ways of judging how earnest the party is and how it fulfils *in practice* its obligations towards its *class* and the *working people*. Frankly acknowledging a mistake, ascertaining the reasons for it, analysing the conditions that have led up to it, and thrashing out the means of its rectification—that is the hallmark of a serious party; that is how it should perform its duties, and how it should educate and train its *class*, and then the *masses*. By failing to fulfil this duty and give the utmost attention and consideration to the study of their patent error, the "Lefts" in Germany (and in Holland) have proved that they are not a *party of a class*, but a circle, not a *party of the masses*, but a group of intellectualists and of a few workers who ape the worst features of intellectualism.

Second, in the same pamphlet of the Frankfurt group of "Lefts," which we have already cited in detail, we read:

"... *The millions of workers who still follow the policy of the Centre [the Catholic "Centre" Party] are counter-revolutionary. The rural proletarians provide the legions of counter-revolutionary troops.*" (Page 3 of the pamphlet.)

Everything goes to show that this statement is far too sweeping and exaggerated. But the basic fact set forth here is incontrovertible, and its acknowledgement by the "Lefts" is particularly clear evidence of their mistake. How can one say that "parliamentarianism is politically obsolete," when "millions" and "legions" of *proletarians* are not only still in favour of parliamentarianism in general, but are downright "counter-revolutionary"? It is obvious that parliamentarianism in Germany is *not yet* politically obsolete. It is obvious that the "Lefts" in Germany have mistaken *their* desire, their politico-ideological attitude, for objective reality. That is a most dangerous mistake for revolutionaries to make. In Russia—where, over a particularly long period and in particularly varied forms, the most brutal and savage yoke of tsarism produced revolutionaries of diverse shades, revolutionaries who displayed amazing devotion, enthusiasm, heroism and will power—in Russia we have observed this mistake of the revolutionaries at very close quarters; we have studied it very attentively and have a first-hand knowledge of it; that is why we can also see it especially clearly in others. Parliamentarianism is of course "politically obsolete" to the Communists in Germany; but—and that is the whole point—we must *not* regard what is obsolete *to us* as something obsolete *to a class, to the masses*. Here again we find that the "Lefts" do not know how to reason, do not know how to act as the party of a *class*, as the party of the *masses*. You must not sink to the level of the masses, to the level of the backward strata of the class. That is incontestable. You must tell them the bitter truth. You are in duty bound to call their bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary prejudices what they are—prejudices. But at the same time you must *soberly* follow the *actual* state of the class-consciousness and preparedness of the entire class (not only of its communist vanguard), and of all the *working people* (not only of their advanced elements).

Even if only a fairly large *minority* of the industrial workers, and not "millions" and "legions," follow the lead of the Catholic clergy—and a similar minority of rural workers

follow the landowners and kulaks (*Grossbauern*)—it *undoubtedly* signifies that parliamentarianism in Germany has *not yet* politically outlived itself, that participation in parliamentary elections and in the struggle on the parliamentary rostrum is *obligatory* on the party of the revolutionary proletariat *specifically* for the purpose of educating the backward strata of *its own class*, and for the purpose of awakening and enlightening the undeveloped, downtrodden and ignorant rural *masses*. Whilst you lack the strength to do away with bourgeois parliaments and every other type of reactionary institution, you *must* work within them because *it is there* that you will still find workers who are duped by the priests and stultified by the conditions of rural life; otherwise you risk turning into nothing but windbags.

Third, the "Left" Communists have a great deal to say in praise of us Bolsheviks. One sometimes feels like telling them to praise us less and to try to get a better knowledge of the Bolsheviks' tactics. We took part in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the Russian bourgeois parliament, in September-November 1917. Were our tactics correct or not? If not, then this should be clearly stated and proved, for it is necessary in evolving the correct tactics for international communism. If they were correct, then certain conclusions must be drawn. Of course, there can be no question of placing conditions in Russia on a par with conditions in Western Europe. But as regards the particular question of the meaning of the concept that "parliamentarianism has become politically obsolete," due account should be taken of our experience, for unless concrete experience is taken into account such concepts very easily turn into empty phrases. In September-November 1917, did we, the Russian Bolsheviks, not have *more* right than any Western Communists to consider that parliamentarianism was politically obsolete in Russia? Of course we did, for the point is not whether bourgeois parliaments have existed for a long time or a short time, but how far the masses of the working people are *prepared* (ideologically, politically and practically) to accept the Soviet system and to dissolve the bourgeois-democratic parliament (or allow it to be dissolved). It is an absolutely incontestable and fully established historical fact that, in September-November 1917, the urban working class and the soldiers and peasants of Russia were, because of a number of special conditions, exceptionally well prepared to accept the Soviet system and to disband the most democratic of bourgeois parliaments. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks did *not* boycott the Constituent Assembly, but took part in the elections both before *and after* the proletariat conquered political power. That these elections yielded exceedingly valuable (and to the proletariat, highly useful) political results has, I make bold to hope, been proved by me in the above-mentioned article, which analyses in detail the returns of the elections to the Constituent Assembly in Russia.

The conclusion which follows from this is absolutely incontrovertible: it has been proved that, far from causing harm to the revolutionary proletariat, participation in a bourgeois-democratic parliament, even a few weeks before the victory of a Soviet republic and even *after* such a victory, actually helps that proletariat to *prove* to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be done away with; it *facilitates* their successful dissolution, and *helps* to make bourgeois parliamentarianism "politically obsolete." To ignore this experience, while at the same time claiming affiliation to the Communist *International*, which must work out its tactics internationally (not as narrow or exclusively national tactics, but as international tactics), means committing a gross error and actually abandoning internationalism in deed, while recognising it in word...

VIII

NO COMPROMISES?

...Naive and quite inexperienced people imagine that the permissibility of compromise *in general* is sufficient to obliterate any distinction between opportunism, against which we are waging, and must wage, an unremitting struggle, and revolutionary Marxism, or communism. But if such people do not yet know that in nature and in society *all* distinctions

are fluid and up to a certain point conventional, nothing can help them but lengthy training, education, enlightenment, and political and everyday experience. In the practical questions that arise in the politics of any particular or specific historical moment, it is important to single out those which display the principal type of intolerable and treacherous compromises, such as embody an opportunism that is fatal to the revolutionary class, and to exert all efforts to explain them and combat them. During the 1914-18 imperialist war between two groups of equally predatory countries, social-chauvinism was the principal and fundamental type of opportunism, i.e., support of "defence of country," which in *such* a war was really equivalent to defence of the predatory interest of one's "own" bourgeoisie. After the war, defence of the robber League of Nations, defence of direct or indirect alliances with the bourgeoisie of one's own country against the revolutionary proletariat and the "Soviet" movement, and defence of bourgeois democracy and bourgeois parliamentarianism against "Soviet power" became the principal manifestations of those intolerable and treacherous compromises, whose sum total constituted an opportunism fatal to the revolutionary proletariat and its cause.

"...All compromise with other parties...any policy of manoeuvring and compromise must be emphatically rejected," the German Lefts write in the Frankfurt pamphlet.

It is surprising that, with such views, these Lefts do not emphatically condemn Bolshevism! After all, the German Lefts cannot but know that the entire history of Bolshevism, both before and after the October Revolution, is *full* of instances of changes of tack, conciliatory tactics and compromises with other parties, including bourgeois parties!

To carry on a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie, a war which is a hundred times more difficult, protracted and complex than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states, and to renounce in advance any change of tack, or any utilisation of a conflict of interests (even if temporary) among one's enemies, or any conciliation or compromise with possible allies (even if they are temporary, unstable, vacillating or conditional allies)—is that not ridiculous in the extreme? Is it not like making a difficult ascent of an unexplored and hitherto inaccessible mountain and refusing in advance ever to move in zigzags, ever to retrace one's steps, or ever to abandon a course once selected, and to try others? And yet people so immature and inexperienced (if youth were the explanation, it would not be so bad; young people are preordained to talk such nonsense for a certain period) have met with support—whether direct or indirect, open or covert, whole or partial, it does not matter—from some members of the Communist Party of Holland.

After the first socialist revolution of the proletariat, and the overthrow of the bourgeoisie in some country, the proletariat of that country remains *for a long time weaker* than the bourgeoisie, simply because of the latter's extensive international links, and also because of the spontaneous and continuous restoration and regeneration of capitalism and the bourgeoisie by the small commodity producers of the country which has overthrown the bourgeoisie. The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skilful and *obligatory* use of any, even the smallest, rift between the enemies, any conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, and also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and confidential. Those who do not understand this reveal a failure to understand even the smallest grain of Marxism, of modern scientific socialism *in general*. Those who have not proved *in practice*, over a fairly considerable period of time and in fairly varied political situations, their ability to apply this truth in practice have not yet learned to help the revolutionary class in its struggle to emancipate all toiling humanity from the exploiters. And this applies equally to the period *before* and *after* the proletariat has won political power.

Our theory is not a dogma, but a *guide to action*, said Marx and Engels. The greatest blunder, the greatest crime, committed by such "out-and-out" Marxists as Karl Kautsky,

Otto Bauer, etc., is that they have not understood this and have been unable to apply it at crucial moments of the proletarian revolution. "Political activity is not like the pavement of Nevsky Prospekt" (the well-kept, broad and level pavement of the perfectly straight principal thoroughfare of St. Petersburg), N. G. Chernyshevsky, the great Russian socialist of the pre-Marxist period, used to say. Since Chernyshevsky's time, disregard or forgetfulness of this truth has cost Russian revolutionaries countless sacrifices. We must strive at all costs to *prevent* the Left Communists and West-European and American revolutionaries that are devoted to the working class from paying *as dearly* as the backward Russians did to learn this truth.

Prior to the downfall of tsarism, the Russian revolutionary Social-Democrats made repeated use of the services of the bourgeois liberals, i.e., they concluded numerous practical compromises with the latter. In 1901-02, even prior to the appearance of Bolshevism, the old editorial board of *Iskra* (consisting of Plekhanov, Axelrod, Zasulich, Martov, Potresov and myself) concluded (not for long, it is true) a formal political alliance with Struve, the political leader of bourgeois liberalism, while at the same time being able to wage an unrelenting and most merciless ideological and political struggle against bourgeois liberalism and against the slightest manifestations of its influence in the working-class movement. The Bolsheviks have always adhered to this policy. Since 1905 they have systematically advocated an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, against the liberal bourgeoisie and tsarism, never, however, refusing to support the bourgeoisie against tsarism (for instance, during second rounds of elections, or during second ballots) and never ceasing their relentless ideological and political struggle against the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the bourgeois-revolutionary peasant party, exposing them as petty-bourgeois democrats who have falsely described themselves as socialists. During the Duma elections of 1907, the Bolsheviks entered briefly into a formal political block with the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Between 1903 and 1912, there were periods of several years in which we were formally united with the Mensheviks in a single Social-Democratic Party, but we *never stopped* our ideological and political struggle against them as opportunists and vehicles of bourgeois influence on the proletariat. During the war, we concluded certain compromises with the Kautskyites, with the Left Mensheviks (Martov), and with a section of the Socialist-Revolutionaries (Chernov and Natanson); we were together with them at Zimmerwald and Kienthal, and issued joint manifestos. However, we never ceased and never relaxed our ideological and political struggle against the Kautskyites, Martov and Chernov (when Natanson died in 1919, a "Revolutionary-Communist" Narodnik, he was very close to and almost in agreement with us). At the very moment of the October Revolution, we entered into an informal but very important (and very successful) political bloc with the petty-bourgeois peasantry by adopting the *Socialist-Revolutionary* agrarian programme in its *entirety*, without a single alteration—i.e., we effected an undeniable compromise in order to prove to the peasants that we wanted, not to "steam-roller" them but to reach agreement with them. At the same time we proposed (and soon after effected) a formal political bloc, including participation in the government, with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who dissolved this bloc after the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and then, in July 1918, went to the length of armed rebellion, and subsequently of an armed struggle, against us.

It is therefore understandable why the attacks made by the German Lefts against the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany for entertaining the idea of a bloc with the Independents (the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany—the Kautskyites) are absolutely inane, in our opinion, and clear proof that the "Lefts" are in the *wrong*. In Russia, too, there were Right Mensheviks (participants in the Kerensky government), who corresponded to the German Scheidemanns, and Left Mensheviks (Martov),

corresponding to the German Kautskyites and standing in opposition to the Right Mensheviks. A gradual shift of the worker masses from the Mensheviks over to the Bolsheviks was to be clearly seen in 1917. At the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets, held in June 1917, we had only 13 per cent of the votes; the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks had a majority. At the Second Congress of Soviets (October 25, 1917, old style) we had 51 per cent of the votes. Why is it that in Germany the *same* and absolutely *identical* shift of the workers from Right to Left did not immediately strengthen the Communists, but first strengthened the midway Independent Party, although the latter never had independent political ideas or an independent policy, but merely wavered between the Scheidemanns and the Communists?

One of the evident reasons was the *erroneous* tactics of the German Communists, who must fearlessly and honestly admit this error and learn to rectify it. The error consisted in their denial of the need to take part in the reactionary bourgeois parliaments and in the reactionary trade unions; the error consisted in numerous manifestations of that "Leftwing" infantile disorder which has now come to the surface and will consequently be cured the more thoroughly, the more rapidly and with greater advantage to the organism.

The German Independent Social-Democratic Party is obviously not a homogeneous body. Alongside the old opportunist leaders (Kautsky, Hilferding and apparently, to a considerable extent, Crispin, Ledebour and others)—these have revealed their inability to understand the significance of Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and their inability to lead the proletariat's revolutionary struggle—there has emerged in this party a Left and proletarian wing, which is growing most rapidly. Hundreds of thousands of members of this party (which has, I think, a membership of some three-quarters of a million) are proletarians who are abandoning Scheidemann and are rapidly going over to communism. This proletarian wing has already proposed—at the Leipzig Congress of the Independents (1919)—immediate and unconditional affiliation to the Third International. To fear a "compromise" with this wing of the party is positively ridiculous. On the contrary, it is the *duty* of Communists to *seek and find* a suitable form of compromise with them, a compromise which, on the one hand, will facilitate and accelerate the necessary complete fusion with this wing and, on the other, will in no way hamper the Communists in their ideological and political struggle against the opportunist Right wing of the Independents. It will probably be no easy matter to devise a suitable form of compromise—but only a charlatan could promise the German workers and the German Communists an "easy" road to victory.

Capitalism would not be capitalism if the proletariat *pur sang* were not surrounded by a large number of exceedingly motley types intermediate between the proletarian and the semi-proletarian (who earns his livelihood in part by the sale of his labour-power), between the semi-proletarian and the small peasant (and petty artisan, handicraft worker and small master in general), between the small peasant and the middle peasant, and so on, and if the proletariat itself were not divided into more developed and less developed strata, if it were not divided according to territorial origin, trade, sometimes according to religion, and so on. From all this follows the necessity, the absolute necessity, for the Communist Party, the vanguard of the proletariat, its class-conscious section, to resort to changes of tack, to conciliation and compromises with the various groups of proletarians, with the various parties of the workers and small masters. It is entirely a matter of *knowing how* to apply these tactics in order to *raise*—not lower—the *general* level of proletarian class-consciousness, revolutionary spirit, and ability to fight and win. Incidentally, it should be noted that the Bolsheviks' victory over the Mensheviks called for the application of tactics of changes of tack, conciliation and compromises, not only before *but also after* the October Revolution of 1917, but the changes of tack and compromises were, of course, such as assisted,

boosted and consolidated the Bolsheviks at the expense of the Mensheviks. The petty-bourgeois democrats (including the Mensheviks) inevitably vacillate between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between bourgeois democracy and the Soviet system, between reformism and revolutionism, between love for the workers and fear of the proletarian dictatorship, etc. The Communists' proper tactics should consist in *utilising* these vacillations, not ignoring them; utilising them calls for concessions to elements that are turning towards the proletariat—whenever and in the measure that they turn towards the proletariat—in addition to fighting those who turn towards the bourgeoisie. As a result of the application of the correct tactics, Menshevism began to disintegrate, and has been disintegrating more and more in our country; the stubbornly opportunist leaders are being isolated, and the best of the workers and the best elements among the petty-bourgeois democrats are being brought into our camp. This is a lengthy process, and the hasty “decision”—“No compromises, no manoeuvres”—can only prejudice the strengthening of the revolutionary proletariat's influence and the enlargement of its forces.

Lastly, one of the undoubted errors of the German “Lefts” lies in their downright refusal to recognise the Treaty of Versailles. The more “weightily” and “pompously,” the more “*emphatically*” and peremptorily this viewpoint is formulated (by K. Horner, for instance), the less sense it seems to make. It is not enough, under the present conditions of the international proletarian revolution, to repudiate the preposterous absurdities of “National Bolshevism” (Laufenberg and others), which has gone to the length of advocating a bloc with the German bourgeoisie for a war against the Entente. One must realise that it is utterly false tactics to refuse to admit that a Soviet Germany (if a German Soviet republic were soon to arise) would have to recognise the Treaty of Versailles for a time, and to submit to it. From this it does not follow that the Independents—at a time when the Scheidemanns were in the government, when the Soviet government in Hungary had not yet been overthrown, and when it was still possible that a Soviet revolution in Vienna would support Soviet Hungary—were right, *under the circumstances*, in putting forward the demand that the Treaty of Versailles should be signed. At that time the Independents tacked and manoeuvred very clumsily, for they more or less accepted responsibility for the Scheidemann traitors, and more or less backslid from advocacy of a ruthless (and most calmly conducted) class war against the Scheidemanns, to advocacy of a “classless” or “above-class” standpoint.

In the present situation, however, the German Communists should obviously not deprive themselves of freedom of action by giving a positive and categorical promise to repudiate the Treaty of Versailles in the event of communism's victory. That would be absurd. They should say: the Scheidemanns and the Kautskyites have committed a number of acts of treachery hindering (and in part quite ruining) the chances of an alliance with Soviet Russia and Soviet Hungary. We Communists will do all we can to *facilitate* and *pave the way* for such an alliance. However, we are in no way obligated to repudiate the Treaty of Versailles, come what may, or to do so at once. The possibility of its successful repudiation will depend, not only on the German, but also on the international successes of the Soviet movement. The Scheidemanns and the Kautskyites have hampered this movement; we are helping it. That is the gist of the matter; therein lies the fundamental difference. And if our class enemies, the exploiters and their Scheidemann and Kautskyite lackeys, have missed many an opportunity of strengthening both the German and the international Soviet movement, of strengthening both the German and the international Soviet revolution, the blame lies with them. The Soviet revolution in Germany will strengthen the international Soviet movement, which is the strongest bulwark (and the only reliable, invincible and world-wide bulwark) against the Treaty of Versailles and against international imperialism in general. To give absolute, categorical and immediate precedence to liberation from the Treaty of Versailles and to give it *precedence over the question* of liberating *other* countries oppressed by imperialism, from the yoke of imperialism, is philistine nationalism (worthy of

the Kautskys, the Hilferdings, the Otto Bauers and Co.), not of revolutionary internationalism. The overthrow of the bourgeoisie in any of the large European countries, including Germany, would be such a gain for the international revolution that, for its sake, one can, and if necessary should tolerate a *more prolonged existence of the Treaty of Versailles*. If Russia, standing alone, could endure the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk for several months, to the advantage of the revolution, there is nothing impossible in a Soviet Germany, allied with Soviet Russia, enduring the existence of the Treaty of Versailles for a longer period, to the advantage of the revolution.

The imperialists of France, Britain, etc., are trying to provoke and ensnare the German Communists: "Say that you will not sign the Treaty of Versailles!" they urge. Like babes, the Left Communists fall into the trap laid for them, instead of skilfully manoeuvring against the crafty and, *at present*, stronger enemy, and instead of telling him, "We shall sign the Treaty of Versailles now." It is folly, not revolutionism, to deprive ourselves in advance of any freedom of action, openly to inform an enemy who is at present better armed than we are whether we shall fight him, and when. To accept battle at a time when it is obviously advantageous to the enemy, but not to us, is criminal; political leaders of the revolutionary class are absolutely useless if they are incapable of "changing tack, or offering conciliation and compromise" in order to take evasive action in a patently disadvantageous battle.

IX

"LEFT-WING" COMMUNISM IN GREAT BRITAIN

[This section gives a lengthy analysis of the political situation in Great Britain—ed.]

X

SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS

The Russian bourgeois revolution of 1905 revealed a highly original turn in world history: in one of the most backward capitalist countries, the strike movement attained a scope and power unprecedented anywhere in the world. In the *first month* of 1905 *alone*, the number of strikers was ten times the *annual* average for the previous decade (1895-1904); from January to October 1905, strikes grew all the time and reached enormous proportions. Under the influence of a number of unique historical conditions, backward Russia was the first to show the world, not only the growth, by leaps and bounds, of the independent activity of the oppressed masses in time of revolution (this had occurred in all great revolutions), but also that the significance of the proletariat is infinitely greater than its proportion in the total population; it showed a combination of the economic strike and the political strike, with the latter developing into an armed uprising, and the birth of the Soviets, a new form of mass struggle and mass organisation of the classes oppressed by capitalism.

The revolutions of February and October 1917 led to the all-round development of the Soviets on a nation-wide scale and to their victory in the proletarian socialist revolution. In less than two years, the international character of the Soviets, the spread of this form of struggle and organisation to the world working-class movement and the historical mission of the Soviets as the grave-digger, heir and successor of bourgeois parliamentarianism and of bourgeois democracy in general, all became clear.

But that is not all. The history of the working-class movement now shows that, in all countries, it is about to go through (and is already going through) a struggle waged by communism—emergent, gaining strength and advancing towards victory—against, primarily, Menshevism, i.e., opportunism and social-chauvinism (the home brand in each particular country), and then as a complement, so to say, Left-wing communism. The former struggle has developed in all countries, apparently without any exception, as a duel between the Second International (already virtually dead) and the Third International. The latter struggle is to be seen in Germany, Great Britain, Italy, America (at any rate, a certain *section* of the Industrial Workers of the World and of the anarcho-syndicalist trends uphold

the errors of Left-wing communism alongside of an almost universal and almost unreserved acceptance of the Soviet system), and in France (the attitude of a section of the former syndicalists towards the political party and parliamentarianism, also alongside of the acceptance of the Soviet system); in other words, the struggle is undoubtedly being waged, not only on an international, but even on a world-wide scale.

But while the working-class movement is everywhere going through what is actually the same kind of preparatory school for victory over the bourgeoisie, it is achieving that development in its *own way* in each country. The big and advanced capitalist countries are travelling this road *far more rapidly* than did Bolshevism, to which history granted fifteen years to prepare itself for victory, as an organised political trend. In the brief space of a year, the Third International has already scored a decisive victory; it has defeated the yellow, social-chauvinist Second International, which only a few months ago was incomparably stronger than the Third International, seemed stable and powerful, and enjoyed every possible support—direct and indirect, material (Cabinet posts, passports, the press) and ideological—from the world bourgeoisie.

It is now essential that Communists of every country should quite consciously take into account both the fundamental objectives of the struggle against opportunism and “Left” doctrinarism, and the *concrete features* which this struggle assumes and must inevitably assume in each country, in conformity with the specific character of its economics, politics, culture, and national composition (Ireland, etc.), its colonies, religious divisions, and so on and so forth. Dissatisfaction with the Second International is felt everywhere and is spreading and growing, both because of its opportunism and because of its inability or incapacity to create a really centralised and really leading centre capable of directing the international tactics of the revolutionary proletariat in its struggle for a world Soviet republic. It should be clearly realised that such a leading centre can never be built up on stereotyped, mechanically equated, and identical tactical rules of struggle. As long as national and state distinctions exist among peoples and countries—and these will continue to exist for a very long time to come, even after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world-wide scale—the unity of the international tactics of the communist working-class movement in all countries demands, not the elimination of variety or the suppression of national distinctions (which is a pipe dream at present), but the application of the *fundamental* principles of communism (Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat), which will *correctly modify* these principles in certain *particulars*, correctly adapt and apply them to national and national-state distinctions. To seek out, investigate, predict, and grasp that which is nationally specific and nationally distinctive, in the *concrete manner* in which each country should tackle a *single* international task: victory over opportunism and Left doctrinarism within the working-class movement; the overthrow of the bourgeoisie; the establishment of a Soviet republic and a proletarian dictatorship—such is the basic task in the historical period that all the advanced countries (and not they alone) are going through. The chief thing—though, of course, far from everything—the chief thing, has already been achieved: the vanguard of the working class has been won over, has ranged itself on the side of Soviet government and against parliamentarianism, on the side of the dictatorship of the proletariat and against bourgeois democracy. All efforts and all attention should now be concentrated on the *next* step, which may seem—and from a certain viewpoint actually is—less fundamental, but, on the other hand, is actually closer to a practical accomplishment of the task. That step is: the search after forms of the *transition* or the *approach* to the proletarian revolution.

The proletarian vanguard has been won over ideologically. That is the main thing. Without this, not even the first step towards victory can be made. But that is still quite a long way from victory. Victory cannot be won with a vanguard alone. To throw only the vanguard into the decisive battle, before the entire class, the broad masses, have taken up

a position either of direct support for the vanguard, or at least of sympathetic neutrality towards it and of precluded support for the enemy, would be, not merely foolish but criminal. Propaganda and agitation alone are not enough for an entire class, the broad masses of the working people, those oppressed by capital, to take up such a stand. For that, the masses must have their own political experience. Such is the fundamental law of all great revolutions, which has been confirmed with compelling force and vividness, not only in Russia but in Germany as well. To turn resolutely towards communism, it was necessary, not only for the ignorant and often illiterate masses of Russia, but also for the literate and well-educated masses of Germany, to realise from their own bitter experience the absolute impotence and spinelessness, the absolute helplessness and servility to the bourgeoisie, and the utter vileness of the government of the paladins of the Second International; they had to realise that a dictatorship of the extreme reactionaries (Kornilov in Russia; Kapp and Co. in Germany) is inevitably the only alternative to a dictatorship of the proletariat.

The immediate objective of the class-conscious vanguard of the international working-class movement, i.e., the Communist parties, groups and trends, is to be able to *lead* the broad masses (who are still, for the most part, apathetic, inert, dormant and convention-ridden) to their new position, or, rather, to be able to lead, *not only* their own party but also these masses in their advance and transition to the new position. While the first historical objective (that of winning over the class-conscious vanguard of the proletariat to the side of Soviet power and the dictatorship of the working class) could not have been reached without a complete ideological and political victory over opportunism and social-chauvinism, the second and immediate objective, which consists in being able to lead the *masses* to a new position ensuring the victory of the vanguard in the revolution, cannot be reached without the liquidation of Left doctrinarism, and without a full elimination of its errors.

As long as it was (and inasmuch as it still is) a question of winning the proletariat's vanguard over to the side of communism, priority went and still goes to propaganda work; even propaganda circles, with all their parochial limitations, are useful under these conditions, and produce good results. But when it is a question of practical action by the masses, of the disposition, if one may so put it, of vast armies, of the alignment of *all* the class forces in a given society *for the final and decisive battle*, then propagandist methods alone, the mere repetition of the truths of "pure" communism, are of no avail. In these circumstances, one must not count in thousands, like the propagandist belonging to a small group that has not yet given leadership to the masses; in these circumstances one must count in millions and tens of millions. In these circumstances, we must ask ourselves, not only whether we have convinced the vanguard of the revolutionary class, but also whether the historically effective forces of *all* classes—positively of all the classes in a given society, without exception—are arrayed in such a way that the decisive battle is at hand—in such a way that: (1) all the class forces hostile to us have become sufficiently entangled, are sufficiently at loggerheads with each other, have sufficiently weakened themselves in a struggle which is beyond their strength; (2) all the vacillating and unstable, intermediate elements—the petty bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois democrats, as distinct from the bourgeoisie—have sufficiently exposed themselves in the eyes of the people, have sufficiently disgraced themselves through their practical bankruptcy, and (3) among the proletariat, a mass sentiment favouring the most determined, bold and dedicated revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie has emerged and begun to grow vigorously. Then revolution is indeed ripe; then, indeed, if we have correctly gauged all the conditions indicated and summarised above, and if we have chosen the right moment, our victory is assured.

The differences between the Churchills and the Lloyd Georges—with insignificant national distinctions, these political types exist in *all* countries—on the one hand, and between the Hendersons and the Lloyd Georges on the other, are quite minor and unimportant from the standpoint of pure (i.e., abstract) communism, i.e., communism that has

not yet matured to the stage of practical political action by the masses, these differences are most important. To take due account of these differences, and to determine the moment when the inevitable conflicts between these "friends," which weaken and enfeeble *all the "friends" taken together*, will have come to a head—that is the concern, the task, of a Communist who wants to be, not merely a class-conscious and convinced propagandist of ideas, but a practical leader of the *masses* in the revolution. It is necessary to link the strictest devotion to the ideas of communism with the ability to effect all the necessary practical compromises, tacks, conciliatory manoeuvres, zigzags, retreats and so on, in order to speed up the achievement and then loss of political power by the Hendersons (the heroes of the Second International, if we are not to name individual representatives of petty-bourgeois democracy who call themselves socialists); to accelerate their inevitable bankruptcy in practice, which will enlighten the masses in the spirit of our ideas, in the direction of communism; to accelerate the inevitable friction, quarrels, conflicts and complete disintegration among the Hendersons, the Lloyd Georges and the Churchills (the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Constitutional-Democrats, the monarchists; the Scheidemanns, the bourgeoisie and the Kappists, etc.); to select the proper moment when the discord among these "pillars of sacrosanct private property" is at its height, so that, through a decisive offensive, the proletariat will defeat them all and capture political power.

History as a whole, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more multiform, more lively and ingenious than is imagined by even the best parties, the most class-conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes. This can readily be understood, because even the finest of vanguards express the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of thousands, whereas at moments of great upsurge and the exertion of all human capacities, revolutions are made by the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of millions, spurred on by a most acute struggle of classes. Two very important practical conclusions follow from this: first, that in order to accomplish its task the revolutionary class must be able to master *all* forms or aspects of social activity without exception (completing after the capture of political power—sometimes at great risk and with very great danger—what it did not complete before the capture of power); second, that the revolutionary class must be prepared for the most rapid and brusque replacement of one form by another.

One will readily agree that any army which does not train to use all the weapons, all the means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses, or may possess, is behaving in an unwise or even criminal manner. This applies to politics even more than it does to the art of war. In politics it is even harder to know in advance which methods of struggle will be applicable and to our advantage in certain future conditions. Unless we learn to apply all the methods of struggle, we may suffer grave and sometimes even decisive defeat, if changes beyond our control in the position of the other classes bring to the forefront a form of activity in which we are especially weak. If, however, we learn to use all the methods of struggle, victory will be certain, because we represent the interests of the really foremost and really revolutionary class, even if circumstances do not permit us to make use of weapons that are most dangerous to the enemy, weapons that deal the swiftest mortal blows. Inexperienced revolutionaries often think that legal methods of struggle are opportunist because, in this field, the bourgeoisie has most frequently deceived and duped the workers (particularly in "peaceful" and non-revolutionary times), while illegal methods of struggle are revolutionary. That, however, is wrong. The truth is that those parties and leaders are opportunists and traitors to the working class that are unable or unwilling (do not say, "I can't"; say, "I shan't") to use illegal methods of struggle in conditions such as those which prevailed, for example, during the imperialist war of 1914-18, when the bourgeoisie of the freest democratic countries most brazenly and brutally deceived the workers, and smothered the truth about the predatory character of the war. But

revolutionaries who are incapable of combining illegal forms of struggle with *every* form of legal struggle are poor revolutionaries indeed. It is not difficult to be a revolutionary when revolution has already broken out and is in spate, when all people are joining the revolution just because they are carried away, because it is the vogue, and sometimes even from careerist motives. After its victory, the proletariat has to make most strenuous efforts, even the most painful, so as to "liberate" itself from such pseudo-revolutionaries. It is far more difficult—and far more precious—to be a revolutionary when the conditions for direct, open, really mass and really revolutionary struggle *do not yet exist*, to be able to champion the interests of the revolution (by propaganda, agitation and organisation) in non-revolutionary bodies, and quite often in downright reactionary bodies, in a non-revolutionary situation, among the masses who are incapable of immediately appreciating the need for revolutionary methods of action. To be able to seek, find and correctly determine the specific path or the particular turn of events that will *lead* the masses to the real, decisive and final revolutionary struggle—such is the main objective of communism in Western Europe and in America today.

Britain is an example. We cannot tell—no one can tell in advance—how soon a real proletarian revolution will flare up there, and *what immediate cause* will most serve to rouse, kindle, and impel into the struggle the very wide masses, who are still dormant. Hence, it is our duty to carry on all our preparatory work in such a way as to be "well shod on all four feet" (as the late Plekhanov, when he was a Marxist and revolutionary, was fond of saying). It is possible that the breach will be forced, the ice broken, by a parliamentary crisis, or by a crisis arising from colonial and imperialist contradictions, which are hopelessly entangled and are becoming increasingly painful and acute, or perhaps by some third cause, etc. We are not discussing the kind of struggle that will *determine* the fate of the proletarian revolution in Great Britain (no Communist has any doubt on that score; for all of us this is a foregone conclusion): what we are discussing is the *immediate cause* that will bring into motion the now dormant proletarian masses, and lead them right up to revolution. Let us not forget that in the French bourgeois republic, for example, in a situation which, from both the international and the national viewpoints, was a hundred times less revolutionary than it is today, such an "unexpected" and "petty" cause as one of the many thousands of fraudulent machinations of the reactionary military caste (the Dreyfus case) was enough to bring the people to the brink of civil war!

In Great Britain the Communists should constantly, unremittently and unswervingly utilise parliamentary elections and all the vicissitudes of the Irish, colonial and world-imperialist policy of the British Government, and all other fields, spheres and aspects of public life, and work in all of them in a new way, in a communist way, in the spirit of the Third, not the Second, International. I have neither the time nor the space here to describe the "Russian" "Bolshevik" methods of participation in parliamentary elections and in the parliamentary struggle; I can, however, assure foreign Communists that they were quite unlike the usual West-European parliamentary campaigns. From this the conclusion is often drawn: "Well, that was in Russia; in our country parliamentarianism is different." This is a false conclusion. Communists, adherents of the Third International in all countries, exist for the purpose of *changing*—all along the line, in all spheres of life—the old socialist, trade unionist, syndicalist, and parliamentary type of work into a *new* type of work, the communist. In Russia, too, there was always an abundance of opportunism, purely bourgeois sharp practices and capitalist rigging in the elections. In Western Europe and in America, the Communists must learn to create a new, uncustomary, non-opportunist, and non-careerist parliamentarianism; the Communist parties must issue their slogans; true proletarians, with the help of the unorganised and downtrodden poor, should distribute leaflets, canvass workers' houses and cottages of the rural proletarians and peasants in the remote villages (fortunately there are many times fewer remote villages in Europe than in

Russia, and in Britain the number is very small); they should go into the public houses, penetrate into unions, societies and chance gatherings of the common people, and speak to the people, not in learned (or very parliamentary) language; they should not at all strive to "get seats" in parliament, but should everywhere try to get people to think, and draw the masses into the struggle, to take the bourgeoisie at its word and utilise the machinery it has set up, the elections it has appointed, and the appeals it has made to the people; they should try to explain to the people what Bolshevism is, in a way that was never possible (under bourgeois rule) outside of election times (exclusive, of course, of times of big strikes, when in Russia a *similar* apparatus for widespread popular agitation worked even more intensively). It is very difficult to do this in Western Europe and extremely difficult in America, but it can and must be done, for the objectives of communism cannot be achieved without effort. We must work to accomplish *practical* tasks, ever more varied and ever more closely connected with all branches of social life, *winning* branch after branch, and sphere after sphere *from the bourgeoisie*.

In Great Britain, further, the work of propaganda, agitation and organisation among the armed forces and among the oppressed and underprivileged nationalities in their "*own*" state (Ireland, the colonies) must also be tackled in a new fashion (one that is not socialist, but communist; not reformist, but revolutionary). That is because, in the era of imperialism in general and especially today after a war that was a sore trial to the peoples and has quickly opened their eyes to the truth (i.e., the fact that tens of millions were killed and maimed for the sole purpose of deciding whether the British or the German robbers should plunder the largest number of countries), all these spheres of social life are heavily charged with inflammable material and are creating numerous causes of conflicts, crises and an intensification of the class struggle. We do not and cannot know which spark—of the innumerable sparks that are flying about in all countries as a result of the world economic and political crisis—will kindle the conflagration, in the sense of raising up the masses; we must, therefore, with our new and communist principles, set to work to stir up all and sundry, even the oldest, mustiest and seemingly hopeless spheres, for otherwise we shall not be able to cope with our tasks, shall not be comprehensively prepared, shall not be in possession of all the weapons and shall not prepare ourselves either to gain victory over the bourgeoisie (which arranged all aspects of social life—and has now disarranged them—in its bourgeois fashion), or to bring about the impending communist reorganisation of every sphere of life, following that victory.

Since the proletarian revolution in Russia and its victories on an international scale, expected neither by the bourgeoisie nor the philistines, the entire world has become different, and the bourgeoisie everywhere has become different too. It is terrified of "Bolshevism," exasperated by it almost to the point of frenzy, and for that very reason it is, on the one hand, precipitating the progress of events and, on the other, concentrating on the forcible suppression of Bolshevism, thereby weakening its own position in a number of other fields. In their tactics the Communists in all the advanced countries must take both these circumstances into account.

When the Russian Cadets and Kerensky began furiously to hound the Bolsheviks—especially since April 1917, and more particularly in June and July 1917—they overdid things. Millions of copies of bourgeois papers, clamouring in every key against the Bolsheviks, helped the masses to make an appraisal of Bolshevism; apart from the newspapers, all public life was full of discussions about Bolshevism, as a result of the bourgeoisie's "zeal." Today the millionaires of all countries are behaving on an international scale in a way that deserves our heartiest thanks. They are hounding Bolshevism with the same zeal as Kerensky and Co. did; they, too, are overdoing things and *helping* us just

as Kerensky did. When the French bourgeoisie makes Bolshevism the central issue in the elections, and accuses the comparatively moderate or vacillating socialists of being Bolsheviks; when the American bourgeoisie, which has completely lost its head, seizes thousands and thousands of people on suspicion of Bolshevism, creates an atmosphere of panic, and broadcasts stories of Bolshevik plots; when, despite all its wisdom and experience, the British bourgeoisie—the most “solid” in the world—makes incredible blunders, founds richly endowed “anti-Bolshevik societies,” creates a special literature on Bolshevism, and recruits an extra number of scientists, agitators and clergymen to combat it, we must salute and thank the capitalists. They are working for us. They are helping us to get the masses interested in the essence and significance of Bolshevism, and they cannot do otherwise, for they have *already* failed to ignore Bolshevism and stifle it.

But at the same time, the bourgeoisie sees practically only one aspect of Bolshevism—insurrection, violence, and terror; it therefore strives to prepare itself for resistance and opposition primarily in *this* field. It is possible that, in certain instances, in certain countries, and for certain brief periods, it will succeed in this. We must reckon with such an eventuality, and we have absolutely nothing to fear if it does succeed. Communism is emerging in positively every sphere of public life; its beginnings are to be seen literally on all sides. The “contagion” (to use the favourite metaphor of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois police, the one mostly to their liking) has very thoroughly penetrated the organism and has completely permeated it. If special efforts are made to block one of the channels, the “contagion” will find another one, sometimes very unexpectedly. Life will assert itself. Let the bourgeoisie rave, work itself into a frenzy, go to extremes, commit follies, take vengeance on the Bolsheviks in advance, and endeavour to kill off (as in India, Hungary, Germany, etc.) more hundreds, thousands, and hundreds of thousands of yesterday’s and tomorrow’s Bolsheviks. In acting this, the bourgeoisie is acting as all historically doomed classes have done. Communists should know that, in any case, the future belongs to them; therefore, we can (and must) combine the most intense passion in the great revolutionary struggle, with the coolest and most sober appraisal of the frenzied ravings of the bourgeoisie. The Russian revolution was cruelly defeated in 1905; the Russian Bolsheviks were defeated in July 1917; over 15,000 German Communists were killed as a result of the wily provocation and cunning manoeuvres of Scheidemann and Noske, who were working hand in glove with the bourgeoisie and the monarchist generals; White terror is raging in Finland and Hungary. But in all cases and in all countries, communism is becoming steeled and is growing; its roots are so deep that persecution does not weaken or debilitate it, but only strengthens it. Only one thing is lacking to enable us to march forward more confidently and firmly to victory, namely, the universal and thorough awareness of all Communists in all countries, of the necessity to display the utmost *flexibility* in their tactics. The communist movement, which is developing magnificently, now lacks, especially in the advanced countries, this awareness and the ability to apply it in practice.

That which happened to such leaders of the Second International, such highly erudite Marxists devoted to socialism as Kautsky, Otto Bauer and others, could (and should) provide a useful lesson. They fully appreciated the need for flexible tactics; they themselves learned Marxist dialectic and taught it to others (and much of what they have done in this field will always remain a valuable contribution to socialist literature); however, *in the application* of this dialectic they committed such an error, or proved to be so *undialectical* in practice, so incapable of taking into account the rapid change of forms and the rapid acquisition of new content by the old forms, that their fate is not much more enviable than that of Hyndman, Guesde and Plekhanov. The principal reason for their bankruptcy was

that they were hypnotised by a definite form of growth of the working-class movement and socialism, forgot all about the one-sidedness of that form, were afraid to see the break-up which objective conditions made inevitable, and continued to repeat simple and, at first glance, incontestable axioms that had been learned by rote, like: "three is more than two." But politics is more like algebra than arithmetic, and still more like higher than elementary mathematics. In reality, all the old forms of the socialist movement have acquired a new content, and, consequently, a new symbol, the "minus" sign, has appeared in front of all the figures; our wiseacres, however, have stubbornly continued (and still continue) to persuade themselves and others that "minus three" is more than "minus two."

We must see to it that Communists do not make a *similar mistake*, only in the opposite sense, or rather, we must see to it that a similar mistake, only made in the opposite sense by the "Left" Communists, is corrected as soon as possible and eliminated as rapidly and painlessly as possible. It is not only Right doctrinairism that is erroneous; Left doctrinairism is erroneous too. Of course, the mistake of Left doctrinairism in communism is at present a thousand times less dangerous and less significant than that of Right doctrinairism (i.e., social-chauvinism and Kautskyism); but, after all, that is only due to the fact that Left communism is a very young trend, is only just coming into being. It is only for this reason that, under certain conditions, the disease can be easily eradicated, and we must set to work with the utmost energy to eradicate it.

The old forms burst asunder, for it turned out that their new content—anti-proletarian and reactionary—had attained an inordinate development. From the standpoint of the development of international communism, our work today has such a durable and powerful content (for Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat) that it can *and must* manifest itself in any form, both new and old; it can and must regenerate, conquer and subjugate all forms, not only the new, but also the old—not for the purpose of reconciling itself with the old, but for the purpose of making all and every form—new and old—a weapon for the complete and irrevocable victory of communism.

The Communists must exert every effort to direct the working-class movement and social development in general along the straightest and shortest road to the victory of Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat on a world-wide scale. That is an incontestable truth. But it is enough to take one little step farther—a step that might seem to be in the same direction—and truth turns into error. We have only to say, as the German and British Left Communists do, that we recognise only one road, only the direct road, and that we will not permit tacking, conciliatory manoeuvres, or compromising—and it will be a mistake which may cause, and in part has already caused and is causing, very grave prejudice to communism. Right doctrinairism persisted in recognising only the old forms, and became utterly bankrupt, for it did not notice the new content. Left doctrinairism persists in the unconditional repudiation of certain old forms, failing to see that the new content is forcing its way through all and sundry forms, that it is our duty as Communists to master all forms, to learn how, with the maximum rapidity, to supplement one form with another, to substitute one for another, and to adapt our tactics to any such change that does not come from our class or from our efforts.

World revolution has been so powerfully stimulated and accelerated by the horrors, vileness and abominations of the world imperialist war and by the hopelessness of the situation created by it, this revolution is developing in scope and depth with such splendid rapidity, with such a wonderful variety of changing forms, with such an instructive practical refutation of all doctrinairism, that there is every reason to hope for a rapid and complete recovery of the international communist movement from the infantile, disorder of "Left-wing" communism.

27 April 1920

Lenin, Vol. 31, pp. 24-104.

FOOD POLICY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

Spring 1920

This essay explains and justifies the food policies and grain requisitions of the Soviet government under War Communism, although it also spells out some of the difficulties and complexities of the food and supply situation. No indication is given of the date written or if published elsewhere earlier but internal evidence would suggest that it was written in the spring of 1920. Svidersky was an official of Commissariat of Food. Gubernia, uyezd (uezd) and volost are successively smaller administrative subdivisions.

A. Svidersky

The Food Policy of the Soviet Government

The People's Food Commissariat is in charge of the state food supply of the population. The leading organ of this Commissariat is, in accordance with the constitution of the R.S.F.S.R., a collegiate (board) appointed by the Council of People's Commissars and is headed by a People's Commissar appointed by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

In the localities the chief organs of the Food Commissariat are the Gubernia Provision Committees, the Uyezd Provision Committees and the District Provision Committees. In regard to organization, the local Provision Committee organs are connected with the local Soviets and with the Provision Commissariat. In addition to this an organization connection exists between the provision organs of the producing gubernias and the workers of the consuming gubernias. This is achieved in the following way:

The Uyezd Provision Committees consist of Uyezd Provision Commissars, who are elected by the uyezd councils and confirmed by the Gubernia Food Commissars, and of a collegiate (board) which consists of persons appointed by the Uyezd Food Commissars of the uyezd councils (Soviets). The Gubernia Provision Committees consist of Gubernia Food Commissars who are elected by the gubernia Soviets and are confirmed by the People's Commissariat for Food Supply, and of a collegiate (board), whose members are appointed by the Gubernia Food Commissars and are confirmed by the executive organs of the gubernia Soviets. The District Food Committees are the provision organs supplying a number of volosts on the economic principle; these act in some places in lieu of the Uyezd Provision Committees. Their structure is on the same principle of organization as that of the Uyezd Food Committees and the Gubernia Food Committees.

The People's Food Commissariat has the right of delegating authorized persons to all the District, Uyezd, and Gubernia Food Committees with a view of suspending decisions which may be contradictory to the decrees and the instructions of the central authorities, or appear inexpedient from the point of view of general state interests. The People's Food Commissariat has the right of including in every Uyezd Food Committee of a given gubernia supplying grain, from one to one-half of the entire number of members of the Uyezd Provision Committee out of the number of candidates recommended by trade unions of workers, by Soviet organizations, and by various party associations of consuming gubernias who stand on the Soviet platform; in the same manner, representatives of Gubernia Food Committees of consuming gubernias may be delegated to every Gubernia Food Commissariat; the general understanding is that one representative is sent from the capitals of Moscow and Petrograd, and one representative from the Army and the Navy; the complete number of the representatives of the Food Commissariat and of the consuming gubernias should consist of not less than one-third and not more than one-half of the entire number of the members of the Gubernia Provision Commissariats. The number of representatives of consuming gubernias in the food organs of the producing gubernias is higher at the present time than the above-mentioned norm, and form approximately 80 per cent of the general number of the members

of the Uyezd and Gubernia Boards of the Food Commissariat of the grain producing gubernias.

A special position in the general network of the organization of the food organs is occupied by the workers' food detachments, the food army, and the organs of labor inspection. The workers' food detachments and the food army taken together, represent one of the main levers in the activity of the People's Food Commissariat and its local organs, especially with regard to the provision of grain and of forage.

The food detachments are formed by the Military Food Bureau of the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions. The functions of these detachments are as follows: 1) the registration of harvests and surplus grain; 2) operations directly connected with the dispatch of grain to the granaries; 3) propaganda work to get the peasants to deliver all the surplus grain to the state; 4) rendering assistance to the transport and so forth. During the grain campaign of 1918-1919 the People's Food Commissariat had at its disposal 400 food detachments consisting of 13,000 men. For the present food campaign the number of food detachments was increased by another hundred which consisted of nearly 13,000 workers mobilized in the consuming gubernias.

The Food Army is entrusted with the duty of compulsorily obtaining all the surplus of grain in those cases where the owners decline to comply with the grain levy laid upon them. In the majority of cases, however, the Food Army is simply held in preparedness. Generally their mere presence in localities where grain is gathered is sufficient to insure the smooth delivery of all surplus, without recourse to compulsion. This was the prevailing state of things during the last grain campaign; it is also the prevailing state of things at the present moment. During the 1918-1919 season the food army numbered about 45,000 men. The increase of the food army for the current supply campaign is necessitated by the extension of the territory at the disposal of the state provision organs.

The Food Army is recruited from volunteers and those liable to military service, but whose state of health renders them unfit for such. From the point of view of organization the Food Army in its structure is similar to that of the Red Army, being subject to all the decrees applying to the latter and it may be utilized for military purposes should the need for this arise.

The organs of labor inspection are formed of class conscious intelligent workers, recommended by the trade unions. These are formed by the military Food Bureau (of the trade unions) and are under its supervision, but their activity is guided by the People's Food Commissariat. The task of the organs of labor inspection is to carry out class control over the activity of the Food Commissariat's institutions as well as of the local food organizations. Recently the Provision Labor Inspection merged with the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection which took the place of the State Control.

This is the business apparatus of the People's Food Commissariat and of its local organs. This is not a mere technical apparatus which collects grain by way of monetary payment at fixed state prices or by way of exchange of goods, collecting at the same time all other food products and articles of general consumption—but it is an organ which is in every respect adapted to obtain grain and to carry on an organized and systematic struggle for the supply of food to the starving population.

Until recently the People's Food Commissariat in the center and the Food Committees in the localities, in addition to carrying out the functions of supply, also carried out all the functions of distribution. For this reason as far as their structural organization was concerned the food organs had to take into consideration the execution of tasks connected with all matters of distribution. At the present time, in accordance with a decree of the 20th of March, 1919, the functions of distribution are entirely transferred to the cooperative societies whilst the People's Food Commissariat, as a state organ, retains the right of control over the activity of the newly created distribution organizations.

These problems, the practical solution of which is entrusted by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and by the Council of the People's Commissars to the People's Food

Commissariat and its local organizations are fully formulated by a number of decrees published consecutively during the period of almost three years existence of the Soviet Government. By a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee dated May 27, 1918, the People's Food Commissariat was instructed to unite into one organ the entire supply of the population with articles of first necessity and of consumption, to organize on a national scale the distribution of these goods, and to prepare the transition to nationalization of trade and industry. By a later decree of the Council of the People's Commissars dated November 21, 1918, the Food Commissariat was instructed to organize the supply of all products serving personal and domestic needs; the aim of this decree was the substitution of the private commercial apparatus by a systematic supply of the population with all necessities out of the Soviet cooperative distributing depots.

The above-mentioned decrees do not by far exhaust all the Soviet legislation by which the activity of the Food Commissariat is defined. But they mark the principal stages in the development of the functions of the food organs. Both decrees emphasize the gradual change of the Food Commissariat from a provision organ in the narrower sense of the word into an organ for the state supply of the population.

As regards the principal instruction, which during the last two years were, for various reasons and in various forms, given to the People's Food Commissariat by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and by the Council of People's Commissars, it must be pointed out that these instructions amounted and continue to amount to the following: 1) the registration of articles of provision and of general consumption; 2) the institution of state monopoly for the chief articles of alimentation, and 3) distribution in accordance with the principle of class distinction: he who does not work neither shall he eat. A certain clarity was introduced in these basic postulates by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee's decree dated January 21, 1919: it was definitely pointed out which particular products constitute the monopoly of the state; these were: grain, forage, sugar, salt and tea; which kind of articles are to be collected on a state scale but not on monopoly principles, these included all meat products, fats, fish and so forth, and which may be obtained by large labor associations and freely brought to town for free sale in the open markets; to these categories belong potatoes and a few other articles.

The decree of January 21 clearly defined the extent of the authority of the food organs by the establishment of the two categories of monopolized and ordinary products. As it happened, this at the same time meant moving a step backward as far as the state supply was concerned. The same decree instructed the People's Food Commissariat with taking measures to improve its supply apparatus for the purpose of extending the state supply also to ordinary products. For the purpose of fulfilling this regulation a decree was issued on August 15, 1919, making the supply of potatoes a state monopoly and prohibiting to any organization, excepting state organs, the purchase of products which have by the decree of January 21 been attributed to ordinary products; this prohibition extended to five gubernias. Thus one of the chief principles of organization of state supply of the population was confirmed afresh.

Our food policy found its clearest expression in the decrees and instructions with regard to the supply of grain. The decree issued by the All-Russian Executive Committee and published on May 13, 1918, the purpose of which was to confirm the hard and fast rule regarding the grain monopoly and making it incumbent upon every owner to turn over all supplies, excepting the quantity required for sowing and for personal consumption to the state food organ according to the established levy; this decree called upon all the laboring and poor peasants to unite immediately for the purpose of a resolute struggle against the grain profiteering peasants. The same decree endowed the People's Food Commissariat with extraordinary prerogatives including the right of applying armed force in cases where resistance is offered in the collection of corn or other food products. The main idea of the decree of May 13 is still more vividly expressed in the appeal of the Council of the People's

Commissars issued to the population towards the end of May, 1918. Not a single step backward should be made with regard to the bread monopoly, was said in this appeal. Not the slightest increase of the fixed prices for grain! No independent storing of grain! All that is disciplined and class conscious—into a united organized food front! Strict execution of all the instructions of the Central Government! No independent activity! Complete revolutionary order all over the country. War to the profiteers!...

Not satisfied with the instructions regarding the principal idea of our food policy, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee by a decree dated June 11, 1918, on the organization of the supply of the village poor, has defined the form of organization in which the line of conduct towards the profiteers as well as to the sections of the village population who are guilty of hiding their surplus of grain are to be treated. Although subsequently, by a special regulation of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the established forms of organization have been removed, in its principal features the food supply policy remained as before and is remaining so until the present time. As in the past the policy is now based upon the organization of the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements of the villages against the profiteers, only under a different form, i.e., in so far as the obligatory grain levy applies also to the middle peasantry as long as it has a surplus of grain.

Of special significance in the food policy of the Soviet Government is the system of exchange of goods, which serves as a means of extracting the grain surplus from the villages: this policy by the way was also utilized by the Provisional Government. The policy of exchange of goods was first practically realized when, in accordance with a regulation of the Council of the People's Commissars passed on the 25th of March, 1918, the People's Food Commissariat was financed for that purpose to the extent of one milliard one hundred and sixty millions of rubles; later on, on the 2nd of April of the same year, a special decree was issued regarding exchange of goods; here all articles subject to goods exchange were enumerated and at the same time a special principle was established upon which all goods exchange is to be carried on; this principle consisted in attracting the poorer peasants to the organization of exchange of commodities and the obligatory transfer of goods sent in exchange for grain to the disposal of the volost or district organizations for the purpose of its further distribution amongst the population in need of these goods. The establishment of this principle was dictated by necessity, as it was proved in practice that the exchange of grain leads to the accumulation of goods in the hands of the profiteers to the great disadvantage of the poor section of the peasantry.

A few months later it became necessary to introduce one more important addition into the system of goods exchange. It appeared that the decree of the 2nd of April is eluded in various ways by the grain owners; this was largely facilitated by the fact that the profiteers and the richer sections of the rural population were enabled to obtain the necessary goods from private sources and thus were not driven to the necessity of turning over their surplus to the state organs with a view of obtaining goods from them, which goods were in addition given to the disposal of the volost and village organizations. In order to deprive the grain owners of the opportunity of resorting to this dishonest method a decree was published on the 8th of August, 1918, concerning obligatory exchange of goods; the first paragraphs of this decree is to the following effect: For the purpose of facilitating the development of the decree issued on the 2nd of April regarding exchange of goods—in all villages and uyezds established for exchange of goods of the industrial gubernias as well as of all non-agricultural products exclusively for grain and other food products, as well as for hemp, flax, leather and so forth; this established system for the exchange of goods applies to cooperatives as well as to all state, public, and private institutions.

The decree concerning obligatory exchange of goods, which was necessitated by the need of storing all grain in the state granaries has in addition to the grain monopoly, also marked a way for the solution of one of the greatest problems in the transitional period from capitalism

to socialism—the problem of establishing definite economic relations between the industrial workers and the agricultural workers. It became necessary to proceed further along this road the more so that for the last two years the state reserve of goods shrank to a great extent. The next progressive step with regard to goods exchange was made on the 5th of August, 1919. The publication of a decree followed, by virtue of which: for the purpose of furthering and combining the decrees of the 2nd of April and of the 8th of August, 1918, concerning exchange of goods, and for the purpose of storing raw material and fuel for the reestablishment and the supply of the village population of the R.S.F.S.R. by the organs of the People's Food Commissariat and the cooperative societies with the produce of mining and manufacturing industries as well as with bread and other food products, is conducted on the sole condition of the delivery to the state organs of all the agricultural and home industry produce by the rural population.

To sum up all the above, the basis of the Soviet food policy may be defined in the following manner: 1) the introduction of the principle of the State supply of the population with food and articles of general consumption; 2) the establishment of a monopoly for the principal food products; 3) the development of state storing with regard to non-controlled products; 4) the introduction of compulsory collective exchange of goods in the rural districts for all products of agriculture and of home industry; 5) the establishment of a compulsory levy upon the population for the delivery of the surplus of grain and the more important products of agriculture; 6) a war for bread and for other products and articles of general consumption necessary to the town against the profiteering peasant elements, which is waged in alliance with the proletarian and semi-proletarian sections of the villages and; 7) favorable terms of supply to the workers as against the non-working sections of the population.

The chief attention of the People's Food Commissariat and its organs is the collection and concentration of food and other products. Of the products which the organs of the Commissariat are endeavoring to obtain, the most important is, of course, grain, which is obtained on the principle of state monopoly.

The state monopoly has evoked sharper criticism than any other economic measure of our revolutionary epoch. That is, of course, quite obvious. The bread monopoly shakes the economic basis of bourgeois society, and affects strongly those social groups which build their welfare upon speculation at the expense of the starving population.

The bread campaign of 1918-1919 began under most unfavorable circumstances. On the one hand starvation in the capitals and in the large industrial centers had reached its height, and to appease the starving population it became necessary to permit the free purchase of sixty pounds of flour, which was carried out by the system of each man making his own purchase; this of course was ruinous to the whole activity of the food organs; on the other hand the 1918 harvest began just at the time when the Red Army suffered a series of defeats on the various fronts with the result that many fertile gubernias were lost to the Soviet Republic. The comparatively small territory over which the rule of the Workers' and Peasants' Government extended was expressed in the modest figure of 667,807,000 poods of grain collected whilst the annual needs of the population even for the supply at a hunger ration was not less than 706,661,000 poods; an obvious shortage of 40,000,000 poods of grain.

At the outset the storing of grain gave rather insignificant results: August gave just a little over one million poods, September a little over 6,000,000 poods. Further, in October, as a result of the military position changing in our favor and the consequent consolidation of the Soviet Government in the localities, the grain storing rose to 24,000,000 poods; it maintained the same level in November and only in the subsequent months, which are generally months of poorer supply, the storing of bread began to decline giving only 14,000,000 poods in December, and ten and a half million poods in January, 1919. An improvement was justifiably expected in February, but was not realized, as a result of our defeats on the eastern front; during the following period from February to August the decline was perceptible. For all that,

in accordance with incomplete data in the possession of the People's Food Commissariat the fertile gubernias alone of the Soviet Republic realized a grain-storing amounting to 110,000,000 poods.

If all the grain which had been stored on various occasions in the war areas of the Urals and the gubernias of Ufa and Orenburg is to be excluded, it will appear that in the twelve gubernias in which the supply is chiefly being carried on, namely in the gubernias of Voronezh, Viatka, Kazan, Kursk, Orel, Penza, Riazan, Samara, Saratov, Simbirsk, Tambov, and Tula, altogether there was stored 99,980,000 poods, of which 69,514,000 is grain proper, the remaining 30,466,000 forage. The following table indicates the manner in which the plan drawn up for the storing of the different kinds of grain has been carried out by the People's Food Commissariat.

Name of cereal	To be stored by levy (in thous. of poods)	Obtained	Per cent Obtained
Grain and flour	154,000	61,885	40.0
Groats and pulse	8,700	7,629	87.7
Forage	96,600	30,466	31.5
Food grain total	163,500	69,514	42.5
Food grain and forage	260,100	99,930	38.4

Thus in 1918-1919 the food organs succeeded in obtaining more than one-third of the grain surplus, both for provision and for forage, as regards groats and pulse the full amount was obtained.

The following table represents the percentage of the food obtained in the individual gubernias:

Gubernia	Per cent grain levy	Per cent forage levy	Per cent obtained
Voronezh	21.1	50.2	31.4
Viatka	29.4	19.9	24.7
Kazan	74.0	47.2	61.1
Kursk	22.1	33.0	25.3
Orel	158.4	41.5	54.8
Penza	102.9	5.5	28.1
Riazan	--	--	61.5
Samara	37.4	--	38.3
Saratov	41.8	15.5	44.3
Simbirsk	57.9	20.2	39.1
Tambov	49.9	29.2	39.5
Tula	84.1	31.5	38.3

The People's Food Commissariat is not in possession of exhaustive figures relating to the food campaign for 1917-1918. According to the incomplete data it succeeded during the ten months of 1917-1918 in obtaining only 30,000,000 poods of various kinds of grain. Considering the above-mentioned figures relating to the 1918-1919 food campaign the conclusion may be drawn that during its second year of existence the food organs of the Soviet Government were much more successful, although they have by far not fulfilled all that was expected; this in its turn proves that under the present conditions the Soviet food policy is the only rational one, and that the extremely complex apparatus which has been established for the storing of bread has justified itself. If we draw our attention to the data characterizing the current food campaign (the unfinished campaign of 1919-1920), we shall be forced to the conclusion that the improvement of the Soviet apparatus is fully confirmed. Out of the plan

for the year for the storing of 296 million poods, 160 million poods, that is to say, more than a half, has already been obtained. During the remaining months before the realization of the new harvest it is likely that not less than 20 to 25 million poods more will be obtained, so that it is presumable that the whole quantity will amount to 180 to 185 million poods or 60 to 61 per cent of the whole amount required for the year.

As to the conditions which facilitated a more successful development of the grain campaign for the current year it is particularly necessary to point out the method of storing adopted in 1919-1920, namely, the method of raising by levy the exact amount established by the organ of the Food Commissariat of the grain to be transferred by the village population who are possessed of a surplus, into the hands of the state. This method of extracting the grain surplus has proved most acceptable to the peasant population which is considering it in the light of loaning grain to the state to supply the hungry workers of the town population, which loan will be repaid by the state with manufactured goods as soon as the workers' government, having withstood and defeated its various enemies, will be in a position to devote itself entirely to work upon the economic front.

The difficult conditions under which the food organs had to carry on their past campaign was unfavorably reflected also upon the output of other agricultural products. The food organs succeeded in obtaining for the whole year 20 million poods of vegetables and greens, or approximately one-fifth of the amount needed by the population. The small amount of potatoes and vegetables obtained is, apart from the general conditions, due to the weakness of the food organs, and it became necessary to permit various organizations to procure these products in accordance with the decree of the 21st of January, 1919, concerning the supply of non-controlled products.

The comparative success of the grain levy suggested to the Soviet Government the application of the same method to other products impossible to purchase for ready cash owing to the extreme devaluation of money. A recently issued decree has established a levy on potatoes, meat, eggs and dairy produce. In order to make delivery of these products not oppressive to the rural population, the food organs have established a standard of levy which is far less than the amount of food exported in the pre-war period. It may be stated with confidence that henceforth the supply of products will be more successful, thanks to the measures adopted, and that therefore the population will be assured of provisions as far as possible under the circumstances.

The result of the supply of meat and fats was also far from being satisfactory. The food organs have supplied only the following quantities of meat: October, 1918, 35 per cent; November, 26 per cent; December, 25 per cent; January, 1919, 16 per cent; February, 13 per cent; March, 22 per cent; April, 15 per cent; May, 11 per cent. The results of the butter and oil supplies are still poorer. It is obvious that under the conditions there can be no question of a regular supply to the population of meat and fats. The amount obtained hardly sufficed for the needs of the hospitals and the Red Army.

More favorable results were obtained from the 1918-1919 fish campaign, although the fish industry of last season showed a decline in comparison with the preceding season. Unfortunately even the stock of fish which was at the disposal of the food organs could not be utilized owing to the transport difficulties in consequence of which it was equally impossible to supply the population with fish regularly. One of the reasons which hindered the supply of the population with fish is, of course, the disorganization of transport which was the result of the absence of fuel, so that finally a quantity of fish amounting to over five million poods accumulated in Astrakhan, whence it could not be removed.

It is essential to note especially the supply of the population with articles for general use. In this regard the following are the tasks with which the state is confronted: (1) the realization of goods exchange, (2) the supply of the population with both monopolized and uncontrolled goods. The goods reserve which is at the disposal of the state organs consists of goods

manufactured and produced by the nationalized enterprises, as well as of goods which the food organs purchase either independently or through the cooperative organizations.

The principal goods at the disposal of the state in 1919 were textile manufacturers. In drawing up the plan for 1919 the People's Food Commissariat took into consideration the stock of manufactured textile goods and the 800,000,000 yards of cloth which were to be manufactured during the current year, and the population of Soviet Russia numbering 80 million persons. This gives us a standard of ten yards per person which quantity is to be increased for the workers (sufficient for a worker's suit) and decreased to some extent for the agricultural population in view of the latter possessing homespun goods. According to this plan the whole textile reserve was to be exhausted by the end of 1919.

In reality, however, the People's Food Commissariat had not expended the whole of this reserve. This was due to various reasons: in the first place, to the inadequacy of the distributing apparatus and the disorganization of transport; secondly, to the fact that in some districts occupied or threatened by the enemy, textile goods were not dispatched, and finally because the actual reserve of textile manufactures was greater than was generally calculated. It does not, however, follow that the state has at its disposal any considerable reserve of textile goods; figuratively speaking, Soviet Russia is wearing out its last textiles.

As regards other goods, the state reserve of these was still smaller. In accordance with the stock at hand, the ration of matches was one and a half boxes per head for the civilian population with five boxes per head for the army, a quarter of a pound tobacco per month or 240 cigarettes for every smoker; and twenty pounds of salt per person per annum. All these rations were constantly decreased during the last year.

We had at our state depots seven million poods of sugar at the beginning of the year; out of these four million poods were distributed prior to the autumn season; the remaining three million were left for the sugar season.

The supply of the population with foot-wear and leather was in a bad state. There was an abundance of soft leather, but the reserve of hard sole leather and India rubber soles was exhausted. Therefore, although it was proposed to supply the population during the year with four million pairs of boots, in reality it was only possible to deliver two hundred pairs monthly. The greater part of the foot-wear manufactured went for the needs of the army.

The distribution of galoshes was to be in the ratio of one pair to every three men of the town population and one pair for eight men of the agricultural districts. Actually, here also the supply was far more modest as, due to the lack of fuel, the output of the factories was inconsiderable.

There was also a shortage of agricultural implements. Only one-third of the requirements could be satisfied by the goods in stock.

The stock of glass at the disposal of the state is rather small. Recently it became necessary to decrease greatly the supply of glass to the population in view of the great demand for glass by the military authorities. As regards glassware the stock was in a most satisfactory state, though the supply was impeded by the transport difficulties.

In a more critical state during the last year was the supply of the population with lighting materials. In 1919-1920, owing to the complete lack of paraffin and petroleum, the supply of lighting materials to the population had to be suspended entirely.

To sum up, the supply of the population with goods during the preceding and the current year was obviously unsatisfactory. The chief reason for this was not so much the shortcomings of the distributive apparatus as the lack of goods reserves at the disposal of the state. The general perspective of the supply graphically is as follows: until the present time we lived exclusively on the old stock and to some extent on that of the future, and it is only now when our forces are no longer expended on the needs of the war forced upon us, that we are beginning once again to create material values.

As regards the second important task with which the People's Food Commissariat is confronted, viz., the exchange of goods with the fertile gubernias, unfortunately, the People's

Food Commissariat does not possess all the material needed for dealing exhaustively with this question. In addition to the above-stated decrees and acts defining the system of exchange of goods, the following may be added: altogether during 1918-1919 goods to the amount of a little over one milliard rubles were sent to the fertile gubernias for the agricultural population; that is to say that during 1918-1919 about 55 to 60 per cent of grain which was received for the starving population through the state organs of supply, was paid for by an exchange of goods. Altogether during the existence of the Soviet Government goods amounting to not less than four to four and a half milliards of rubles have been dispatched to the agricultural districts.

The question now in conclusion is: did the People's Food Commissariat and its organs prove equal to the task with which they were confronted? From the foregoing it is apparent that the task of supplying the population with food products and articles of prime necessity remains unsolved. The state organs of supply have proved so far incapable of giving to the population even a minimum of what it requires and without which a more or less normal existence is unthinkable.

In considering the activity of the Food Commissariat and its organs the fact should not be overlooked that on the whole the food problem depends upon a number of questions without the actual solution of which the proper organization of the supply for the population is an absolute impossibility. The four years' world war and the proletarian revolution of 1918 had shaken the basis of the former economic relations; and so long as a new social edifice is not built up on the ruins of the old capitalist world, there can be no question of the full supply of all the needs of the population.

Unfortunately, this aspect of the question is intentionally overlooked by the enemies of the Soviet Government and often also by the adherents of the proletarian revolution. The fact is overlooked that the problem of supplying the population is being dealt with by the People's Food Commissariat and its organs at an acute moment of blockade, at the moment when Soviet Russia represents a besieged fortress, cut off from the sources of grain and fats, under conditions of tormenting travail, of social beginnings in production, under the natural decline of production of labor in all branches of production and under conditions of extreme disorganization of transport.

The activity of the state food organs is in some way explained by the data regarding the organs of supplying the public feeding which were given by Comrade Popov in the article entitled "The Consumption of the Town Population of Soviet Russia," published in the second supplement of the *Economicheskaya Zhizn* (Economic Life) for 1919. On the basis of a whole number of budget forms from Petrograd and Moscow and of almost all the gubernia towns and some of the uyezd towns, Comrade Popov comes to the following conclusions: for nine producing gubernias at an average consumption there was 1.44 pounds of bread per person or what is the same 1.30 pounds of bread per adult. The People's Food Commissariat and its organs provided 52.4 per cent of the rationed bread. In the consuming gubernias in which it became necessary to bring bread from other districts, the supply of the Commissariat was much weaker. In 75 towns and settlements and in 20 consuming gubernias, there was on an average 1.02 pounds of bread per person (fluctuating from 0.75 pounds per day for the gubernia of Cherepovetz to 1.28 pounds for the gubernia of Nizhni-Novgorod); in other words one and a third pounds of bread for every adult per day. The Food Commissariat and its distributive organs supplied the population on an average of 40 per cent, reaching to 71.74 per cent for the Cherepovetz gubernia and 95 per cent for that of Olonetz. In Moscow the supply of the People's Food Commissariat reaches the above mentioned figure of 38 per cent; it may be mentioned that the industrial workers and the railwaymen received 41 to 42 per cent while employees and others including bourgeois elements received 36 per cent.

The figures quoted speak for themselves. They prove that if the Commissariat does not supply the full ration of bread in its organization of public feeding under the existing difficult conditions it supplies at least a formidable quantity. The 40 to 50 per cent of the whole

quantity of bread consumed which is supplied by the Food Commissariat would never have fallen into the hands of the workers and the poor had the population been driven to buy it at the existing exorbitant prices in the open market.

It is therefore not possible to look upon the activity of the Food Commissariat as unimportant. It is equally impossible to regard the Soviet food policy as incorrect and not answering the interests of the working masses. In the present transition period the main tasks of the state organs of supply is to give the workers and the poor, at the expense of the rich, the little that the state has at its disposal. From the above, apparently means of solving this question have been found; but they would not have been found had the government food policy been abandoned.

It is essential to mention a few measures in the sphere of food supply undertaken by the government. Being fully aware of the insufficiency of the goods supplied to the population, the state organs of supply assist the population in other ways. Thus, for instance, the decree dated March 17, 1919, establishes the principle of free feeding for children; this measure has so far been introduced in Moscow, Petrograd and 14 gubernia towns; by virtue of this decree the products supplied by the food organs are free to all children who have not reached the age of sixteen. In addition to this, in August, 1919, the decree followed, establishing an additional ration for those families of Red Army soldiers receiving pensions. Finally, the state is taking energetic measures for the organization of public feeding, which are to improve public feeding at the account of economy effected in the products and materials expended.

The practical significance of the measures mentioned may be gathered from the data concerning the organization of free child feeding and of public feeding. Towards the end of 1919 Moscow children's dining rooms catered to 300,000 children and Petrograd to 260,000 children; the half-yearly estimate for the second half of 1919 for child feeding amounts almost to three milliards of rubles. Moscow had public kitchens to serve 320,000 persons, Petrograd 822,464 persons; in other words Petrograd was in a position to feed the entire population in public kitchens.

During the present year the principle of free feeding generally, and of children in particular, has widened extensively. According to the state estimate for 1920, the annual expenditure of the labor government for the organization of free feeding of children, infants as well as of all homeless children, amounted to 51,306,100,000 rubles. In addition to this, in the month of March the organization of free public feeding for all workers and other persons of Petrograd and Moscow was begun.

The increase of the food resources at the disposal of the food organs is to be explained by the successes of the Red Army, by the improvements of the state supply apparatus as well as the general consolidation of the Soviet Government; all this made it possible to put forward a number of important questions in the sphere of public supply. In the first place the questions have arisen of the improvement of the food position of mental workers and secondly of increased rations for workers employed in the more important state enterprises. The latter measures which are necessarily only taken gradually are already giving results, which take the form of an undoubted increase of the productivity of labor—both physical and mental.

Starvation has not yet been overcome in Soviet Russia. To defeat starvation it is necessary to break the resistance of the bourgeoisie and to build up the political and economic life of the country on new communist lines. The approaching victory over starvation depends upon the extent to which in spite of all the difficulties, Soviet Russia is achieving her aims.

With regard to the present difficult period which is continuing to demand, though less than formerly, ever fresh victims, it is permissible to put the following questions: what other government, with the exception of the Soviet Government, which has realized the dictatorship of the workers and the peasants, could possibly give to the workers and the poor that which the supply organs of the Soviet Government have given him? Would not any other kind of government have deprived the toilers of the little that they receive in order to enrich at the expense of these people all the parasitic elements and the bourgeoisie?

Soviet Russia, Vol. 3, No. 18 (30 October 1920), pp. 430-433 and No. 21 (20 November 1921), pp. 513-516.



A PROPOSED LEAGUE OF NATIONS COMMISSION OF INQUIRY TO RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET RESPONSE

May 1920

This tentative effort at better Soviet-Western relations failed. The Soviet response well expresses attitudes at the time. The Soviet Union did not join the League of Nations until much later. The English Trade Unions delegation referred to did visit Russia and published its impressions. Several dates are involved in the exchange: the Soviet resolution was taken on 7 May but the cable was sent on the thirteenth.

THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY TO RUSSIA

Report presented by the Belgian Representative, M. Destrée

The Council of the League of Nations decided at one of its previous meetings to send a Commission of Enquiry to Russia in order to obtain precise and impartial information regarding the internal situation in that country. The Council naturally wished that this enquiry should be carried out with the strictest impartiality and without prejudice of any kind, favourable or unfavourable, to the Russian Revolution and the Soviet Republic, of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants.

This enquiry might have served as a sound basis for a just estimate of the situation; might have cleared up international misunderstandings; and, while respecting the right of the Russian people to whatever form of Government they might choose, it might have paved the way to the resumption of economic relations which are as important for Russia as for the rest of the world.

The following telegram, dated 17th March, was sent to the Soviet authorities:—

“The Council of the League of Nations, having been invited to examine the possibility of sending a Commission to Russia, has decided to constitute a Commission in order to obtain impartial and reliable information on the conditions now prevailing in that country. The Permanent Secretariat of the League is therefore instructed to ask the Soviet authorities whether they are prepared to give this Commission the right of free entry and return, and to make arrangements for ensuring to the Commission complete liberty of movement, communication and investigation, and to guarantee the absolute immunity and dignity of its members and the inviolability of their correspondence, archives and effects.

“The Commission will begin its work as soon as these facilities and rights have been formally assured to it.

“On receipt of an affirmative reply the composition of the Commission will be notified to the Soviet Authorities at the earliest possible moment.

“Drummond,
Secretary-General.”

The following reply was received by the Council at its meeting in Rome:—

Secretary-General, League of Nations, Palazzo Chigi, Rome.
London, 42113. 767. 14. 3 h. 16s.

Following cable dated Reval, 13th May, and addressed Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary of the League of Nations, London. Received here 14th May.

"Resolution adopted by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Russia on 7th May, 1920. The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the workers, peasants and Red Army Deputies and of the Cossacks, welcomes any sign which would show that the Governments which, up to the present, have made war on Soviet Russia and which have tried to separate it from the other countries by cordons and barbed wire, now realise the uselessness of their attempts to strangle the great Russian people. The decision of the League of Nations to send a delegation to Russia to study its present situation is considered by the Central Executive Committee as a sign that some of the Powers belonging to the League of Nations are trying to renounce the policy of strife against the Russian people. The Central Executive Committee welcomes this decision, although up to the present the League of Nations has not made the smallest effort officially to communicate the fact of its existence to the Russian people. But, at the same time, the Central Executive Committee notes that the Polish Government, which belongs to the League of Nations, has imposed war on the Russian people before deigning to enter into negotiations with them on neutral or even Allied territory, that the Polish Government has then tried to seize territories belonging to Russia or to Soviet Ukraine, and that, in this criminal policy, the Polish Government has not met with any opposition from the League of Nations, but has even received active support from certain Powers, Members of the League, which have invariably supported all revolutions of the deposed class of exploiters against the Soviet power. The Soviet Government, which hoped for the raising of the blockade of Russia, is keenly interested that representatives of all the nations should know the internal situation of Russia. The Soviet Government, therefore, will admit to Russia representatives of all the organs of the Press provided they give a guarantee that they will in no way abuse the hospitality of the Russian people. The Soviet Government will receive as guests of the Russian Professional Unions the Delegation of the English Congress of Trade Unions, who will have full liberty to study the situation in Russia in all its aspects. Taking these principles as a basis, the Central Executive Committee declares that it consents in principle to the visit of the Delegation of the League of Nations, and that on Soviet Russian territory they will be given the same liberty for studying the situation as is enjoyed by the representatives of other Powers within the boundaries of a sovereign State. They consider it evident, at the same time, that the League of Nations, which professes to watch over not only the integrity of international law, but also over all principles regulating relations between the civilised nations, should not send to Russia as representatives or experts persons who have been associated with the plots against the Russian Government. Further, whereas certain Members of the League of Nations are actively supporting Poland, which is in a state of war with Soviet Russia, and are furnishing it with arms and instructors, the Central Executive Committee, for military reasons, does not wish to admit, at the present time, representatives of the League among whom would be representatives of nations which have, in fact, renounced their neutrality in the war on Soviet Russia. Firmly convinced that the Red Army will prove to Poland in the near future the necessity of peace with Soviet Russia and that the latter will soon be able to return to pacific labour and put a stop to the restrictions imposed by the state of war, the Central Executive Committee appoints a Commission composed of the Comrades Kamenev, Lutovinov, and Kourski, which will have the right, together with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, to authorise, when the proper moment arrives, the entry into Russia of the representatives of the League of Nations without the necessity for a further convocation of the Central Executive Committee.

"1328. (Signed) President of the Meeting of the Central Executive Committee, Kamenev; Secretary, Enukidze."

I [Destrée] propose that a reply be sent to the Soviet Authorities reading as follows:—

“The Council of the League of Nations has very carefully considered the answer of the Soviet Government to the wireless telegram sent by the Council on 17th March.

“The Council regrets that, after the long delay in replying to the invitation of the Council, the Soviet Government has put forward conditions practically amounting to a refusal.

“The Soviet Government claim in their reply to differentiate between the States whose representatives may be authorised to take part in the proposed enquiry. The League of Nations is a single international organ for the establishment of justice and peace. Its delegates do not represent any particular State; they represent the League itself.

“The League of Nations still hopes that the Soviet Government will modify its reply. “If, however, it cannot accept, before 15th June, the terms of the request as submitted to it on 17th March, the Council of the League of Nations must lay upon the Soviet Government the entire responsibility for frustrating a step prompted solely by the desire to improve international relations and the economic situation in the world.”

League of Nations, *Official Journal*, No. 4 (June 1920), pp. 149-151.



GEORGIAN INDEPENDENCE

7 May 1920

Georgia had successfully established an independent state with a Menshevik led government in 1918 (see volume one). Soviet Russia finally recognized Georgian independence with this document, temporarily halting what until then appeared to be aggressive preparations against Georgia and all the states of the Caucasus. The outbreak of war with Poland probably dictated this more conciliatory policy. This treaty appeared to follow a pattern established with the Baltic states but it ran counter to other policies which aimed at de facto incorporation of nominally independent republics through control by the Communist Party and the sharing of some government functions. Georgia would be forcibly taken over in 1921 (see below).

PEACE TREATY, CONCLUDED IN MOSCOW ON 7 MAY 1920, BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST FEDERAL SOVIET REPUBLIC (RSFSR) AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA

The RSFSR and the Democratic Republic of Georgia, animated by a common desire to establish stable and peaceful relations between the two countries in order to assure the well-being of the people living therein, have decided to conclude for this purpose a special treaty and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries: the government of the RSFSR, Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Grigorii Illarionovich Uratadze, member of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia; who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

Article I. Recognizing the principles proclaimed by the RSFSR concerning the right of all peoples to self-determination, including complete secession from the state to which they belong, Russia recognizes unconditionally the existence and independence of the Georgian state, and voluntarily renounces all sovereign rights which belonged to Russia with respect to the Georgian people and territory.

Article II. Recognizing the principles proclaimed in the preceding article 1 of the present treaty, Russia undertakes to refrain from any kind of interference in the internal affairs of Georgia.

Article III. 1. The state frontier between Russia and Georgia, runs from the Black Sea, along the river Psou to Mount Akhakheha, passes over Mount Akhakheha and Mount Agapet, and continues along the northern frontier of the former Chernomorsk, Kutais, and Tiflis provinces to the Zakatalsk circuit and along the eastern boundary thereof up to the frontier of Armenia.

2. The summits of all mountains along this boundary line shall be considered neutral until January 1, 1922. They shall neither be occupied by troops of, nor fortified by, either of the contracting parties.

3. The neutralization provided for in Article 2 shall extend also the Dar'ial summit from Balty to Kobi, on the Mamison summit from Zaremag to Oni, and on all other summits for a distance of five versts on each side of the boundary line.

4. The exact determination of the state boundary between the two contracting parties shall be carried out by a special mixed boundary commission composed of an equal number of representatives of each party. The results of the work of this commission shall be confirmed by a special treaty between the two contracting parties.

Article IV. 1. Russia undertakes to recognize unconditionally as entering into the state of Georgia, in addition to those parts of the province of Chernomorsk transferred to Georgia in accordance with paragraph 1 of article 3 of the present treaty, the following provinces and regions of the former Russian Empire: Tiflis, Kutais and Batum with all districts and circuits forming the said provinces and regions, and, in addition, the circuits of Zakatalsk and Sukhum.

2. In accordance with the gradual development of mutual relations between Georgia and states other than Russia which exist or may be formed later, and which now border or may border on Georgia along boundary lines other than those described in the preceding article 3 of the present treaty, Russia undertakes to recognize, at a later date, as Georgian territory those parts of the former vice-royalty of the Caucasus which may be transferred to Georgia by agreements concluded with the above-mentioned formations.

Article V. Recognizing the justice of Russia's request that within the territory of Georgia henceforth there shall not be permitted any military operations, the presence of military forces, or, generally, activities which may create within the territory of Georgia conditions likely to endanger Russia's independence or to establish in Georgia a base of military operations directed against the RSFSR or against states allied with the latter, Georgia undertakes:

1. To disarm immediately or to intern in concentration camps all military and naval units which, at the time of signing this agreement, shall find themselves on the territory of Georgia, and also detachments or groups which pretend to be the government of Russia or of part of Russia, or the government of states allied with Russia, as well as representatives and officials, organizations and groups whose purpose is to overthrow the government of Russia or of allied states.

2. To disarm immediately and to intern all vessels anchored in the harbors of Georgia which form part of the military and naval forces and groups mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present article, or which for any reason have been at the disposal of those organizations and groups and are anchored at present in the harbors of Georgia. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this article shall be applied in full to the crews of those vessels.

3. To deliver to Russia free of charge, without request for compensation, and without exception, all military and naval property, valuables, and sums which shall be found in the possession, use, or at the disposal of the organizations and groups mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article and which, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the same article, have been transferred to Georgia.

By the terms of the present paragraph the following shall be considered as naval and military property: vessels and other floating units, all artillery, commissary (including food and equipment), engineering and aviation supplies.

4. To hand over to Russia, after their disarmament, all units, organizations, groups, and crews of the vessels mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present article.

Note: Russia undertakes to spare the life of all persons delivered to her under this article.

5. To take measures to deport from Georgian territory, as described in article 4 of the present treaty, all troops and military units which do not form a part of the government troops of Georgia.

6. To take measures against the admission into the territory as described in article 4 of the present treaty of all troops and military units which do not form a part of the government troops of Georgia.

7. To take measures against the admission into the territory of Georgia of troops and military units enumerated in the preceding paragraph 5 of the present article.

8. To forbid any person belonging to the units, organizations and groups enumerated in paragraphs 1 and 5 of the present article, in case such persons are not of Georgian nationality, to enlist in any capacity whatsoever, even as volunteers, in the government troops of Georgia.

9. Neither to permit henceforth any formation or existence on her territory, as described in article 4 of the present treaty, of any kind of organizations and groups pretending to be the government of Russia or a part of Russia, or the government of a state allied with Russia, nor to permit any representatives and officials of the organizations and groups having as their purpose the overthrow of the government of Russia or the government of states allied to Russia. Georgia also undertakes to prohibit any transportation through her territory by such organizations and groups of all material which may be used for attacking Russia or allied states as well as to prohibit vessels and floating units belonging to such organizations and groups from remaining in Georgian ports and waters, with the exception of such cases as may be provided for by international law with regard to vessels in distress and the like.

10. In case such organizations, groups, representatives, or officials enumerated in paragraph 8 of this article should attempt to violate the measures therein,—these persons and their property, while subject to arrest or sequestration by the government of Georgia in accordance with the obligations which it has assumed in virtue of paragraph 8, shall be treated in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article.

11. The measures provided for in paragraph 5 of this article shall be carried out immediately after the signature of this treaty. Georgia promises to effect their execution within the shortest possible delay, not hesitating to employ armed force whenever necessary.

Article VI. Russia undertakes not to permit on her territory the sojourn or activities of any kind of groups and organizations pretending to be the government of Georgia or any part thereof, or of any kind of groups and organizations whose purpose is the overthrow of the government of Georgia. Russia undertakes to use all her influence with the states allied to her for the purpose of preventing any admission into their territories of groups and organizations mentioned in this article.

Article VII. In order to remove all possible misunderstandings, both contracting parties have agreed that in carrying out paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 5 of this treaty in those parts of Georgia which shall form part thereof as provided for in paragraph 2 of article 4 of this treaty after the delimitation of Georgia with neighboring states, except Russia, the necessary preventive measures, on the part of Georgia, provided for in such cases, shall be carried out as soon as possible after she has formally asserted sovereignty over any of these territories.

Article VIII. A mixed commission composed of an equal number of representatives of both parties shall be established to supervise the exact fulfilment of articles 5 and 6 of this treaty, as well as to transfer and receive persons and properties mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 5. The commission shall itself determine the order of procedure. The delivery and

the reception of persons and property, in conformity with paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 5 of the present agreement shall be completed within two months from the date of the signature of this treaty.

Article IX. 1. Persons of Georgian origin residing on Russian territory and having attained the age of eighteen are entitled to opt for Georgian citizenship. Similarly, persons of non-Georgian origin, residing on the territory of Georgia and having attained the age indicated, are entitled to opt for Russian citizenship.

2. The details concerning the procedure to be followed for carrying out the present article shall be confirmed by a special agreement between the two contracting parties.

3. Citizens of both contracting parties who desire to avail themselves of the rights granted them by the present article shall fulfill the required formalities within a year from the date on which the agreement mentioned in the preceding paragraph 2 of this article shall enter into force.

Article X. Georgia undertakes to exempt from punishment and from any further judicial or administrative prosecution all persons who were subject to such prosecution in Georgia for offenses committed in behalf of the RSFSR or of the communist party.

Note: Georgia undertakes to liberate immediately all persons under imprisonment for offenses as mentioned above.

Article XI. Each of the contracting parties undertakes to recognize and respect the flag and emblem of the other party as the emblem of a friendly state. The designs of the flags and emblems and modifications thereto, if any, shall be communicated mutually through diplomatic channels.

Article XII. Pending the conclusion of a commercial treaty between the contracting parties, for which purpose measures shall be taken as soon as possible, economic relations between Russia and Georgia shall be subject, temporarily, to the following general provisions:

1. Both contracting parties shall base their mutual commercial relations upon the principle of the most favored nation clause.

2. Goods whose origin or destination is one of the contracting parties shall not be subjected by the other party to any transit duties or taxes.

Article XIII. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 11 of the present treaty shall serve as a basis for the commercial treaty which is to be concluded between the two contracting parties, as provided in article 12.

Article XIV. Diplomatic and consular relations shall be established between Russia and Georgia as soon as possible. Pending the conclusion of a special convention between the contracting parties concerning the mutual status of their consuls, for which purpose measures shall be taken, the rights and duties of a consul shall be determined by the laws of each contracting party relating thereto.

Article XV. The settlement of questions of public and private rights arising between citizens of both contracting parties, as well as the settlement of certain special questions between the two states, shall be entrusted to special Russo-Georgian mixed commissions which shall be formed within the shortest possible delay after the signature of this treaty. The composition, rights, and duties of these commissions shall be set forth in separate instructions to be confirmed in the case of each commission upon mutual agreement of both contracting parties. Within the jurisdiction of these commissions, among other questions, fall:

1. Formulation of a commercial treaty and other economic agreements.

2. Settlement of questions concerning the distribution, from the former central institutions, of all archives, judicial and administrative records, deposits and acts of civil character.

3. Settlement of questions concerning the distribution, from the former central institutions, of all archives, judicial and administrative records, deposits and acts of civil character.

4. Settlement of the question concerning the method of utilization, the use, possession, and administration of the Batum-Baku petroleum pipeline with regard to that part of it which,

as provided in article 4 of the present treaty, shall fall in Georgian territory. This question shall be confirmed later by means of a special agreement between the two contracting parties.

Article XVI. The present treaty enters into force automatically from the date of its signature and shall not require special ratification. In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries of the two contracting parties have signed the present treaty and affixed their seals thereto.

Done in two copies in Moscow, May 7, 1920.

(Signed) L. Karakhan.

(Signed) Gr. Uratadze.

Special Secret Supplement to the Agreement Between Russia and Georgia

Article I. Georgia undertakes to recognize the right of free existence and activity of all communist organizations throughout her territory, and in particular the right of free assemblies and free press (including press production).

In any case there shall be no judicial or administrative repression against private persons, as a result of public propaganda and agitation in behalf of the communist program or from the activity of persons and organizations working on a communist basis.

Article II. The present secret supplement shall form an integral part of the treaty signed on this date between Russia and Georgia. Similarly to the said treaty, this supplement enters into force automatically from the date of its signature and shall require no special ratification.

Done in two copies at Moscow, May 7, 1920.

L. Karakhan

Gr. Uratadze.

Supplementary Agreement to the Treaty of Peace Between Russia and Georgia, Concluded on May 7, 1920

The undersigned, the representative of the RSFSR, Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and the plenipotentiary of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Grigori Illarionovich Uratadze, member of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia, taking into consideration the fact that the Russian government has secured the preliminary approval of the government of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic as concerns the contents of the articles which follow, have agreed as follows:

Article I. The question of contested localities situated on the frontier of Georgia and Azerbaijan and in the Zakatalsk circuit shall be submitted for settlement to a mixed commission composed of representatives of the government of Azerbaijan and Georgia in equal number, presided over by a plenipotentiary of the RSFSR. All decisions of this commission shall be recognized by Azerbaijan and Georgia as compulsory.

Article II. Pending the decision of the commission with regard to questions mentioned in paragraph 1 of this agreement, Georgia and Azerbaijan shall not send into the Zakatalsk circuit any troops in addition to those which were stationed there at the time of the signature of this agreement.

Article III. The present supplementary agreement shall be regarded as an integral part of the treaty between Russia and Georgia signed on May 7, 1920, in Moscow, and similarly to the said treaty, enters into force automatically from the date of its signature and shall not require special ratification.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and affixed their seals thereto.

Done in Moscow in two copies, May 12, 1920.

(Signed) L. Karakhan.

Gr. Uratadze.

Batsell, pp. 247-254, with minor modifications.



REORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR NATIONALITIES

19 May 1920

The end of the Civil War brought to the fore the relationship of the many nationalities of the old and new state to the dominant Russians and to the central government. This issue was to preoccupy the leaders over the next few years and profoundly affect the shape of the new state—a federal republic. The Commissariat for Nationalities had not been very active in 1918-1919 but now it and its head, Stalin, began to play a much more assertive role both vis-a-vis the nationalities and within the government. This decree marked the first step. Later decrees in 1920 further strengthened the authority of the commissariat.

DECREE OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

In order to ensure fraternal co-operation among the nationalities and tribes of the RSFSR, the People's Commissariat for Nationalities shall be reorganized on the following basis:

1. Every nationality within the RSFSR appoints, directly from the local soviets and their congresses or through its autonomous government, where such exists, a special Delegation to the People's Commissariat for Nationalities, consisting of a chairman and two members.
2. The Delegations of the nationalities are in charge of the corresponding departments of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities, and may reorganize them in accordance with the needs and requirements of the working masses of their nationalities.
3. The People's Commissariat for Nationalities is subordinated to the Soviet of Nationalities composed of representatives of the above-mentioned national Delegations.
4. The Soviet of Nationalities is presided over by the People's Commissar for Nationalities assisted by a board of five members.
5. The People's Commissariat for Nationalities is given the following immediate tasks:
 - (a) to work out and apply all the measures required to ensure fraternal co-operation among the nationalities and tribes of the RSFSR;
 - (b) to work out and apply all the measures required to guarantee the interests of the national minorities residing in the territory of other nationalities within the RSFSR;
 - (c) to solve all disputes arising from the overlapping of national settlements.
6. The People's Commissariat for Nationalities is instructed to issue appropriate instructions to this effect.

May 19, 1920.

Chairman of VTsIK: M. Kalinin
 People's Commissar for Nationalities: J. Stalin
 Secretary of VTsIK: A. Yenukidze

Schlesinger, *Nationalities Problem*, pp. 34-35.



WAR WITH POLAND

THESES OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

23 May 1920

On 25 April 1920 the long simmering border conflict with Poland led to full war when Poland invaded the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as part of its effort to build a Polish dominated federation

including all or parts of Lithuania, Belorussia and Ukraine. The following document represented the official position of the Russian Communist Party regarding the nature and issues of the war, including its view that Poland—and the other small states bordering Russia in the west—were mere pawns of the major Western powers who were the victors in World War I, the "Entente" to which the document refers. The theses also discussed measures for mobilizing Russia's resources for the war. The theses were drafted by Trotsky after meetings of the Party's Politburo on 26 and 28 April, but were published only on this date in Izvestia. "White-Guard" was used here to link Poland and others to the Bolsheviks' opponents in the Civil War, called "Whites" or "White Guards," and was intended as a general derogatory term. See also the Soviet note to Poland of 28 January 1920, and Joffe's comments on the peace treaty, 18 March 1921.

THE POLISH FRONT AND OUR TASKS

1. The imperialists of the Entente, while conducting negotiations about trade relations with Soviet Russia, were at the same time holding White-Guardist Poland, Finland and Latvia on a leash. In the camp of the imperialists uncertainty and contradiction reign supreme on all questions, and especially concerning what policy to adopt to insure the suffocation of workers' and peasants' Russia.

2. Some of the capitalists of the Entente countries, especially those that produce articles of mass consumption, hoped, by means of trade with the kulaks through the White-Guard cooperatives, to wreck the socialist economy which we are building. Heavy industry—and military industry first of all—preferred the military destruction of Soviet Russia and the direct seizure of its natural resources. Different Entente governments and even different members of those governments have wavered and still waver from one position to the other, depending on which capitalist circles they are connected with and how they evaluate the firmness of their own armies and Soviet Russia's ability to resist.

3. White-Guard Poland, like the other small border states, does not have an independent policy, and is guided by greed moderated only by cowardice. When the Entente, influenced by a sharp need for raw materials, more definitely turned toward trade negotiations, the bourgeoisie of the western border states gave up thoughts of further seizures and plunder at the expense of Russia. A series of peace negotiations opened—first with Estonia, with which we have concluded peace, and then with Latvia, Poland, Finland, Rumania and Lithuania.

4. But then in the ranks of the Entente again a different wind began to blow. The labor upsurge in Soviet Russia on the one hand, and on the other our firm course in regards to the [nationalization of] cooperatives, apparently made the Entente bosses understand that although trade with us is fully possible and economically beneficial for both sides, the stock exchange cannot succeed through trade in undermining the foundations that we are laying for a socialist economy. The stormy growth of proletarian revolution in Germany and its obvious approach in all other countries, including England, propels the imperialist governments of all countries onto the path of bitter struggle against their own and other workers and, consequently, onto the path of a new military adventure against Soviet Russia.

5. Feeling the leash on which their master held them weakening, and being urged on by the most extreme imperialists of the Entente countries, the Polish bourgeoisie opened an offensive against Ukraine. They openly announced their intent to occupy it in order to establish over it, through their own puppets such as Petliura [a Ukrainian nationalist leader—RW], their own military, national, economic and political domination.

6. At the same time Finland and Latvia put forth absurd territorial demands, while the Latvian delegation did not hide the fact that their territorial demands were formulated according to instructions from Warsaw in support of the Polish offensive against Vitebsk and Smolensk.

7. Thus, questions of our future relations with the western border states, and the question of a blockade and of possible trade relations with the Entente countries, again will be decided by military arms.

8. Having opened an offensive against us after all of our concessions and after our declarations of willingness to make new concessions in the interest of peace, the Polish bourgeoisie has put its own fate at risk. It proclaimed that it can not and does not wish to exist alongside Soviet Russia. By this it has driven itself into a corner. There can be no doubt as to the outcome of the forthcoming struggle. The nobility and bourgeoisie of Poland will be destroyed. The Polish proletariat will turn their country into a socialist republic.

9. But because the battle will lead not to life, but to death, it will have an extremely intense and harsh character. The Polish government, in which stock exchange scoundrels work hand in hand with the scoundrels of social-patriotism, will mobilize against us not only the bitter hatred of the large, middle and petty-kulak bourgeoisie and the haughty arrogance of the nobility, but also the nationalist prejudices of the backward elements of the laboring masses, which the monopoly yellow press systematically poisons with injections of chauvinism.

Therefore we have proclaimed from the very beginning, and in the future will show by actions, that the destruction of the Polish White-Guardists who have attacked us will not by one iota change our attitude toward the independence of Poland.

10. From all of the above it follows that it is necessary for us to consider the war with Poland not as a partial task for the Western front, but as a central task for all of workers' and peasants' Russia.

11. All party, soviet and trade union organizations must immediately begin a broad and intensive agitation across the entire country, one which is not limited to the cities but which reaches to the furthest depths of the rural countryside. Their goal is to explain to the entire population of Russia the meaning of our policy regarding Poland, the history of our efforts to secure peace, the objectives of the Polish attack on us, and the historical significance of our war with White-Guard Poland. Workers and peasants, both men and women, must understand and appreciate that war with Poland is their war, is a war for the independence of socialist Russia, for its solidarity with socialist Poland and with the proletariat of Europe and the entire world.

12. The concentration of the country's attention and effort on the Western front must not under any circumstances lead to a suspension of the economic measures upon which Soviet Russia has focused its attention during the past months: the revival of transportation and the procurement of food, fuel and raw materials. The intense nature of the struggle with bourgeois Poland will demand a stable economic situation in the rear and first of all a strong transport apparatus which is able to supply the front during its westward advance.

Central and local economic organs must strictly review their own programs in order to concentrate on what is actually and without doubt necessary, achieving thereby the desirable balance between immediate support of the front and ensuring future successes in the area of transport and the basic industrial branches.

13. The transfer of some of our military units and of whole armies to a labor function was, apparently, interpreted by the Polish chauvinists as a sign of our weariness and of military weakness. It is necessary to show in action the extent to which our enemy miscalculated. Central and local military authorities, together with the relevant economic institutions, must review the list of military units which are on the labor front, immediately free the majority of them from labor duties and bring them to combat readiness for rapid transfer to the Western front. On the labor front military units, excepting for special circumstances, must be replaced by people mobilized for labor service.

14. Local and party organization must immediately and fully discuss the question of their own assistance for the Western front. First of all must be the goal of fulfilling the instructions of the Central Committee regarding the mobilization of workers for the Western front.

It is necessary in this connection to again review the staff of all party, soviet and, especially, economic institutions. The process of transfer from collegial to one-person management must be hastened and the personnel freed up thereby must be put at the disposal of the Political Directorate of the RVSР [Revolutionary War Council of the Republic].

15. Mass meetings and conferences of non-party workers and peasants must be convened everywhere for the discussion of the war with Poland and for establishing committees for assistance to the Western front.

16. All People's Commissariats and their departments must immediately convene conferences for working out plans of agitational, organizational, economic and other assistance to the Western front.

Every Saturday the People's Commissars will present to the Council of Defense (copies to the RVSR) brief factual reports on the assistance their commissariats have given to the Western front during the previous week.

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TROTSKY, TERROR AND COMMUNISM

29 MAY 1920

Karl Kautsky's 1918 criticism of the Bolshevik regime had provoked Lenin into one of his most famous, important, and vitriolic writings, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky—see volume one of Documents of Soviet History. Kautsky, long one of the leading lights of European socialism, resumed his criticisms, prompting Trotsky to write Terrorism and Communism. Finished just before the second congress of the Communist International, one purpose was to win firm support for the Bolshevik position rejecting all compromise with the centrist elements of European socialism—with which he identified Kautsky. To do so he had to argue for the correctness of Bolshevik policies from the seizure of power through the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly and the Civil War, including the use of terror, and to redefine democracy. Moreover, he had to impute a general European significance to them, not just a unique Russian history. This selection is abridged and the last part, dealing with the trade union and labor controversy in Russia, is completely omitted.

Leon Trotsky
Terrorism and Communism
A Reply to Karl Kautsky

1

The Balance of Power

The argument which is repeated again and again in criticisms of the Soviet system in Russia, and particularly in criticisms of revolutionary attempts to set up a similar structure in other countries, is the argument based on the balance of power. The Soviet regime in Russia is utopian—"because it does not correspond to the balance of power." Backward Russia cannot put objects before itself which would be appropriate to advanced Germany. And for the proletariat of Germany it would be madness to take political power into its own hands, as this "at the present moment" would disturb the balance of power. The League of Nations is imperfect, but still corresponds to the balance of power. The struggle for the overthrow of imperialist supremacy is utopian—the balance of power only requires a revision of the Versailles Treaty....

What is this balance of power after all—that sacramental formula which is to define, direct, and explain the whole course of history, wholesale and retail? Why exactly is it that

the formula of the balance of power, in the mouth of Kautsky and his present school, inevitably appears as a justification of indecision, stagnation, cowardice and treachery?

By the balance of power they understand everything you please: the level of production attained, the degree of differentiation of classes, the number of organized workers, the total funds at the disposal of the trade unions, sometimes the results of the last parliamentary elections, frequently the degree of readiness for compromise on the part of the ministry, or the degree of effrontery of the financial oligarchy. Most frequently, it means that summary political impression which exists in the mind of a half-blind pedant, or a so-called realist politician, who, though he has absorbed the phraseology of Marxism, in reality is guided by the most shallow manoeuvres, bourgeois prejudices, and parliamentary "tactics"....

The balance of political power at any given moment is determined under the influence of fundamental and secondary factors of differing degrees of effectiveness, and only in its most fundamental quality is it determined by the stage of the development of production. The social structure of a people is extraordinarily behind the development of its productive forces. The lower middle classes, and particularly the peasantry, retain their existence long after their economic methods have been made obsolete, and have been condemned, by the technical development of the productive powers of society. The consciousness of the masses, in its turn, is extraordinarily behind the development of their social relations, the consciousness of the old Socialist parties is a whole epoch behind the state of mind of the masses, and the consciousness of the old parliamentary and trade union leaders, more reactionary than the consciousness of their party, represents a petrified mass which history has been unable hitherto either to digest or reject. In the parliamentary epoch, during the period of stability of social relations, the psychological factor—without great error—was the foundation upon which all current calculations were based. It was considered that parliamentary elections reflected the balance of power with sufficient exactness. The imperialist war, which upset all bourgeois society, displayed the complete uselessness of the old criteria. The latter completely ignored those profound historical factors which had gradually been accumulating in the preceding period, and have now, all at once, appeared on the surface, and have begun to determine the course of history.

The political worshippers of routine, incapable of surveying the historical process in its complexity, in its internal clashes and contradictions, imagined to themselves that history was preparing the way for the Socialist order simultaneously and systematically on all sides, so that concentration of production and the development of a Communist morality in the producer and the consumer mature simultaneously with the electric plough and a parliamentary majority. Hence the purely mechanical attitude towards parliamentarism, which, in the eyes of the majority of the statesmen of the Second International, indicated the degree to which society was prepared for Socialism as accurately as the manometer indicates the pressure of steam. Yet there is nothing more senseless than this mechanized representation of the development of social relations....

In this way the cause of the misfortunes at present experienced by humanity is precisely that the development of the technical command of men over nature has *long ago* grown ripe for the socialization of economic life. The proletariat has occupied a place in production which completely guarantees its dictatorship, while the most intelligent forces in history—the parties and their leaders—have been discovered to be still wholly under the yoke of the old prejudices, and only fostered a lack of faith among the masses in their own power. In quite recent years Kautsky used to understand this. "The proletariat at the present time has grown so strong," wrote Kautsky in his pamphlet, *The Path to Power*, "that is can calmly await the coming war. There can be no more talk of a *premature revolution*, now that the proletariat has drawn from the present structure of the State such strength as could be drawn therefrom, and now that its reconstruction has become a condition of the proletariat's further progress." From the moment that the development of productive forces,

outgrowing the framework of the bourgeois national State, drew mankind into an epoch of crises and convulsions, the consciousness of the masses was shaken by dread shocks out of the comparative equilibrium of the preceding epoch. The routine and stagnation of its mode of living, the hypnotic suggestion of peaceful legality, had already ceased to dominate the proletariat. But it has not yet stepped, consciously and courageously, on to the path of open revolutionary struggle. It wavered, passing through the last moment of unstable equilibrium. At such a moment of psychological change, the part played by the summit—the State, on the one hand, and the revolutionary Party on the other—acquires a colossal importance. A determined push from left or right is sufficient to move the proletariat, for a certain period, to one or the other side. We saw this in 1914, when, under the united pressure of imperialist governments and Socialist patriotic parties, the working class was all at once thrown out of its equilibrium and hurled on to the path of imperialism. We have since seen how the experience of the war, the contrasts between its results and its first objects, is shaking the masses in a revolutionary sense, making them more and more capable of an open revolt against capitalism. In such conditions, the presence of a revolutionary party, which renders to itself a clear account of the motive forces of the present epoch, and understands the exceptional role amongst them of a revolutionary class; which knows its inexhaustible, but unrevealed, powers; which believes in that class and believes in itself; which knows the power of revolutionary method in an epoch of instability of all social relations; which is ready to employ that method and carry it through to the end—the presence of such a party represents a factor of incalculable historical importance.

And, on the other hand, the Socialist party, enjoying traditional influence, which does *not* render itself an account of what is going on around it, which does *not* understand the revolutionary situation, and, therefore, finds no key to it, which does *not* believe in either the proletariat or itself—such a party in our time is the most mischievous stumbling block in history, and a source of confusion and inevitable chaos.

Such is now the role of Kautsky and his sympathizers...

2

The Dictatorship of the Proletariat

"Marx and Engels hammered out the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which Engels stubbornly defended in 1891, shortly before his death—the idea that the political autocracy of the proletariat is the sole form in which it can realize its control of the state."

That is what Kautsky wrote about ten years ago. The sole form of power for the proletariat he considered to be not a Socialist majority in a democratic parliament, but the political autocracy of the proletariat, its dictatorship. And it is quite clear that, if our problem is the abolition of private property in the means of production, the only road to its solution lies through the concentration of State power in its entirety in the hands of the proletariat, and the setting up for the transitional period of an exceptional regime—a regime in which the ruling class if guided, not by general principles calculated for a prolonged period, but by considerations of revolutionary policy.

The dictatorship is necessary because it is a case, not of partial changes, but of the very existence of the bourgeoisie. No agreement is possible on this ground. Only force can be the deciding factor. The dictatorship of the proletariat does not exclude, of course, either separate agreements, or considerable concessions, especially in connection with the lower middle class and the peasantry. But the proletariat can only conclude these agreements after having gained possession of the apparatus of power, and having guaranteed to itself the possibility of independently deciding on which points to yield and on which to stand firm, in the interests of the general Socialist task.

Kautsky now repudiates the dictatorship of the proletariat at the very outset, as the "tyranny of the minority over the majority." That is, he discerns in the revolutionary regime of the proletariat those very features by which the honest Socialists of all countries invariably describe the dictatorship of the exploiters, albeit masked by the forms of democracy.

Abandoning the idea of a revolutionary dictatorship, Kautsky transforms the question of the conquest of power by the proletariat into a question of the conquest of a majority of votes by the Social-Democratic Party in one of the electoral campaigns of the future. Universal suffrage, according to the legal fiction of parliamentarism, expresses the will of the citizens of all classes in the nation, and, consequently, gives a possibility of attracting a majority to the side of Socialism. While the theoretical possibility has not been realized, the Socialist minority must submit to the bourgeois majority. This fetishism of the parliamentary majority represents a brutal repudiation, not only of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but of Marxism and of the revolution altogether. If, in principle, we are to subordinate Socialist policy to the parliamentary mystery of majority and minority, it follows that, in countries where formal democracy prevails, there is no place at all for the revolutionary struggle. If the majority elected on the basis of universal suffrage in Switzerland pass draconian legislation against strikers, or if the executive elected by the will of a formal majority in Northern America shoots workers, have the Swiss and American workers the "right" of protest by organizing a general strike? Obviously, no. the political strike is a form of extra-parliamentary pressure on the "national will," as it has expressed itself through universal suffrage. True, Kautsky himself, apparently, is ashamed to go as far as the logic of his new position demands. Bound by some sort of remnant of the past, he is obliged to acknowledge the possibility of correcting universal suffrage by action. Parliamentary elections, at all events in principle, never took the place, in the eyes of the Social-Democrats, of the real class struggle, of its conflicts, repulses, attacks, revolts; they were considered merely as a contributory fact in this struggle, playing a greater part at one period, a smaller at another, and no part at all in the period of dictatorship.

In 1891, that is, not long before his death, Engels, as we just heard, obstinately defended the dictatorship of the proletariat as the only possible form of its control of the State. Kautsky himself more than once repeated this definition. Hence, by the way, we can see what an unworthy forgery is Kautsky's present attempt to throw back the dictatorship of the proletariat at us as a purely Russian invention.

Who aims at the end cannot reject the means. The struggle must be carried on with such intensity as actually to guarantee the supremacy of the proletariat. If the Socialist revolution requires a dictatorship—"the sole form in which the proletariat can achieve control of the State"—it follows that the dictatorship must be guaranteed at all cost.

To write a pamphlet about dictatorship one needs an inkpot and a pile of paper, and possibly, in addition, a certain number of ideas in one's head. But in order to establish and consolidate the dictatorship, one has to prevent the bourgeoisie from undermining the State power of the proletariat. Kautsky apparently thinks that this can be achieved by tearful pamphlets. But his own experience ought to have shown him that it is not sufficient to have lost all influence with the proletariat, to acquire influence with the bourgeoisie.

It is only possible to safeguard the supremacy of the working class by forcing the bourgeoisie accustomed to rule, to realize that it is too dangerous an undertaking for it to revolt against the dictatorship of the proletariat, to undermine it by conspiracies, sabotage, insurrections, or the calling in of foreign troops. The bourgeoisie, hurled from power, must be forced to obey. In what way? The priests used to terrify the people with future penalties. We have no such resources at our disposal. But even the priests' hell never stood alone, but was always bracketed with the material fire of the Holy Inquisition, and with the scorpions of the democratic State. Is it possible that Kautsky is leaning to the idea that the bourgeoisie can be held down with the help of the categorical imperative, which in his last writings plays the part of the Holy Ghost? We, on our part, can only promise him our material assistance if he decides to equip a Kantian-humanitarian mission to the realms of Denikin and Kolchak. At all events, there he would have the possibility of convincing himself that the counter-revolutionaries are not naturally devoid of character, and that,

thanks to their six years' existence in the fire and smoke of war, their character has managed to become thoroughly hardened. Every White Guard has long ago acquired the simple truth that it is easier to hang a Communist to the branch of a tree than to convert him with a book of Kautsky's. These gentlemen have no superstitious fear, either of the principles of democracy or of the flames of hell—the more so because the priests of the church and of official learning act in collusion with them, and pour their combined thunders exclusively on the heads of the Bolsheviks. The Russian White Guards resemble the German and all other White Guards in this respect—that they cannot be convinced or shamed, but only terrorized or crushed.

The man who repudiates terrorism in principle—i.e., repudiates measures of suppression and intimidation towards determined and armed counter-revolution, must reject all idea of the political supremacy of the working class and its revolutionary dictatorship. The man who repudiates the dictatorship of the proletariat repudiates the Socialist revolution, and digs the grave of Socialism....

3

Democracy

"Either Democracy, or Civil War"

Kautsky has a clear and solitary path to salvation: *democracy*. All that is necessary is that every one should acknowledge it and bind himself to support it. The Right Socialists must renounce the sanguinary slaughter with which they have been carrying out the will of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie itself must abandon the idea of using its Noskes and Lieutenant Vogels to defend its privileges to the last breath. Finally, the proletariat must once and for all reject the idea of overthrowing the bourgeoisie by means other than those laid down in the Constitution. If the conditions enumerated are observed, the social revolution will painlessly melt into democracy. In order to succeed it is sufficient, as we see, for our stormy history to draw a nightcap over its head, and take a pinch of wisdom out of Kautsky's snuffbox.

"There exist only two possibilities," says our sage, "either democracy, or civil war"....

The Imperialist Transformation of Democracy

It is not for nothing that the word "democracy" has a double meaning in the political vocabulary. On the one hand, it means a state system founded on universal suffrage and the other attributes of formal "popular government." On the other hand, by the word "democracy" is understood the mass of the people itself, in so far as it leads a political existence. In the second sense, as in the first, the meaning of democracy rises above class distinctions. This peculiarity of terminology has its profound political significance. Democracy as a political system is the more perfect and unshakeable the greater is the part played in the life of the country by the intermediate and less differentiated mass of the population—the lower middle class of the town and the country. Democracy achieved its highest expression in the nineteenth century in Switzerland and the United States of North America. On the other side of the ocean the democratic organization of power in a federal republic was based on the agrarian democracy of the farmers. In the small Helvetian Republic, the lower middle classes of the towns and the rich peasantry constituted the basis of the conservative democracy of the united cantons.

Born of the struggle of the Third Estate against the powers of feudalism, the democratic State very soon becomes the weapon of defence against the powers of feudalism, the democratic State very soon becomes the weapon of defence against the class antagonisms generated within bourgeois society....

The revolutionary proletarians say: "It is hopeless to think of a peaceful arrival to power while the bourgeoisie retains in its hands all the apparatus of power. Three times over hopeless is the idea of coming to power by the path which the bourgeoisie itself indicates and, at the same time, barricades—the path of parliamentary democracy. There is only one

way: to seize power, taking away from the bourgeoisie the material apparatus of government. Independently of the superficial balance of forces in parliament, I shall take over for social administration the chief forces and resources of production. I shall free the mind of the lower middle class from their capitalist hypnosis. I shall show them in practice what is the meaning of Socialist production. Then even the most backward, the most ignorant, or most terrorized sections of the nation will support me, and willingly and intelligently will join in the work of social construction."

When the Russian Soviet Government dissolved the Constituent Assembly, that fact seemed to the leading Social-Democrats of Western Europe, if not the beginning of the end of the world, at all events a rude and arbitrary break with all the previous developments of Socialism. In reality, it was only the inevitable outcome of the new position resulting from imperialism and the war. If Russian Communism was the first to enter the path of casting up theoretical and practical accounts, this was due to the same historical reasons which forced the Russian proletariat to be the first to enter the path of the struggle for power.

All that has happened since then in Europe bears witness to the fact that we drew the right conclusion. To imagine that democracy can be restored in its general purity means that one is living in a pitiful, reactionary utopia....

4

Terrorism

The chief theme of Kautsky's book is terrorism. The view that terrorism is of the essence of revolution Kautsky proclaims to be a widespread delusion. It is untrue that he who desires revolution must put up with terrorism. As far as he, Kautsky, is concerned, he is, generally speaking, for revolution, but decidedly against terrorism. From there, however, complications begin.

"The revolution brings us," Kautsky complains, "a bloody terrorism carried out by Socialist governments. The Bolsheviks in Russia first stepped on to this path, and were, consequently, sternly condemned by all Socialists who had not adopted the Bolshevik point of view, including the Socialists of the German Majority. But as soon as the latter found themselves threatened in their supremacy, they had recourse to the methods of the same terrorist regime which they attacked in the East." It would seem that from this follows the conclusion that terrorism is much more profoundly bound up with the nature of revolution than certain sages think. But Kautsky makes an absolutely opposite conclusion....

Kautsky, in spite of all the happenings in the world to-day, completely fails to realize what war is in general, and the civil war in particular. He does not understand that every, or nearly every, sympathizer with Thiers in Paris was not merely an "opponent" of the Communards in ideas, but an agent and spy of Thiers, a ferocious enemy ready to shoot one in the back. The enemy must be made harmless, and in wartime this means that he must be destroyed.

The problem of revolution, as of war, consists in breaking the will of the foe, forcing him to capitulate and to accept the conditions of the conqueror. The will, of course, is a fact of the physical world, but in contradistinction for a meeting, a dispute, or a congress, the revolution carries out its object by means of the employment of material resources—though to a less degree than war. The bourgeoisie itself conquered power by means of revolts, and consolidated it by the civil war. In the peaceful period, it retains power by means of a system of repression. As long as class society, founded on the most deep-rooted antagonisms, continues, to exist, repression remains a necessary means of breaking the will of the opposing side.

Even if, in one country or another, the dictatorship of the proletariat grew up within the external framework of democracy, this would by no means avert the civil war. The question as to who is to rule the country, *i.e.*, of the life or death of the bourgeoisie, will be

decided on either side, not by references to the paragraphs of the constitution, but by the employment of all forms of violence. However deeply Kautsky goes into the question of the food of the anthropopithecus (see page 122 et seq. of his book) and other immediate and remote conditions which determine the cause of human cruelty, he will find in history no other way of breaking the class will of the enemy except the systematic and energetic use of violence.

The degree of ferocity of the struggle depends on a series of internal and international circumstances. The more ferocious and dangerous is the resistance of the class enemy who have been overthrown, the more inevitably does the system of repression take the form of a system of terror.

But here Kautsky unexpectedly takes up a new position in his struggle with Soviet terrorism. He simply waves aside all reference to the ferocity of the counter-revolutionary opposition of the Russian bourgeoisie.

"Such ferocity," he says, "could not be noticed in November, 1917, in Petrograd and Moscow, and still less more recently in Budapest." (Page 149.) With such a happy formulation of the question, revolutionary terrorism merely proves to be a product of the blood-thirstiness of the Bolsheviks, who simultaneously abandoned the traditions of the vegetarian anthropopithecus and the moral lessons of Kautsky.

The first conquest of power by the Soviets at the beginning of November, 1917 (new style), was actually accomplished with insignificant sacrifices. The Russian bourgeoisie found itself to such a degree estranged from the masses of the people, so internally helpless, so compromised by the course and the result of the war, so demoralized by the regime of Kerensky, that it scarcely dared show any resistance. In Petrograd the power of Kerensky was overthrown almost without a fight. In Moscow its resistance was dragged out, mainly owing to the indecisive character of our own actions. In the majority of the provincial towns, power was transferred to the Soviet on the mere receipt of a telegram from Petrograd or Moscow. If the matter had ended there, there would have been no world of the Red Terror. But in November, 1917, there was already evidence of the beginning of the resistance of the propertied classes. True, there was required the intervention of the imperialist governments of the West in order to give the Russian counter-revolution faith in itself, and to add ever-increasing power to its resistance. This can be shown from facts, both important and insignificant, day by day during the whole epoch of the Soviet revolution.

Kerensky's "Staff" felt no support forthcoming from the mass of the soldiery, and was inclined to recognize the Soviet Government, which had begun negotiations for an armistice with the Germans. But there followed the protest of the military missions of the Entente, followed by open threats. The Staff was frightened; incited by "Allied" officers, it entered the path of opposition. This led to armed conflict and to the murder of the chief of the field staff, General Dukhonin, by a group of revolutionary sailors.

In Petrograd, the official agents of the Entente, especially the French Military Mission, hand in hand with the S.R.s and the Mensheviks, openly organized the opposition, mobilizing, arming, inciting against us the cadets, and the bourgeois youth generally, from the second day of the Soviet revolution. The rising of the junkers on November 10 brought about a hundred times more victims than the revolution of November 7. The campaign of the adventurers Kerensky and Krasnov against Petrograd, organized at the same time by the Entente, naturally introduced into the struggle the first elements of savagery. Nevertheless, General Krasnov was set free on his word of honor. The Yaroslav rising (in the summer of 1918) which involved so many victims, was organized by Savinkov on the instructions of the French Embassy, and with its resources. Archangel was captured according to the plans of British naval agents, with the help of British warships and aeroplanes. The beginning of the empire of Kolchak, the nominee of the American Stock Exchange, was brought about by the foreign Czecho-Slovak Corps maintained by the resources of the

French Government. Kaledin and Krasnov (liberated by us), the first leaders of the counter-revolution on the Don, could enjoy partial success only thanks to the open military and financial aid of Germany. In the Ukraine the Soviet power was overthrown in the beginning of 1918 by German militarism. The Volunteer Army of Denikin was created with the financial and technical help of Great Britain and France. Only in the hope of British intervention and of British military support was Yudenich's army created. The politicians, the diplomats, and the journalists of the Entente have for two years on end been debating with complete frankness the question of whether the financing of the civil war in Russia is a sufficiently profitable enterprise. In such circumstances, one needs truly a brazen forehead to seek the reason for the sanguinary character of the civil war in Russia in the malevolence of the Bolsheviks, and not in the international situation.

The Russian proletariat was the first to enter the path of the social revolution, and the Russian bourgeoisie, politically helpless, was emboldened to struggle against it political and economic expropriation only because it saw its elder sister in all countries still in power, and still maintaining economic, political, and, to a certain extent, military supremacy.

If our November revolution had taken place a few months, or even a few weeks, after the establishment of the rule of the proletariat in Germany, France, and England, there can be no doubt that our revolution would have been the most "peaceful," the most "bloodless" of all possible revolutions on this sinful earth. But this historical sequence—the most "natural" at the first glance, and, in my case, the most beneficial for the Russian working class—found itself infringed—not through our fault, but through the will of events. Instead of being the last, the Russian proletariat proved to be the first. It was just this circumstance, after the first period of confusion, that imparted desperation to the character of the resistance of the classes which had ruled in Russia previously, and forced the Russian proletariat, in a moment of the greatest peril, foreign attacks, and internal plots and insurrections, to have recourse to severe measures of State terror. No one will now say that those measures proved futile. But, perhaps, we are expected to consider them "intolerable?"

The working class, which seized power in battle, had as its object and its duty to establish that power unshakably, to guarantee its own supremacy beyond question, to destroy its enemies' hankering for a new revolution, and thereby to make sure of carrying out Socialist reforms. Otherwise there would be no point in seizing power.

The revolution "logically" does not demand terrorism, just as "logically" it does not demand an armed insurrection. What a profound commonplace! But the revolution does require of the revolutionary class that it should attain its end by all methods at its disposal—if necessary, by an armed rising: if required, by terrorism. A revolutionary class which has conquered power with arms in its hands is bound to, and will, suppress, rifle in hand, all attempts to tear the power out of its hands. Where it has against it a hostile army, it will oppose to it its own army. Where it is confronted with armed conspiracy, attempt at murder, or rising, it will hurl at the heads of its enemies an unsparing penalty. Perhaps Kautsky has invented other methods? Or does he reduce the whole question to the *degree* of repression, and recommend in all circumstances imprisonment instead of execution?

The question of the form of repression, or of its degree, of course, is not one of "principle." It is a question of expediency. In a revolutionary period, the party which has been thrown from power, which does not reconcile itself with the stability of the ruling class, and which proves this by its desperate struggle against the latter, cannot be terrorized by the threat of imprisonment, as it does not believe in its duration. It is just this simple but decisive fact that explains the widespread recourse to shooting in a civil war.

Or, perhaps, Kautsky wishes to say that execution is not expedient, that "classes cannot be cowed." This is untrue. Terror is helpless—and then only "in the long run"—if it is employed by reaction against a historically rising class. But terror can be very efficient

against a reactionary class which does not want to leave the scene of operations. *Intimidation* is a powerful weapon of policy, both internationally and internally. War, like revolution, is founded upon intimidation. A victorious war, generally speaking, destroys only an insignificant part of the conquered army, intimidating the remainder and breaking their will. The revolution works in the same way: it kills individuals, and intimidates thousands. In this sense, the Red Terror is not distinguishable from the armed insurrection, the direct continuation of which it represents. The State terror of a revolutionary class can be condemned "morally" only by a man who, as a principle, rejects (in words) every form of violence whatsoever—consequently, every war and every rising. For this one has to be merely and simply a hypocritical Quaker.

"But, in that case, in what do your tactics differ from the tactics of Tsarism?" we are asked, by the high priests of Liberalism and Kautskianism.

You do not understand this, holy men? We shall explain to you. The terror of Tsarism was directed against the proletariat. The gendarmerie of Tsarism throttled the workers who were fighting for the Socialist order. Our Extraordinary Commissions shoot landlords, capitalist, and generals who are striving to restore the capitalist order. Do you grasp this distinction? Yes? For us Communists it is quite sufficient.

"Freedom of the Press"

One point particularly worries Kautsky, the author of a great many books and articles—the freedom of the Press. Is it permissible to suppress newspapers?

During war all institutions and organs of the State and of public opinion become, directly or indirectly, weapons of warfare. This is particularly true of the Press. No government carrying on a serious war will allow publications to exist on its territory which, openly or indirectly, support the enemy. Still more so in a civil war. The nature of the latter is such that each of the struggling sides has in the rear of its armies considerable circles of the population on the side of the enemy. In war, where both success and failure are repaid by death, hostile agents who penetrate into the rear are subject to execution. This is inhumane, but no one ever considered war a school of humanity—still less civil war. Can it be seriously demanded that, during a civil war with the White Guards of Denikin, the publications of parties supporting Denikin should come out unhindered in Moscow and Petrograd? To propose this in the name of the "freedom" of the Press is just the same as, in the name of open dealing, to demand the publication of military secrets. "A besieged city," wrote a Communard, Arthur Arnould of Paris, "cannot permit within its midst that hopes for its fall should openly be expressed, that the fighters defending it should be incited to treason, that the movements of its troops should be communicated to the enemy. Such was the position of Paris under the Commune." Such is the position of the Soviet Republic during the two years of its existence.

Let us, however, listen to what Kautsky has to say in this connection.

"The justification of this system (*i.e.*, repressions in connection with the Press) is reduced to the naive idea that an absolute truth (!) exists, and that only the Communists possess it (!). Similarly," continues Kautsky, "it reduces itself to another point of view, that all writers are by nature liars (!) and that only Communists are fanatics for truth (!). In reality, liars and fanatics for what they consider truth are to be found in all camps." And so on, and so on, and so on. (Page 176)

In this way, in Kautsky's eyes, the revolution, in its most acute phase, when it is a question of the life and death of classes, continues as hitherto to be a literary discussion with the object of establishing the truth. What profundity!... Our "truth," of course, is not absolute. But as in its name we are, at the present moment, shedding our blood, we have neither cause nor possibility to carry on a literary discussion as to the relativity of truth with those who "criticize" us with the help of all forms of arms. Similarly, our problem is not

to punish liars and to encourage just men amongst journalists of all shades of opinion, but to throttle the class lie of the bourgeoisie and to achieve the class truth of the proletariat, irrespective of the fact that in both camps there are fanatics and liars.

"The Soviet Government," Kautsky thunders, "has destroyed the sole remedy that might militate against corruption: the freedom of the Press. Control by means of unlimited freedom of the Press alone could have restrained those bandits and adventurers who will inevitably cling like leeches to every unlimited, uncontrolled power." (Page 188.) And so on.

The Press as a trusty weapon of the struggle with corruption! This liberal recipe sounds particularly pitiful when one remembers the two countries with the greatest "freedom" of the Press—North America and France—which, at the same time, are countries of the most highly developed stage of capitalist corruption.

Feeding on the old scandal of the political ante-rooms of the Russian revolution, Kautsky imagines that without Cadet and Menshevik freedom the Soviet apparatus is honey-combed with "bandits" and "adventurers." Such was the voice of the Mensheviks a year or eighteen months ago. Now even they will not dare to repeat this. With the help of Soviet control and party selection, the Soviet Government, in the intense atmosphere of the struggle, has dealt with the bandits and adventurers who appeared on the surface at the moment of the revolution incomparably better than any government whatsoever, at any time whatsoever.

We are fighting. We are fighting a life-and-death struggle. The Press is a weapon not of an abstract society, but of two irreconcilable, armed and contending sides. We are destroying the Press of the counter-revolution, just as we destroyed its fortified positions, its stores, its communications, and its intelligence system. Are we depriving ourselves of Cadet and Menshevik criticisms of the corruption of the working class? In return, we are victoriously destroying the very foundations of capitalist corruption.

But Kautsky goes further to develop his theme. He complains that we suppress the newspapers of the S.R.s and the Mensheviks, and even—such things have been known—arrest their leaders. Are we not dealing here with "shades of opinion" in the proletarian or the Socialist movement? The scholastic pedant does not see facts beyond his accustomed words. The Mensheviks and S.R.s for him are simply tendencies in Socialism, whereas, in the course of the revolution, they have been transformed into an organization which works in active co-operation with the counter-revolution and carries on against us an open war. The army of Kolchak was organized by Socialist Revolutionaries (how that name savours to-day of the charlatan!), and was supported by Mensheviks. Both carried on—and carry on—against us, for a year and a half, a war on the Northern front. The Mensheviks who rule the Caucasus, formerly the allies of Hohenzollern, and to-day the allies of Lloyd George, arrested and shot Bolsheviks hand in hand with German and British officers. The Mensheviks and S.R.s of the Kuban Rada organized the army of Denikin. The Estonian Mensheviks who participate in their government was directly concerned in the last advance of Yudenich against Petrograd. Such are these "tendencies" in the Socialist movement. Kautsky considers that one can be in a state of open and civil war with the Mensheviks and S.R.s, who, with the help of the troops they themselves have organized for Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin, are fighting for their "shade of opinions" in Socialism, and at the same time to allow those innocent "shades of opinion" freedom of the Press in our rear. If the dispute with the S.R.s and the Mensheviks could be settled by means of persuasion and voting—that is, if there were not behind their backs the Russian and foreign imperialists—there would be no civil war.

Kautsky, of course, is ready to "condemn"—an extra drop of ink—the blockade, and the Entente support of Denikin, and the White Terror. But in his high impartiality he cannot refuse the latter certain extenuating circumstances. The White Terror, you see, does not infringe their own principles, while the Bolsheviks, making use of the Red Terror, betray

the principle of "the sacredness of human life which they themselves proclaimed." (Page 210.)

What is the meaning of the principle of the sacredness of human life in practice, and in what does it differ from the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," Kautsky does not explain. When a murderer raises his knife over a child, may one kill the murderer to save the child? Will not thereby the principle of the "sacredness of human life" be infringed? May one kill the murderer to save oneself? Is an insurrection of oppressed slaves against their masters permissible? Is it permissible to purchase one's freedom at the cost of the life of one's jailers? If human life in general is sacred and inviolable, we must deny ourselves not only the use of terror, not only war, but also revolution itself. Kautsky simply does not realize the counter-revolutionary meaning of the "principle" which he attempts to force upon us. Elsewhere we shall see that Kautsky accuses us of concluding the Brest-Litovsk peace: in his opinion we ought to have continued war. But what then becomes of the sacredness of human life? Does life cease to be sacred when it is a question of people talking another language, or does Kautsky consider that mass murders organized on principles of strategy and tactics are not murders at all? Truly it is difficult to put forward in our age a principle more hypocritical and more stupid. As long as human labor power, and, consequently, life itself, remain articles of sale and purchase, of exploitation and robbery, the principle of the "sacredness of human life" remains a shameful lie, uttered with the object of keeping the oppressed slaves in their chains.

We used to fight against the death penalty introduced by Kerensky, because that penalty was inflicted by the courts-martial of the old army on soldiers who refused to continue the imperialist war. We tore this weapon out of the hands of the old courts-martial, destroyed the courts-martial themselves, and demobilized the old army which had brought them forth. Destroying in the Red Army, and generally throughout the country, counter-revolutionary conspirators who strive by means of insurrections, murders, and disorganization, to restore the old regime, we are acting in accordance with the iron laws of a war in which we desire to guarantee our victory.

If it is a question of seeking formal contradictions, then obviously we must do so on the side of the White Terror, which is the weapon of classes which consider themselves "Christian," patronize idealist philosophy, and are firmly convinced that the individuality (their own) is an end-in-itself. As for us, we were never concerned with the Kantian-priestly and vegetarian-Quaker prattle about the "sacredness of human life." We were revolutionaries in opposition, and have remained revolutionaries in power. To make the individual sacred we must destroy the social order which crucifies him. And this problem can only be solved by blood and iron.

There is another difference between the White Terror and the Red, which Kautsky to-day ignores, but which in the eyes of a Marxist is of decisive significance. The White Terror is the weapon of the historically reactionary class. When we exposed the futility of the repressions of the bourgeois State against the proletariat, we never denied that by arrests and executions the ruling class, under certain conditions, might temporarily retard the development of the social revolution. But we were convinced that they would not be able to bring it to a halt. We relied on the fact that the proletariat is the historically rising class, and that bourgeois society could not develop without increasing the forces of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie to-day is a falling class. It not only no longer plays an essential part in production, but by its imperialist methods of appropriation is destroying the economic structure of the world and human culture generally. Nevertheless, the historical persistence of the bourgeoisie is colossal. It holds to power, and does not wish to abandon it. Thereby it threatens to drag after it into the abyss the whole of society. We are forced to tear it off, to chop it away. The Red Terror is a weapon utilized against a class, doomed to destruction, which does not wish to perish. If the White Terror can only retard the historical rise

of the proletariat, the Red Terror hastens the destruction of the bourgeoisie. This hastening—a pure question of acceleration—is at certain periods of decisive importance. Without the Red Terror, the Russian bourgeoisie, together with the world bourgeoisie, would throttle us long before the coming of the revolution in Europe. One must be blind not to see this, or a swindler to deny it.

The man who recognizes the revolutionary historic importance of the very fact of the existence of the Soviet system must also sanction the Red Terror....

Leon Trotsky, *Terror and Communism, A Reply to Karl Kautsky*.



THE VILLAGE OF OZERO

Early Summer 1920

This account of the Russian village in 1920 was made by a member of the British Labour Delegation which visited Russia in 1920. It reveals the impact of the revolution on the peasants and their ambiguous attitude toward the Soviet government. References to requisitions and a sharp drop in sown land foreshadowed the famine which gripped the Volga region within a year—see below. Ozero was a village in Samara province in the middle Volga region. The delegation was sent by the British Trade Unions Congress to study conditions in Russia and when the rest left Buxton stayed on to study the peasantry. His report, though undated, would have applied to the June-July period.

Charles Roden Buxton

Report on the Village of Ozero

My visit to this district (some 60 miles from Samara) lasted one week. I stayed all this time in peasants' houses, visiting about seven different villages. My visits were all unexpected, and my freedom of movement was not in any way restricted. I tried to select villages which had no special peculiarities; and, as far as I can judge, those I visited were typical ones, except that they were in a "military area," the district having been the scene of fighting up to a few months ago.

Most of the time I spent in the house of one of the "middle" peasantry at Ozero, and what follows relates to that village. I received a stream of visits from all sorts of people. I also visited the houses of other peasants, the Soviet, the school, the church, the meeting-house of the Molokani, etc. Most of those with whom I talked were not members of the Communist Party.

I was accompanied by a young Russian, an employee in the telegraph service (also not a Communist), who helped me with travelling arrangements and supplemented my defects with regard to the language.

LAND SYSTEM

The population of Ozero is about 2,500 (most villages here are larger). The great majority are considered "middle" peasants; about one-fifth would be called "poor" peasants. Many of the latter live in houses built of clay, while the ordinary house is of wood throughout. Of "rich" peasants there are only four or five.

My host had three strips of land—one of wheat, one of rye, and one of millet—widely distant from one another; in all 35 desiatines (79 acres). The normal allowance of land now is five desiatines per "soul," and he has a wife and five children. (Before the Revolution he had only three desiatines.) His stock consisted of five horses, three cows, six sheep, and a few pigs, geese and chickens. He had also two dogs.

Before the Revolution there were numerous large estates in the neighbourhood—some belonging to private landlords (several of whom were absentees), one belonging to the Tsaritsa Maria Feodorovna, and some were Crown Land. The circumstances under which these estates were taken over by the peasants differed widely. Two examples may be given:

(a) That of a Cossack landlord, Ch., owning some 2,000 desiatines (4,500 acres). Some soldiers returning from the Front in 1917 (*i.e.*, before the October Revolution) demanded his land and seed to sow it. He refused. They then took both land and seed themselves. He fled to P. (the chief town of the Uyezd or district) and got some soldiers sent from there to Ozero. They arrested a "poor" peasant; but they were disarmed by the villagers. It was the intention of the villagers to leave the landlord some land and some seed, but finding that neither he nor his manager returned, they divided all his land and goods. His house remained empty for some time, but was finally broken up for building materials.

(b) That of a landlord, U., owning some 200 desiatines (450 acres) and having about twenty camels, twenty horses, twenty cows, and fifty sheep. At the October Revolution he had to give up most of his property. He has now only fifteen desiatines and only four camels, and a proportionately smaller number of other stock. His farmyard (*dvor*) is much too large for his needs. He continues to live in his house (the nicest in the village, and occupying the most prominent position), but he has had to give up his two best rooms, one to be the Communist Club, and the other to be the office of the Military Commissar (see below). I had several long talks with him.

The peasants say they have gained greatly by the Revolution in the matter of the land, and "in this sense" are in favour of the Revolution. Obviously it has made an immense difference in their position.

The division of the land, after the Revolution of October 1917, was effected as follows:

The Soviet of the Uyezd (P.) allotted a certain quantity of land to the village of Ozero as a whole. The Soviet of Ozero, which was specially elected for the purpose—all the villagers having the right to vote—then distributed the land among individuals, on the basis of so much land per "soul."

The more thoughtful among the villagers consider the present distribution as provisional. "This is certainly not the final arrangement," said my host.

The land is now regarded by the peasants as their individual property for all practical purposes. It passes in practice to the son on the death of the father, whatever the law may be.

Formerly a certain amount of the land of the village used to be cultivated by the village as a whole, and not divided into individual holdings. The Government has lately recommended the revival of this system under the name of "Soviet strips" (*polosa*). It was, however, found inconvenient and was abandoned before the Revolution. Instead, grain was collected from each individual, stored in a barn—the same which has lately been used for the Government contribution—and kept for the expenses of the village, including poor relief, and as a reserve against famine.

FOOD COLLECTION BY THE STATE

In Ozero this year, contributions of produce and services for the needs of the State have been made as follows:

- (a) Compulsory contribution of grain for the civil population—36,000 poods;
- (b) Compulsory contribution of sheep and hay for the Army;

(c) Voluntary contributions for various purposes—*e.g.*, for the town of Moscow, in response to an appeal by a Commissar, who came and addressed a meeting in the village. Such contributions are willingly made.

(d) A mobilisation of horses and carts and labour to transport the produce. This is said to be the chief reason why less land has been ploughed and sown than before.

The amount of the compulsory contribution from each village is fixed by the "Regional Supply Committee" (Raionni Prodovolstvenni Komitet) at P., the chief town of the Uyezd. (I presume it has to raise a certain total prescribed by some higher authority.) The produce is collected by the Village Soviet. It has to be conveyed to P. (about 15 miles), and sometimes as far as Samara (60 miles). The total demand for grain was 50,000 poods—the amount actually contributed being somewhat less. A new demand was recently made, for the whole remaining stock of grain, leaving three poods per head until next harvest.

Payment is made at fixed prices—wheat, 44-49 roubles per pood; rye, 34 roubles per pood; hay, 12 roubles per pood. Horses are purchased direct by the military and paid for at market prices; I myself saw prices ranging from 80,000 to 180,000 roubles being paid.

There is bitter resentment at the amount and variety of the demands, the awkward times at which they are made, and the low prices paid. "Commissars—powerful persons—are continually coming here," said one peasant to me, "we don't know what to do with them." "New orders (*prikazi*) are continually arriving."

The peasants could get far more for their produce, they say, if they could sell in the open market. This is a very sore point. They say, however, that they escape the taxes which they formerly paid.

Villages which make their contributions completely and regularly are rewarded by preferential treatment in the matter of manufactured goods (see below under "Shops and Distribution").

The Samara Government is one of the "break-governments," *i.e.*, is expected to send away a large surplus, and this no doubt accounts for the exceptional demands made on it.

Great excitement prevailed in the village over the question of 37 sheep which had been sent in excess of the number demanded. The authorities were demanding more sheep, without giving credit to the village for the excess. The villagers contended that a receipt had been given for the 37 sheep, but when asked to produce it, they failed to find it. (The receipt for the grain, I may add, had also been lost.) I attended an animated meeting of the Village Soviet on this subject, at which a Commissar from P. was present, and the point was argued at great length. The general public were admitted, and, by special permission of the meeting, allowed to speak.

At Ozero there has not been any violent conflict with the military over the food contributions; but I heard of one village in the neighbourhood where a disturbance had occurred, and many peasants had lost their lives.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

There was a sharp fall in the amount of land ploughed and sown last autumn and spring—*i.e.*, for the harvest of 1920. The land of the village consists of 9,000 *desiatines* (22,500 acres).

According to the "three-field system," 3,000 *desiatines* are usually ploughed and sown each year, the rest lying fallow. Last autumn and spring, however, only about 900 *desiatines* were ploughed and sown. My host's neighbour sowed only five *desiatines* instead of fourteen. This is generally ascribed in the village to the mobilisation of horses and carts for transporting supplies. I could not find out whether any other causes had operated, such as general political uncertainty.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS GOVERNMENT

The majority of peasants in Ozero, as far as I could judge from many conversations, consider that they owe much to the Soviet Government in the matter of the land; they

approve of the "principle of everybody being equal"; they often talk of the "true" Communist as being an ideal sort of person. But they complain bitterly of three things: first, and most important of all, the high cost of living and the absence of many necessities (see below); secondly, the compulsory contributions (see above); and thirdly, the worry of perpetual orders and appeals, often hard to understand.

They consider that the Government is responsible for all these evils alike, and that the peasant is somehow in a position of inferiority to the townsman.

Membership of the Communist Party is very rare. In Ozero, there are seven members. All the Soviet members, except the President (who is a Communist), are "non-party" (*bezpartini*). The Communists are a little group of active propagandists—in many respects the most progressive people in the village—who freely admit the difficulty of their task. The proportion of Communist members in the other villages I visited was much the same.

I found in the village of K. an interesting contrast to Ozero. In K., the feeling is violently anti-Communist. Some of the leading villagers came to see me, and said quite openly: "We are living under a Government of brutes (*zoyerini*). It is like Catherine the Great's time. We are slaves." These were expressions which I never heard in Ozero, or in any of the other villages I visited. It is worth noting that in K., the priest was an able man of the most unbending and dogmatic type. I stayed in the house where he lodged, and noted the atmosphere of solemnity and reverence which surrounded him. It was evident from several other signs that the clerical influence was strong here.

Incidentally, my experience at this village shows that the peasants were not afraid to express opinions hostile to the Government.

SHOPS, DISTRIBUTION OF GOODS AND CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

In Ozero there was formerly a Co-operative Store, called the "Self-help Consumers' Society." The name is still retained, but the shop is, in fact, the State shop for all goods which the village has to buy. It is supplied from the central shop of the "region" at P., which in its turn is supplied by the central "Supply Committee" for the Samara "Government."

By a decree of March, 1919, so I was told, everyone has access to the store on equal terms, and shares are no longer taken up.

Supplies are very scanty indeed. When I was at V., another village, a new lot had just come in, and there was an excited crowd outside the shop. I saw people coming out with cups, teapots, boots, shoes, whetstones for grinding, gloves for rough winter work, etc.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The chief organs of local government in Ozero are (a) the Soviet, (b) the Military Commissar. There is also the Militia (practically police), but this consists of one man only, who enjoys the title of "chief *milizioner*."

(a) Strictly speaking, the Soviet of Ozero is a Volost Soviet (another small village being combined with Ozero). It sends representatives to the Congress of Volost Soviets for the "Region" at P—; this region includes five Volosts. The Uyezd of P—contains several such "Regions."

The present Soviet of Ozero, consisting of twenty-two members, was elected at a general meeting of the villagers nine months ago. The election appears to have been a free one. According to the Constitution, there should be an election every three months, but it is the general opinion in the village that this period is too short. (In another village, V—, they began by holding elections every three months, but now hold them every six months.)

Some time ago, the President of the Soviet was arrested for showing insufficient energy in the collection of food for the authorities. He was shortly afterwards released, but another President was nominated by the Military Commissar for the "Region." This President is a Communist, and is the same man who was President of the "Committee of Poverty" (see below.) All the other members are "non-party."

The discussion I heard at a meeting of the Soviet was highly practical and business-like.

It is the business of the Soviet to carry out the orders of the various Commissariats, and of the departments of the "Government" administration at Samara. It disburses all payments received from the higher authorities, such as those for the schoolmaster, for Red Army men's families, etc. I could not exactly ascertain its functions as to the distribution of the land, apart from the redistribution which took place after the October Revolution in 1917 (see above.) It is apparently intended that there shall be a periodical redistribution.

Generally, the assumption which we habitually make in England, that each authority must have a distinct sphere of competence, not overlapping with that of any other, does not seem to hold good in Russia. This is an important point when we come to consider the following.

(b) The Military Commissar, who is a native of Ozero. He has an office of his own in the house of a former landlord (see above). I had several conversations with him, and I should say he was a man of tact and judgement. He was appointed by the military authorities, and controls all military affairs, mobilisation, desertion, support of soldiers' families, accounts, purchase of horses, etc. But his functions are much wider. He has also the "political oversight" of all the Volost of which Ozero forms part. He organises the Communist Party locally, and also the plays and entertainments which form part of their propaganda. (I was much struck by the ingenuity of the amateur theatres in several villages.) In addition, he is Chairman of the Commission for fighting epidemics. Lastly, he has a voice in the distribution of the land. The Soviet does it in the first instance, but he is supposed to know the Constitution and the decrees concerning it; if the Soviet, in his opinion, does not act in accordance with these, he can suggest alterations, and if they are rejected, can refer the matter to the Soviet of the Uyezd. Evidently his powers are extremely wide. It is fair to remember that the Samara district was the scene of much fighting in 1918 and 1919, and is still, to a certain extent, under special military control.

THE "COMMITTEE OF POVERTY"

This body existed in Ozero during 1918. A decree was issued, I was told, to the effect that the Soviet should be formed of "poor" peasants, who should, in addition to the ordinary functions of the Soviet, collect certain special requisitions which were made at that time. The object was that the Soviet might not be dominated by the "rich" peasants. The procedure was as follows:-

A meeting of all the village was called, at which the chairman read out a list of candidates for the "Committee of Poverty." Each name, as it was read, was discussed, and several candidates were rejected as not being "poor." The voting was by show of hands. About 40 were elected, with a "presidium" of three, the President being the same man who is now the (nominated) President of the Soviet. The Committee "did not understand its duties," and after a few months (November, 1918, I understand) was dissolved, the ordinary Soviet taking its place.

EDUCATION

There are two schools in Ozero; one is a regular school building (for some time past requisitioned as a hospital), the other is the house of one of the teachers. The schools are only open in the winter (October to March). According to the programme, there should be five teachers, but there are only two. Education is not yet compulsory for all, but it is intended that it shall be. About the same number of children attend as before the Revolution (there were 165 last winter), but there would be far more if there were a sufficiency of teachers, books and equipment, and if the children had adequate clothes and boots. The old Zemstvo schools and Church schools are abolished, and only "Labour schools" exist now. The priest, however, gives religious instruction to a certain number in his own house. The Government programme is admirable, but hitherto has not been practically realised. The

teacher with whom I talked received 1,800 roubles a month. No beginning has yet been made with adult education in Ozero.

In the clerical village above referred to, I was told that very few children go to the schools, because "they are godless, and teach only dances and songs, not the laws of God." The priest in this village goes himself to the schools and gives religious instruction on certain days.

RELIGION

I heard much condemnation of the anti-religious propaganda carried on by the Communist Party. It was often said that if the Communists want the peasants to co-operate with them, they should not place this obstacle in the way. "It is like holding a horse back and beating him at the same time," said one informant. What is being done now, said a Baptist to me (several sects are represented in Ozero), is exactly on all fours with the oppression of the sects by the Orthodox Church. The peasants, he said, are certainly very ignorant, but to expect them to leave the Church "is like taking away a child from the breast." They are afraid of the new agricultural communes because they think they are "atheistic."

The priest at Ozero is a simple peasant who works for his living. He encourages people to read the Bible. The priest at K. (see above) is of a very different type, and apparently a formidable opponent of the new regime.

SANITATION, FOOD, ETC.

Though insects abound in the peasants' houses, to the discomfort of the traveller, this does not mean that the peasants do not try to keep clean. Almost every house has a small mud building behind it, which contains the bath. A fire is made under a large cauldron of water; there is also a tub of cold water, and a high seat on which the bather can enjoy the steam produced by throwing water on the fire, at the same time beating himself with twigs to increase the heat. They now frequently use milk instead of soap. It is the custom to take a bath once a week, and oftener if dirty work is being done.

There is a Commission for fighting epidemics, which consists of the Military Commissar, the local doctor, and two or three representatives of the Soviet. It puts up various warning notices, and sees to the notification of disease, establishment of hospitals, etc.

The doctor was sent to Ozero on account of the typhus epidemic, which, however, is now over.

My general impression was that the population of Ozero was tolerably healthy. It certainly presented a very marked contrast to that of the towns. On the other hand, the absence of clothes, boots and soap must have disastrous effects; probably in normal times the people would look far more healthy. The peasants say that much disease is caused by the absence of salt.

Eggs and milk are plentiful. Sour milk (the Turkish yogurt), kasha or porridge made of millet-seed, cabbage soup, and coarse fish from the lake, are also common foods. I often had meat, but this was a special luxury reserved for the guest.

NEEDS OF THE POPULATION

The want of various manufactured goods is by far the greatest grievance of the people of Ozero. Almost every one of the scores of conversations I had, began with this all-engrossing subject. The articles most frequently mentioned were ploughs, scythes, wheels, tyres, nails; kerosene, paraffin, soap, grease, glass, cloth, boots, and paper. Medical necessities were also often mentioned. The doctor at Ozero, I was told, "has nothing except his thermometer." There is a special grievance about salt, because the peasants say it could be obtained in Russia at no great distance (near Uralsk), and they ought to be allowed to go and get it.

EFFECTS OF THE WAR, ETC.

The effects of the war were noticeable in Ozero on every hand. They were impressed on me not only by the lack of manufactured goods, but by the number of people whose sons were serving at the front, or were prisoners of war in Germany; by the perpetual demand for Army supplies and for their transport; by the large organisation in the neighbourhood for collecting these supplies; by the special portion of land which had to be cultivated to maintain soldiers' families; by the six or seven miles of wire entanglements and trenches on the neighbouring steppe, the result of Koltchak's advance in 1919; and by many other indications.

SOVIET FARMS, COMMUNES, ARTELS

There were none of these in any of the villages I visited, but I heard many details about them. All receive direct aid from the Agricultural Department of the Government. A Soviet Farm is one run directly by the authorities. A Commune is a very close association of a few families, with a common house, all their property being merged in the common stock. The peasants are very shy of these Communes. They raise the familiar objections to co-partnership in farming; they also think that membership in a Commune means membership in the Communist party, and that they are in some way atheistic institutions.

An Artel is a compromise. It consists of a considerable number of members who have their own houses, stock and implements, and work partly for themselves, but who live together in a colony, and have shares in the Artel. The Artel thus acquires capital, and gradually extends its operations as a co-operative enterprise worked by all the members jointly.

British Labour Delegation to Russia, 1920, *Report*, pp. 130-136.



ZINOVIEV ON THE WORLD REVOLUTION:

OPENING ADDRESS TO THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN

19 July 1920

The Second Congress of the Communist International opened at a moment when the Soviet leaders were especially optimistic: the Civil War had been won, the Polish invasion had not only been repulsed but the Red Army was approaching Warsaw, and the political and economic situation of Europe still seemed ripe for the next wave of revolution. Zinoviev's opening speech—"Remember this day....Tell your children...."—reflected this high point of revolutionary optimism.

[Speech of Zinoviev]

Comrades, on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, I declare the Second World Congress of the Communist International opened. (Thunderous applause, continuing for some time. Cries of "Hurrah!" The band plays the "Internationale").

Comrades, our first word, the word of workers assembled from all over the world, should be consecrated to the memory of our best friends and leaders, who have perished for the cause of the Communist International. You all know that during the past year there

is no country in which the blood of the Communist workers, and the best leaders of the working class has not flowed. It is sufficient to remember the names of our Hungarian comrades, it is enough to remember Comrades Levine, Tibor Samuelli, Jogviches, and many others who have joined the multitude of revolutionaries fallen in the beginning of the German and Russian revolutions. In Finland, Esthonia, Hungary, hundreds and thousands of the best sons of the working class have perished during this time. In opening our Congress, we are first of all doing honour to the memory of those of our best comrades who have perished for the cause of the Communist International.

In honour of our perished comrades, I propose to the Communist International to rise. (All stand up. The band plays the Funeral March.)

Further, we must remember those of our comrades who are at present locked up in the prisons of various bourgeois republics. We must remember our French friends, Comrades Loriot, Monatte, and a whole list of other comrades, cast into prison a short time before our Congress. We send our greetings to all the numerous fighters of the workers' revolution who are languishing in the German, Hungarian, French, British, and American prisons. We send our brotherly greetings to the American Communist workers, who have particularly suffered from persecution this last year. The American bourgeoisie is literally strangling the Communist workers, and all revolutionaries in general. Our friends cannot find any work in America, they are kept in close stone cells....[in original-ed.] There is no cruel measure which the American bourgeoisie has not employed against the workers who are in the ranks of the Communists or of the I.W.W., or any other revolutionary organisations following the same route as the Communist International.

We are giving voice to our deepest conviction that the words uttered not long ago by a French comrade, after the arrest of Loriot, Monatte, and others, will become justified. He said: "Yes, we are living in a time when the ruling bourgeoisie, the 'Democrats' and the so-called 'Socialists' are casting the best leaders of Communism into prison, but we are certain that soon the roles will be changed, and those who today are seated in the bourgeois Governments will tomorrow be put into prison by the working class, while those who are now in prison by order of the bourgeoisie will be placed in power by the working class." (Applause.)

Comrades, the Communist International was founded fifteen months ago. Naturally, it had first of all to cross swords with the Second International, with whom we entered into a direct struggle. Both our friends and our foes—in the face of today's Congress, which is literally a World Congress, attended by representatives from the whole of Europe and America—must recognise that our struggle against the Second International has been crowned with success. Today we are entitled to proclaim that the Second International has been completely beaten by the Third Communist International. (Thunderous applause.)

Comrades, what does this fact signify? It signifies that we have defeated the Second International. The struggle between us and the Second International was not a struggle between two factions of the same revolutionary movement, not a struggle against doctrinary differences of opinion or against tendencies within the same class camp, it was practically a *struggle of classes*. It is true that in the Second International there are many brothers of our own class; yet nevertheless our struggle against the Second International is not a warfare between factions within the same class, but something incomparably greater.

The collapse of the Second International is a reflection of the collapse of the bourgeois order itself. Here lies the point of the situation. We have conquered the Second International because the twilight of the gods of capitalism has set in. We have vanquished it because the bourgeoisie of the whole world has not been, and will not be, able to do away with the consequences of the imperialistic war. That is why we are conquering the Second International—because the League of Nations, the Entente, and all the bourgeoisie are

powerless to do anything effectual for the restoration of the economical life of Europe. We have defeated the Second International because the bourgeoisie will prove itself powerless to solve the problems standing before it demanding solution, unless it "tenders its resignation" (historically speaking).

The Second International has joined its fate to that of the bourgeoisie ever since the first shot was fired in 1914. The social-patriots of each country supported "their own" bourgeoisie, and "their own" bourgeois "fatherland." It was so up to the end of the war. And, after the war, the Second International again linked its fate to that of the bourgeoisie, this time particularly with the group of bourgeois countries which had secured the victory in the imperialist war.

You remember the first attempts at reviving the Second International when the imperialist slaughter began? You remember the conferences at Berne and Lucerne, at which the so-called leading part of the Second International desired at all costs to become "akin" to the League of Nations? The leaders of the reviving Second International tried to hold on to Wilson's coattails. You remember, comrades, that at the Berne Conference the Chairman, opening the Conference, greeted Wilson by comparing him to Jaures, thus insulting the spirit of the fallen tribune of the French workers. Already after the end of the war the Second International desired to join its fate with that of the bourgeoisie, i.e., that part of it which the Second International thought to be the strongest of all—the League of Nations. This was its desire and that is why all the blows which the working class of the whole world—and its advance guard, the Third International—have been dealing to the bourgeoisie during this whole year, have been falling also on the Second International. The Yellow Second International has linked its fate indissolubly to a class that is now perishing before our very eyes. That is why our victory over the Second International is so significant. This, we repeat, is not a victory of one faction of the labour movement over the other, nor of one Party over another. No! It is something incomparably greater: *every organisation which attempts to join its fate to that of the bourgeois class must perish also*. That is the historical meaning of the victory of the Communist International over the Second International. The working class, as a young class, is a rising star. It is marching to power. Meantime the bourgeoisie, its star set, is choking in the blood of the working class. It is growing old and decrepit. And as a drowning man grasps a living one, so is the bourgeoisie holding to the Second International and strangling it in its dying clutches. They are both perishing under our very eyes. Both the bourgeoisie and its agent, the Yellow International, are nearing the end (in a historical sense, a year counts for a minute). We can hear their deathrattle. Soon the earth will be free from the bourgeois yoke, from all the organisations which have been holding the working class in moral captivity. Soon our International Worker Association will be able to proceed peacefully to the construction of a new world, on the basis of the Communist principles of brotherhood.

Comrades, during these last years the idea of "Democracy" has been fading away before our eyes and is now living out its last days. I consider the theses on the role of bourgeois democracy accepted by the first Congress as the most important document of the first Constituent Congress of the Communist International, and even, if you like, the most important document of the Communist movement of these last years. These theses have been read by the whole world. The workers of the world, the class-conscious part of the peasants and soldiers have studied them. And the course of events during these last 15 or 16 months has confirmed at each step the correctness of the analysis made by the first Congress of the Communist International in its estimate of bourgeois democracy, as pointed out in these theses. When the American bourgeoisie, before the eyes of the whole world, annulled all its own laws, all the constitutional guarantees of the working class; when matters have gone so far that Socialists elected in accordance with all the rules of parliamentary procedure, on the basis of the established laws, are, nevertheless, not admitted into

Parliament but put into prison—when such a classical country of bourgeois democracy as America violates the principles of democracy at each step, then she is giving a practical illustration of how perfectly right the Communist International was in pointing out in its programs, its theses, the real historical role of so-called democracy.

Comrades, this is a bona-fide World Congress of the Communist International that we see before us. Our Congress represents the vanguard of the workers of the whole world. Before this World Congress we shall place a series of questions which are at present in dispute within the depths of the International Communist movement. We have invited to the Congress a whole number of labour organisations which are not quite Communist, which are yet only becoming crystallized. The international situation of the working class after the long war, after the desperate crisis, is such that in some places the workers' organisations are standing at crossroads and their movements are undecided. They have not finally determined their tactics, they have not finally chosen the road which they will take. We have invited to work with us all the workers' organisations which we are sure really desire to fight honestly against capitalism. We will speak to them as our brothers in the struggle and in our sufferings as brothers of the same class, ready like us to give up their lives for the cause of the liberation of the working class. We shall not resemble the Second International, which did nothing but turn into ridicule and hunt down the revolutionary workers who did not follow its train of thought which was a double-faced Janus, showing a sweet smile to the right and cruelly gaping jaws to the left. We are deeply convinced life will be the workers' teacher. The imperialist war has taught the workers many things. The honest revolutionary elements of syndicalism, anarchism, industrialism and the Shop Stewards' Committees will pass over and are already passing over to the side of Communism. It is our duty now to help them to do so quickly.

On the other hand, the representatives of the German Independent Party, the French Socialist Party and the American Socialist Party are also present at our Congress. They have but recently left the ranks of the Second International. With the honest revolutionary workers in the ranks of these parties, we wish to enter into a Communist union.

Comrades, you know that by degrees, as the Third International grew, about ten of the larger old parties—I shall not stop to enumerate them—have left the ranks of the Second International. A new stage is now commencing: the old parties are not only leaving the Second International, but they are making attempts to enter the ranks of the Third. A number of representatives of such parties, as I have said already, are now present among us. The Communist Congress will put all the burning questions squarely before the German and French workers. The Communist Congress will in no wise admit any ideological double-dealing, it will not make any concessions in the question of principles.

The radical questions of the proletarian revolution must be put in a categorical form. We want clarity, absolute clarity. We shall not permit the Third International to become a fad. The questions before us interest millions of workers. We shall expose our views on all the urgent questions of the day before the workers of the French and German Socialist Parties. We shall wait patiently until the vast majority of the French and German workers will have completed the requisite weeding-out in their ranks and are able to pass into those of the Communist International in such a way that no one might possibly regard them as a simple ballast for the latter; they must come over to us to conduct the joint struggle, together with us, against the bourgeoisie.

We intend to lay before the present Congress the Constitution of the Communist International. We consider that, just as in every separate country, in order to conquer the bourgeoisie, the Communists need first of all a strong centralised Party welded out of one piece of metal, it is also time to proceed to such an organisation on an international scale. We are carrying on this struggle against the international bourgeoisie against a whole world of foes, armed to the teeth. We must have an iron international proletarian organisation which

will be able at any given moment to render the maximum of assistance to any of its detachments, which can forge the most powerful, most elastic, most rapid weapons in order to be fully armed in face of the enemy with which they will have to contend. In the Draft Constitution we are citing an extract from the Constitution of the first International Workers' Association, the leaders of which were Marx and Engels. In this Constitution Marx and Engels said: "If up to now the struggle of the working class has not met with success, it is first of all due to the fact that the workers had no international understanding, no well formed international organisation, no mutual support *on an international scale*." Yes, comrades, there is the simple truth. But we have had to wait over 50 years, to pass through four years of war, to live through the horrors that mankind has been experiencing during the last period, in order that this simple truth should not only become accessible to individuals or separate groups, but that it should enter the brain and marrow of millions of workers. We are perfectly sure that at present this idea has become the common property of the masses. We understand very well that for victory over the bourgeoisie it is necessary to realise at last this elementary simple idea, voiced by the First International, the first International Workers' Association, whose traditions and principles in many questions we are now taking up in order to realise them at once. The representatives of the Petrograd working men and women, who were the first to rise in October 1917, are present here. I say to them: a great historic event is taking place today in Petrograd—the Second Congress of the Communist International has entered its name in history at the moment when it opened its sessions. Remember this day. Know that this is the reward for all your resolutions and for all your courageous and steadfast struggle. Tell your children and explain to them the meaning of this day. Imprint on your hearts the memory of this solemn moment.

Before us is an accomplished fact, grand in its simplicity! For what can be simpler: the workers of all the world have united together to free themselves from the yoke of the rich? And at the same time, what can be grander than this? Is it possible, comrades, that you do not hear, as I do, the beating of the wings of victory? Our earth *shall* be free!

Wage-slavery *shall* be suppressed. Communism *will* conquer!

Comrades, in concluding my speech I recollect that in a few months 50 years will have gone by since the first great historical uprising of European workers served as an example for us all. I am speaking of the Paris Commune. I am referring to the heroic uprising of the proletarians of Paris, who, in spite of all their weakness and mistakes (we are trying to avoid them) made a golden record in the history of the international proletarian movement, and opened the way which is now being followed by millions of workers.

Allow me to express the wish that on the fiftieth anniversary of the Paris Commune we shall see in France a French Republic of Soviets. (Loud, thunderous applause.)

Comrades, in an article written immediately after the Constituent Congress of the Communist International entitled: "Prospects of the International Revolution," I happened to say in my enthusiasm that maybe only a year would elapse before we would be beginning to forget that a struggle had been going on in Europe for the power of Soviets, because this struggle would be definitely ended in Europe and would have passed over to the other continents. One of the bourgeois German professors dug up this sentence of mine; and quite recently I had occasion to read an article in which he quoted it and remarked with malignity: "Well, soon a Second Congress will be opened: more than a year has elapsed; but it seems that the Soviet Power has not quite conquered in Europe yet." We can answer to this learned bourgeois that, if he likes, it is so: we went too far in our hopes. Perhaps not one year, but two and even three will be necessary for all Europe to become a Soviet Power. But if you are so modest that you consider a reprieve of a year or two as an unheard-of piece of luck, we can only wish you joy in your modesty. And we may express our conviction that, sooner or later—we shall bear up for a while—we *shall* have an international Soviet Republic whose leader will be the Communist International.

Long live the working class of the whole world! Long live the Communist International! (Long and thunderous applause.)

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THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION:
THESES ADOPTED BY THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN
24 July 1920

The Second Congress of the Communist International differed dramatically from the first and from later ones. Not only was the representation much broader and at least somewhat more representative, but it saw spirited debate about the basic organization and tactics of the Comintern. Nonetheless, its overriding feature was the relatively easy success of Lenin and his associates in forcing through Lenin's vision of the Comintern. In many respects the debates of the Second Congress were an extension of the issues raised in his "Infantile Disorder" essay, which was distributed to the delegates (discussed above). Certainly the Congress was much concerned with such matters as dealing with both left and right deviations and with imposing the Bolshevik model. The following document shows the extent to which the spirit and practice of the Bolsheviks were being put forth as the fundamental operating principles of the new organization. Its stress upon the importance of the Russian model and upon centralization and discipline is remarkable. Although drafted and presented by Zinoviev, the ideas are vintage Lenin, including a classic definition of democratic centralism.

ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
IN THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION

The world proletariat is confronted with decisive battles. We are living in an epoch of civil war. The critical hour has struck. In almost all countries where there is a labor movement of any importance the working class, arms in hand, stands in the midst of fierce and decisive battles. Now more than ever is the working class in need of a strong organization. Without losing an hour of invaluable time, the working class must keep on indefatigably preparing for the impending decisive struggle.

The first heroic uprising of the French proletariat during the Paris Commune of 1871 would have been much more successful, and many errors and shortcomings would have been avoided, had there been a strong Communist party, no matter how small. The struggle which the proletariat is now facing, under changed historical circumstances, will be of much more vital importance to the future destiny of the working class than was the insurrection of 1871.

The Second World Congress of the Communist International therefore calls upon the revolutionary workers of the whole world to concentrate all their attention on the following:

1. The Communist Party is part of the working class, namely, its most advanced, class-conscious, and therefore most revolutionary part. The Communist Party is formed of the best, most intelligent, self-sacrificing and far-seeing workers. The Communist Party has no other interests than those of the working class. It differs from the general mass of the workers in that it takes a general view of the whole historical march of the working class, and at all turns of the road it endeavors to defend the interests, not of separate groups or

professions, but of the working class as a whole. The Communist Party is the organized political lever by means of which the more advanced part of the working class leads all the proletarian and semi-proletarian mass in the right direction.

2. Until the time when the power of government will have been finally conquered by the proletariat, until the time when the proletarian rule will have been firmly established beyond the possibility of a bourgeois restoration, the Communist Party will have in its organized ranks only a minority of the workers. Up to the time when the power will have been seized by it, and during the transition period, the Communist Party may, under favorable conditions, exercise undisputed moral and political influence on all the proletarian and semi-proletarian classes of the population; but it will not be able to unite them within its ranks. Only when the proletarian dictatorship has deprived the bourgeoisie of such powerful weapons as the press, the school, parliament, church, the government apparatus, etc., only when the final overthrow of the capitalist order will have become an evident fact—only then will all or almost all the workers enter the ranks of the Communist Party.

3. A sharp distinction must be made between the conception of "party" and "class." The members of the "Christian" and liberal trade unions of Germany, England and other countries, are undoubtedly parts of the working class. More or less considerable circles of the working people, followers of Scheidemann, Gompers and Co., are likewise part of the working class. Under certain historical conditions the working class is very likely to be impregnated with numerous reactionary elements. The task of Communism is not to adapt itself to such retrograde elements of the working class, but to raise the whole working class to the level of the Communist vanguard. The confounding of these two conceptions—of party and of class—can only lead to the greatest errors and confusion. Thus, for instance, it is clear that notwithstanding the disposition or prejudices of certain parts of the working masses during the imperialist war, the workers' parties ought to have counteracted these prejudices, defending the historical interests of the proletariat, which demanded of the proletarian parties a declaration of war against war.

Thus in the beginning of the imperialistic war of 1914, the social traitor parties of all countries, in upholding the capitalists of their "own" countries, unanimously declared that such was the will of the people. They forgot at the same time that even if this were so, the duty of the workers' party would have been to combat such an attitude of the majority of the workers, and to defend the interests of the workers at whatever cost. At the very beginning of the Twentieth Century the Russian Mensheviks of that time (the so-called "economists"), denied the possibility of an open political struggle against Tsarism, on the ground that the working class in general was not yet ripe for the understanding of the political struggle. So also has the right wing of the Independents of Germany, in all its compromising, referred to the "will of the masses," failing to understand that the party exists precisely for the purpose of marching ahead of the masses and pointing out the way to them.

4. The Communist International is firmly convinced that the collapse of the old "Social Democratic" parties of the Second International cannot be represented as the collapse of the proletarian party organizations in general. The period of open struggle for the dictatorship of the workers has created a new proletarian party—the Communist Party.

5. The Communist International emphatically rejects the opinion that the workers could carry out a revolution without having an independent political party of their own. Every class struggle is a political struggle. The object of this struggle, which inevitably turns into a civil war, is the obtaining of political power. However, this power cannot be acquired, organized and directed otherwise than by means of a political party. Only in case the workers have for their leader an organized and experienced party, with strictly defined objects, and a practically drawn-up program of immediate action, both in internal and foreign policy—then only will the acquisition of political power cease to be a casual episode, but

it will serve as a starting point for the gradual introduction of the Communist society by the proletariat.

This class struggle likewise demands that the general guidance of the various forms of the proletarian movement (labor unions, factory committees, co-operative associations, cultural-educational work, elections, etc.), be united in one central organization. Only a political party can be such a unifying and guiding centre. To refuse to create and strengthen such a party and submit to its dictates, would mean to abandon the idea of unity in the guidance of the separate proletarian groups, operating on the different arenas of the struggle. Lastly, the class struggle of the proletariat demands a concentrated propaganda, throwing light on the various stages of the fight, a unified point of view, and directing the attention of the proletariat at each given moment to the definite tasks to be accomplished by the whole class. This cannot be done without the help of a centralized political apparatus, i.e., a political party. Therefore the propaganda of the revolutionary Syndicalists, and the partisans of the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.), against the necessity of an independent workers' party, as a matter of fact has only served and continues to serve the interests of the bourgeoisie and the counter-revolutionary "Social-Democrats." In their propaganda against the Communist Party, which the Syndicalists and Industrialists desire to replace by the trade unions or any kind of shapeless, general labor organizations, they approach the opportunists. After the defeat of the revolution in 1905, during the course of several years the Russian Mensheviks proclaimed the necessity of a so-called Labor Congress, which was to replace the revolutionary party of the working class: all kinds of "laborites" of England and America, while consciously carrying on a bourgeois policy, are propagating among the workers the idea of creating indefinite, shapeless workers' unions instead of a political party. The revolutionary Syndicalists and Industrialists desire to fight against the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, but they do not know how to do it. They do not see that working class without an independent political party is like a body without a head.

Revolutionary Syndicalism and Industrialism are a step forward only in comparison with the old, musty, counter-revolutionary ideology of the Second International. But in comparison with the revolutionary Marxian doctrine, i.e., with Communism, Syndicalism and Industrialism are a step backward. The declaration made by the "lefts" of the Communist Labor Party of Germany (in the program-declaration of their Constituent Congress in April) to the effect that they are forming a party, but not one in the traditional sense of the word ("Kein Partei im ueberlieferten Sinne")—is a capitulation before the views of Syndicalism and Industrialism which are reactionary. The working class cannot achieve the victory over the bourgeoisie by means of the general strike alone, and by the policy of folded arms. The proletariat must resort to an armed uprising. Having understood this, one realizes that an organized political party is absolutely essential, and that shapeless labor organizations will not suffice.

The revolutionary Syndicalists frequently advance the idea of the great importance of a determined revolutionary minority. The Communist Party is just such a determined minority of the working class, which is ready to act, which has a program and strives to organize the masses for the struggle.

6. The most important task of a genuine Communist Party is to preserve constantly the closest contact with the widest masses of the workers. For that purpose the Communists must carry on activity also within such organizations which are non-partisan, but which comprise large proletarian groups, for example, organizations of war invalids in various countries, the "Hands off Russia" Committee in England, Proletarian Tenants' Unions, and so forth. Of special importance are the so-called non-party conferences of workers and peasants held in Russia. Such conferences are being organized almost in every town, in all industrial districts, and in the country. In the elections to these conferences the widest

masses even of the most backward workers take part. The order of business at these conferences is made up of the most pressing questions, such as the food question, the housing problem, the military situations, the school question. The Communists exercise their influence on these non-party conferences in the most energetic manner, and with the greatest success for the party. They consider it their most important task to carry on the work of organization and instruction within such organizations. But in order that their efforts should bring forth the desired results, and that such organizations should not become the prey of opponents of the revolutionary proletariat, the most advanced Communist workers should always have their own independent, closely united Communist Party, working in an organized manner, and standing up for the general interests of Communism at each turn of events, and under every form of the movement.

7. The Communists have no fear of the largest workers' organizations which belong to no party, even when they are of a decidedly reactionary nature (yellow unions, Christian associations, etc.). The Communist Party carries on its work inside such organizations, and untiringly instructs the workers, and proves to them that the idea of no political party as a principle is consciously cultivated among the workers by the bourgeoisie and its labor lieutenants, with the object of keeping the proletariat from an organized struggle for Socialism.

8. The old classical division of the labor movement into three forms (party, labor unions and co-operatives) has evidently served its time. The proletarian revolution in Russia has brought forward the fundamental form of the proletarian dictatorship—the Soviets. The new divisions which are now forming everywhere are: Party, Soviet, Industrial Union. But the party of the proletariat, that is to say, the Communist Party, must constantly and systematically direct the work of the Soviets as well as of the revolutionized industrial unions. The Communist Party, the organized vanguard of the working class, must direct the struggle of the entire class on the economic and the political fields, and also on the field of education. It must be the animating spirit in the industrial unions, workers' councils and all other forms of proletarian organizations.

The origin of the Soviets as an historically basic form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in no way lessens the guiding role of the Communist Party in the proletarian revolution. The assertions made by the "left" Communists of Germany (in their appeal to the German proletariat of April 14, 1920, signed—"The Communist Labor Party of Germany") that the party must always adapt itself to the idea of the Soviets and assume a proletarian character, is nothing but a hazy expression of the opinion that the Communist Party should dissolve itself into the Soviets, that the Soviets can replace the Communist Party. This idea is essentially mistaken and reactionary.

There was a period in the history of the Russian Revolution when the Soviets were acting in opposition to the party, and supported the policy of the agents of the bourgeoisie. The same has happened in Germany, and may take place in other countries.

In order that the Soviets may be able to perform their historic mission, a strong Communist Party is necessary which should not merely adapt itself to the Soviets, but on the contrary should take care that the Soviets do not adapt themselves to the bourgeoisie, and to the white guard Social Democracy; that with the aid of the Communist factions in the Soviets the latter be brought under the banner of the Communist Party.

Those who propose to the Communist Party to "conform" to the Soviets, those who perceive in such "conformation" a strengthening of the "proletarian nature" of the party, are rendering a bad service both to the party and to the Soviets, and do not understand the importance of the Party, nor that of the Soviets. The stronger the Communist Party in each country, the sooner will the Soviet idea triumph. Many "independent" and even "right" Socialists profess to believe in the Soviet idea. But we cannot prevent such elements from

distorting this idea, except if there exists a strong Communist Party, capable of determining the policy of the Soviets and making them follow it.

9. The Communist Party is necessary to the working class not only before it has seized power, not only while it is acquiring such power, but also after the power has passed into the hands of the working class. The history of the Russian Communist Party, for three years at the head of such a vast country, shows that the role of the party after the conquest of power by the working class has not only not diminished, but on the contrary, has greatly increased.

10. On the day of the seizure of power by the proletariat, its party still remained, as formerly, a part of the working class. But it was just that part of the class which organized the victory. During twenty years in Russia—and for a number of years in Germany—the Communist Party, in its struggle not only against the bourgeoisie, but also against those Socialists who diffuse bourgeois ideas among the proletariat, has enrolled in its ranks the staunchest, most far-seeing and most advanced fighters of the working class. Only by having such a closely united organization of the best part of the working class is it possible for the party to overcome all the difficulties which arise before the proletarian dictatorship in the days following the victory. The organizations of a new proletarian Red Army, the practical abolition of the bourgeois governing apparatus and the building in its place of the framework of a new proletarian state apparatus, the struggle against the narrow craft tendencies of certain separate groups of workers, the struggle against local and provincial "patriotism," clearing the way for the creation of a new labor discipline—in all these undertakings the final decisive word is to be said by the Communist Party, whose members by their own example animate and guide the majority of the workers.

11. The necessity of a political party for the proletariat can cease only with the complete abolition of classes. On the way to this final victory of Communism it is possible that the relative importance of the three fundamental proletarian organizations of modern times (Party, Soviets and Industrial Unions), shall undergo some changes, and that gradually a single type of workers' organization will be formed. The Communist Party, however, will become absorbed in the working class only when Communism ceases to be the object of struggle, and the whole working class shall have become Communist.

12. The Second Congress of the Communist International must not only serve to establish the historical mission of the Communist Party in general, but it must indicate to the international proletariat, in rough draft, what kind of Communist Party is needed.

13. The Communist International assumes that especially during the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Communist Party should be organized on the basis of strict proletarian centralism. In order to lead the working class successfully during the long, stubborn civil war, the Communist Party must establish the strictest military discipline within its own ranks. The experience of the Russian Communist Party in its successful leadership of the civil war of the working class during three years, has proved that the victory of the workers is impossible without a severe discipline, a perfected centralization and the full confidence of all the organizations of the party in the leading organ of the party.

14. The Communist Party should be based on the principle of democratic centralization. The chief principle of the latter is the election of the upper party units by those immediately below, the unconditional subordination of subordinate units to the decisions of those above them, and a strong party central organ, whose decrees are binding upon all the leaders of party life between party conventions.

15. In view of the state of siege introduced by the bourgeoisie against the Communists, a whole series of Communist parties in Europe and America are compelled to exist illegally. It must be remembered that under such conditions it may become necessary sometimes to deviate temporarily from the strict observance of the elective principle, and to

delegate to the leading party organizations the right of cooptation, as was done in Russia at one time. Under the state of siege the Communist Party cannot have recourse to a democratic referendum among all the members of the party (as was proposed by part of the American Communists), but on the contrary it should empower its leading central organ to make important decisions in emergencies on behalf of all the members of the party.

16. The doctrine of a wide "autonomy" for the separate local organizations of the party at the present moment only weakens the Communist Party, undermines its working capacity and aids the development of petty bourgeois, anarchistic, centrifugal tendencies.

17. In countries where the power is in the hands of the bourgeoisie or the counter-revolutionary Social Democrats, the Communist Party must learn to unite systematically legal with illegal work; but all legal work must be carried on under the practical control of the illegal party. The parliamentary groups of Communists, both in the central as well as in the local government institutions, must be fully and absolutely subject to the Communist Party in general, irrespective of whether the party on the whole be a legal or an illegal organization at the moment. Any delegate who in one way or another does not submit absolutely to the party shall be expelled from the ranks of Communism.

The legal press (newspapers, publications) must be unconditionally and fully subject to the party in general, and to its central committee. No concessions are admissible in this respect.

18. The fundamental principle of all organization work of the Communist Party and individual Communists must be the creation of Communist nuclei everywhere where they find proletarians and semi-proletarians—although even in small numbers. In every Soviet of Workers' Deputies, in every trade and industrial union, co-operative association, factory, tenants' union, in every government institution, everywhere, even though there may be only three people sympathizing with Communism, a Communist nucleus must be immediately organized. It is only the power of organization of the Communists that enables the advance guard of the working class to be the leader of the whole class. Communist nuclei working in organizations adhering to no political party must be subject to the party organizations in general, whether the party itself is working legally or illegally at the given moment. Communist nuclei of all kinds must be subordinated one to another in a strictly hierarchical order and system.

19. The Communist Party almost always begins its work among the industrial workers residing for the most part in cities. For the rapid victory of the working class it is necessary that the party should also work in the country, in the villages. The Communist Party must carry on its propaganda and organization work among the agricultural laborers and the poorer farmers. It must especially endeavor to organize Communist nuclei in the rural districts.

The international organization of the proletariat will be strong only if in all the countries where the Communists are carrying on their struggle the above principles of party organization and activity are firmly established. The Communist International invites to its Congress all labor unions which recognize the principles of the Third International, and are ready to break with the yellow International. The Communist International intends to organize an international section composed of the red labor unions, which recognize the principles of Communism. The Communist International will not refuse to co-operate with purely non-political workers' organizations desirous of carrying on a serious revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie. But at the same time the Communist International will never cease to emphasize to the workers of all the world:

1. The Communist International is the chief and essential instrument for the liberation of the working class. In each country there must now be not only Communist groups, or tendencies, but—a Communist Party.

2. In every country there must be only one Communist Party.
3. The Communist Party must be founded on the principle of the strictest centralization, and during the period of civil war it must introduce military discipline in its ranks.
4. In every place where there are a dozen proletarians or semi-proletarians, the Communist Party must have an organized nucleus.
5. In each non-political organization there must be a Communist nucleus, strictly subordinate to the party in general.
6. While firmly and faithfully supporting the program and revolutionary tactics of Communism, the Communist Party must always be closely united with the most widely spread workers' organizations and avoid sectarianism as much as lack of principle.

Blueprint, pp. 73-85.



BUKHARIN ON WOMEN UNDER THE SOVIET SYSTEM

31 July 1920

The emancipation of women under socialism and the role they would play in the new society was the subject of many articles and speeches. The most famous of these are those by Alexandra Kollontai, but other Bolsheviks wrote on the topic as well. Bukharin's is an interesting comparison to those of Kollontai, found elsewhere in this volume and in volume one of Documents of Soviet History. Compare also to "Mary the Bolshevik" (15 September 1922) and other documents on women in this volume, and to the article by Trotsky in volume three (13 July 1923).

Nikolai Bukharin

Russian "Bolshevism" and the Working Women

We COMMUNISTS in Russia live under such unusually hard conditions that we have neither energy nor time to record immediately all the important and interesting events created in the course of the revolution and now being further developed. We are entirely engaged in the struggle that is going on for the protection of the revolution, which is being attacked by its deadly enemies. We also must do reconstruction work, so as to bring about Communism. Owing to the pressure of work and struggle we fail to pay sufficient attention to the fact that the new order created also a new and entirely different individual, who did not exist before, in fact, whose existence before was impossible. The new social relations among the people create and educate new human beings. Everybody is ready to abuse and insult the Bolsheviks—most people do it without any particular reason, simply for the pleasure of passing judgment on Bolshevism; others have no idea about it and don't know what it really means. Only a few realize what a tremendous rebuilding task Bolshevism is performing for the benefit of humanity. Under the scorching breath of the revolution, and owing to the activity of the Communist Party, there sprang out from the lowest rank of the society, among the creative mass, new people of a higher type; they are determined fighters, full of self-sacrifice, bright and faithful workers, real heroes.

It is especially interesting to observe the change which took place among the women of the plain proletarians and peasants. Those hitherto treated like cattle have at last realized that they are human beings entitled to equal rights. They take part in the general

struggle against capitalism, against exploitation and slavery in any form. The working-women and the rural female population began to participate in the administration of husbandry. They sit in the Soviets and Executive Committees of various types and hold responsible positions, and are frequently seen armed, or nursing at the front. The working women of the middle class and the peasant women are especially active in all situations that deal with the social care of women, mothers, children, aged people, sick, invalids, etc. They are to be found in institutions for pregnant women, women who have just been confined, for nursing women, in infant asylums, in children's colonies, at vocational centers, in school kitchens, public dining rooms, tea houses, in hospitals, recreation centers, in aged and invalid homes, in public libraries, reading rooms, in propaganda centers for the spreading of communistic ideas and general knowledge; everywhere these simple women are active in bigger or smaller groups; they are, in fact, often the very soul of such establishments. In the performing of their duties they show as much brain as heart, they have an almost "ambitious, passionate enthusiasm" for the new creative abilities and possess common sense for practical things.

Women who hardly ever heard about Communism before the revolution, many of whom learned to read and write only in the schools of the party organizations, do distinguished work in order to realize the Communistic theory. The talents and energy of the women after the revolution, owing to free activity, grow like plants in the sunshine after a shower has just passed. This new life awakens the women of the proletariat and peasants; it gives them tasks and duties, experience and training; it transforms them into revolutionary fighters and co-workers of the Communistic Society. This is still more surprising when we keep in mind all the suffering, strain and struggle which Soviet Russia has had to go through in order to protect its existence and secure its proper development. Here and there the Bolsheviks are compelled to take up anew the struggle against armed forces, to suppress the spirit of capitalism which the counter-revolution of the whole world is ready to save by the force of its weapons; the shattered domestic economy results in privation, hunger, diseases. In spite of all this, Soviet Russia is struggling for a bright future, for a free and happy common life, and the women of the proletarians and peasants are working and struggling together with them. A person who would have to report the activity and strivings of these women from day to day would have a hard task to decide where to begin and where to stop.

The Cossack Conference now being held in Moscow is very typical as an indication of the new individuality awakening in the women. Women are also taking part in this conference as delegates entitled to equal rights. The revolution opened their eyes, awakened them, transformed them into fighters for the cause of the working people. What a transformation! Before the revolution, these women sat in their Cossack villages, managed their cottages, gardens and fields, as their mothers and grandmothers had done before them. They did not care what took place beyond the boundaries of their little village. When one of these women happened to visit the seat of the county or province, this was an event which gave material for long gossip. Now they participate in the discussions and decisions of their Soviets and they do not hesitate to make the long journey to Moscow. They sit among strangers whom they have seen for the first time and they express their opinions, discuss and come to conclusions; they feel as if they were among brothers and sisters discussing the most important life-issues of great Russia. Many a sensible remark, a clever suggestion, a thoughtful question, comes from the peasant women. It seems like a dream but it is reality.

The revolution and the Soviet Government offer to every toiler, creating with his hands or brain, the possibility to work for the common welfare and progress, and thus enable him to obtain bread, freedom, dignity, honor, in short—helps him to create an existence worthy of a human being. The right and the duty to cooperate, regardless of sex—that is the rule in Soviet Russia; this cooperation is carried out through the shops, fields and administration. During the regime of the Tsar, the women had no part in the political life of the

country. The lady of the higher circle was wife and mistress, she did not care about the affairs of the state. The fate of the women of the masses was similar to this. After the March revolution of 1917, the women of the wealthy classes, namely, the liberals and the intellectual women (the "Intelligentsia") began to take part most energetically in public life. They also appeared as speakers at meetings. But only among the revolutionists could the Russian woman, who has always been so daring and full of self-sacrifice, take a full part in the political life. The revolutionary movement and struggles were carried on by men as well as by women. Not only Sophie Perovskaya, but many other Russian women who found death on the gallows, in horrible prisons, in deserts of snow, have their revolutionary integrity attested with a firm hand. As soon as the revolutionary movement had penetrated the masses, the women also became its supporters. The proletarian women did not fail to appear at any economical or social walk-outs, at general strikes, at public information centers, at May demonstrations. Working women and wives of workers fell on the battlefields of the revolution. But in comparison with the great number of the working class, the number of women who took part in the political struggle of their class was comparatively small. Only a small group of the elite of the working women was working and fighting for the emancipation of the exploited and suppressed, who were in misery and slavery. Only the proletarian November Revolution brought out the big mass of the working and peasant women, who were seeking and failing, but always conscious of another, greater ideal. The individuals were growing intellectually and morally through this ideal, and in serving it these individuals became the majority and are now innumerable.

Soviet Russia, Vol. 3, No. 5 (31 July 1920) pp. 109-110, with modifications.



STATUTES OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

4 August 1920

At the Second Congress of the Communist International Lenin, Zinoviev, and the other Russian leaders devoted much of their effort to creating a centralized, disciplined organization in the image of the Bolshevik Party. Those who showed too much independence or balked on key issues were driven out as Lenin applied to the Comintern many of the same tactics of splitting off dissenters that he had used earlier in the Bolshevik Party. The statutes reflect the determination to impose discipline and centralization on the parties adhering to the Comintern even if that required splitting existing leftist parties. It also affirmed the importance of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) as well as ensuring Russian domination of the ECCI.

STATUTES OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

In the year 1864 the First International Workingmen's Association—the First International—was formed in London. In the constitution of this International Workingmen's Association it was stated:

That the emancipation of the working class is to be attained by the working class itself.

That the struggle for the emancipation of the working class does not mean a struggle for class privileges and monopolies but a struggle for equal rights and equal obligations, for the abolition of every kind of class-domination.

That the economic subjection of the worker to the monopolists of the means of production, i.e., of the sources of life is the cause of enslavement in all its forms, the cause of all social misery, all moral degradation and political subordination.

That the economic emancipation of the working class is therefore the great aim which every political movement must be subordinated to.

That all attempts to attain this great aim have failed as yet because of the lack of solidarity between the workers in the different industries of each country, and the absence of the fraternal union between the working class of the different countries.

That the emancipation is neither a local nor a national problem but a problem of a social character embracing every civilized country, and the solution of which depends on the theoretical and practical co-operation of the most progressive countries.

That the present simultaneous revival of the workers' movement in the industrial countries of Europe on the one hand awakens new hopes whilst on the other hand it is a solemn warning of the danger of relapse into the old errors and an appeal for an immediate union of the hitherto disconnected movement.

The Second International which was established in 1889 at Paris had undertaken to continue the work of the First International. In 1914 at the outbreak of the world slaughter it has suffered a complete collapse. Undermined by opportunism and damaged by the treason of its leaders who had taken the side of the bourgeoisie—the Second International perished.

The Third Communist International which has been established in March, 1919, in the capital of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in the city of Moscow solemnly proclaims before the entire world that it takes upon itself to continue and to complete the great cause begun by the First International Workers' Association.

The Third Communist International had been formed at a moment when the imperialist slaughter of 1914-1918 in which the imperialist bourgeoisie of the various countries had sacrificed twenty million men, came to an end.

Keep in mind the imperialist war! This is the first appeal of the Communist International to every toiler wherever he may live and whatever language he may speak. Keep in mind that owing to the existence of the capitalist system a small group of Imperialists had the opportunity during four long years to compel the workers of various countries to cut each other's throat. Keep in mind that the bourgeois war has cast Europe and the entire world into a state of extreme destitution and starvation. Keep in mind that unless the capitalist system is overthrown the repetition of such criminal war is not only possible but inevitable.

In order to overthrow the international bourgeoisie and to create an international Soviet Republic as a transition stage to the complete abolition of the state, the Communist International will use all means at its disposal, including force of arms.

The Communist International considers the dictatorship of the proletariat as the only means for the liberation of humanity from the horrors of capitalism. The Communist International considers the Soviet form of government as the historically evolved form of this dictatorship of the proletariat.

The imperialist war is responsible for the close union of the fate of the workers of one country with the fate of the workers of all other countries. The imperialist war emphasizes once more what is pointed out in the statute of the First International: that the emancipation of labor is neither local, nor a national task, but one of an international character.

The Communist International once and forever breaks with the traditions of the Second International which in reality only recognized the white race. The Communist International makes it its task to emancipate the workers of the entire world. The ranks of the Communist International fraternally unite men of all colors: white, yellow and black—the toilers of the entire world.

The Communist International fully and unreservedly upholds the gains of the great proletarian revolution in Russia, the first victorious socialist revolution in the world's history, and calls upon all workers to follow the same road. The Communist International makes it its duty to support by all the power at its disposal every Soviet Republic wherever it may be formed.

The Communist International is aware that for the purpose of a speedy achievement of victory the International Association of workers which is struggling for the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of Communism should possess a firm and centralized organization. To all intents and purposes the Communist International should represent an universal Communist party, of which the parties operating in every country form individual sections. The apparatus of the Communist International is organized to secure to the toilers of every country the possibility at any given moment to obtain the maximum of aid from the organized workers of the other countries.

For this purpose the Communist International affirms the following items of its statute:

1. The new International Association of workers is established for the purpose of organizing common activity of the workers of various countries who are striving towards a single aim: the overthrow of capitalism, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the International Soviet Republic for the complete abolition of classes and the realization of socialism—this first step to Communist Society.

2. The new International Association of workers is called The Communist International.

3. All the parties and organizations comprising the Communist International bear the name of the Communist Party of the given country (section of the Communist International).

4. The World Congress of all parties and organizations which form part of the Communist International is the supreme organ of this International. The World Congress as a rule convenes not less than once a year. The World Congress confirms the programs of the various parties comprising the Communist International. The World Congress discusses and decides the more important questions of program and tactics, which are connected with the activity of the Communist International. The number of decisive votes at the World Congress for every party and organization is decided upon by a special regulation of the Congress.

5. The World Congress elects an Executive Committee of the Communist International which serves as the leading organ of the Communist International in the intervals between the convention of World Congresses and is responsible only to the World Congress.

6. The residence of the Executive Committee of the Communist International is each time decided at the World Congress of the Communist International.

7. A special World Congress of the Communist International may be convened either by regulation of the Executive Committee, or at the demand of one half of the number of the parties which were part of the Communist International at the last World Congress.

8. The bulk of the work and responsibility in the Executive Committee of the Communist International lies with the party of that country where, in keeping with the regulation of the World Congress, the Executive Committee finds its residence at the time being. The party of the country in question sends to the Executive Committee not less than five members with a decisive vote. In addition to this, one representative with a decisive vote is sent to the Communist International from ten to twelve of the largest of Communist parties. The list of these representatives is to be confirmed by the Universal Congress of the Communist International. The remaining parties and organizations forming part of the Communist International enjoy the right of sending to the Executive Committee one representative each with a consultative vote.

9. The Executive Committee is the leading organ of the Communist International during the conventions; the Executive Committee publishes in no less than four languages the central organ of the Communist International (the periodical "The Communist International"). The Executive Committee makes the necessary appeals on behalf of the Communist International, and issues instructions obligatory to all the parties and organizations which form part of the Communist International. The Executive Committee of the Communist International enjoys the right to demand from the affiliated parties the exclusion of groups of members who are guilty of the infringement of international proletarian discipline, as well as the exclusion from the Communist International of such parties guilty of the infringement of the regulations of the World Congress. These parties retain the right of appealing to the World Congress. In the event of necessity, the Executive Committee organizes in various countries its technical and auxiliary bureaux, completely subordinated to the Executive Committee. The representatives of the Executive Committee shall carry out their political tasks in closest contact with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the given country.

10. The Executive Committee of the Communist International enjoys the right to include in its ranks representatives of organizations and parties not affiliated with the Communist International but which are sympathetic towards Communism; these are to have a consultative vote only.

11. The organs of all the parties and organizations forming part of the Communist International as well as of those who are recognized sympathizers of the Communist International are obliged to publish all official regulations of the Communist International and of its Executive Committee.

12. The general state of things in the whole of Europe and of America makes necessary for the Communists of the whole world an obligatory formation of illegal Communist organizations along with those existing legally. The Executive Committee shall be bound to see that this shall be carried out everywhere.

13. As a rule all political relations between the separate parties forming the Communist International are carried on through the Executive Committee of the Communist International. In cases of exigency direct relations are established, with the provision, however, that the Executive Committee of the Communist International is informed of the same at the same time.

14. The trade unions who have accepted the Communist platform and are united on an international scale under the control of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, form Trade Union Sections of the Communist International. The Communist Trade Unions send their representatives to the World Congresses of the Communist International through the medium of the Communist parties of their respective countries. Trade union sections of the Communist International delegate a representative with a decisive vote to the Executive Committee of the Communist International. The Executive Committee of the Communist International enjoys the right of sending a representative with decisive vote, to the Trade Union section of the Communist International.

15. The International League of Communist Youth is subject to the Communist International and its Executive Committee. One representative of the Executive Committee of the International League of Communist Youth with a decisive vote is delegated to the Executive Committee of the Communist International. The Executive Committee of the Communist International, on the other hand, enjoys the right of sending a representative with a decisive vote to the executive organ of the International League of Communist Youth.

16. The Executive Committee of the Communist International confirms the International Secretary of the Communist Women's Movement and organizes a women's section of the Communist International.

17. In the event of a member of the Communist International coming to another country, he is to have the fraternal support of the local members of the Third International.

Blueprint, pp. 33-40.



CONDITIONS OF ADMISSION TO THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

6 August 1920

Possibly the most important document of the Second Congress of the Communist International, the Conditions of Admission, firmly reiterated the determination to create a centralized, disciplined organization on the model of the Russian Bolshevik Party. Especially clear is the determination to prevent parties or groups suspected of centrism, reformism, or willingness to cooperate with the moderate socialists from joining the Communist International. Notable also is the insistence on splitting the various socialist parties and the requirement to purge their ranks—in some respects it is a list of who is unacceptable—which is found also in some other resolutions of the Congress. The conditions provoked bitter debate as did some other issues such as the insistence on carrying on illegal activity along with legal activity. Nonetheless, the Conditions carried overwhelmingly, with only two votes against.

CONDITIONS OF ADMISSION TO THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

The first constituent congress of the Communist International did not draw up precise conditions of admission to the Third International.

At the moment of the convocation of the First Congress in the majority of countries only Communist currents and groups existed.

The Second World Congress of the Communist International is convening under different conditions. At the present moment in most countries there are not only Communist tendencies and groups but Communist parties and organizations.

The Communist International more and more frequently receives applications from parties and groups but a short time ago belonging to the Second International, now desirous of joining the Third International, but not yet really Communists. The Second International is completely broken. Seeing the complete helplessness of the Second International, the intermediary faction and the groups of the "centre" are trying to lean on the ever strengthening Communist International, hoping at the same time, however, to preserve a certain "autonomy" which should enable them to carry on their former opportunist or "centrist" policy. The Communist International has become the fashion.

The desire of certain leading groups of the "centre" to join the Third International now is an indirect confirmation of the fact that the Communist International has gained the sympathy of the majority of conscious workers of the whole world and that it is growing stronger every day.

The Communist International is being threatened with the danger of dilution with the fluctuating and half-and-half groups which have as yet not abandoned the ideology of the Second International.

It must be mentioned that in some of the large parties (Italy, Norway, Jugo-Slavia, etc.), the majority of which adhere to the point of view of Communism, there is up to this moment a considerable reformist and social pacifist wing, which only awaiting the moment

to revive and to begin an active "sabotager" of the proletarian revolution, and thus assist the bourgeoisie and the Second International.

No Communist should forget the lesson of the Hungarian Soviet Republic.

The unity between the Hungarian Communists and the so-called Left Social Democrats cost the Hungarian proletariat very dear.

In view of this the Second World Congress finds it necessary to establish most definite conditions for the joining of new parties, as well as to point out to such parties as have already joined the Communist International the duties which are laid upon them.

The Second Congress of the Communist International rules that the conditions for joining the Communist International shall be as follows:

1. The general propaganda and agitation should bear a really Communist character, and should correspond to the program and decisions of the Third International. The entire party press should be edited by reliable Communists who have proved their loyalty to the cause of the proletarian revolution. The dictatorship of the proletariat should not be spoken of simply as a current hackneyed formula, it should be advocated in such a way that its necessity should be apparent to every rank-and-file workingman and workingwoman, to each soldier and peasant, and should emanate from everyday facts, systematically recorded by our press day by day.

All periodical and other publications, as well as all party publications and editions, are subject to the control of the presidium of the party, independently of whether the party is legal or illegal. It should in no way be permitted that the publishers abuse their autonomy and carry on a policy not fully corresponding to the policy of the party.

Wherever the followers of the Third International have access, and whatever means of propaganda are at their disposal, whether the columns of newspapers, popular meetings, labor unions or co-operatives,—it is indispensable for them not only to denounce the bourgeoisie, but also its assistants and agents—reformists of every color and shade.

2. Every organization desiring to join the Communist International shall be bound systematically and regularly to remove from all the responsible posts in the labor movement (party organization, editorship, labor unions, parliamentary factions, co-operatives, municipalities, etc.) all reformists and followers of the "centre," and to have them replaced by Communists, even at the cost of replacing at the beginning "experienced" opportunists by rank-and-file workers.

3. The class struggle in almost every country of Europe and America is entering the phase of civil war. Under such conditions the Communists can have no confidence in bourgeois laws. They should create everywhere a parallel illegal apparatus, which at the decisive moment should be of assistance to the party to do its duty toward the revolution. In every country where, in consequence of martial law or of other exceptional laws, the Communists are unable to carry on their work legally, a combination of legal and illegal work is absolutely necessary.

4. Persistent and systematic propaganda and agitation must be carried on in the army, where Communist groups should be formed in every military organization. Wherever owing to repressive legislation agitation becomes impossible, it is necessary to carry on such agitation illegally. But refusal to carry on or participate in such work should be considered equal to treason to the revolutionary cause, and incompatible with affiliation to the Third International.

5. A systematic and regular propaganda is necessary in the rural districts. The working class can gain no victory unless it possesses the sympathy and support of at least part of the rural workers and of the poor peasants, and unless other sections of the population are equally utilized. Communist work in the rural districts is acquiring a predominant importance during the present period. It should be carried on through Communist workers of both city and country who have connections with the rural districts. To refuse to do this work,

or to transfer such work to untrustworthy half reformists, is equal to renouncing the proletarian revolution.

6. Every party desirous of affiliating to the Third International should renounce not only avowed social patriotism, but also the falsehood and the hypocrisy of social pacifism. It should systematically demonstrate to the workers that without a revolutionary overthrow of capitalism no international arbitration, no talk of disarmament, no democratic reorganization of the League of Nations will be capable of saving mankind from new imperialist wars.

7. Parties desirous of joining the Communist International must recognize the necessity of a complete and absolute rupture with reformism and the policy of the "centrists," and must advocate this rupture amongst the widest circles of the party membership, without which condition a consistent Communist policy is impossible. The Communist International demands unconditionally and peremptorily that such rupture be brought about with the least possible delay. The Communist International cannot reconcile itself to the fact that such avowed reformists as for instance Turatti, Modigliani, Kautsky, Hilferding, Hillquit, Longuet, Macdonald and others should be entitled to consider themselves members of the Third International. This would make the Third International resemble the Second International.

8. In the Colonial question and that of the oppressed nationalities, there is necessary an especially distinct and clear line of conduct of the parties of countries where the bourgeoisie possesses such colonies or oppresses other nationalities. Every party desirous of belonging to the Third International should be bound to denounce without any reserve all the methods of "its own" imperialists in the colonies, supporting not in words only but practically a movement of liberation in the colonies. It should demand the expulsion of its own imperialists from such colonies, and cultivate among the workers of its own country a truly fraternal attitude towards the working population of the colonies and oppressed nationalities, and carry on a systematic agitation in its own army against every kind of oppression of the colonial population.

9. Every party desirous of belonging to the Communist International should be bound to carry on systematic and persistent Communist work in the labor unions, co-operatives and other organizations of working masses. It is necessary to form Communist nuclei within these organizations, which by persistent and lasting work should win over labor unions to Communism. These nuclei should constantly denounce the treachery of the social patriots and of the fluctuations of the "centre." These Communist nuclei should be completely subordinated to the party in general.

10. Any party belonging to the Communist International is bound to carry on a stubborn struggle against the Amsterdam "International" of the yellow labor unions. It should propagate insistently amongst the organized workers the necessity of a rupture with the yellow Amsterdam International. It should support by all means in its power the International Unification of Red Labor Unions joining to the Communist International.

11. Parties desirous of joining the Third International shall be bound to inspect the personnel of their parliamentary factions, to remove all unreliable elements therefrom, to control such factions, not only verbally but in reality, to subordinate them to the Central Committee of the party, and to demand from each Communist representative in parliament to subject his entire activity to the interests of real revolutionary propaganda and agitation.

12. All the parties belonging to the Communist International should be formed on the basis of the principle of democratic centralization. At the present time of acute civil war the Communist Party will only be able fully to do its duty when it is organized in a sufficiently centralized manner; when it possesses an iron discipline and when its party centre enjoys the confidence of the party membership and is endowed with complete power, authority and ample rights.

13. The Communist parties of those countries where the Communist activity is legal should clean out their members from time to time, as well as those of the party organizations, in order to systematically free the party from the petty bourgeois elements which penetrate into it.

14. Each party desirous of affiliating to the Communist International should be obliged to render every possible assistance to the Soviet Republics in their struggle against all counter-revolutionary forces. The Communist parties should carry on a precise and definite propaganda to induce the workers to refuse to transport any kind of military equipment intended for fighting against the Soviet Republics, and should also by legal or illegal means carry on a propaganda amongst the troops sent against the workers' republics, etc.

15. All those parties which up to the present moment have stood upon the old social democratic programs should within the shortest time possible draw up a new Communist program in conformity with the special conditions of their country, and in accordance with the resolutions of the Communist International. As a rule the program of each party belonging to the Communist International should be confirmed by the next congress of the Communist International or its Executive Committee. In the event of the failure of the program of any party being confirmed by the Executive Committee of the Communist International, the said party shall be entitled to appeal to the congress of the Communist International.

16. All the resolutions of the congresses of the Communist International, as well as the resolutions of the Executive Committee are binding for all parties joining the Communist International. The Communist International, operating under the conditions of most acute civil warfare, should be centralized in a better manner than the Second International. At the same time, the Communist International and the Executive Committee are naturally bound in every form of their activity to consider the variety of conditions under which the different parties have to work and struggle, and generally binding resolutions should be passed only on such questions upon which such resolutions are possible.

17. In connection with the above, all parties desiring to join the Communist International should alter their names. Each party desirous of joining the Communist International should bear the following name: Communist Party of such and such a country, section of the Third Communist International. The question of the party name is not only a formal one, but is a political question of great importance. The Communist International has declared a decisive war against the entire bourgeois world, and all the yellow Social Democratic parties. It is indispensable that every rank-and-file worker should be able clearly to distinguish between the Communist parties and the old official "Social-Democratic" or "Socialist" parties, which have betrayed the cause of the working class.

18. All the leading organs of the press of every party are bound to publish all the most important documents of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

19. All parties which have joined the Communist International as well as those which have expressed a desire to do so are obliged in as short a space of time as possible, and in no case later than four months after the Second Congress of the Communist International, to convene an Extraordinary Congress in order to discuss these conditions. In addition to this, the Central Committees of these parties should take care to acquaint all its local organizations with the regulations of the Second Congress.

20. All those parties which at the present time are willing to join the Third International, but have so far not changed their tactics in any radical manner, should, prior to their joining the Third International, take care that not less than two-thirds of their committee members and of all their central institutions should be composed of comrades who have made an open and definite declaration prior to the convening of the Second Congress, as to their desire that the party should affiliate to the Third International. Exceptions are permitted only with the consent of the Executive Committee of the Third International. The Executive Committee of the Communist International has the right to make an exception also for the representatives of the "centre" as mentioned in paragraph 7.

21. Those members of the party who reject in principle the conditions and the theses of the Third International, are liable to be excluded from the party.

This applies also to the delegates at the special congresses of the party.

Blueprint, pp. 64-72.



THE TASKS OF THE KOMSOMOL

2 October 1920

The Young Communist League, or Komsomol, was founded in November 1918 as a union of youth organizations and, after a stormy initial period, was brought under the control of the Communist Party. As the Party's youth organization it played an important role in the political, economic, and social development of the Soviet Union. It was especially useful as a vehicle for mobilizing the enthusiasm and energies of young people and for indoctrinating them with the party's ideology and programs. In Lenin's address, he stressed the importance of a new generation which was less sullied by life under the old, capitalist system. He discussed what must be learned and how, stressing the importance of combining learning and education "with the struggle of all the working people against the exploiters." He also emphasized its role as a "shock force" in the development of the country.

V. I. Lenin

The Tasks of the Youth Leagues

*Speech Delivered at the Third All-Russia Congress
of the Russian Young Communist League*

(The Congress greets Lenin with a tremendous ovation.)

Comrades, today I would like to talk on the fundamental tasks of the Young Communist League and, in this connection, on what the youth organisations in a socialist republic should be like in general.

It is all the more necessary to dwell on this question because in a certain sense it may be said that it is the youth that will be faced with the actual task of creating a communist society. For it is clear that the generation of working people brought up in capitalist society can, at best, accomplish the task of destroying the foundations of the old, the capitalist way of life, which was built on exploitation. At best it will be able to accomplish the tasks of creating a social system that will help the proletariat and the working classes retain power and lay a firm foundation, which can be built on only by a generation that is starting to work under the new conditions, in a situation in which relations based on the exploitation of man by man no longer exist.

And so, in dealing from this angle with the tasks confronting the youth, I must say that the tasks of the youth in general, and of the Young Communist Leagues and all other organisations in particular, might be summed up in a single word: learn.

Of course, this is only a "single word." It does not reply to the principal and most essential questions: what to learn, and how to learn? And the whole point here is that, with the transformation of the old, capitalist society, the up-bringing, training and education of the new generations that will create the communist society cannot be conducted on the old lines. The teaching, training and education of the youth must proceed from the material that

has been left to us by the old society. We can build communism only on the basis of the totality of knowledge, organisations and institutions, only by using the stock of human forces and means that have been left to us by the old society. Only by radically remoulding the teaching, organisation and training of the youth shall we be able to ensure that the efforts of the younger generation will result in the creation of a society that will be unlike the old society, i.e., in the creation of a communist society. That is why we must deal in detail with the question of what we should teach the youth and how the youth should learn if it really wants to justify the name of communist youth, and how it should be trained so as to be able to complete and consummate what we have started.

I must say that the first and most natural reply would seem to be that the Youth League, and the youth in general, who want to advance to communism, should learn communism.

But this reply—"learn communism"—is too general. What do we need in order to learn communism? What must be singled out from the sum of general knowledge so as to acquire a knowledge of communism? Here a number of dangers arise, which very often manifest themselves whenever the task of learning communism is presented incorrectly, or when it is interpreted in too one-sided a manner.

Naturally, the first thought that enters one's mind is that learning communism means assimilating the sum of knowledge that is contained in communist manuals, pamphlets and books. But such a definition of the study of communism would be too crude and inadequate. If the study of communism consisted solely in assimilating what is contained in communist books and pamphlets, we might all too easily obtain communist text-jugglers or braggarts, and this would very often do us harm, because such people, after learning by rote what is set forth in communist books and pamphlets, would prove incapable of combining the various branches of knowledge, and would be unable to act in the way communism really demands.

One of the greatest evils and misfortunes left to us by the old, capitalist society is the complete rift between books and practical life; we have had books explaining everything in the best possible manner, yet in most cases these books contained the most pernicious and hypocritical lies, a false description of capitalist society.

That is why it would be most mistaken merely to assimilate book knowledge about communism. No longer do our speeches and articles merely reiterate what used to be said about communism, because our speeches and articles are connected with our daily work in all fields. Without work and without struggle, book knowledge of communism obtained from communist pamphlets and works is absolutely worthless, for it would continue the old separation of theory and practice, the old rift which was the most pernicious feature of the old, bourgeois society.

It would be still more dangerous to set about assimilating only communist slogans. Had we not realised this danger in time, and had we not directed all our efforts to averting this danger, the half million or million young men and women who would have called themselves Communists after studying communism in this way would only greatly prejudice the cause of communism.

The question arises: how is all this to be blended for the study of communism? What must we take from the old schools, from the old kind of science? It was the declared aim of the old type of school to produce men with an all-round education, to teach the sciences in general. We know that this was utterly false, since the whole of society was based and maintained on the division of people into classes, into exploiters and oppressed. Since they were thoroughly imbued with the class spirit, the old schools naturally gave knowledge only to the children of the bourgeoisie. Every word was falsified in the interests of the bourgeoisie. In these schools the younger generation of workers and peasants were not so much educated as drilled in the interests of that bourgeoisie. They were trained in such a

way as to be useful servants of the bourgeoisie, able to create profits for it without disturbing its peace and leisure. That is why, while rejecting the old type of schools, we have made it our task to take from it only what we require for genuine communist education.

This brings me to the reproaches and accusations which we constantly hear levelled at the old schools, and which often lead to wholly wrong conclusions. It is said that the old school was a school of purely book knowledge, of ceaseless drilling and grinding. That is true, but we must distinguish between what was bad in the old schools and what is useful to us, and we must be able to select from it what is necessary for communism.

The old schools provided purely book knowledge; they compelled their pupils to assimilate a mass of useless, superfluous and barren knowledge, which cluttered up the brain and turned the younger generation into bureaucrats regimented according to a single pattern. But it would mean falling into a grave error for you to try to draw the conclusion that one can become a Communist without assimilating the wealth of knowledge amassed by mankind. It would be mistaken to think it sufficient to learn communist slogans and the conclusions of communist science, without acquiring that sum of knowledge of which communism itself is a result. Marxism is an example which shows how communism arose out of the sum of human knowledge.

You have read and heard that communist theory—the science of communism created in the main by Marx, this doctrine of Marxism—has ceased to be the work of a single socialist of the nineteenth century, even though he was a genius, and that it has become the doctrine of millions and tens of millions of proletarians all over the world, who are applying it in their struggle against capitalism. If you were to ask why the teachings of Marx have been able to win the hearts and minds of millions and tens of millions of the most revolutionary class, you would receive only one answer: it was because Marx based his work on the firm foundation of the human knowledge acquired under capitalism. After making a study of the laws governing the development of human society, Marx realised the inevitability of capitalism developing towards communism. What is most important is that he proved this on the sole basis of a most precise, detailed and profound study of this capitalist society, by fully assimilating all that earlier science had produced. He critically reshaped everything that had been created by human society, without ignoring a single detail. He reconsidered, subjected to criticism, and verified on the working-class movement everything that human thinking had created, and therefrom formulated conclusions which people hemmed in by bourgeois limitations or bound by bourgeois prejudices could not draw.

We must bear this in mind when, for example, we talk about proletarian culture. We shall be unable to solve this problem unless we clearly realise that only a precise knowledge and transformation of the culture created by the entire development of mankind will enable us to create a proletarian culture. The latter is not clutched out of thin air; it is not an invention of those who call themselves experts in proletarian culture. That is all nonsense. Proletarian culture must be the logical development of the store of knowledge mankind has accumulated under the yoke of capitalist, landowner and bureaucratic society. All these roads have been leading, and will continue to lead up to proletarian culture, in the same way as political economy, as reshaped by Marx, has shown us what human society must arrive at, shown us the passage to the class struggle, to the beginning of the proletarian revolution.

When we so often hear representatives of the youth, as well as certain advocates of a new system of education, attacking the old schools, claiming that they used the system of cramming, we say to them that we must take what was good in the old schools. We must not borrow the system of encumbering young people's minds with an immense amount of knowledge, nine-tenths of which was useless and one-tenth distorted. This, however, does

not mean that we can restrict ourselves to communist conclusions and learn only communist slogans. You will not create communism that way. You can become a Communist only when you enrich your mind with a knowledge of all the treasures created by mankind.

We have no need to develop and perfect the mind of every student with a knowledge of fundamental facts. Communism will become an empty word, a mere signboard, and a Communist, a mere boaster, if all the knowledge he has acquired is not digested in his mind. You should not merely assimilate this knowledge, but assimilate it critically, so as not to cram your mind with useless lumber, but enrich it with all those facts that are indispensable to the well-educated man of today. If a Communist took it into his head to boast about his communism because of the cut-and-dried conclusions he had acquired, without putting in a great deal of serious and hard work and without understanding facts he should examine critically, he would be a deplorable Communist indeed. Such superficiality would be decidedly fatal. If I know that I know little, I shall strive to learn more; but if a man says that he is a Communist and that he need not know anything thoroughly, he will never become anything like a Communist.

The old schools produced servants needed by the capitalists; the old schools turned men of science into men who had to write and say whatever pleased the capitalists. We must therefore abolish them. But does the fact that we must abolish them, destroy them, mean that we should not take from them everything mankind has accumulated that is essential to man? Does it mean that we do not have to distinguish between what was necessary to capitalism and what is necessary to communism?

We are replacing the old drill-sergeant methods practised in bourgeois society, against the will of the majority, with the class-conscious discipline of the workers and peasants, who combine hatred of the old society with a determination, ability and readiness to unite and organise their forces for this struggle so as to forge the wills of millions and hundreds of millions of people—disunited, and scattered over the territory of a huge country—into a single will, without which defeat is inevitable. Without this solidarity, without this conscious discipline of the workers and peasants, our cause is hopeless. Without this, we shall be unable to vanquish the capitalists and landowners of the whole world. We shall not even consolidate the foundation, let alone build a new, communist society on that foundation. Likewise, while condemning the old schools, while harbouring an absolutely justified and necessary hatred for the old schools and appreciating the readiness to destroy them, we must realise that we must replace the old system of instruction, the old cramming and the old drill, with an ability to acquire the sum total of human knowledge, and to acquire it in such a way that communism shall not be something to be learned by rote, but something that you yourselves have thought over, something that will embody conclusions inevitable from the standpoint of present-day education.

That is the way the main tasks should be presented when we speak of the aim: learn communism.

I shall take a practical example to make this clear to you, and to demonstrate the approach to the problem of how you must learn. You all know that, following the military problems, those of defending the republic, we are now confronted with economic tasks. Communist society, as we know, cannot be built unless we restore industry and agriculture, and that, not in the old way. They must be re-established on a modern basis, in accordance with the last word in science. You know that electricity is that basis, and that only after electrification of the entire country, of all branches of industry and agriculture, only when you have achieved that aim, will you be able to build for yourselves the communist society which the older generation will not be able to build. Confronting you is the task of economically reviving the whole country, of reorganising and restoring both agriculture and industry on modern technical lines, based on modern science and technology, on electricity. You realise perfectly well that illiterate people cannot tackle electrification, and that elementary literacy is not enough either. It is insufficient to understand what electricity is;

what is needed is the knowledge of how to apply it technically in industry and agriculture, and in the individual branches of industry and agriculture. This has to be learnt for oneself, and it must be taught to the entire rising generation of working people. That is the task confronting every class-conscious Communist, every young person who regards himself a Communist and who clearly understands that, by joining the Young Communist League, he has pledged himself to help the Party build communism and to help the whole younger generation create a communist society. He must realise that he can create it only on the basis of modern education, and if he does not acquire this education communism will remain merely a pious wish.

It was the task of the older generation to overthrow the bourgeoisie. The main task then was to criticise the bourgeoisie, arouse hatred of the bourgeoisie among the masses, and foster class-consciousness and the ability to unite their forces. The new generation is confronted with a far more complex task. Your duty does not lie only in assembling your forces so as to uphold the workers' and peasants' government against an invasion instigated by the capitalists. Of course, you must do that; that is something you clearly realise, and is distinctly seen by the Communist. However, that is not enough. You have to build up a communist society. In many respects half of the work has been done. The old order has been destroyed, just as it deserved, it has been turned into a heap of ruins, just as it deserved. The ground has been cleared, and on this ground the younger communist generation must build a communist society. You are faced with the task of construction, and you can accomplish that task only by assimilating all modern knowledge, only if you are able to transform communism from cut-and-dried and memorised formulas, counsels, recipes, prescriptions and programmes into that living reality which gives unity to your immediate work, and only if you are able to make communism a guide in all your practical work.

That is the task you should pursue in educating, training and rousing the entire younger generation. You must be foremost among the millions of builders of a communist society in whose ranks every young man and young woman should be. You will not build a communist society unless you enlist the mass of young workers and peasants in the work of building communism.

This naturally brings me to the question of how we should teach communism and what the specific features of our methods should be.

I first of all shall deal here with the question of communist ethics.

You must train yourselves to be Communists. It is the task of the Youth League to organise its practical activities in such a way that, by learning, organising, uniting and fighting, its members shall train both themselves and all those who look to it for leadership; it should train Communists. The entire purpose of training, educating and teaching the youth of today should be to imbue them with communist ethics.

But is there such a thing as communist ethics? Is there such a thing as communist morality? Of course, there is. It is often suggested that we have no ethics of our own; very often the bourgeoisie accuse us Communists of rejecting all morality. This is a method of confusing the issue, of throwing dust in the eyes of the workers and peasants.

In what sense do we reject ethics, reject morality?

In the sense given to it by the bourgeoisie, who based ethics on God's commandments. On this point we, of course, say that we do not believe in God, and that we know perfectly well that the clergy, the landowners and the bourgeoisie invoked the name of God so as to further their own interests as exploiters. Or, instead of basing ethics on the commandments of morality, on the commandments of God, they based it on idealist or semi-idealist phrases, which always amounted to something very similar to God's commandments.

We reject any morality based on extra-human and extra-class concepts. We say that this is deception, dupery, stultification of the workers and peasants in the interests of the land-owners and capitalists.

We say that our morality is entirely subordinated to the interests of the proletariat's class struggle. Our morality stems from the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat.

The old society was based on the oppression of all the workers and peasants by the landowners and capitalists. We had to destroy all that, and overthrow them but to do that we have to create unity. That is something that God cannot create.

This unity could be provided only by the factories, only by a proletariat trained and roused from its long slumber. Only when that class was formed did a mass movement arise which has led to what we have now—the victory of the proletarian revolution in one of the weakest of countries, which for three years has been repelling the onslaught of the bourgeoisie of the whole world. We can see how the proletarian revolution is developing all over the world. On the basis of experience, we now say that only the proletariat could have created the solid force which the disunited and scattered peasantry are following and which has withstood all onslaughts by the exploiters. Only this class can help the working masses unite, rally their ranks and conclusively defend, conclusively consolidate and conclusively build up a communist society.

That is why we say that to us there is no such thing as a morality that stands outside human society; that is a fraud. To us morality is subordinated to the interests of the proletariat's class struggle.

What does that class struggle consist in? It consists in overthrowing the tsar, overthrowing the capitalists, and abolishing the capitalist class.

What are classes in general? Classes are that which permits one section of society to appropriate the labour of another section. If one section of society appropriates all the land, we have a landowner class and a peasant class. If one section of society owns the factories, shares and capital, while another section works in these factories, we have a capitalist class and a proletarian class.

It was not difficult to drive out the tsar—that required only a few days. It was not very difficult to drive out the landowners—that was done in a few months. Nor was it very difficult to drive out the capitalists. But it is incomparably more difficult to abolish classes; we still have the division into workers and peasants. If the peasant is installed on his plot of land and appropriates his surplus grain, that is, grain that he does not need for himself or for his cattle, while the rest of the people have to go without bread, then the peasant becomes an exploiter. The more grain he clings to, the more profitable he finds it; as for the rest, let them starve: "The more they starve, the dearer I can sell this grain." All should work according to a single common plan, on common land, in common factories and in accordance with a common system. Is that easy to attain? You see that it is not as easy as driving out the tsar, the landowners and the capitalists. What is required is that the proletariat re-educate a section of the peasantry; it must win over the working peasants in order to crush the resistance of those peasants who are rich and are profiting from the poverty and want of the rest. Hence the task of the proletarian struggle is not quite completed after we have overthrown the tsar and driven out the landowners and capitalists; to accomplish that is the task of the system we call the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The class struggle is continuing; it has merely changed its forms. It is the class struggle of the proletariat to prevent the return of the old exploiters, to unite in a single union the scattered masses of unenlightened peasants. The class struggle is continuing and it is our task to subordinate all interests to that struggle. Our communist morality is also subordinated to that task. We say: morality is what serves to destroy the old exploiting society and to unite all the working people around the proletariat, which is, building up a new, a communist society.

Communist morality is that which serves this struggle and unites the working people against all exploitation, against all petty private property; for petty property puts into the

hands of one person that which has been created by the labour of the whole of society. In our country the land is common property.

But suppose I take a piece of this common property and grow on it twice as much grain as I need, and profiteer on the surplus? Suppose I argue that the more starving people there are, the more they will pay? Would I then be behaving like a Communist? No, I would be behaving like an exploiter, like a proprietor. That must be combated. If that is allowed to go on, things will revert to the rule of the capitalists, to the rule of the bourgeoisie, as has more than once happened in previous revolutions. To prevent the restoration of the rule of the capitalists and the bourgeoisie, we must not allow profiteering; we must not allow individuals to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest; the working people must unite with the proletariat and form a communist society. This is the principal feature of the fundamental task of the League and the organisation of the communist youth.

The old society was based on the principle: rob or be robbed; work for others or make others work for you; be a slave-owner or a slave. Naturally, people brought up in such a society assimilate with their mother's milk, one might say, the psychology, the habit, the concept which says: you are either a slave-owner or a slave, or else, a small owner, a petty employee, a petty official, or an intellectual—in short, a man who is concerned only with himself, and does not care a rap for anybody else.

If I work this plot of land, I do not care a rap for anybody else; if others starve, all the better, I shall get the more for my grain. If I have a job as a doctor, engineer, teacher, or clerk, I do not care a rap for anybody else. If I toady to and please the powers that be, I may be able to keep my job, and even get on in life and become a bourgeois. A Communist cannot harbour such a psychology and such sentiments. When the workers and peasants proved that they were able, by their own efforts, to defend themselves and create a new society—that was the beginning of the new and communist education, education in the struggle against the exploiters, education in alliance with the proletariat against the self-seekers and petty proprietors, against the psychology and habits which say: I seek my own profit and don't care a rap for anything else.

That is the reply to the question of how the young and rising generation should learn communism.

It can learn communism only by linking up every step in its studies, training and education with the continuous struggle the proletarians and the working people are waging against the old society of exploiters. When people tell us about morality, we say: to a Communist all morality lies in this united discipline and conscious mass struggle against the exploiters. We do not believe in an eternal morality, and we expose the falseness of all the fables about morality. Morality serves the purpose of helping human society rise to a higher level and rid itself of the exploitation of labour.

To achieve this we need that generation of young people who began to reach political maturity in the midst of a disciplined and desperate struggle against the bourgeoisie. In this struggle that generation is training genuine Communists; it must subordinate to this struggle, and link up with it, each step in its studies, education and training. The education of the communist youth must consist, not in giving them suave talks and moral precepts. This is not what education consists in. When people have seen the way in which their fathers and mothers lived under the yoke of the landowners and capitalists; when they have themselves experienced the sufferings of those who began the struggle against the exploiters; when they have seen what deadly enemies the landowners and capitalists are—they are taught by these conditions to become Communists. Communist morality is based on the struggle for the consolidation and completion of communism. That is also the basis of communist training, education, and teaching. That is the reply to the question of how communism should be learnt.

We could not believe in teaching, training and education if they were restricted only to the schoolroom and divorced from the ferment of life. As long as the workers and peasants are oppressed by the landowners and capitalists, the young generation will remain blind and ignorant. Our schools must provide the youth with the fundamentals of knowledge, the ability to evolve communist views independently; they must make educated people of the youth. While they are attending school, they must learn to become participants in the struggle for emancipation from the exploiters. The Young Communist League will justify its name as the League of the young communist generation only when every step in its teaching, training and education is linked up with participation in the common struggle of all working people against the exploiters. You are well aware that, as long as Russia remains the only workers' republic and the old, bourgeois system exists in the rest of the world, we shall be weaker than they are, and be constantly threatened with a new attack; and that only if we learn to be solidly united shall we win in the further struggle and—having gained strength—become really invincible. Thus, to be a Communist means that you must organise and unite the entire young generation and set an example of training and discipline in this struggle. Then you will be able to start building the edifice of communist society and bring it to completion.

To make this clearer to you, I shall quote an example. We call ourselves Communists. What is a Communist? Communist is a Latin word. *Communis* is the Latin for "common." Communist society is a society in which all things—the land, the factories—are owned in common and the people work in common. That is communism.

Is it possible to work in common if each one works separately on his own plot of land? Work in common cannot be brought about all at once. That is impossible. It does not drop from the skies. It comes through toil and suffering; it is created in the course of struggle. The old books are of no use here; no one will believe them. One's own experience of life is needed. When Kolchak and Denikin were advancing from Siberia and the South, the peasants were on their side. They did not like Bolshevism because the Bolsheviks took their grain at a fixed price. But when the peasants in Siberia and the Ukraine experienced the rule of Kolchak and Denikin, they realised that they had only one alternative: either to go to the capitalists, who would at once hand them over into slavery under the landowners; or to follow the workers, who, it is true, did not promise a land flowing with milk and honey, and demanded iron discipline and firmness in an arduous struggle, but would lead them out of enslavement by the capitalists and landowners. When even the ignorant peasants saw and realised this from their own experience, they became conscious adherents of communism, who had gone through a severe school. It is such experience that must form the basis of all the activities of the Young Communist League.

I have replied to the questions of what we must learn, what we must take from the old schools and from the old science. I shall now try to answer the question of how this must be learnt. The answer is: only by inseparably linking each step in the activities of the schools, each step in training, education and teaching, with the struggle of all the working people against the exploiters.

I shall quote a few examples from the experience of the work of some of the youth organisations so as to illustrate how this training in communism should proceed. Everybody is talking about abolishing illiteracy. You know that a communist society cannot be built in an illiterate country. It is not enough for the Soviet government to issue an order, or for the Party to issue a particular slogan, or to assign a certain number of the best workers to this task. The young generation itself must take up this work. Communism means that the youth, the young men and women who belong to the Youth League, should say: this is our job; we shall unite and go into the rural districts to abolish illiteracy, so that there shall be no illiterates among our young people. We are trying to get the rising generation to devote their activities to this work. You know that we cannot rapidly transform an ignorant and illiterate Russia into a literate country. But if the Youth League sets to work on

the job, and if all young people work for the benefit of all, the League, with a membership of 400,000 young men and women, will be entitled to call itself a Young Communist League. It is also a task of the League, not only to acquire knowledge itself, but to help those young people who are unable to extricate themselves by their own efforts from the toils of illiteracy. Being a member of the Youth League means devoting one's labour and efforts to the common cause. That is what a communist education means. Only in the course of such work do young men and women become real Communists. Only if they achieve practical results in this work will they become Communists.

Take, for example, work in the suburban vegetable gardens. Is that not a real job of work? It is one of the tasks of the Young Communist League. People are starving; there is hunger in the factories. To save ourselves from starvation, vegetable gardens must be developed. But farming is being carried on in the old way. Therefore, more class-conscious elements should engage in this work, and then you will find that the number of vegetable gardens will increase, their acreage will grow, and the results will improve. The Young Communist League must take an active part in this work. Every League and League branch should regard this as its duty.

The Young Communist League must be a shock force, helping in every job and displaying initiative and enterprise. The League should be an organisation enabling any worker to see that it consists of people whose teachings he perhaps does not understand, and whose teachings he may not immediately believe, but from whose practical work and activity he can see that they are really people who are showing him the right road.

If the Young Communist League fails to organise its work in this way in all fields, it will mean that it is reverting to the old bourgeois path. We must combine our education with the struggle of the working people against the exploiters, so as to help the former accomplish the tasks set by the teachings of communism.

The members of the League should use every spare hour to improve the vegetable gardens, or to organise the education of young people at some factory, and so on. We want to transform Russia from a poverty-stricken and wretched country into one that is wealthy. The Young Communist League must combine its education, learning and training with the labour of the workers and peasants, so as not to confine itself to schools or to reading communist books and pamphlets. Only by working side by side with the workers and peasants can one become a genuine Communist. It has to be generally realised that all members of the Youth League are literate people and at the same time are keen at their jobs. When everyone sees that we have ousted the old drill-ground methods from the old schools and have replaced them with conscious discipline, that all young men and women take part in subbotniks, and utilise every suburban farm to help the population—people will cease to regard labour in the old way.

It is the task of the Young Communist League to organise assistance everywhere, in village or city block, in such matters as—and I shall take a small example—public hygiene or the distribution of food. How was this done in the old, capitalist society? Everybody worked only for himself and nobody cared a straw for the aged and the sick, or whether housework was the concern only of the women, who, in consequence, were in a condition of oppression and servitude. Whose business is it to combat this? It is the business of the Youth Leagues, which must say: we shall change all this; we shall organise detachments of young people who will help to assure public hygiene or distribute food, who will conduct systematic house-to-house inspections, and work in an organised way for the benefit of the whole of society, distributing their forces properly and demonstrating that labour must be organised.

The generation of people who are now at the age of fifty cannot expect to see a communist society. This generation will be gone before then. But the generation of those who are now fifteen will see a communist society, and will itself build this society. This generation should know that the entire purpose of their lives is to build a communist society.

In the old society, each family worked separately and labour was not organised by anybody except the landowners and capitalists, who oppressed the masses of the people. We must organise all labour, no matter how toilsome or messy it may be, in such a way that every worker and peasant will be able to say: I am part of the great army of free labour, and shall be able to build up my life without the landowners and capitalist, able to help establish a communist system. The Young Communist League should teach all young people to engage in conscious and disciplined labour from an early age. In this way we can be confident that the problems now confronting us will be solved. We must assume that no less than ten years will be required for the electrification of the country, so that our impoverished land may profit from the latest achievements of technology. And so, the generation of those who are now fifteen years old, and will be living in a communist society in ten or twenty years' time, should tackle all its educational tasks in such a way that every day, in every village and city, the young people shall engage in the practical solution of some problem of labour in common, even though the smallest or the simplest. The success of communist construction will be assured when this is done in every village, as communist emulation develops, and the youth prove that they can unite their labour. Only by regarding your every step from the standpoint of the success of that construction, and only by asking ourselves whether we have done all we can to be united and politically-conscious working people will the Young Communist League succeed in uniting its half a million members into a single army of labour and win universal respect. (*Stormy applause.*)

Lenin, Vol. 31, pp. 283-299.



LUNACHARSKY REPORTS ON THE WORK OF THE COMMISSARIAT OF EDUCATION

5 October 1920

This report of A. V. Lunacharsky, People's Commissar of Education, to the Central Executive Committee provides a summary of the education activities of the commissariat as well as a justification for some of them, such as the Unified Labor School. Some of his statistics must be taken with reservations, but the report shows the main thrust of Soviet work in this area and of achievements thus far. The account appeared in Izvestia on 5 October.

A. V. Lunacharsky *Report to the Central Executive Committee*

The work of popular education, from the very moment when it was called into being by the November Revolution, was immediately confronted with great difficulties, which can be classified into the three most important groups. In the first place a radical transformation of the old school was an imperative necessity, for the old school was a political school, definitely dominated by the cultural and political spirit of the bourgeoisie and gentry, of tsarism and the clergy. This was the first difficulty, since there are very few works on the Socialist school in world literature. As far as theory is concerned, we had to deal in this case with an almost unexplored field. What source of light did we have to guide us on the untrodden paths? A page and a half written by Marx in his youth for the Geneva Congress,

and a few scattered phrases! Instruction in the old school had, of course, something in common with education, but the school was founded on principles which this education along with a mixture of pseudo-education, with subjects that were harmful in that they were useless but consumed a great deal of time, or with clearly corrupt subjects, such as religious instruction. While in the secondary and higher schools the minds of the students were poisoned with distorted science, the teachers in the elementary schools were torn between two incompatible tasks—to teach literacy and yet to leave the pupils in complete ignorance. We undertook to eradicate these vices, and we put forth the idea of the general school.

We instituted the single labor school which was to lead everyone, irrespective of origin, through all the school grades. And we made the schools popular, within reach of all. This meant not only free tuition, but also breakfast and lunches at the school, free school supplies, etc. We had to go even further, to furnishing shoes and clothing. We wanted the people to know what the Soviet power was bringing. We have a reply to all superficial attacks that we "promised this or that but did not fulfill it." We reply: we would have accomplished it if we were not diverted by the attempts to strangle us. Formally, the school network of Russia is growing rapidly. The old school buildings are in horrible condition and badly in need of repairs. Many school buildings in the cities have been taken over for hospitals or military institutions. As soon as we have a sufficient number of schools we will immediately make school attendance obligatory.

The single school does not mean a uniform school. The single school is one which gives equal entrance rights to all and equal rights after graduation. But we proposed at the same time that the schools, particularly the secondary schools, should be of different kinds. We deemed it possible, and even recommended that the higher classes of the secondary schools should have two or three divisions, so that the pupils could choose one or another specialty according to their inclinations. Owing to the categorical demand of our economic commissariats we were compelled to allow pupils over 14 years of age to transfer from a general school to a trade or technical school. We have these trade and technical schools, in addition to the schools of general education. Along with this we improved the schools by eliminating the useless subjects, such as ancient languages and religious instruction, by doing away with separate schools for boys and girls, and, lastly, by abolishing the old school discipline.

But the newest feature, which even some of our cultured comrades do not yet fully comprehend, is the principle of the so-called labor school. This term was in many cases completely misunderstood. It was taken to mean that theoretical instruction and books should be completely excluded from the school and that they should be replaced by productive toil in form. In reality we did not at all intend such a transformation of the schools. Essentially, the principle of the labor school includes two main ideas. The first contends that knowledge should come through toil, that the children should through their own activity discover and reproduce what they learned from books. Using at first the play instinct, the games should be made more and more serious, and the pupils should be familiarized with the subjects of their studies through excursions, observations, and so forth.

In this way may be learned the whole history of human toil. In connection with this, the technical side, say, of the organization of a factory, may also be taken up, starting with the delivery of fuel, of raw materials, of the basic types of motors, etc. It would also be possible in this way to introduce the principles of labor discipline. We can thus ignore the nature of the erstwhile capitalist system and turn directly to the present system. We have never given up this idea, for the school of labor of the industrial type is the only communist school.

And now for the elementary schools. Most of the elementary schools are situated in the villages and productive toil in these must be of a somewhat different character from that in the secondary schools. There should be moderate self-service in these, for instance,

keeping the school in order. With regard to these schools I feel that we must welcome them, and in the villages we must also see to the development of their agricultural aspect. With respect to this we have already taken energetic steps and have tried to come to some understanding with the Commissariat of Agriculture in regard to the mobilization of agricultural experts, of whom we have but a small number, to provide instruction in agriculture for the village school teachers, the majority of whom have no such knowledge.

Our village school teachers have absolutely no knowledge of agriculture. Steps have already been taken to improve this condition. Every fall and spring, new schools and lecture-courses for teachers are opened to instruct them in the principles of toil in elementary schools. In this respect the Commissariat of Education has already had some achievements to its credit. We have data showing that the mass of our teachers, with very few exceptions, have become adherents of the Soviet power, have renounced sabotage and are working with the Soviets. At all the congresses of school teachers you will find as much enthusiasm as in our factories and workshops. They are eagerly following the instructions and directions coming from the center.

I will quote to you some figures which illustrate the school situation in a general way. In 1911, the last year for which complete statistical data are available, there were 55,846 elementary schools. In 1919 we had 73,859 such schools, that is, we increased their number almost 50 per cent. For the present year their number has increased to about 88,000. These schools take care of about 60 to 65 per cent of the total number of children in Russia. The actual school attendance was not high, owing to the terrible conditions last winter, but on the whole it extended to 5,000,000. The number of pupils increased very rapidly. The schools under the tsar could only take care of three and a half million children, while our schools take care of five and a half million.

The number of second grade schools increased very little, because we cannot open new schools. The total number is 3,600. We have about half a million pupils in second grade schools, which is only seven to eight per cent of the total number of children of this age. In this respect the situation is extremely bad. Even if we would exclude all the children of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, the vast majority of the children of the workers and peasants would be left outside of these schools. It is disgraceful, and we must candidly admit it; we are forced to open two-year schools for children to give them at least some education, so that this generation may not be condemned to utter ignorance.

The figures on the training of a teaching-staff are very eloquent. Immense energy was displayed, but it must be remembered that we can not rapidly increase the number of teachers, even though we have drawn into this work a large number of persons who were excluded from this profession under the tsar. There were 21 higher pedagogical schools under the tsar, while we have 55. The total number of schools increased considerably and the number of students rose from 4,000 to 34,000. I can tell you that of these 34,000—under present terrible conditions when people are condemned to starvation, and when such studies can be undertaken only by those who have not been coddled and have not been drawn into service in some other Soviet institution—we have 10,305 persons who are so completely and diligently devoting themselves to school-work that they have proven themselves deserving of social insurance (scholarship), which is given under the strictest control and cannot be obtained by those who do not merit it. We have thus achieved a certain degree of success in this respect. But we must accomplish a great deal more than this. We need an enormous army of teachers. We have 400,000 educational workers and we need more than a million.

Besides we also have kindergartens. Colossal efforts have been made in this direction and we are inclined to be proud of this. It should, however, be mentioned that under the tsar nothing had existed in the field of pre-school endeavor. I do not speak here of the few kindergartens, model homes for children, of a certain number of charity institutions which were established in large cities by rich merchants, and several schools of the Froebel type for children of the rich.

In 1919 we had 3,623 kindergartens and about 1,000 kindergartens are being added every year.

I shall now turn to the higher schools. These present an even more difficult task than the secondary schools. For some time the professors were with our enemies. The students took part in insurrections against us and the professors participated in all kinds of plots. Every time that the Whites appeared at Samara or Saratov the professors were their main support. They sent statements abroad vilifying us. And when we came to them they hid in a shell. But the professors are indispensable, and we are confronted in this respect by a problem similar to that presented by the military department. Comrade Trotsky was right when he said that no army was ever betrayed as much as the Red Army. But the Red Army was nevertheless successful. This is also the case in the higher schools. A change is already taking place, and not solely through the appointment of new men. I could mention a large number of distinguished men—I do not speak here of our splendid friend, the deceased Timiriazev, whose clear views and perspicacity were amazing—I could mention a score of scientists who have really become Soviet adherents. In Petrograd the effect was soon visible. The scientific life of Petrograd has risen. The same effect occurred among the students. Petrograd sets the pace. The first students conference was held there and after listening to a brilliant report by Zinoviev, a definitely "red" resolution was adopted by an enormous majority.

And now for the labor colleges! At present we manage them in such a way that they are open only to workers who are recommended by labor organizations. We take them into the school and to a certain extent we subject them to rigid discipline. The students of a labor college have no right to miss any lecture without serious causes and they must pass examinations to prove efficiency in their studies.

At present the standard of the labor colleges is quite high, and they are already very promising. But our experience with labor colleges taught also a great deal with regard to the universities in general. Under pressure from the economic commissariats, the department of technical and trade education proposed raising the educational level of the workers. With this end in view, a large number of night courses for workers were opened. Simultaneously, we took the question of the necessity of increasing the number of middle and higher engineers. We inquired about the number of engineers necessary, and the Council of National Economy made very serious demands upon us. According to its calculations the schools must give 3,600 new engineers each year. To satisfy this need of the country, the Department of Technical Education decided, first of all, to obtain the right to free engineering students of the last two years from all outside work, to provide them with rations and to feed their professors, but at the same time to place them under military discipline and punish them as deserters if they did not attend to their work. These measures are of course extraordinary, but they are dictated by present conditions, and thanks to them we graduated over 3,000 engineers this year. We know that we need physicians as well as other specialists, and we have therefore also decided to assure food to all the collaborators in the medical colleges, with the result that the number of students has increased threefold.

The tsarist government looked upon the universities as explosive centers, but we have nothing to fear from them, and we go on opening new universities. Thus we have already 21 universities instead of 15. Of the new universities, three or four may be considered to be functioning normally. The Turkestan and Ural universities, which are still in the process of organization, will in the near future be in a position to do effective work. We have, just as before the Revolution, four medical universities and three archeological universities. Of veterinary institutes we have six instead of two. The number of professors has increased to 1,644 because we have promoted all the lecture-instructors to the rank of professors.

I will now speak of the work outside of the schools, which is of vast importance. All of you know that we can not at present do much in the publishing field. In library work we make use of old books, enriching the school libraries and the general libraries from the

stock that we have obtained from the bookstores and from the liquidation of the landlords' libraries, which were practically useless. The number of libraries in Russia has greatly increased and they grow with incredible rapidity. In the Tver Province, for instance, there are over 3,000 libraries. Some provinces have over 1,000 libraries. The total number of libraries in 30 provinces was 13,500 in 1919, and in these same provinces we now have about 27,000 libraries, not including reading rooms. The increase in the number of libraries is astounding, and I might add that the library attendance, considering present conditions, is not less astounding. However, in the matter of supplying the libraries in the future we are up against great difficulties.

One of the greatest of the Soviet decrees is the decree on the liquidation of illiteracy. In the province of Cherepovetz 58,000 persons have already passed through the schools for illiterates, in Ivanovo-Voznessensk, 50,000 persons. In the city of Novozybkov there are no more illiterates above [below? Ed.] the age of 40. In Petrograd also there will soon be no illiterates. We have not enough reading primers. However, at present 6 1/2 million primers have already been printed or are on the press.

A special resolution which I proposed two years ago at the Eighth Congress and which was then adopted, stated that the People's Commissariat of Education should, under the present conditions, be an organ of Communist education, and that the Commissariat of Education and the Party should be closely connected, since this Commissariat is an organ of education and since education must mean Communist education. And to the extent to which the Party carries on propaganda and agitation it should make full use of the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Education. But we made very slow progress in this direction, and the Commissariat of Education suffered thereby. Vladimir Ilyich [Lenin] has many times pointed out the plain duty of the party to attract the teachers, as they come nearer to us, to educational and political work; and to compel those teachers who do not come nearer to us to read the decrees and to spread our literature. A good start was then made by the extra-mural division. The extra-mural division was instructed to organize, conjointly with the provincial party committees, courses on the struggle with Poland. This was an absolutely new thing because the extra-mural teachers had to undertake work of a new type in cooperation with the Party and under the direction of party members, to present the history of Poland, the present social order of Poland, the causes of the war with Poland, etc. In this respect we had considerable success which proves that when the Party supports us we can accomplish a great deal of work, considerably more work than without such support. Indeed, in this work we made a discovery. In 29 provinces, in each of which we opened a school, we passed 2,381 agitators in one month, specialists on the Polish question, and all these agitators were assigned by the Party to the front or for work in the interior. As a further illustration of my thought, I will point out how energetically the sub-divisions of the Commissariat of Education work when they have the support of the Party. For instance when it was decided to open new educational institutions in honor of the Third International, this slogan was issued with Comrade Kalinin's and my own signature and the results exceeded all our expectations. We were able to achieve unprecedented results in the sense of opening new educational institutions. We had demanded that these institutions be situated in equipped buildings and that they be provided with school supplies. Now we have 23 schools, 164 homes for children, 20 kindergartens, etc. In short, 316 educational institutions sprang up like mushrooms. They all bear the name of the Third International, and this has immense propaganda value.

I shall mention another important step. In the first place, we have just now been entrusted with the food campaign. We ourselves offered to carry on this campaign by means of placards, theatrical performances, literature and agitation of a scientific character. We threw our extra-mural and school forces into the mass of the peasantry and have thus helped the Commissariat of Food in its struggle for the grain quotas. We have achieved a

number of concrete results in this respect. But one of the most pleasant results is the fact that we now have textbooks which will be a great help in the work of training agitators. With the aid of the Central Committee of the Party a book of 200 pages was written, set in type, put on the press and printed—all in eight days. This shows what we can do if we try.

One of the brightest aspects of the activity of the Commissariat of Education was manifested in the care of art monuments and museums. In particular, amazing work has been done in the field of repairing antique buildings. There has been a large increase in the number of museums. At present there are 119 provincial museums, as against 31 of the old regime. Even the museum experts declare that they are amazed and fascinated by the eagerness to collect and to preserve antiques which is shown by the mass of the people of Soviet Russia and by all the organs of the Soviet power. The Hermitage has been enlarged to one and a half times its previous size.

Then comes the division of music. The number of schools has remained the same, but the schools were reorganized and the number of students has increased. About 9,000 persons above the age of 16 are now studying music.

In the theatrical field we have accomplished great work, but to breathe in new life means to get a new repertoire. The new theatre will be created by new dramatists. In this respect the only thing to do is to write new plays. For the present we have removed from the theatres the objectionable elements.

I once asked Comrade Guilbeaux how many peasant theaters there are in France. In all of France there are only 113 peasant theaters, while in the province of Kostroma alone we have 400 peasant theaters and throughout Russia there are 3,000 peasant theaters.

The entire People's Commissariat of Education, with its teachers and educators, is at present inspired by a strong desire to work and is on the right path for this work. Therefore, if the Commissariat is given support great activity will result and I am sure that the work will not be worse than in any other department. I hope that this report will mark a turning point. If we prove that under such difficult conditions the Communists, the Soviet power, does not overlook the work of education and that we can even effect important achievements, I assure you that this will mean a colossal victory against our enemies and among our friends. In the field of education we must therefore display the maximum effort, and I hope that you will not reject my proposals.

Soviet Russia, Vol. 3, No. 22 (27 November 1920) pp. 521-524, with modifications.



PROLET CULT

5-11 October 1920

Proletcult (Union of Proletarian Cultural-Educational Organizations) strove to create a new proletarian art. It had come into existence as an organization before the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, but the movement had a much longer history. During the early years of the revolution it was characterized both by a semi-official status because of its patronage by the People's Commissariat of Education and by intense debate among its adherents as to just exactly what it stood for. Finally, in October 1920 a congress of Proletcult organizations from

around the country convened. The congress inadvertently brought to a head the potential conflict inherent in the claim of Proletcult, or any other organization, to be an independent spokesman for proletarian interests, given the Communist Party's own demand for a monopoly in that role. Lenin had never fully trusted Proletcult, whose tendency toward independence from the party he could not accept, and he felt uncomfortable with the prominent role of his old rival, A. A. Bogdanov. The following document is a brief account of the congress and gives an outline of its concerns. More than that, however, it sparked Lenin's most emphatic personal intervention into the arts during this era although not his only one. Lunacharsky, speaking to the congress on 7 October, reasserted Proletcult's claim to autonomy even though Communist dominated. Lenin read this in the newspaper the next day and angrily demanded that Proletcult be subordinated to the Party and state—see the following document. In its final resolution, the Proletcult congress bowed to Party pressure and accepted its subordination, although not without considerable bitterness on the part of many, including Communist members who did not see the need for such action. The final formulation of Party policy on Proletcult came soon afterwards—see 1 December below—and had implications for the arts generally as well.

The First All-Russian Congress of Proletcults

The First All-Russian Congress of Proletcults took place October 5-11 in Moscow. It had been proposed to convene a second All-Russian Conference of Proletcults, but, as over 400 people gathered from all ends of Russia—including 211 delegates with voting rights, 89 delegates with consultative rights and 107 guests—and as these delegates represented a half-million workers in 1,384 Proletcults (including 35 province and city, 247 district and 826 factory Proletcults), it was decided to proclaim the conference a congress. The party composition of the delegates is interesting. Excluding the guests, of the 300 delegates 197 were Communists, 3 candidates for Communist Party membership, 5 sympathizers [with the Communists], 89 non-party, 5 anarchists and 1 Bundist.

The Congress of Proletcults was opened the evening of October 5 by the Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Proletcults, Comrade Lebedev-Poliansky. It elected a presidium of the Congress, confirmed the rules for its work and announced the order of the reports. Greetings to the Congress were received from many organizations, including....[listing follows]

The work of the Congress began October 6 with the report of Comrade Lebedev-Poliansky about the activity of the All-Russian Central Committee of Proletcults. Referring to the difficult conditions under which the Central Committee worked—shortage of personnel, the impossibility during two years to convene a congress or conference—the speaker noted that life itself gave rise to Proletcults across all of Russia, including the Urals, Ukraine, Siberia, the Caucasus, and that there is a Proletcult even in Georgia, where it suffers under the displeasure of a Menshevik government. Today the idea of Proletcult is finding a reception even among West-European workers, and that is why, at the time of the Second Congress of the Communist International, an international bureau of Proletcults was created. Although an estimate of the size of Proletcults in 1919 was done only 6 January 1920, and the estimate for 1920 was done at the end of July 1920, nonetheless the Proletcults grew rapidly in both numbers and quality. They put out more than twenty proletarian journals, united about 80,000 workers in theatrical, musical, artistic and literary studios, and published more than a hundred proletarian writers.

The musical and theatrical studios of the Proletcults and many proletarian writers traveled around the fronts, despite the hardships, and had a strong impact on the moral of the Red Army, inspiring it toward victory. In the fine arts and poetry, Proletcult workers led

the struggle against cubism and futurism and identified a significant stratum of worker-artists and poets.

After a long and lively exchange of opinions about the report, it was approved. The evening session the same day approved the report of Comrade A. A. Bogdanov, "The Path of Proletarian Creativity," in which he showed that any creative work is a variety of labor and that in any labor there is an element of creativity, which expresses itself in the combinations and divisions. The session also approved the report of Comrade Fal'kner-Smit, "The Important Stages of Proletarian Science."

The morning session of October 7 heard the greeting of People's Commissar for Enlightenment, Comrade Lunacharsky, in the name of the international bureau of Proletcults. He reported that it was proposed to establish an international publishing house and to guarantee the full autonomy of Proletcult. Then he read a report "About Professionalism in the Arts." Comrade Lunacharsky emphasized that the three thousand peasant theaters which have appeared among us imitate the worst of bourgeois characteristics, putting on vulgar plays, and therefore it is necessary for the proletariat to approach professional artists critically, selecting only those who can contribute to the organization of a new communist art. Professionals either demonstrate a weak craft, looking to the past, or gropingly take the first steps on new paths. The proletariat needs a mass monumental art, different from that of the professionals of the past, and a new communist content in this art. Only Proletcult has the strength to create this, if it does not fall into amateurism.

That evening Comrade Lebedev-Poliansky gave a report about the extent and character of the work of Proletcult, in which he demonstrated that the basic work of Proletcult must be creative, with cultural-enlightenment work secondary. Proletcults must justify the results of their work to the broad masses of industrial workers, and not so much broaden as deepen and intensify their work.

Then the congress separated into sections—theatrical, fine arts, musical-vocal, literary, and organizational—the work of which proceeded on parallel lines. The theatrical section heard and accepted the report of comrade Smyshliav, "The Theatrical Work of Proletcult," the fine arts section the report of Comrade Ivanov, the musical-vocal section the report of Comrade Krasin, "Tasks and Methods of Work of the Music Departments of Proletcults," the literary section the report of comrade Sadofiev, "Tasks of Proletarian Literature," and in the organizational section the report of comrade Ignatov. The resolutions will be published in the stenographic account of the Congress, so here we note only that the literary section adopted a resolution about freeing proletarian writers from non-literary duties in order that they can devote themselves entirely to literature, about the organization of publishing houses and literary studios—central and district—and about the founding of an instructors bureau at the Central Committee for help and for supervision locally. Candidates were nominated for the editorial board of an arts journal also: one from the Central Committee and four who were elected by the literary section (Kirillov and Sadofiev with 23 votes, Berdnikov and Arskii with 12 votes).

In the report on the organizational question it was proposed to organize in each Proletcult several sections: scientific, literature and publication, art, organization and instructors, finance, supplies, children's and national minorities. It was proposed to found in Moscow a central artistic arena for displaying the creative achievements of all Proletcults. All members of the Central Committee are obligated to serve a specified area.

The meetings of the sections occupied October 8 and 9. Then an All-Russian Central Committee of Proletcults was elected. The final meeting was on Monday, October 11, on the question of the subordination of the activity of Proletcult to the Politprosvet [Political-Educational Committee] of the People's Commissariat of Enlightenment, which was being formed out of the former out-of-school section. It was decided in the interests of centralization of cultural-enlightenment work to subordinate Proletcult to the People's Commissariat of Enlightenment.

On Sunday October 10 the Congress delegates viewed the exhibitions of fine arts of the Moscow, Petrograd and some provincial Proletcults, visited the Tretyakov Gallery and in the evening went to the theater. In general the Congress proceeded with great enthusiasm, which testified to the vitality of the Proletcult members, but the subordination of Proletcult to the Politprosvet of the Commissariat of Enlightenment perplexed many.

Griadushchee, No. 12-13, (1920), pp. 21-22.



PROLET CULT AND THE PARTY — I

8 October 1920

See preceding headnote.

V. I. Lenin

On Proletarian Culture

We see from *Izvestia* of October 8 that, in his address to the Proletcult Congress, Comrade Lunacharsky said things that were *diametrically opposite* to what he and I had agreed upon yesterday.

It is necessary that a draft resolution (of the Proletcult Congress) should be drawn up with the utmost urgency, and that it should be endorsed by the Central Committee, in time to have it put to the vote *at this very session* of the Proletcult. On behalf of the Central Committee it should be submitted not later than today, for endorsement both by the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Education and by the Proletcult Congress, because the Congress is closing today.

DRAFT RESOLUTION

1) All educational work in the Soviet Republic of workers and peasants, in the field of political education in general and in the field of art in particular, should be imbued with the spirit of the class struggle being waged by the proletariat for the successful achievement of the aims of its dictatorship, i.e., the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the abolition of classes, and the elimination of all forms of exploitation of man by man.

2) Hence, the proletariat, both through its vanguard—the Communist Party—and through the many types of proletarian organisations in general, should display the utmost activity and play the leading part in all the work of public education.

3) All the experience of modern history and, particularly, the more than half-century-old revolutionary struggle of the proletariat of all countries since the appearance of the *Communist Manifesto* has unquestionably demonstrated that the Marxist world outlook is the only true expression of the interests, the viewpoint, and the culture of the revolutionary proletariat.

4) Marxism has won its historic significance as the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat because, far from rejecting the most valuable achievements of the bourgeois epoch, it has, on the contrary, assimilated and refashioned everything of value in the more than two thousand years of the development of human thought and culture. Only further work on this basis and in this direction, inspired by the practical experience of the proletarian dictatorship as the final stage in the struggle against every form of exploitation, can be recognised as the development of a genuine proletarian culture.

5) Adhering unswervingly to this stand of principle, the All-Russia Proletcult Congress rejects in the most resolute manner, as theoretically unsound and practically harmful, all attempts to invent one's own particular brand of culture, to remain isolated in self-contained organisations, to draw a line dividing the field of work of the People's Commissariat of Education and the Proletcult, or to set up a Proletcult "autonomy" within establishments under the People's Commissariat of Education and so forth. On the contrary, the Congress enjoins all Proletcult organisations to fully consider themselves in duty bound to act as auxiliary bodies of the network of establishments under the People's Commissariat of Education, and to accomplish their tasks under the general guidance of the Soviet authorities (specifically, of the People's Commissariat of Education) and of the Russian Communist Party, as part of the tasks of the proletarian dictatorship.

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Comrade Lunacharsky says that his words have been distorted. In that case this resolution is needed *all the more* urgently.

Lenin, Vol. 31, pp. 316-317. [Three stars in original—ed.]



STALIN ON THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONALITY POLICY

10 October 1920

At a time when the relationship with small nationalities was being transformed and when larger nationality groups in "independent" Soviet republics were being more closely tied to the central government, Stalin attempted to explain Soviet policy on "the national question." The article was published in Pravda on this date.

J. V. Stalin

The Policy of the Soviet Government on the National Question in Russia

Three years of revolution and civil war in Russia have shown that unless central Russia and her border regions support each other the victory of the revolution and the liberation of Russia from the clutches of imperialism will be impossible. Central Russia, that hearth of world revolution, cannot hold out long without the assistance of the border regions, which abound in raw materials, fuel and foodstuffs. The border regions of Russia in their turn would be inevitably doomed to imperialist bondage without the political, military and organizational support of more developed central Russia. If it is true to say that the more developed proletarian West cannot finish off the world bourgeoisie without the support of the border regions of Russia, which are less developed but which abound in essential resources.

The Entente undoubtedly took this circumstance into account from the very first days of the existence of the Soviet Government, when it (the Entente) pursued the plan of the economic encirclement of central Russia by cutting off the most important of her border regions. And the plan of the economic encirclement of Russia has remained the unchanging basis of all the Entente's campaigns against Russia, from 1918 to 1920, not excluding its present machinations in the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Turkestan.

All the more important is it, therefore, to achieve a firm union between the centre and the border regions of Russia.

Hence the need to establish definite relations, definite ties between the centre and the border regions of Russia ensuring an intimate and indestructible union between them.

What must these relations be, what forms must they assume?

In other words, what is the policy of the Soviet Government on the national question in Russia?

The demand for the secession of the border regions from Russia as the form of the relations between the centre and the border regions must be rejected not only because it runs counter to the very formulation of the question of establishing a union between the centre and the border regions, but primarily because it runs fundamentally counter to the interests of the mass of the people in both the centre and the border regions. Apart from the fact that the secession of the border regions would undermine the revolutionary might of central Russia, which is stimulating the movement for emancipation in the West and the East, the seceded border regions themselves would inevitably fall into the bondage of international imperialism. One has only to glance at Georgia, Armenia, Poland, Finland, etc., which have seceded from Russia but which have retained only the semblance of independence, having in reality been converted into unconditional vassals of the Entente; one has only, lastly, to recall the recent case of the Ukraine and Azerbaijan, of which the former was plundered by German capital and the latter by the Entente, to realize the utterly counter-revolutionary nature of the demand for the secession of the border regions under present international conditions. When a life-and-death struggle is developing between proletarian Russia and the imperialist Entente, there are only two possible outcomes for the border regions:

Either they go along with Russia, and then the toiling masses of the border regions will be freed from imperialist oppression;

Or they go along with the Entente, and then the yoke of imperialism will be inevitable. There is no third course.

The so-called independence of so-called independent Georgia, Armenia, Poland, Finland, etc., is only an illusion, and conceals the utter dependence of these apologies for states on one or another group of imperialists.

Of course, the border regions of Russia, the nations and races which inhabit these regions, possess, as all other nations do, the inalienable right to secede from Russia; and if any of these nations decided by a majority to secede from Russia, as was the case with Finland in 1917, Russia, presumably, would be obliged to take note of the fact and sanction the secession. But the question here is not about the rights of nations, which are unquestionable, but about the interests of the mass of the people both in the centre and in the border regions; it is a question of the character—which is determined by these interests—of the agitation which our Party must carry on if it does not wish to renounce its own principles and if it wishes to influence the will of the labouring masses of the nationalities in a definite direction. And the interests of the masses render the demand for the secession of the border regions at the present stage of the revolution a profoundly counter-revolutionary one.

Similarly, what is known as cultural-national autonomy must also be rejected as a form of union between the centre and the border regions of Russia. The experience of Austria-Hungary (the birthplace of cultural-national autonomy) during the last ten years has revealed the absolutely ephemeral and non-viable character of cultural-national autonomy as a form of alliance between the labouring masses of the nationalities of a multi-national state. Springer and Bauer, the authors of cultural-national autonomy, who are now confronted by the failure of their cunningly contrived national programme, are living corroborations of this. Finally, the champion of cultural-national autonomy in Russia, the once

famous Bund, was itself recently obliged officially to acknowledge the superfluity of cultural-national autonomy, publicly declaring that:

"The demand for cultural-national autonomy, which was put forward under the capitalist system, loses its meaning in the conditions of a socialist revolution" (see *The Twelfth Conference of the Bund*, 1920, p. 21).

There remains *regional* autonomy for border regions that are distinguished by a specific manner of life and national composition, as the only expedient form of union between the centre and the border regions, an autonomy which is designed to connect the border regions of Russia with the centre by a federal tie. This is the Soviet form of autonomy which was proclaimed by the Soviet Government from the very first days of its existence and which is now being put into effect in the border regions in the form of administrative communes and autonomous Soviet republics.

Soviet autonomy is not a rigid thing fixed once and for all time; it permits of the most varied forms and degrees of development. It passes from narrow, administrative autonomy (the Volga Germans, the Chuvashes, the Karelians) to a wider, political autonomy (the Bashkirs, the Volga Tatars, the Kirghiz); from wide political autonomy to a still wider form of it (the Ukraine, Turkestan); and, lastly, from the Ukrainian type of autonomy to the highest form of autonomy—to contractual relations (Azerbaijan). This flexibility of Soviet autonomy is one of its prime merits; for this flexibility enables it to embrace all the various types of border regions of Russia, which vary greatly in their levels of cultural and economic development. The three years of Soviet policy on the national question in Russia have shown that in applying Soviet autonomy in its diverse forms the Soviet Government is on the right path, for this policy alone has made it possible for it to open the road to the remotest corners of the border regions of Russia, to arouse to political activity the most backward and nationally diverse masses and to connect these masses with the centre by the most varied ties—a problem which no other government in the world has solved, or has even set itself (being afraid to do so!). The administrative redivision of Russia on the basis of Soviet autonomy has not yet been completed; the North Caucasians, the Kalmyks, the Chereviss, the Votyaks, the Buryats and others are still awaiting a settlement of the question. But no matter what aspect the administrative map of the future Russia may assume, and no matter what shortcomings there may have been in this field—and some shortcomings there certainly were—it must be acknowledged that by undertaking an administrative redivision on the basis of regional autonomy Russia has made a very big stride towards rallying the border regions around the proletarian centre and bringing the government into closer contact with the broad masses of the border regions.

But the proclamation of this or that form of Soviet autonomy, the issuing of corresponding decrees and ordinances, and even the creation of governments in the border regions, in the shape of regional Councils of People's Commissars of the autonomous republics, are still far from enough to consolidate the union between the border regions and the centre. To consolidate this union it is necessary, first of all, to put an end to the estrangement and isolation of the border regions, to their patriarchal and uncultured manner of life, and to their distrust of the centre, which still persist in the border regions as a heritage of the brutal policy of tsarism. Tsarism deliberately cultivated patriarchal and feudal oppression in the border regions in order to keep the masses in slavery and ignorance. Tsarism deliberately settled the best areas in the border regions with colonizing elements in order to force the masses of the native nationalities into the worst areas and to intensify national strife. Tsarism restricted, and at times simply suppressed, the native schools, theatres and educational institutions in order to keep the masses in ignorance. Tsarism frustrated all initiative of the best members of the native population. Lastly, tsarism suppressed all activity of the masses in the border regions. By all these means tsarism implanted among the mass of the

native nationalities a profound distrust, at times passing into direct hostility, towards everything Russian. If the union between central Russia and the border regions is to be consolidated, this distrust must be removed and an atmosphere of mutual understanding and fraternal confidence created. But, in order to remove this distrust we must first help the masses of the border regions to emancipate themselves from the survivals of feudal-patriarchal oppression; we must abolish—actually, and not only nominally—all the privileges of the colonizing elements; we must allow the masses to experience the material benefits of the revolution.

In brief, we must prove to the masses that central, proletarian Russia is defending their interests, and their interests alone; and this must be proved not only by repressive measures against the colonizers and bourgeois nationalists, measures that are often quite incomprehensible to the masses, but primarily by a consistent and carefully considered economic policy.

Everybody is acquainted with the liberals' demand for universal compulsory education. The Communists in the border regions cannot be more right-wing than the liberals; they must put universal education into effect there if they want to end the ignorance of the people and if they want to create closer spiritual ties between the centre of Russia and the border regions. But to do so, it is necessary to develop local national schools, national theatres and national educational institutions and to raise the cultural level of the masses of the border regions, for it need hardly be shown that ignorance is the most dangerous enemy of the Soviet regime. We do not know what success is attending our work in this field generally, but we are informed that in one of the most important border regions the local People's Commissariat of Education is spending on the native schools only ten per cent of its credits. If that is true, it must be admitted that in this field we have, unfortunately, not gone much further than the "old regime."

Soviet power is not power divorced from the people; on the contrary, it is the only power of its kind, having sprung from the Russian masses and being near and dear to them. This in fact explains the unparalleled strength and resilience which the Soviet regime usually displays at critical moments.

Soviet power must become just as near and dear to the masses of the border regions of Russia. But this requires that it should first of all become comprehensible to them. It is therefore necessary that all Soviet organs in the border regions—the courts, the administration, the economic bodies, the organs of direct authority (and the organs of the Party as well)—should as far as possible be recruited from the local people acquainted with the manner of life, habits, customs and language of the native population; that all the best people from the local masses should be drawn into these institutions; that the local labouring masses should participate in every sphere of administration of the country, including the formation of military units, in order that the masses should see that the Soviet power and its organs are the products of their own efforts, the embodiment of their aspirations. Only in this way can firm spiritual ties be established between the masses and the Soviet power, and only in this way can the Soviet power become comprehensible and dear to the labouring masses of the border regions.

Some comrades regard the autonomous republics in Russia and Soviet autonomy generally as a temporary, if necessary, evil which owing to certain circumstances had to be tolerated, but which must be combated with a view to its eventual abolishment. It need hardly be shown that this view is fundamentally false and that at any rate it is entirely foreign to the policy of the Soviet Government on the national question. Soviet autonomy must not be regarded as an abstraction or an artificial thing; still less should it be considered an empty and declaratory promise. Soviet autonomy is the most real and concrete form

of the union of the border regions with central Russia. Nobody will deny that the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkestan, Kirghizia, Bashkiria, Tataria and the other border regions, if they desire the cultural and material prosperity of their masses, must have native schools, courts, administration and organs of authority, recruited principally from the local people. Furthermore, the real sovietization of these regions, their conversion into Soviet countries closely bound with central Russia in one integral state, is *inconceivable* without the widespread organization of local schools, without the creation of courts, administrative bodies, organs of authority, etc., staffed with people acquainted with the life and language of the population. But establishing schools, courts, administration and organs of authority functioning in the native language—this is precisely putting Soviet autonomy into practice; for Soviet autonomy is nothing but the sum total of all these institutions clothed in Ukrainian, Turkestan, Kirghiz, etc., forms.

How, after this, can one seriously say that Soviet autonomy is ephemeral, that it must be combated, and so on?

One thing or the other:

Either the Ukrainian, Azerbaijan, Kirghiz, Uzbek, Bashkir and other languages are an actual reality, and it is therefore absolutely essential to develop in these regions native schools, courts, administrative bodies and organs of authority recruited from the local people—in which case Soviet autonomy must be put into effect in these regions in its entirety, without reservations;

Or the Ukrainian, Azerbaijan and other languages are a pure fiction, and therefore schools and other institutions functioning in the native languages are unnecessary—in which case Soviet autonomy must be discarded as useless lumber.

The search for a third way is due either to ignorance of the subject or to deplorable folly.

One serious obstacle to the realization of Soviet autonomy is the acute shortage in the border regions of intellectual forces of local origin, the shortage of instructors in every branch of Soviet and Party work without exception. This shortage cannot but hamper both educational and revolutionary constructive work in the border regions. But for that very reason it would be unwise and harmful to alienate the all too few groups of native intellectuals, who perhaps would like to serve the masses but are unable to do so, perhaps because, not being Communists, they believe themselves to be surrounded by an atmosphere of mistrust and are afraid of possible repressive measures. The policy of drawing such groups into Soviet work, the policy of recruiting them for industrial, agrarian, food-supply and other posts, with a view to their gradual sovietization, may be applied with success. For it can hardly be maintained that these intellectual groups are less reliable than, let us say, the counter revolutionary military experts who, their counter-revolutionary spirit notwithstanding, were drawn into the work and subsequently became sovietized, occupying very important posts.

But the employment of the national groups of intellectuals will still be far from sufficient to satisfy the demand for instructors. We must simultaneously develop in the border regions a ramified system of courses of study and schools in every branch of administration in order to create cadres of instructors from the local people. For it is clear that without such cadres the organization of native schools, courts, administrative and other institutions functioning in the native languages will be rendered extremely difficult.

A no less serious obstacle to the realization of Soviet autonomy is the haste, often becoming gross tactlessness, displayed by certain comrades in the matter of sovietizing the border regions. When such comrades venture to take upon themselves the "heroic task" of

introducing "pure communism" in regions which are a whole historical period behind central Russia, regions where the medieval order has not yet been wholly abolished, one may safely say that no good will come of such cavalry raids, of "communism" of this kind. We should like to remind these comrades of the point in our programme which says:

"The R.C.P. upholds the historical and class standpoint, giving consideration to the stage of historical development in which the given nation finds itself—whether it is on the way from medievalism to bourgeois democracy, or from bourgeois democracy to Soviet, or proletarian, democracy, etc."

And further:

"In any case, the proletariat of those nations which were oppressor nations must exercise particular caution and be particularly heedful of the survivals of national sentiment among the labouring masses of the oppressed or unequal nations" (see *Programme of the R.C.P.*).

That means that if in Azerbaijan, for instance, the direct method of requisitioning superfluous dwelling space alienates from us the Azerbaijanian masses, who regard the home, the domestic hearth, as sacred and inviolable, it is obvious that the direct way of requisitioning superfluous dwelling space must be replaced by an indirect, roundabout way of achieving the same end. Or if, for instance, the Daghestan masses, who are profoundly imbued with religious prejudices, follow the Communists "on the basis of the Sharia," it is obvious that the direct way of combating religious prejudices in this country must be replaced by indirect and more cautious ways. And so on, and so forth.

In brief, cavalry raids with the object of "immediately communizing" the backward masses must be discarded in favour of a circumspect and carefully considered policy of gradually drawing these masses into the general stream of Soviet development.

Such in general are the practical conditions necessary for realizing Soviet autonomy, the introduction of which ensures closer spiritual ties and a firm revolutionary union between the centre and the border regions of Russia.

Soviet Russia is performing an experiment without parallel hitherto in the world in organizing the cooperation of a number of nations and races within a single proletarian state on a basis of mutual confidence, of voluntary and fraternal agreement. The three years of the revolution have shown that this experiment has every chance of succeeding. But this experiment can be certain of complete success only if our practical policy on the national question in the localities does not run counter to the demands of already proclaimed Soviet autonomy, in its varied forms and degrees, and if every practical measure we adopt in the localities helps to introduce the masses of the border regions to a higher, proletarian spiritual and material culture in forms conforming with the manner of life and national features of these masses.

In that lies the guarantee of the consolidation of the revolutionary union between central Russia and the border regions of Russia, against which all the machinations of the Entente will be shattered.

Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 363-376.



MASS SPECTACLES: "THE STORMING OF THE WINTER PALACE"

7 November 1920

One of the special features of the era was the mass spectacle which combined elements of revolutionary theater—both in theme and in method—with celebration of the triumph of the

revolution. These presented the revolution and revolutionary movement in what might be called an heroic or mythic form with clearly delineated good and bad, heroes and villains, and the ultimate triumph of revolution and the path to the glorious future. Some contemporary observers compared them to medieval mystery plays. These mass spectacles were a feature of the Civil War era and were especially popular in 1920, when several were mounted. They involved hundreds or even thousands in the "casts" and were presented out of doors to huge crowds. The culmination of these was "The Storming of the Winter Palace," presented in the Winter Palace Square with a cast of about 6,000, although, as the description makes clear, the distinction between performers and audience was somewhat artificial. The following description was provided by an observer, one Holitscher. Explanatory words in brackets are by this editor.

["THE STORMING OF THE WINTER PALACE"]

Two large stages, White and Red, had been erected in front of the Winter Palace, the immense semi-circle of which formed the background of the play. To the right was a white one; to the left a red one. In the centre they were connected by a high arched bridge. At the start 1,500 people were the actors. They included some professional actors, pupils of the theatre schools, members of the Club for Proletarian Culture, of the Theatre Societies, of the Red Army, and the Baltic Fleet. But at the conclusion more than 100,000 people were participating, pouring out from the tribunes and from the houses. The spectacle began at ten at night. A searchlight attached to the top of the Alexander Column [in the center of the square] lit up as bright as day the White stage to the right, on which the Provisional Government of Kerensky was holding a meeting. From the other side, from the invisible Red stage, an indistinct murmur was proceeding; it was the low murmur of the multitude who had had enough of the war, but who had to submit to Kerensky's word of command, as the ministerial council under the presidency of the Tribune [Kerensky] had just resolved to pursue the war to a victorious termination. The searchlight was turned on to the Red stage. There one saw workmen and women, children and cripples reeling home tired from the factories; maimed soldiers toiling up to the bridge because the order had been issued that new armies were to be formed. At the same time on the White stage capitalists pushed sacks of money with their bellies towards Kerensky's throne, and ministers jumped from the ministerial bench and collected all the valuables in a heap, whilst from the dark side the cry of "Lenin" rose above the murmurs, at first indistinctly, then louder and louder. Next Kerensky was seen on his throne at the head of the ministerial bench gesticulating, waving his hands energetically and pointing to the money-bags. But the ministers remained undecided. They fidgeted about on their bench as from the invisible Red stage the tumultuous sounds became more rhythmic and more collective; one could now hear the notes of a song, which might or might not be the "International." Kerensky was still speaking and gesticulating to the ministerial bench, but the restlessness and indecision had become general. The whole row, clad in grey, were seen to bend over together to the right, then with a sudden jerk to the left. This was repeated several times with increasingly violent movements. Then came Kerensky's celebrated women's battalions. They mounted the stage with parodied movements, waved their rifles, and shouted to Kerensky, "Mirituræ te saluant." As the White stage became wrapped in darkness, the Red one was illuminated. Workmen, women and children, soldiers with arms, and people of all kinds were seen crowding round a gigantic Red Flag. The factories, the prisons—large red scenic constructions with barred windows, their interiors lit up with glaring red light—opened their doors wide. Crowds increasingly emerged from them, and clustered round the Red Flag. From the collective

surging crowd the "International" rose as a powerful articulate chorus. The word "Lenin" was hurled to the sky as by one mighty shout from a hundred thousand throats. In the meanwhile the battalions had drawn up in order round the flag, ready to march across that bridge which connected the two stages. The searchlight was switched on the White stage. The ministerial bench was rocking as if shaken by a storm. A volley came from the Red side. Kerensky's bodyguard rushed with waving rifles to the bridge. The ministerial bench fell with a crash. From a side street of Uritsky Square two motor cars rushed up to the White stage, sounding their horns furiously. With a desperate leap, Kerensky sprang from his throne over the fallen ministerial bench to the steps which led from the stage to the ground, where the motor cars received him and his ministers. They rushed madly across the square past the column to the Winter Palace, the gates of which opened with the rapidity of lightning and admitted them.

The Winter Palace now began to take a part in the play. All the first story windows were suddenly illuminated by a most brilliant light. At the same time fighting on the bridge continued. Accompanied by the rattle of machine guns and wild firing, an action developed, and hand to hand fighting took place between the Red Army and the Whites, who had remained behind. Dead and wounded fell down the steps, tumbling over the parapet of the bridge on to the pavement of the square below. In the meanwhile the lights in the Winter Palace were turned on, turned off, and again turned on. For several minutes the battle raged on the bridge, till at last a decision was reached. The whole fighting mass of the Red Army, united and conscious of its strength, this mass singing the "International," pressed down the steps towards the Winter Palace. Regiments emerged from the side streets of Uritsky Square, and joined those coming from the stage in tens and tens of thousands.

Now from the direction of the Neva [River] the sound of thunder was suddenly heard. It came from the "Aurora," the historic battleship that bombarded the Winter Palace in November, 1917, which was firing its guns from the same position where it still lay anchored in the Neva, having been ordered to participate in the mystery play of the Revolution.

Again the Winter Palace came into action. A gate opened and cars rushed through with Kerensky and his adherents. They made for the Millionaia [Boulevard], and so away.

A hundred thousand was now approaching the Winter Palace. The immense square was crowded with marching, running, singing, shouting people, all pressing towards the Winter Palace. Rifle shots, the rattle of machine guns, the terrible thunder from the "Aurora"—all this was awful, arresting, almost indescribable. Then came rockets to announce the end. The guns of the "Aurora" became silent, the shouting died down, and the mass melted in the night.

Huntley Carter, pp. 106-109.



DECLINE OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT

14 November 1920

By 1920 industrial and agricultural production had fallen dramatically below that of the pre-war years. This table was published in Pravda on 14 November 1920 in an article by Yu. Larin, a prominent figure in economic planning and policy. Larin gave appropriate warnings about the difficulties of accurate measures and comparisons. Much of the data applies only

to the R.S.F.S.R. but some include other areas. Note that the figures in the first column are for a year whereas those in the second column are for a half-year except as noted. The key figures are those in the third column, which give the percent of output for 1920 as against the equivalent period in 1913 and 1914—the first half of the year in all but three instances. By any reading the chart shows how catastrophically the economy had collapsed and some important products such as iron and steel had fallen disastrously. Overall industrial production in late 1920 is estimated at less than one-fifth of the prewar level, perhaps as low as 13%. Of the units of measure mentioned in the chart, a vedro (literally, a bucket or pail) equals approximately 21 pints or 12 liters, a pood equals 36.11 lbs. or 16.38 kilograms, and a dessiatine equals 2.7 acres or 1.09 hectares.

Products	Yearly Output in 1913-1914	Output during first half year 1920	% of half year's output 1913-1914
1. Paints, varnishes, etc.	3,000,000 poods	33,000 poods	2.2
2. Paper and cardboards (in- cluding Ukraine)	13,500,000 "	1,030,000 "	15.2
3. Rubber goods	1,840,000 "	34,000 "	1.7
4. Glass (one case = 15 poods)	440,000 cases	28,000 cases	13.0
5. Matches	3,650,000 "	310,000 "	16.0
6. Tobacco	4,300,000 "	380,000 "	17.7
7. Alcohol (40°)	38,500,000 vedros	1,930,000 vedros (for 1919-1920)	5.0 of yearly output
8. Sugar (including Ukraine)	105,000,000 poods	4,737,000 poods (for 1919-1920)	4.5 of yearly output
9. Raw Starch	13,200,000 "	1,042,000 poods (for 1919-1920)	7.8 of yearly output
10. Coal (ncluding Ukraine and Siberia)	1,800,000,000 poods	225,000,000 poods	25.0
11. Oil (Including Caucasus)	600,000,000 "	100,000 "	33.0
12. Copper	1,330,000 "	less than 300,000 poods	less than 50.0
13. Manganese (including Ukraine)	17,000,000 poods	—	—
14. Lead (Including Caucasus and Siberia)	100,000 "	—	—
15. Zinc (Including Caucasus)	200,000 poods	—	—
16. Platinum	300 "	50 poods	33.0
17. Gold (Including Siberia)	4,000 "	240 "	12.0
18. Pyrites	3,500,000 "	less than 700,000 poods	less than 40.0
19. Magnesium	4,000,000 poods	over 1,000,000 "	about 25.0
20. Chromide Ore	1,500,000 "	about 500,000 "	about 30.0
21. Iron Orc (including Ukraine; without Crimea)	530,000,000 poods	32,000,000 poods	12.0
22. Pig Iron (including Ukraine)	257,000,000 "	30,000,000 "	2.4
23. Iron and Steel (in- cluding Ukraine)	220,000,000 "	4,500,000 "	4.0

Products	Yearly Output in 1913-1914	Output during first half year 1920	% of half year's output 1913-1914
24. Cotton (Turkestan)	20,000,000 poods (1915)	4,000,000 poods (1919)	20.0
25. Cotton Yarn	19,800,000 "	330,000 "	3.3
26. Flax (dessiatines sown)	1,060,000 dessiatines	536,000 dessiatines (1919)	50.0
27. Flax Yarn	3,240,000 poods	540,000 poods	33.0
28. Sulphuric Acid	11,000,000 "	1,250,000 " (1919)	11.4
29. Soda (3/4 Ukraine)	11,500,000 poods	1,200,000 " (1919 in the Urals)	?
30. Potash (Caucasus)	1,600,000 "	Almost nothing	—
31. Nitric Acid	1,470,000 "	Almost nothing	0.0
32. Butter (Including Ukraine; without Caucasus, Don region and Siberia)	23,000,000 poods	500,000 poods	4.3
33. Chemical Products	32,620,000 "	1,700,000 "	10.4
34. Portland Cement (Including Ukraine and Caucasus)	150,000,000 poods	none	—
35. Wood Working Industry	—	45,000,000 cu. ft. sawed timber 7,000,000 standards of other timber	30.0
36. Flour	1,000,000,000 poods	19,000,000 poods	18.0
37. Mineral Fertilizers	10,030,000 poods	(in 1916—4,000,000 pds.)	?
38. Tar (Without Belorussia)	6,000,000 "	4,500,000 poods (for 1920)	75.0
39. Soap and Candles	20,867,000 "	291,000 poods	2.8
40. Pencils (Gross = 144 pieces)	500,000 gross	3,000 gross	1.2

Pravda (14 November 1920) and *Bulletin of the Russian Information Bureau in the U.S.*, No. 24-26 (5 February 1921), p. 16.



THE DECREE ON ABORTION

18 November 1920

One of the most misunderstood controversies of the early Soviet state was the policy on abortions. As the decree legalizing them made clear, the regime did not really approve of them, but rather accepted legalization as preferable to the then widespread illegal abortions with all of their dangers until such time as socialism would achieve "the gradual disappearance of this evil." Nonetheless, and contrary to expectations, abortion remained a major form of birth control in the USSR.

ON THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN'S HEALTH

During the past decades the number of women resorting to artificial discontinuation of pregnancy has grown both in the West and in this country. The legislation of all countries

combats this evil by punishing the woman who chooses to have an abortion and the doctor who makes it. Without leading to favourable results, this method of combating abortions has driven the operation underground and made the woman a victim of mercenary and often ignorant quacks who make a profession of secret operations. As a result, up to 50 per cent of such woman are infected in the course of operation, and up to 4 per cent of them die.

The Workers' and Peasants' Government is conscious of this serious evil to the community. It combats this evil by propaganda against abortions among working women. By working for socialism, and by introducing the protection of maternity and infancy on an extensive scale, it feels assured of achieving the gradual disappearance of this evil. But as the moral survivals of the past and the difficult economic conditions of the present still compel many women to resort to this operation, the People's Commissariats of Health and of Justice, anxious to protect the health of the women and considering that the method of repressions in this field fails entirely to achieve this aim, have decided:

- (1) To permit such operations to be made freely and without any charge in Soviet hospitals, where conditions are assured of minimising the harm of the operation.
- (2) Absolutely to forbid anyone but a doctor to carry out this operation.
- (3) Any nurse or midwife found guilty of making such an operation will be deprived of the right to practise, and tried by a People's Court.
- (4) A doctor carrying out an abortion in his private practice with mercenary aims will be called to account by a People's Court.

People's Commissar of Health, N. Semashko.

People's Commissar of Justice, Kurski.

N. A. Semashko, *Health Protection in the USSR*, pp. 82-84.



TROTSKY ON THE END OF THE WARS

20 November 1920

With the armistice with Poland on 12 October and the final defeat of the sole remaining White Army under Baron Wrangel in mid November, Russia, for the first time since 1914, was not engaged in major warfare. Minor military activities continued for some time, but there were no major military fronts. Trotsky reflected on this and on the uncertain implications for Soviet Russia, given that the world revolution had "not come as soon as we desired it."

Leon Trotsky

The Military Situation on November 30, 1920

Today we no longer have any fronts, and what we have to speak about now is not the military situation at present, but what it was some time ago.

After the defeat of Denikin there remained the Wrangel front. This front originated in the remains of Denikin's army, which we were unable to destroy owing to the weariness of our troops. Wrangel established himself in the Crimea and the equilibrium was maintained until the war with Poland. After the formation of the Polish front, Wrangel broke from the Crimea, seized a part of the coast and spread to the east, nearly to Taganrog. Our troops described a fairly correct semi-circle with a radius of 120-125 versts. Wrangel occupied the central position and struck out at various radii. His position was advantageous

in so far as he maintained his forces in a central position. At one time there was the danger that Wrangel would unite with Poland; another danger was that he would penetrate to the Caucasus, unite with Georgia and Armenia and receive support from England and France. All this induced us to concentrate great forces against Wrangel. It was imperative to deliver a blow in the nearest direction and for this it was necessary to secure a foothold on the left bank of the Dnieper. This was the sector near Kachovka, which he considered as the base from which to deliver the blow. Here we concentrated our chief infantry and the First Cavalry Army.

Wrangel tried to break us up. He had the advantage of his central position and an excellent reconnoitering force. He had communications everywhere. Prince Tumanov wrote that they had learned scouting from the Germans during the imperialistic war. Wrangel was therefore sure of his aim and his operations against us were directed by means of consecutive attacks on various parts of our front. When we held desperately on to the Kachovka *place-d'armes*, Wrangel attacked in the east and threatened the Don Basin. The southern command understood its task well and acted in complete unison with the head command. Wrangel's base was the Crimea, and whenever he attacked in the east or the west, we strove to cut him off from his base. Apart from that, we tried to avoid disseminating our forces. And our efforts were crowned with success.

The infantry played the chief role in the decisive battles at the Kachovka *place-d'armes*, but, as always, it needed the support of the cavalry, the more so as our infantry mainly consists of politically uneducated peasants; on the other hand, the cavalry is a more enlightened element, it leads the way and is of great importance. At the gates of the Crimea our troops had to fight under the most incredibly difficult conditions. Krivoshein, in Constantinople said that our men fought heroically. He also said that we developed a furious artillery fire. The latter is not quite correct; we practically had no artillery at all. We could not bring up our heavy artillery owing to the state of the roads; whereas, Wrangel had ample artillery. The commander of the 30th Division deliberated about marching forward with the infantry alone, under the scant support of the light artillery. On the receipt, however, of the telegram stating that the 51st Division had reached the Crimea, the 30th Division crossed the left bank of the Dnieper and thus decided the issue of the whole campaign. We won only by dint of heroism and self-sacrifice. The booty is not yet registered completely; so far, we have 52,000 prisoners, 277 cannons, a great number of machine-guns, 7 armored trains, 100 locomotives, 32 automobiles, 34 ships and 7 armored cars.

When Wrangel was practically liquidated, Petlura came upon the scene. If Wrangel was the legitimate heir of Denikin, Petlura was the bastard of Poland, put up by her against us. He had charge of 15,000 bayonets and 9,000 horses. Against Wrangel we had a great preponderance of forces, practically twice as much; against Petlura we had less; our settlement in the Crimea, however, had a great moral influence. A great battle took place on the 10th; on the 15th Petlura's divisions were routed; the remnants of his army retired to the Polish frontier and were disarmed by the Poles. We captured great trophies. After the defeat of Wrangel and Petlura, Balakhovich's bands do not stand the slightest chance of success.

We have no fighting front now; the communiques speak about the guarding of works, railways, etc. However comfortable it may be to confess that there is no more war, we have no right to soothe ourselves with the hope that the respite will be for long. We are not going to violate the peace, but we do not know with whom we may be forced to fight next. Experience, successes, and errors have taught us to be cautious.

The international revolution has not come as soon as we desired it; still, it may be either a matter of decades or of weeks. It is difficult to say when the world revolution will come. Therefore, we must not say that nobody else will want to fight against us. There is a base, Batum. Eighteen months ago negotiations were being carried on concerning the lease of Batum. In the event of Batum going over to England, Georgia will become the

place-d'armes for the remnants of Wrangel's army, and we will thus have a new ulcer in the Caucasus. Most decidedly averse to war, we should nevertheless be on our guard. Batum itself is not so important as is a new front in the Caucasus. Our diplomacy stated it was the intention of England to occupy Batum. Curzon in his turn asked whether we desired to occupy it. What is the meaning of this reply? The world bourgeoisie has been astonished at the swift defeat of Wrangel, but after the shock they have found a new cause for agitation in our alleged attempt upon Georgia. In this respect things in the Caucasus are not favorable. The Greece of Venizelos was the instrument of the Entente against Turkey; now Venizelos' party has lost at the elections, and the Germanophile party has come to the fore, an event which is to our advantage, for it is opposed to the Entente, though perhaps timidly and irresolutely. Under present circumstances, England and France cannot depend on Turkey, but they can promise her Baku, i.e., settle their accounts at our expense. It is thus clear that we are going to meet with some danger in the Caucasus. We can by a slight effort prepare this front and secure our safety in respect to Baku and Batum.

We are passing to the economic line of action and must preserve the army; but we must do this without damaging it; the demobilization must be confined to the staffs, the base, and the organs of supply, of which we had so many. Divisions were hastily organized for the battle. We should now bring them into proper shape. We can reduce the total number of the army by two-fifths, but preserve the number of bayonets and raise the quality of the army. Officer courses must be organized, which will be able to give us thousands of new commanders. If we carry out all these measures, by next summer we shall have a better army than now. The respite will not weaken, but will increase the work in the army. We had in our army many specialists and non-proletarian elements. We have not always given them careful attention, but both have come over to our side and have fought side by side with the Communists. Generally speaking the organization of the army is sound and in the course of a few months respite, we can take it under the control of the party organization.

The half of the party members that is in the army must learn to understand the other part that is at the base, and there is no doubt that they will unite.

Attention should be given to the Don Basin: the best men should be despatched there to regulate the work of supply and of industry. It is necessary to establish the closest contact with the trade unions; the best men should be placed in the economic apparatus and their work should be valued in proportion to the good they bring the workers.

Soviet Russia, Vol. 4, No. 6 (5 February 1921), pp. 132-133.



LUNACHARSKY AND SLAVINSKY ON THE ARTS AND THEIR ROLE

30 November 1920

This brief document contains many of the main issues confronting the new Soviet government in the field of the arts and shows its attitude towards the arts. The first two paragraphs give homage both to the cultural legacy of Russia and to the need to create "purely proletarian art forms," thereby encompassing the two most passionately held positions on the arts, ones which most people found mutually exclusive. It also asserts the political education role of the arts, the Party's role in the arts, the importance of proletarianizing arts institutions, and the state's guiding role. It represents a semi-official statement on arts policy at the time.

Compare this to the official policy on Proletcult in the next document. A. V. Lunacharsky was People's Commissar of Education—which included the arts—and Yu. M. Slavinsky was president of the Union of Art Workers (Rabis).

A. V. Lunacharsky and Yu. M. Slavinsky
*Theses of the Art Section of Narkompros and
 the Central Commission of the Union of Art Workers
 Concerning Basic Policy in the Field of Art*

While recognizing that the time for establishing indisputable principles of a proletarian aesthetics has not yet come, the Art Section of Narkompros and the Central Committee of All Art Workers consider it essential, nevertheless, to elucidate adequately and accurately the basic principles by which they are guided in their activities.

1. We acknowledge the proletariat's absolute right to make a careful reexamination of all those elements of world art that it has inherited and to affirm the truism that the new proletarian and socialist art can be built only on the foundation of all our acquisitions from the past. At the same time we acknowledge that the preservation and utilization of the genuine artistic values that we have acquired from the old culture is an indisputable task of the Soviet government. In this respect the legacy of the past must be cleared ruthlessly of all those admixtures of bourgeois degeneration and corruption; cheap pornography, philistine vulgarity, intellectual boredom, antirevolutionary and religious prejudices—insofar as such admixtures are contained in our legacy from the past—must be removed. In those cases where dubious elements are linked indissolubly with genuine artistic achievements, it is essential to take steps to ensure that the new young, mass proletarian public evaluate critically the spiritual nourishment provided it. In general, the proletariat must assimilate the legacy of the old culture not as a pupil, but as a powerful, conscious, and incisive critic.

2. Besides this, our Soviet and professional cultural and artistic activities must be directed toward creating purely proletarian art forms and institutions; these would, in every way, assist the existing and emergent workers' and peasants' studios, which are seeking new paths within the visual arts, music, the theater, and literature.

3. In the same way all fields of art must be utilized in order to elevate and illustrate clearly our political and revolutionary agitational/ propaganda work; this must be done in connection with both shock work demonstrated during certain weeks, days, and campaigns, and normal, everyday work. Art is a powerful means of infecting those around us with ideas, feelings, and moods. Agitation and propaganda acquire particular acuity and effectiveness when they are clothed in the attractive and mighty forms of art.

However, this political art, this artistic judgment on the ideal aspirations of the revolution can emerge only when the artist himself is sincere in surrendering his strength to this cause, only when he is really imbued with revolutionary consciousness and is full of revolutionary feeling. Hence, Communist propaganda among the actual votaries of art is also an urgent task both of the Art Section and of the Union of Art Workers.

4. Art is divided up into a large number of directions. The proletariat is only just working out its own artistic criteria, and therefore no state authority or any professional union should regard any one of them as belonging to the state; at the same time, however, they should render every assistance to the new searches in art.

5. Institutions of art education must be proletarianized. One way of doing this would be to open workers' departments in all higher institutions concerned with the plastic, musical, and theatrical arts.

At the same time particular attention must be given to the development of mass taste and artistic creativity by introducing art into everyday life and into industrial production

at large, i.e., by assisting in the evolution of an artistic industry and in the extensive development of choral singing and mass activities.

In basing themselves on these principles—on the one hand, under the general control of Glavpolitprosvet [Central Political-Educational Committee] and through it of the Communist Party and, on the other, linked indissolubly with the professionally organized proletariat and the All-Russian Soviet of Unions—the Art Section of Narkompros and the All-Russian Union of Art Workers will carry out in sympathy and in concord its work of art education and artistic industrialism throughout the country.

Bowlit, pp. 184-185.



PROLET CULT AND THE PARTY — II

1 December 1920

The Central Committee resolution on Proletcult (Proletkult) was one of the most important Party documents on the arts of the early 1920s. Prompted by Lenin's note of 8 October—see above—it not only asserted the importance of proper Party spirit in the arts but also insisted that Proletcult must work under Party supervision by "men who have been closely vetted by the Party." Proletcult was to become in effect a part of the government. The decree, moreover, included a sweeping attack on Futurists and other arts groups, which were charged with being bourgeois influenced. Particularly chilling for its future implications was the statement that if the Party had not heretofore intervened in the arts it was because the press prevented it from engaging in military affairs at the fronts devoting the necessary attention to such questions; but in the future it "must devote far more attention" to such questions.

ON THE PROLETKULTS (LETTER FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, R.C.P.)

The Central Committee of the Party and, at its direction, the Communist fraction of the last All-Russia Congress of Proletkults have adopted the following resolution:

(1) At the basis of the mutual relationships between the Proletkult and the People's Commissariat of Education there must be the closest approximation of the work of both organs, in accordance with the Resolution of the IXth Congress of the R.C.P.;

(2) The creative work of the Proletkult must form one of the components of the work the People's Commissariat of Education, the organ that is bringing about the dictatorship of the proletariat in the cultural field;

(3) In accordance with this requirement, the central organ of the Proletkult, since it takes an active part in the politico-educational work of the People's Commissariat of Education, becomes a section of the People's Commissariat of Education, subordinate to it and guided in its work by the line dictated by the People's Commissariat of Education of the Russian Communist Party;

(4) Inter-relationship of local organs: the inter-relationship of Departments of Public Education (*narobraz*) and Political Education Committees (*politprosvet*) with the Proletkults must be of the same order: local Proletkults become sub-sections within the Departments of Public Education and are guided in their work by the line laid down by the

Provincial Committees (*gubkom*) of the R.C.P. for the Provincial Departments of Public Education;

(5) The Central Committee of the R.C.P. directs the People's Commissariat of Education to create and maintain conditions that will guarantee the proletarians the possibility of free creative work in their establishments.

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party considers it necessary to offer the following elucidation to comrades in the Proletkults, and to leaders of local and Provincial Departments of Public Education and Party organisations:

The Proletkult came into being before the October Revolution. It was proclaimed an 'independent' workers' organisation, independent of the Ministry of Public Education of the Kerensky period. The October Revolution changed the perspectives. The Proletkults continued to be 'independent,' but now this was 'independence' of the Soviet regime. For this and a variety of other reasons there was an influx into the Proletkults of elements socially alien to us—petty bourgeois elements who sometimes actually gained control of the direction of the Proletkults. The Futurists, decadents, adherents of idealist philosophy hostile to Marxism, and simply drop-outs from the ranks of bourgeois publicism and philosophy somehow began to direct all the affairs of the Proletkults.

Under the guise of 'proletarian culture' the workers were offered bourgeois views in philosophy (Machism) and in the cultural field absurd, perverted tastes (Futurism) began to find favour.

Instead of assisting proletarian youth to study seriously and deepen its communist approach to all the problems of life and art, certain artists and philosophers who were essentially far-removed from Communism and hostile to it proclaimed themselves genuinely proletarian, gained control of the Proletkults and prevented the workers from setting off on the high road of free and really proletarian creativity. Under the guise of proletarian culture, certain groups and groupings of the intelligentsia thrust their own semi-bourgeois philosophical 'systems' and inventions on the progressive workers. The same anti-Marxist views that had blossomed so luxuriantly after the defeat of the 1905 Revolution and for several years (1907-12) occupied the minds of the 'social-democratic' intelligentsia, nourished during the years of reaction by God-building and various kinds of idealist philosophy—these same views in disguised forms are now the subject of attempts by anti-Marxist groups of intellectuals to find favour via the Proletkults.

If our Party has not up to now interfered in this matter, this may be explained only by the fact that it has been engaged in military affairs at the fronts, and has not therefore always been able to devote the necessary attention to these important questions. Now, when the Party is faced with the opportunity to tackle cultural-educational work more thoroughly, it must devote far more attention to questions of public education in general and the Proletkults in particular.

If our Party has not up to now interfered in this matter, this may be explained only by the fact that it has been engaged in military affairs at the fronts, and has not therefore always been able to devote the necessary attention to these important questions. Now, when the Party is faced with the opportunity to tackle cultural-educational work more thoroughly, it must devote far more attention to questions of public education in general and the Proletkults in particular.

The same elements of the intelligentsia that attempted to smuggle in their reactionary views under the guise of 'proletarian culture' are now mounting a noisy campaign against the above-mentioned decision of the Central Committee. These elements are trying to represent the Central Committee's resolution as a step that must result in a restriction of the workers' artistic creativity. This, of course, is not so. The best labour elements in the Proletkults understand entirely what motives have been guiding the Central Committee of our Party.

Not only does the Central Committee not wish to restrict the initiative of the worker intelligentsia in the field of artistic creativity, it wants, on the contrary, to create the most healthy and normal conditions for it and to give it the opportunity to be reflected fruitfully in the whole matter of artistic creativity. The Central Committee realises clearly that now that the war is drawing to an end interest in questions of artistic creativity and proletarian culture will grow more and more in the ranks of the workers. The Central Committee values and respects the progressive workers' desire to raise, in their turn, questions of the spiritually richer development of the personality, etc. The Party will do all it can to ensure that this matter really does fall into the hands of the worker intelligentsia, and that the workers' government will give the worker intelligentsia all it needs for this purpose.

From the draft instructions worked out by the People's Commissariat of Education and confirmed by the Central Committee of our Party, all interested comrades will see that complete autonomy of the reorganised workers' Proletkults in the field of artistic creativity is guaranteed. The Central Committee has given quite detailed directives on this point for action by the People's Commissariat. And the Central Committee will watch, and entrusts the Provincial Party Committees to watch, that there is no petty tutelage of the reorganised Proletkults.

At the same time, the Central Committee realises that in the field of the arts the same intellectual currents that have been exerting a disruptive influence in the Proletkults have made themselves felt up to now in the People's Commissariat of Education itself. The Central Committee will achieve the removal of these bourgeois currents from the People's Commissariat, too. The Central Committee has taken a special decision, according to which the Provincial Departments of Public Education, which by the new resolution will direct the work of the Proletkults, will be made up of men who have been closely vetted by the Party. In the coalescence of the Provincial Departments of Public Education with the Proletkults, the Central Committee sees a guarantee that the best proletarian elements hitherto united in the ranks of the Proletkults will now take the most active part in this work and therefore aid the Party in giving all the work of the People's Commissariat of Education a really proletarian character. The closest possible combination, amicable work in the ranks of our educational organisations, which must become in practice, not simply in words, the organs of a genuine, not contrived proletarian culture—these are the aims for which the Central Committee of our Party now enlists us.

James, pp. 113-114.



SOVIETIZATION OF ARMENIA

2 December 1920

The independent Armenian state had led a troubled existence. Already under pressure from Soviet Russia, the outbreak of war with Turkey and Turkish successes put it in a precarious position. On 2 December it signed an agreement with Soviet Russia which made it a Communist led Soviet Republic and, in effect, ended its independence and represented its reincorporation into the Russian-Soviet state.

AGREEMENT REGARDING THE INDEPENDENCE OF ARMENIA AND ITS CONVERSION TO A SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

On the 2nd of December 1920, the Plenipotentiary Representative of R.S.F.S.R., Comrade Legrand, on behalf of the Russian Soviet Government on the one hand, and Comrades Dro and Terterian, on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Armenia on the other, have concluded an Agreement regarding the following:

1. Armenia is declared an independent Socialist Republic.
2. Until the convention of a Congress of Soviets, Armenia shall form a Temporary Military-Revolutionary Committee which shall assume power in Armenia.
3. The Russian Soviet Government shall recognize as forming an indisputable part of the territory of S.S.R.A.: the Erivan Government with all the districts forming part of it; a part of the Kars area which guarantees it (Armenia), from a military point of view, the possession of the Djadjur-Araks railroad line; the Zengazur district of the Elizabetopol government, a part of the Kazakh district of the same government—within the limits of the Agreement of August 10—and those parts of the Tiflis Government which were in the possession of Armenia before October 28, 1920.
4. The commanders of the Armenian Army shall not be held responsible for actions committed in the ranks of the army prior to the proclamation of Soviet power in Armenia.
5. Present members of the "Dashnaktzutiun" Party and other socialist parties of Armenia shall not be subject to any repression for their membership in these parties.
6. The Military-Revolutionary Committee shall consist of five members appointed by the Communist Party and two members from the leftist "Dashnak" groups, upon agreement with the Communist Party.
7. The Russian Soviet Government shall take measures for an immediate concentration of military forces necessary for the defense of the independence of the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic.
8. Upon the signature of the present Agreement the Government of the Republic of Armenia shall be removed from power; power shall temporarily, until the arrival of the Revolutionary Committee, pass to the military command, at the head of which shall be Comrade Dro. Comrade Silyan shall be appointed the Commissar of R.S.F.S.R. to the Military Command of Armenia.

Soviet Treaty Series, p. 82.



ALLIANCE AND SEMI-UNIFICATION OF THE RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN REPUBLICS

12 December 1920

The peculiar political situation existing by 1920 whereby nominally independent states were, in fact, controlled by the same political party and leadership led to a series of treaties and agreements, which began the process of unifying the state long before the formal creation of the USSR in 1923-1924. The Ukraine was an especially important territory and this treaty provided for de facto incorporation into a single state, including the merger of many commissariats and sending Ukrainian deputies to the All-Russian Congresses of Soviets. An identical treaty was signed with Belorussia and a similar one had already been made with Azerbaijan. See also the Treaty of Union, 30 December 1922, below.

TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS OF THE
RUSSIAN SOCIALIST FEDERAL SOVIET REPUBLIC (RSFSR)
AND THE UKRAINIAN SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLIC (UKSSR)

The government of the RSFSR and the government of the UkSSR, recognizing the right of self-determination of peoples as proclaimed by the great proletarian revolution and the independence and sovereignty of the contracting parties, and conscious of the necessity of uniting their forces for the purpose of defence and in the interests of their economic structure, have decided to conclude the present treaty of alliance between the workers and peasants, for which purpose they have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The Soviet Russian government—the president of the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Georgii Vasil'evich Chicherin; and the Soviet Ukrainian government—the president of the [Ukrainian] Council of People's Commissars and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Christian Georgievich Rakovskii.

The above-mentioned plenipotentiaries, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have come to the following agreement:

I

The RSFSR and the UkSSR unite in a military and economic union.

II

Both states consider it necessary to declare that all common engagements which they may undertake in the future in regard to other states can be prefaced only upon the community of interests of the workers and peasants concluding the present treaty of alliance between their republics, and that the fact that the Ukrainian territory previously belonged to the former Russian Empire shall imply no obligation whatsoever on the part of the UkSSR.

III

For the better realization of the purpose indicated in Par. I, both governments declare the following commissariats as being henceforth unified: (1) War and Navy, (2) Supreme Council of People's Economy, (3) Foreign Trade, (4) Finance, (5) Labor, (6) Ways and Communication, and (7) Posts and Telegraphs.

IV

The united people's commissariats of both republics enter into the composition of the Sovnarkom of the RSFSR, the latter having their plenipotentiaries in the Sovnarkom of the UkSSR. These plenipotentiaries are approved and controlled by the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and Congress of Soviets.

V

The order and form of the internal administration of the unified commissariats shall be established by a special agreement between the two governments.

VI

The supervision and control over the united commissariats is effected through the All-Russian Congresses of Soviets of Workers, Peasants' and Red Army Deputies, as well as through the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The UkSSR shall send thereto her representatives in conformity with the statute of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

VII

The present treaty must be submitted for ratification by the corresponding superior legislative institutions of the two republics.

The original has been drawn up and signed in two copies, in the Russian and Ukrainian languages, at Moscow, on December 28, 1920.

Additional Order to the Regulation of the All-Russian
Congresses of Soviets

At the Congress of Soviets each of the signatory parties has the right to demand that, in regard to the non-unified commissariats, the other party shall have only advisory power.

Batsell, pp. 246-247.



"COMMUNISM IS SOVIET POWER PLUS
THE ELECTRIFICATION OF THE WHOLE COUNTRY"

22 December 1920

In December 1920 a triumphant Lenin reported to the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The first part of his speech recounted the military triumphs of the Soviet regime in the Civil War and the Polish War, and the country's current international situation. Now, he argued, the regime could turn to the pressing economic issues. He dealt first with agrarian issues and then turning to industrial development he called for vigorous measures and greater and more innovative use of machinery. He forecast a time when politics would decline in the business of congresses "and engineers and agronomists will do most of the talking." The key to this was electrification, leading to one of Lenin's most famous phrases: "Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country." In fact, the State Electrification Commission (Goelro) already was working on a general plan for electrification of the country, and Lenin's speech served also as an introduction to and endorsement of its report later in the Congress. The report on electrification was hailed not only for its economic and cultural implications, but as a harbinger of central economic planning. This has been abbreviated to include only the section on electrification (and Lenin's opening statement).

V. I. Lenin

Report on the Work

of the Council of People's Commissars

(Shouts from the hall: "Long live Comrade Lenin!" Storm of applause. An ovation.) Comrades, I have to present a report on the home and foreign policy of the government. I do not think it is the purpose of my report to give you a list of at least the most outstanding or most important laws and measures adopted by the workers' and peasants' government. Nor do I think that you would be interested in an account of the events of this period, or that it is very important that I should give one. As I see it, general conclusions should be drawn from the principal lessons we have learnt during this year, which was no less abundant in abrupt political changes than the preceding years of the revolution were. From the general lessons of this year's experience we must deduce the most urgent political and economic tasks that face us, tasks to which the Soviet government—both through the legislative acts which are being submitted for your examination and endorsement and through the sum total of its measures—at present attaches the greatest hopes and significance, and from the fulfillment of which it expects important progress in our economic development....

I now come to the last item—the question of electrification, which stands on the agenda of the Congress. You are to hear a report on this subject. I think that we are witnessing a momentous change, one which in any case marks the beginning of important successes for the Soviets. Henceforth the rostrum at All-Russia Congresses will be mounted, not only by politicians and administrators but also by engineers and agronomists. This marks the beginning of that very happy time when politics will recede into the background, when politics will be discussed less often and at shorter length, and engineers and agronomists will do most of the talking. To really proceed with the work of economic development, this custom must be initiated at the All-Russia Congress of Soviets and in all Soviets and organisations, newspapers, organs of propaganda and agitation, and all institutions, from top to bottom.

We have, no doubt, learnt politics; here we stand as firm as a rock. But things are bad as far as economic matters are concerned. Henceforth, less politics will be the best politics. Bring more engineers and agronomists to the fore, learn from them, keep an eye on their work, and turn our congresses and conferences, not into propaganda meetings but into bodies that will verify our economic achievements, bodies in which we can really learn the business of economic development.

You will hear the report of the State Electrification Commission, which was set up in conformity with the decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of February 7, 1920. On February 21, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy signed the final ordinance determining the composition of the commission, and a number of leading experts and workers, mainly from the Supreme Council of the National Economy, over a hundred of them, and also from the People's Commissariat of Railways and the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, are devoting their entire energy to this work. We have before us the results of the work of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia in the shape of this small volume which will be distributed to you today or tomorrow. I trust you will not be scared by this little volume. I think I shall have no difficulty in convincing you of the particular importance of this book. In my opinion it is the second programme of our Party. We have a Party programme which has been excellently explained by Comrades Preobrazhensky and Bukharin in the form of a book which is less voluminous, but extremely useful. That is the political programme; it is an enumeration of our objectives, an explanation of the relations between classes and masses. It must, however, also be realised that the time has come to take this road in actual fact and to measure the practical results achieved. Our Party programme must not remain solely a programme of the Party. It must become a programme of our economic development, or otherwise it will be valueless even as a programme of the Party. It must be supplemented with a second Party programme, a plan of work aimed at restoring our entire economy and raising it to the level of up-to-date technical development. Without a plan of electrification, we cannot undertake any real constructive work. When we discuss the restoration of agriculture, industry and transport, and their harmonious co-ordination, we are obliged to discuss a broad economic plan. We must adopt a definite plan. Of course, it will be a plan adopted as a first approximation. This Party programme will not be as invariable as our real Party programme is, which can be modified by Party congresses alone. No, day by day this programme will be improved, elaborated, perfected and modified, in every workshop and in every volost. We need it as a first draft, which will be submitted to the whole of Russia as a great economic plan designed for a period of not less than ten years and indicating how Russia is to be placed on the real economic basis required for communism. What was one of the most powerful incentives that multiplied our strength and our energies to a tremendous degree when we fought and won on the war front? It was the realisation of danger. Everybody asked whether it was possible that the landowners and capitalists might return to Russia. And the reply was that it was. We therefore multiplied our efforts a hundredfold, and we were victorious.

Take the economic front, and ask whether capitalism can be restored economically in Russia. We have combated the Sukharevka black market. The other day, just prior to the opening of the All-Russia Congress of Soviets, this not very pleasant institution was closed down by the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies. (*Applause.*) The Sukharevka black market has been closed but it is not that market that is so sinister. The old Sukharevka market on Sukharevskaya Square has been closed down, an act that presented no difficulty. The sinister thing is the "Sukharevka" that resides in the heart and behaviour of every petty proprietor. This is the "Sukharevka" that must be closed down. That "Sukharevka" is the basis of capitalism. While it exists, the capitalists may return to Russia and may grow stronger than we are. That must be clearly realised. It must serve as the mainspring of our work and as a condition and yardstick of our real success. While we live in a small-peasant country, there is a firmer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. That must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the cities, knows that we have not torn up the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis, of the internal enemy. The latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, that of modern large-scale production. Only electricity provides that basis.

Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country. Otherwise the country will remain a small-peasant country, and we must clearly realise that. We are weaker than capitalism, not only on the world scale, but also within the country. That is common knowledge. We have realised it, and we shall see to it that the economic basis is transformed from a small-peasant basis into a large-scale industrial basis. Only when the country has been electrified, and industry, agriculture and transport have been placed on the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, only then shall we be fully victorious.

We have already drawn up a preliminary plan for the electrification of the country; two hundred of our best scientific and technical men have worked on it. We have a plan which gives us estimates of materials and finances covering a long period of years, not less than a decade. This plan indicates how many million barrels of cement and how many million bricks we shall require for the purpose of electrification. To accomplish the task of electrification from the financial point of view, the estimates are between 1,000 and 1,200 million gold rubles. You know that we are far from being able to meet this sum from our gold reserves. Our stock of foodstuffs is not very large either. We must therefore meet the expenditure indicated in these estimates by means of concessions, in accordance with the plan I have mentioned. You will see the calculation showing how the restoration of our industry and our transport is being planned on this basis.

I recently had occasion to attend a peasant festival held in Volokolamsk Uyezd, a remote part of Moscow Gubernia, where the peasants have electric lighting. A meeting was arranged in the street, and one of the peasants came forward and began to make a speech welcoming this new event in the lives of the peasants. "We peasants were unenlightened," he said, "and now light has appeared among us, an 'unnatural light, which will light up our peasant darkness'." For my part, these words did not surprise me. Of course, to the non-Party peasant masses electric light is an "unnatural" light; but what we consider unnatural is that the peasants and workers should have lived for hundreds and thousands of years in such backwardness, poverty and oppression under the yoke of the landowners and the capitalists. You cannot emerge from this darkness very rapidly. What we must now try is to convert every electric power station we build into a stronghold of enlightenment to be used to make the masses electricity-conscious, so to speak. All should be made aware of the reason why these small electric power stations, whose numbers run into the dozens, are linked up with the restoration of industry. We have an established plan of electrification, but the fulfillment of this plan is designed to cover a number of years. We must fulfill this

plan at all costs, and the period of its fulfillment must be reduced. Here we must have the same thing as was the case with one of our first economic plans, the plan for the restoration of transport—Order No. 1042—which was designed to cover a period of five years, but has now been reduced to three and a half years because we are ahead of the schedule. To carry out the electrification plan we may need a period of ten or twenty years to effect the changes that will preclude any return to capitalism. This will be an example of rapid social development without precedent anywhere in the world. The plan must be carried out at all costs, and its deadline brought nearer.

This is the first time that we have set about economic work in such a fashion that, besides separate plans which have arisen in separate sections of industry as, for instance, in the transport system and have been brought into other branches of industry, we now have an all-over plan calculated for a number of years. This is hard work, designed to bring about the victory of communism.

It should, however, be realised and remembered that we cannot carry out electrification with the illiterates we have. Our commission will endeavour to stamp out illiteracy—but that is not enough. It has done a good deal compared with the past, but it has done little compared with what has to be done. Besides literacy, we need cultured, enlightened and educated working people; the majority of the peasants must be made fully aware of the tasks awaiting us. This programme of the Party must be a basic book to be used in every school. You will find in it, in addition to the general plan of electrification, separate plans for every district of Russia. Thus every comrade who goes to the provinces will have a definite scheme of electrification for his district, a scheme for transition from darkness and ignorance to a normal life. And, comrades, you can and must compare the theses you have been presented with, elaborate and check them on the spot; you must see to it that when the question "What is communism?" is asked in any school and in any study circle, the answer should contain not only what is written in the Party programme but should also say how we can emerge from the state of ignorance.

Our best men, our economic experts, have accomplished the task we set them of drawing up a plan for the electrification of Russia and the restoration of her economy. We must now see to it that the workers and peasants should realise how great and difficult this task is, how it must be approached and tackled.

We must see to it that every factory and every electric power station becomes a centre of enlightenment; if Russia is covered with a dense network of electric power stations and powerful technical installations, our communist economic development will become a model for a future socialist Europe and Asia. (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

Lenin, Vol. 31, pp. 487, 513-517.



THEATER AND THE ARTS—A REPORT ON THEIR DEVELOPMENT UNDER WAR COMMUNISM

31 December 1920

This report of the Commissariat of Education surveyed policy and development in all the arts fields and was part of a larger report on the work of the Commissariat. It was given at a Party meeting called to review the work of the Commissariat of Education as part of an effort at reorganization. The meeting was held in Moscow from 31 December 1920 to 4 January 1921.

ART IN SOVIET RUSSIA

(From the Report of the Commissariat of Education)

In Tsarist Russia the enjoyment of art in all its forms was exclusively the privilege of the ruling classes. The "nation" only got wretched crumbs as a substitute. Knowing what a powerful means of agitation the theatre is for the masses, the police State kept a vigilant eye upon the so-called people's theatres, fencing them round with a censorship and entirely subjecting them to the police authorities. Education, both musical, theatrical and artistic, was quite inaccessible to the masses.

It became the aim of the Soviet Government to make art accessible to all, to bind it up in the life of the laboring masses, to put it on a new foundation so that it should draw new forces from among the proletariat.

At the same time, while working persistently towards the creation of a new, purely proletarian art, we endeavored to familiarize the proletariat with the best achievements of former art.

At the start, in the realization of this task, we met with our principal difficulty, which was the lack of talented forces in the art world who could understand the tasks confronting Soviet Russian art and could see them carried out. Only recently have we been able to make progress among the art workers and they have given us a number of prominent men and helped us to put art on a sound basis.

The Theatrical World. Much has been done in democratizing the theatre. The repertoire of the biggest theatres has been greatly improved; in this connection, we are still working to acquaint the workers with the best models of the classic theatre. By a recent regulation, a uniform price for seats at all theatres has been established; this measure is a step towards the complete abolition of all pay for theatrical shows. Considering the theatre as an instrument of education and propaganda, we should make it free of charge, as we do the school. Parallel with the classical repertoire, there is slowly coming up a new revolutionary repertoire, which we are endeavoring to foster by means of competition in the studios and workshops.

On the other hand, among the working masses themselves, such a tremendous striving towards theatrical creation is evident that it has proved extraordinarily difficult to manage and direct all the theatres and groups that sprang up so naturally.

The Musical World. In the musical field our path was generally the same as in the theatrical sphere, i.e., we aimed at drawing the wide labor masses to appreciate works of genuine musical art; extensive musical education was given and wide facilities for the production of new music, growing out of the proletariat itself and corresponding to the spirit of the times.

We are accomplishing the first task by creating a number of State orchestras from our best orchestral forces. The Musical Department has formed five large symphony orchestras, about fifty small orchestras and two orchestras of national instruments. These orchestras during 1919 and the beginning of 1920 gave in the provinces about 170 symphonic concerts from chosen works of classical music, 70 concert-meetings and over 170 concerts of various kinds. These concerts enjoy invariable success among the workers and Red Army men.

The work in the field of musical education is conducted along two lines; the musical education of the wide masses is attained by the establishment of a network of national musical schools, whose number at the present time is 75 (before the Revolution there was one); on the other hand the Musical Department of the Commissariat of Education is working extensively in the schools and children's homes. Thus in Petrograd up to 500 schools and 600 children's homes have included in their curricula the systematic teaching of music. Choir singing has been introduced in 80 per cent of all the schools; the practice of music in 60 per cent; the nurseries all have a musical staff attached to them.

The second line is the creation of professional music schools, the number of which is already 200, with an attendance of 26,000. The percentage of worker and peasant students in the national schools is 70 per cent, in the vocational schools of the first and second grades about 55 per cent, and in the higher musical schools it is not more than 30 per cent, which is naturally to be explained by the fact that a corresponding cadre of workers and peasants has not yet been prepared for the high schools.

Apart from this the Musical Department is engaged in the production of musical instruments; it is at present giving most attention to the revival of the noblest of Russian national instruments,—the "Dombra." The nationalization of instruments and of music enabled the Musical Department to adopt measures for the correct distribution of this supply and to take stock of especially valuable old instruments, of which a collection has been formed. Thus we possess the only collection of the famous Stradivarius violins in the whole world; these are not hidden in the museums but are given, on competition, to the use of the best violinists, who are obliged to let the masses hear good execution on the famous instruments.

The problem of realizing a new proletarian music is, of course, not going to be decided by means of decrees or by personal effort. In this regard our hope is with the proletarian youth who are training in our musical schools, and every spark of talent is supported by us by all possible means.

Fine Arts Department. This department carries on extensive work of practical nature. Having made the industrial principle the basis of its work, it has spread a wide network of workshops, both of a purely artistic type and of industrial art where on the one hand it strives in general to develop the artistic taste of the working masses and awaken talent amongst them, and on the other hand directly introduces the principles of art and style in industrial work. With the latter aim, work-shops have been set up for chintz work, wood-work, stone-work, printing, pottery, and toy-making, etc. There are 35 such workshops in different parts of Russia. The total number of people in these workshops is 7,000.

Besides this the Department is organizing, both in Moscow and in the provinces, art exhibitions whose aim it is to acquaint the workers with all the tendencies of art in general. That fine art is not declining with us is proved clearly not only by the productivity, but by the quality of the work in our porcelain factories, whose productions are highly valued abroad. They now employ widely the watchwords and emblems of the times in their work. The State has given full freedom of development to all tendencies in the sphere of art, for it believes that its ever-growing contact with the working masses serves as the surest regulator for putting art on a firm and true foundation. The occasionally apparent preponderance of one tendency in art over another finds its explanation in the fact that energy and impetus is at times displayed by young art groups, which discover enthusiastically new ways or achievements. We regard this calmly and without apprehension. We are sure that the new artist, the proletarian-artist who has graduated from our art schools, will at the proper moment deliberately sweep away all that is superfluous and superficial; he will use all that is valuable and will give to the world an art that will be unequalled for its vividness and expressiveness.

Museum Department. One of the most brilliant pages in our art work is the activity of the Commissariat for Education in the sphere of the safe-guarding of the monuments of art and of the past.

Since the Revolution, our museum collections have been growing all the time. All the treasures that had been hidden from the eyes of the masses in palaces and manors have been collected and placed in the museums, being the property of all the workers. The network of museums in the provinces is growing with unusual rapidity. From 31 at the beginning of the Revolution their number is now 119, and practically every day brings news of the opening of a new museum. The treasures of the Hermitage have grown by half as much again. The museums of the capitals have been rearranged, redistributed and supplied with

experienced guides, who read lectures and conduct the excursions of workers and peasants. Visits to the museums have grown numerically and have changed still more qualitatively; workers and peasants are overfilling the museums. The attendance at the museums, especially in the provinces, is hard to define. It is sufficient, however, to point out that according to a rough report, the museums of Moscow alone, during 1919, had over 500,000 visitors. A number of country manors have been wholly transformed into museums, which vividly illustrate the life and surroundings in the Ducal Estates of the XVIII and XIX centuries. Not less intensive is the work of restoration. The cleansing of ancient icons has enriched our collection of very valuable productions of Russian icon-painting.

In spite of all the obstacles and difficulties, the Museum Department of the Educational Commissariat, slowly but splendidly, is working to restore the Kremlin and the Yaroslav Mosques.

Finally, archeological excavation has not ceased for a moment and the study of our past is making good headway. Archeological groups of amateurs are being formed in the provinces, carrying on excavation and research under the guidance of scientific leaders.

Soviet Russia, Vol. 4, No. 12 (19 March 1921), pp. 288-290, with modification.



"OUT OF SCHOOL" EDUCATION—A REPORT

31 December 1920

This was part of the overall report on the Commissariat of Education referred to in the preceding headnote. Eradication of illiteracy was a major goal of the Soviet government as was raising the overall educational level. The name of the Commissariat is variously translated as Education, Public Education, and Enlightenment.

OUT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION

(From the Report of the Commissariat of Education)

From the very first day of its existence the Commissariat for Public Education was confronted by the problem of out-of-school education or, according to the present terminology, of political-education work.

We have to deal with a country in which the percentage of illiterates is enormous, a country which it was the policy of the Tsarist regime to keep in darkness and ignorance, a country which was in the power of most fanatical prejudices.

The old Out-of-School Department, now the Political-Educational Department of the Commissariat of Public Education, faced the problem of organizing public libraries, schools of all types for adults, clubs, people's houses, excursions, etc. The task was to broaden this activity and give it a communist direction.

In the field of library work the results were that in 32 provinces there were 13,500 libraries in 1919 and 26,278 libraries in 1920.

The number of libraries taken over by the Soviet Government was 11,904; of these there were 8,229 school libraries. In 1919, the number of libraries amounted to 25,562; the number of school libraries being 11,467. It should be pointed out that these figures are in no way sufficient to show the growth of the libraries, because they do not include a great number of establishments of the library type which have grown up in the Red Army, nor the libraries organized by the trade unions for their members, nor the small libraries of a

primary type serve as a basis for the so-called reading huts, the number of which amounts to about 40,000 on the whole territory of Soviet Russia.

Very characteristic are the figures showing the growth of the library matter in Petrograd:

Before the Revolution there were 23 libraries with 140,000 volumes; after the Revolution 59 libraries with 865,000 volumes.

After the Revolution 59 libraries with 865,000 volumes.

Further, the Out-of-School Department was engaged with the work of organizing schools of different types for adults.

In 1919, there were registered by the Out-of-School Department 7,134 schools for adults and 101 people's universities.

A special task was the work of liquidating illiteracy. By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars an Extraordinary Commission for the Eradication of Illiteracy was created.

Here are some figures on the number of illiterates in Russia. There were registered:

<i>Province</i>	<i>Illiterates</i>
Saratov	2,400,000
Viatka	2,000,000
Homel	1,500,000
Riazan	1,200,000
Penza	300,000
Vologda	500,000
Pskov	600,000
Kazan	500,000
Nizhni-Novgorod	440,000
Ural	75%
Altai	78%
Simbirsk	80%
Tiumen	93%
Astrakhan	93%

These figures are eloquent of the difficulties and the vast scale of the work to be carried out in this field.

According to the plans of the Central Commission, courses are organized all over Russia for the preparation of a staff of teachers for the eradication of illiteracy.

In the province of Cherepoviets three-day county course-conferences were held, which were attended by 350 school workers; then two-day volost course-conferences, which were attended by 10,000 persons, and finally special instructors' control courses which were attended by 5,000 persons. Information was received about the organization of courses in the provinces of Archangelsk, Astrakhan, Vitebsk, Vologda, Homel, Ekaterinburg, Kaluga, Kursk, Ivanovo-Vosnessensk, Moscow, Novgorod, Orel, Olonets, Orenburg, Penza, Samara, Saratov, North-Dvina, Simbirsk, Uralsk, Ufa, Cheliabinsk, Tiumen. (This information is for the period up to the middle of the summer 1920.)

The work of the Commission has given good results. The pace at which the work is being carried on is shown by the following figures on attendance at the courses for liquidation of illiteracy during a three month period:

In the province of Tambov by 40,000 people;

In the province of Cherepoviets by 57,807 people;

In the province of Ivanovo-Vosnessensk by 50,000 people.

In Petrograd by 25,000 people.

All over the Republic an enormous number of literacy schools have been opened; 10,000 schools were opened by the middle of Spring in the province of Cherepoviets alone;

in the province of Tambov—6,000 schools, which were attended by 48,000 pupils in the month of April; in the province of Simbirsk—6,000 schools, in the province of Kazan—5,000 schools, which were attended by 150,000 pupils; in the province of Viatka 4,000 persons were attending the literacy schools, even before the decree was issued.

The information received from different cities furnishes the following picture: In Petrograd there are 500 school establishments with 1 or 2 schools in each; 4,000 persons have already passed these schools and 25,000 more are attending them at present. A great number of schools were opened in Moscow with 22,000 attending. There are 25 schools in Kronstadt, 190 schools in Kaluga, 150 in Tula, 130 in Kosmodemiansk, 65 in Uriev-Polsk, 45 in Kustanay, 40 in Gzhatsk, 20 in Zhidrinsk, 20 in Romen, 300 in Berdiansk, 180 in Archangelsk, 190 in Omsk, 70 in Yelaguba, 30 in New-Omsk, 12 in Cheliabinsk, 15 in Ekaterinodar, 20 in Odessa.

It is interesting to point out the compulsory measures which are practices in different parts of the Republic: In the province of Kazan, those who refuse to attend the literacy schools are subject to 5,000 roubles fine, to 3 months of compulsory labor and the loss of their food cards. In Petrograd those who refuse to attend the schools are reduced to a lower food category, they are tried in a people's court and excluded from the trade union. In the province of Tambov a signature for an illiterate has no validity.

Primers are printed in Russian, Polish, German, Tartar, Yiddish, and in the other languages of the peoples living in Russia, and a great number of copies are published.

According to our information, 2,700,000 citizens attended the schools during 1920.

But in order to carry out all this work, it was necessary to have a staff of Out-of-School education workers, of whom there were very few in Russia.

The Political-Educational Department developed its work in this direction, and by the end of 1919 a staff of 6,200 workers had been prepared. The number of courses was 65.

In order to complete the picture of the work carried out by the Department for Out-of-School Education, it is necessary to add the network of people's houses and clubs, which is continually increasing, covering the whole country, and the enormous number of lectures, concerts, meetings and debates which are held daily over the whole territory of the Republic.

Soviet Russia, Vol. 4, No. 12 (19 March 1921), pp. 290-291, with modifications.

2 THE YEAR 1921

LENIN AUTHORIZES THE INVASION OF GEORGIA

14 February 1921

After bringing both Azerbaijan and Armenia under Soviet control, the Bolshevik leaders turned their attention to Georgia. A strong and stable government had taken root in Georgia and enjoyed general popular support. Communist efforts to overthrow it had been unsuccessful. Soviet leaders in the Caucasus, especially Ordzhonikidze, who was effectively in charge in the region, advocated a direct invasion to support a staged Communist uprising. Lenin, however, hesitated, fearing both the degree of popular support for the Georgian government and Western opinion. Finally he relented and sent the following telegram permitting the Eleventh Army—stationed in Azerbaijan and Armenia—"to give active support to the uprising in Georgia." This was transmitted with great secrecy and was acted upon immediately—the Red Army invaded Georgia on 16 February.

Copy
Top Secret
14/II-1921

The Central Committee is inclined to allow the Eleventh Army to give active support to the uprising in Georgia and to occupy Tiflis provided that international norms are observed, and on condition that all members of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Eleventh Army, after a thorough review of all the information, guarantee success. We give warning that we are having to go without bread for want of transport and that we shall therefore not let you have a single locomotive or railway truck. We are compelled to transport nothing from the Caucasus but grain and oil. We require an immediate answer by direct line signed by all members of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Eleventh Army and likewise by Smilga, Gitis, Trifonov and Frumkin. No decisive steps are to be taken before receipt of our answer to telegrams from all these persons.

On behalf of the Central Committee, Krestinskii
"Sklianskii"

(Typewritten, signed by
Comrade Sklianskii)

Comrade Sklianskii. Have this encyphered at once *ultra-carefully, in your own presence*, keeping the original. Send it to *Smilga*, making sure that he is at the receiver *in person* and decyphers it *himself* (tell the C.-in-C. about it without showing it to him).

Stalin will send it himself to Ordzhonikidze.

Triple caution and the utmost caution, then. It is on your responsibility.

Lenin

(In Comrade Lenin's handwriting)

Return all this.

(Written by Comrade Lenin)

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GOSPLAN

22 February 1921

Central planning was an important part of Bolshevik thinking about the economy. Gosplan, established in 1922, became one of the most important, usually the main, planning agency for the Soviet economy.

DECREE ON THE GENERAL STATE PLANNING COMMISSION (GOSPLAN)

February 22, 1921

1. A General Planning Commission, attached to the Council of Labor and Defense (STO), is being created for elaboration of a single, all-embracing State economic plan on the basis of the electrification plan approved by the VIII Congress of Soviets, and for the general supervision of the realization of the aforesaid plan.

The economic undertakings of the first order, in particular those which should be accomplished at the earliest date, specifically, during 1921, should be worked out in minute detail by the General Planning Commission, or its sub-commission, with full consideration of the existing economic conditions.

2. The functions of the State General Planning Commission are:

(a) The working out of a single general State economic plan as well as the means and order for its fulfillment;

(b) To examine and co-ordinate with the general state plan the industrial programs and planning suggestions of the various departments and regional economic organizations in all branches of the national economy; and to establish a priority of tasks;

(c) To work out general state measures for developing the knowledge and organizing the research necessary for putting the plan of state economy into practice, and for employing and training the necessary personnel;

(d) To work out measures for acquainting the general public with the plan for the national economy, the means for its fulfillment and the forms for the corresponding organization of labor.

3. The State General Planning Commission, in carrying out its functions, is entitled to communicate directly with all higher governmental and central establishments and institutions of the Republic.

4. Commissariats, regional, and local institutions are obliged to comply with all requests by the State General Planning Commission for materials and information, and also to provide necessary explanations through responsible employees.

5. All planning suggestions connected with problems of national economy, originating in the commissariats and the departments, are to be submitted to the State General Planning Commission for examination and co-ordination with the state general plan.

6. The Presidium and the members of the State General Planning Commission are appointed by the Council of Labor and Defense. The Chairman of the State General Planning Commission has the right to communicate directly with the President of the Council of Labor and Defense.

7. In carrying out its duties, the State General Planning Commission has its own staff or employees. Moreover, the Commission is permitted to enlist the services of individual specialists for permanent or temporary work in the Commission and also to authorize separate work on a piece-work wage basis.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars
Lenin

THE WORKERS' OPPOSITION

February-March 1921

*The Workers' Opposition developed in 1919-1920 out of discontent, especially among trade union leaders, with various party policies: the use of pre-1917 managerial and technical specialists, the loss of workers' control in the factories, the declining authority of the trade unions, and the growth of party bureaucracy and authoritarianism. They also were concerned that the party was losing touch with its proletarian base. The two most prominent early spokesmen were veteran Bolsheviks and trade union leaders A. G. Shliapnikov and Iu. Kh. Lutovinov. What had been a general tendency coalesced into an organized faction between the Ninth Party Conference in November 1920 and the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921. The adherence of Alexandra Kollontai to the group in January 1921 brought them a more vigorous spokesman, one who could organize their various grievances and views into a coherent program. The result was *The Workers Opposition*, printed at Kollontai's own expense—the party refused to publish it—as a pamphlet for distribution to delegates to the Tenth Congress and which is given here. In Kollontai's hands the *Workers' Opposition* issues were elevated into broader issues about the evolving nature of the party and the fate of the revolution. The *Workers' Opposition* put forth these ideas at the Congress—see the three contending trade union resolutions, 14 March below—emphasizing the connection between manual labor and party membership, calling for the expulsion of “careerists” from the party and demanding freedom of discussion for party members. Indeed, their charge was the extremely serious one that accused the leadership of no longer being in touch with the needs and aspirations of the workers. At the same time, however, they still defended the monopoly of power by the party itself. Despite some ability to rally the extensive grassroots worker discontent and disillusionment with the party they were easily defeated by Lenin and effectively suppressed during the next year. Their appearance and demands, however, probably contributed to Lenin's resolution on party unity—see 16 March below—which is often considered one of the most important documents in the development of the Communist Party. The issues the *Workers' Opposition* raised had far-reaching significance and were important for Communist and labor parties elsewhere. The introduction to the English language edition, put out by the Industrial Workers of the World in 1922, argued that the Russian revolution was “not the property of any certain group or party,” that criticism of Bolshevik policies was “as much the business of revolutionary workers in America as anywhere else,” and that Kollontai showed that “Lenin, Trotsky and Zinoviev...were wrong all the time in trying to solve the social problem from the top downward.” The issues raised by the *Workers' Opposition* were fundamental ones for a transforming revolutionary movement and for the future Soviet Union, both in the policy disputes of the 1920's and in the post-Staline efforts at reform. The pamphlet is a bibliographic rarity and is reproduced here in full.*

Alexandra Kollontai
The Workers' Opposition

What is the Workers' Opposition?

What is the “Workers' Opposition?” Is it necessary on behalf of our party and the worldwide workers' revolution to welcome its existence, or is it just the contrary, a harmful phenomenon, dangerous “politically” as comrade Trotsky just recently stated in one of his speeches on the trade union question? In order to answer these questions which are agitating and perturbing many of our fellow workers, it is necessary to make clear:

1. Who enters into the Workers' Opposition, and how has it originated?

2. Where is the root of the controversy between the leading comrades of our party centers and the Workers' Opposition?

It is very significant—and to this must be drawn the attention of our central bodies—that the Workers' Opposition is composed of the most advanced part of our class-organized proletarian communists. The opposition consists almost exclusively of members of the trade unions, and this fact is attested by the signatures of those who side with the opposition under the theses on the role of industrial unions. Who are these members of the trade unions? Workers, that part of the advanced guard of the Russian proletariat which has borne on its shoulders all the difficulties of the revolutionary struggle, and which did not dissolve itself in the work of state administration and lose contact with the laboring masses, but on the contrary, remained closely connected with them. To remain a member in the union, to preserve the close vital contact with one's union, and hence, with the workers of one's industry, through all these stormy years, when the center of social and political life has been shifted away from the unions, is not at all an easy and simple task. Foamy waves of the revolution have caught and carried far away from the unions the best, the strongest and the most active elements of the industrial proletariat, throwing one to the military front, another into the Soviet institutions, and seating a third at desks covered with green office table cloth and heaps of office papers, books, estimates, and projects.

The unions have been depopulated. And only workers imbued with the strongest proletarian spirit, the real blossom of the rising revolutionary class, remained immune to the dissipating influence of authority, of petty ambition and high positions in Soviet bureaucracy. They still stay spiritually welded together with the masses of the workers, that lowest stratum of society from whom they themselves came, an organic connection which could not be severed even by the highest Soviet positions.

As soon as the intensity of the struggle on the fronts diminished, and the pendulum of life swung on the side of economic reconstruction, these representatives, inveterate proletarians in spirit, the most luminous and staunchest of their own class, rapidly discarded their military garb, gave up their office work in the military establishments, in order to answer the silent call of their comrades, the millions of Russian workers who even in Soviet Russia drudge out their shamefully miserable existence.

Through their class instinct, these comrades standing at the head of the Workers' Opposition became conscious of the fact that there was something wrong: they understood that even though during these three years we have created the Soviet institutions and reaffirmed the principles of the workers' republic, yet the working class, as a class, as a self-contained social unit with identical class aspirations, tasks, interests, and, hence, with a uniform, consistent, clear-cut policy, becomes an ever less important factor in the affairs of the Soviet republic. Ever less does it lend color to the measures promulgated by its own government; ever less does it direct the policy and influence the work and the trend of thought of the central authorities. During the first period of the revolution, who would dare to speak of the "upper" and the "lower" strata? Masses, namely, the laboring masses, and the leading party centers were all in one. All aspirations that were borne of life and struggle at that time found their most exact reflection in the most clearly defined and scientifically grounded formula of the leading party centers. There was no line drawn between the "upper" and the "lower" strata and there could be none. At present, however, this division does exist, and there is no agitation or intimidation strong enough to eradicate the mass conviction that there has grown up a quite new peculiar social layer, that of the soviet and "upper" party elements.

The members of the trade unions, the existing nucleus of the Workers' Opposition have understood this fact, or rather, sensed it by their healthy class instinct. First, they found it

necessary to come into close contact with the rank and file, enter into their class organizations, the unions, which, less than any other institution have come under the destroying influence of foreign, non-proletarian elements, viz: the peasant and bourgeois elements, which by adapting themselves to the Soviet regime deform our Soviet institutions and divert our policy from clearly defined class channels into the morass of "adaptation."

Thus, the Workers' Opposition consists of proletarians closely connected with machine or mine, who are a part and parcel of the working class.

The Workers' Opposition, moreover, is wonderful in that it has no prominent leaders. It originated as any healthy, inevitable, class-founded movement would originate—from the depths of the laboring masses. It sprouted from deep roots simultaneously in all corners of Soviet Russia, when the appearance of the Workers' Opposition in the large centers was not even heard of.

"We had no idea whatever of the fact that in Moscow controversies are taking place," said one delegate from Siberia to one of the Miners' congresses, "and yet questions similar to yours have been agitating our minds also." Behind the Workers' Opposition there stand the proletarian masses, or, to be more exact, the Workers' Opposition is the class-uniform, class-conscious and class-consistent part of our industrial proletariat—that part of it which considers it impossible to substitute the great creative power of the proletariat in the process of building communist economy by the formal label of the dictatorship of the working class.

The higher we go up the ladder of the Soviet and party hierarchy, the fewer adherents to the Opposition we find. The deeper we penetrate into the masses the more response do we find to the program of the Workers' Opposition. This is very significant, and very important. This must be taken into consideration by the directing centers of our party. If the masses go away from the "upper" elements; if there appears a break, a crack, between the directing centers and the "lower" elements, that means that there is something wrong with the "upper" elements, particularly when the masses are not silent, but think, act, move, and defend themselves and their own slogans.

The "upper" elements may divert the masses from the straight road of history which leads toward communism only when the masses are mute, obedient, and when they passively and credulously follow their leaders. So it was in 1914, at the beginning of the World War, when the workers believed their leaders and decided: "The instinctive feeling of protest against the war deceives us; it is necessary to be silent, to stifle that feeling and obey the superiors." But when the masses are in turmoil, criticize their leaders, and use their own brains; when they stubbornly vote against their beloved leaders, quite often suppressing the feeling of personal sympathy towards them; then the matter assumes a serious turn, and it is the task of the party not to conceal the controversy, not to nick-name the Opposition with unfounded and meaningless epithets, but to ponder seriously over the whole matter and find out where the root of the evil is, where the root of the controversy is, what it is that the working class, the bearer of communism and its only creator, wants.

And thus the Workers' Opposition is the advanced part of the proletariat which has not severed the ties with the laboring masses organized into unions, and which has not scattered itself in the soviet institutions.

The Root of the Controversy

Before making clear what the cause is of the ever widening break between the "Workers' Opposition" and the official point of view held by our directing centers, it is necessary to call attention to two facts:

(1) The Workers' Opposition sprang from the depths of the industrial proletariat of Soviet Russia, and it is an outgrowth not only of the unbearable conditions of life and labor

in which seven million of the industrial workers find themselves, but is also a product of vacillation, inconsistencies, and outright deviations in our Soviet policy from the clearly expressed class-consistent principles of the communist program.

(2) The Opposition did not originate in some particular center, was not a fruit of personal strife and controversy, but, on the contrary, covers the whole extent of Soviet Russia and meets with a resonant response.

At present there prevails an opinion that the whole root of the controversy arising between the Workers' Opposition and the numerous currents noticeable among the leaders consists exclusively in the difference of opinions regarding the problems that confront the trade unions. This, however, is not true. The break goes deeper. Representatives of the Opposition are not always able to clearly express and define it, but as soon as some vital question of the reconstruction of our republic is touched upon, controversies arise concerning a whole series of cardinal economic and political questions.

For the first time the two different points of view, as they are expressed by the leaders of our party and the representatives of our class-organized workers, found their reflection at the Ninth Congress of our party, when that body was discussing the question: "Collective versus personal management in the industry." At that time there was no opposition from a well formed group, but it is very significant that collective management was favored by all the representatives of the trade unions, while opposed to it were all the leaders of our party, who are accustomed to appraise all events from the institutional angle. They require a great deal of shrewdness and skill to placate the socially heterogeneous and the sometimes politically hostile aspirations of the different social groups of the population as expressed by proletarians, peasant smallholders, and bourgeoisie in the person of specialists, and pseudo-specialists of all kinds and degrees.

Why was it that none but the unions stubbornly defended the principle of collective management, even without being able to adduce scientific arguments in favor of it; and why was it that the specialists' supporters at the same time defended the "one man management?" The reason is that in this controversy, though both sides emphatically denied that there was a question of principle involved, two historically irreconcilable points of view had clashed. The "one man management" is a product of the individualist conception of the bourgeois class. The "one man management" is in principle an unrestricted, isolated, free will of one man, disconnected from the collective.

This idea finds its reflection in all spheres of human endeavor—beginning with the appointment of a sovereign for the state and ending with a sovereign director of the factory. This is the supreme wisdom of bourgeois thought. The bourgeoisie do not believe in the power of a collective body. They like only to whip the masses into an obedient flock, and drive them wherever their unrestricted will desires.

The working class and its spokesmen, on the contrary, realize that the new communist aspirations can be attained only through the collective creative efforts of the workers themselves. The more the masses are developed in the expression of their collective will and common thought the quicker and more complete will be the realization of working class aspirations, for it will create a new, homogeneous, unified, perfectly arranged communist industry. Only those who are directly bound to industry can introduce into it animating innovations.

Rejection of a principle—the principle of collective management in the control of industry—was a tactical compromise on behalf of our party, an act of adaptation. It was, moreover, an act of deviation from that class policy which we so zealously cultivated and defended during the first phase of the revolution.

Why did this happen? How did it happen that our party, matured and tempered in the struggle of the revolution, was permitted to be carried away from the direct road in order

to journey along the round-about path of adaptation, formerly condemned severely and branded as "opportunism."

The answer to this question we shall give later. Meanwhile we shall turn to the question: how did the Workers' Opposition form and develop?

The Ninth Congress (Russian Communist Party) was held in the spring. During the summer the Opposition did not assert itself. Nothing was heard about it during the stormy debates that took place at the Second Congress of the Communist International, but deep at the bottom there was taking place an accumulation of experience, of critical thought. The first expression of this process, incomplete at the time, was at the party conference, in September, 1920. For a time the thought preoccupied itself largely with rejections and criticism. The Opposition had no well formulated proposals of its own. But it was obvious that the party was entering into a new phase of its life. Within its ranks a ferment was at work; signifying that the "lower" elements demand freedom of criticism, loudly proclaiming that bureaucracy strangles them and leaves no freedom for activity, or for manifestation of initiative. The leaders of the party understood this undercurrent and through Comrade Zinoviev made many verbal promises as to freedom of criticism, widening of the scope of self-activity for the masses, the need to combat bureaucratic deformations, punishment of leaders deviating from the principles of democracy, etc. A great deal was said, and said well; but from words to deeds there is a considerable distance. The September conference, together with Zinoviev's speech which promised much, has changed nothing either in the party itself or in the life of the masses. The root from which the Opposition sprouts, was not destroyed. Down at the bottom a growth of inarticulate dissatisfaction, criticism, and independence was taking place.

This inarticulate ferment was noted even by the party leaders, where it quite unexpectedly generated sharp controversies. It is significant that in the central party bodies sharp controversies arose concerning the part that must be played by the trade unions. This, however, is only natural.

At present this subject of controversy between the Opposition and the party leaders, while not being the only one, is still the cardinal point of our whole domestic policy.

Long before the Workers' Opposition had appeared with its theses and formed that basis on which, in its opinion, the dictatorship of the proletariat must rest in the sphere of industrial reconstruction, the leaders in the party had sharply disagreed in their appraisal of the part that is to be played by the working class organizations regarding the latter's participation in the reconstruction of industries on a communist basis. The Central Committee of the party split into groups. Comrade Lenin stood in opposition to Trotsky, while Bukharin took the middle ground.

Only at the Eighth Soviet Congress and immediately after did it become obvious that within the party itself there was a united group kept together primarily by the theses of principles concerning the trade unions. This group, the Opposition, having no great theoreticians, and in spite of a most resolute resistance from the most popular leaders of the party, was growing strong and spreading all over laboring Russia. Was it so only in Petrograd and Moscow? Not at all! Even from the Donets basin, the Ural Mountains, Siberia, and a number of other industrial centers came reports to the Central Committee that there also the Workers' Opposition was forming and acting. It is true that not everywhere does the Opposition find itself in complete accord on all points with the workers of Moscow. At times there is much indefiniteness, pettiness, and absurdity in the expressions, demands and motives of the Opposition, while even the cardinal points may differ; yet there is everywhere one unalterable point—and this is the question: Who shall develop the creative powers in the sphere of economic reconstruction? Shall it be purely class organs directly connected by vital ties with the industries—that is, shall industrial unions do the

work of reconstruction—or shall it be left to the Soviet machine which is separated from direct vital industrial activity and is mixed in its composition? This is the root of the break. The Workers' Opposition defends the first principle, while the leaders of the party, whatever might be their own differences on various secondary matters, are in complete accord on the cardinal point and defend the second principle.

What does this mean?

This means that our party lives through its first serious crisis of the revolutionary period, and that the Opposition is not to be driven away by such a cheap name as "syndicalism," but that all comrades must consider this in all seriousness. Who is right—the leaders, or the working masses endowed with the healthy class instinct?

Crisis in the Party

Before considering the basic points of the controversy between the leaders of our Party and the Workers' Opposition, it is necessary to find an answer to the question: How could it happen that our party—formerly strong, mighty, and invincible because of its clear-cut and firm class policy—began to deviate from its program?

The dearer the Communist Party is to us just because it has made such a resolute step forward on the road to the liberation of workers from the yoke of capital, the less right we have to close our eyes to the mistakes of leading centers.

The power of the party must lie in the ability of our leading centers to detect the problems and tasks that confronted the workers, and to pick up the tendencies, which they have been able to direct so that the masses might conquer one more of the historical positions. So it was in the past, but it is no longer so at present. Our party not only reduces its speed but ever oftener "wisely" looks back and asks: "Have we not gone too far? Is this not the time to call a halt? Is it not wiser to be more cautious, and to avoid daring experiments unseen in the whole of the history."

What was it that produced this "wise caution" (particularly expressed in the distrust of the leading party centers toward the economic industrial abilities of the labor unions)—caution that has lately overwhelmed all our centers. Where is the cause?

If we begin diligently to search for the cause of the arising controversy in our party, it becomes clear that the party is passing through a crisis which was brought about by three fundamental causes.

The first main basic cause is the distressful environment in which our party must work and act. The Russian Communist Party must build communism and carry into life its program: (1) an environment of complete destruction and breakdown of the economic structure; (2) the face of the never diminishing ruthless pressure of the imperialist states and white guards; (3) in a backward country, where the working class must by itself realize communism, create new communist forms of economy despite a preponderant peasant population, where the necessary economic prerequisites for socialization of production and distribution are lacking, and where capitalism has not been able as yet to complete the full cycle of its development (from the unlimited struggle of competition of the first stages of capitalism to its highest form—to the regulation of production by capitalist unions—the trusts).

It is quite natural that all these factors hinder the practical realization of our program (particularly in its essential part—in the reconstruction of industries on the new basis) and inject into our Soviet economic policy diverse influences and a lack of uniformity.

Out of this basic cause follow the two others. First of all, the economic backwardness of Russia and the domination of the peasantry within its boundaries create that diversity, and inevitably detract the practical policy of our party from the clear-cut class direction, consistent in principle and theory.

Any party standing at the head of a heterogeneous Soviet state is compelled to consider the aspirations of peasants with their petty-bourgeois inclinations and resentments towards communism, as well as lend ear to the numerous petty bourgeois elements, remnants of the former capitalists in Russia, to all kinds of traders, middlemen, petty officials, etc., who have very rapidly adapted themselves to the Soviet institutions and occupy responsible positions in the centers, appear in the capacity of agents of different commissariats, etc. No wonder that Tsurupa, the People's Commissar of Supplies, at the Eighth Congress quoted figures which showed of those that in the service of the Commissariat of Supplies, 17 per cent were workers, 13 per cent peasants, less than 20 per cent specialists, and that of the remaining, more than 50 per cent were "tradesmen, salesmen, and similar people, in the majority even illiterate." (Tsurupa's own words.) In Tsurupa's opinion there is a proof of their democratic composition, even though they have nothing in common with the class proletarians, with the producers of all wealth, with the workers in factories and mills.

These are the elements—the elements of petty-bourgeois widely scattered through the Soviet institutions, the elements of the middle class with their hostility toward communism, and with their predilections toward the immutable customs of the past, with resentments and fears toward revolutionary acts—these are the elements that bring decay into our Soviet institutions, breeding there an atmosphere altogether repugnant to the working class. They are two different worlds and hostile at that. And yet we in Soviet Russia are compelled to persuade both ourselves and the working class that the petty-bourgeoisie and middle classes (not speaking of well to do peasants) can quite comfortably exist under the common motto: "All Power to the Soviets," forgetful of the fact that in practical everyday life the interests of the workers and those of the middle classes and peasantry imbued with petty-bourgeois psychology must inevitably clash, rending the Soviet policy asunder, and deforming its clear-cut class statutes.

Besides peasant-owners in the villages and burgher elements in the cities, our party in its Soviet state policy is forced to reckon with the influence exerted by the representatives of wealthy bourgeoisie now appearing in the form of specialists, technicians, engineers, and former managers of financial and industrial affairs, who by all their past experience are bound to the capitalist system of production. They can not even imagine of any other mode of production but that one which lies within the traditional bounds of capitalist economies.

The more Soviet Russia finds itself in need of specialists in the sphere of technique and management of production, the stronger becomes the influence of these elements, foreign to the working class elements, on the development of our economy. Having been thrown aside during the first period of the revolution, and being compelled to take up an attitude of watchful waiting or sometimes even open hostility toward the Soviet authorities, particularly during the most trying months (the historical sabotage by the intellectuals), this social group of brains in capitalist production, of servile, hired, well-paid servants of capital, acquire more and more influence and importance in politics with every day that passes.

Do we need names? Every fellow worker carefully watching our foreign and domestic policy recalls more than one of such names.

As long as the center of our life remained at the military fronts the influence of these gentlemen directing our Soviet policy, particularly in the sphere of industrial reconstruction, was comparatively negligible. Specialists, the remnants of the past, by all their nature closely, unalterably bound to the bourgeois system that we aim to destroy, gradually began to penetrate into our Red Army, introducing there their atmosphere of the past (blind subordination, servile obedience, distinction, ranks, and the arbitrary will of superiors in place of class discipline, etc.), but to the general political activity of the Soviet republic their influence did not extend.

The proletariat did not question their superior skill to direct military affairs, fully realizing through their healthy class instinct that in military matters the working class as a class can not express a new word, is powerless to introduce substantial changes into the military system—to reconstruct its foundation on a new class basis. Professional militarism—an inheritance of the past ages—and wars will have no place in the communist society. The struggle will go on along other channels, will take quite different forms inconceivable to our imagination. Militarism lives through its last days, through the transitory epoch of dictatorship and, therefore, it is only natural that the workers, as a class, could not introduce into the forms and systems of militarism anything new and conducive to the future development of society. Even in the Red Army, however, there were innovating touches of the working class, but the nature of militarism remained the same, and the direction of military affairs by the former officers and generals of the old army did not draw the Soviet policy in military affairs away to the opposite side sufficiently for the workers to feel any harm to themselves or to their class interests.

In the sphere of national economy it is quite different, however. Production, its organization—this is the essence of communism. To debar the workers from the organization of industry, to deprive them, that is, their industrial organizations, of the opportunity to develop their powers in creating new forms of production in industry through their unions, to deny these expressions of the class organization of the proletariat, while placing full reliance on the “skill” of specialists trained and taught to carry on production under a quite different system of production—is to jump off the rails of scientific Marxian thought. This is, however, just the thing that is being done by the leaders of our party at present.

Seeing the utter collapse of our industries, while still clinging to the capitalist mode of production (payment for labor in money, graduations in wages received according to the work done) where do our party leaders, in a fit of distrust in the creative abilities of workers’ collectives, seek salvation from the industrial chaos? Among scions of the bourgeois-capitalist past, among businessmen and technicians, whose creative abilities in the sphere of industry are subject to the routine, habits and methods of the capitalist system of production and economy. They are the ones who introduce the ridiculously naive belief that it is possible to bring about communism by bureaucratic means. They “decree” where it is now necessary to create and carry on research.

The more the military front recedes before the economic front, the keener becomes our crying need, the more pronounced the influence of that group which is not only inherently foreign to communism, but absolutely unable to develop the right qualities for introducing new forms of organizing the work, of new motives for increasing production, of new approaches to production and distribution. All these technicians, practical men, men of business experience, who just now appear on the surface of soviet life, by exerting their influence on the economic policy bring pressure to bear upon the leaders of our party through and within the Soviet institutions.

The party, therefore, finds itself in a difficult and embarrassing situation regarding the control over the soviet state, and is forced to lend ear and adapt itself to three economically hostile groups of the population, each different in social structure. The workers demand a clear-cut, uncompromising policy, a rapid, forced advance toward communism; while the peasantry with its petty-bourgeois proclivities and sympathies demand different kinds of “freedom,” including freedom of trade and non-interference into their affairs. The latter are joined in this demand by the burgher class in the form of “agents,” of Soviet officials, of commissars in the army, etc. who have already adapted themselves to the Soviet regime, but who by their psychology sway our policy toward petty-bourgeois lines.

As far as the center is concerned, the influence of these petty-bourgeois elements is negligible, but in the provinces and in local soviet activity their influence is great and a harmful one. Finally, there is still another group of men, that of the former managers and

directors of the capitalist industries. These are not the magnates of capital, like Riabushinsky or Rublikov, whom the Soviet republic got rid of during the first phase of the revolution, but they are the most talented servants of the capitalist system of production, "the brains and genius" of capitalism, its true creators and sponsors. Heartily approving the centralist tendencies of the Soviet government in the sphere of economics, well realizing all the benefits of trustification and regulation of production (this, by the way, is being carried on by capital in all advanced industrial countries), they are striving for just one thing. They want that this regulation should be carried on not through the labor organizations (the industrial unions) but through themselves—acting now under the guise of Soviet economic institutions—the center industrial committees, industrial centers of the Supreme Council of National Economy, where they are already firmly rooted. The influence of these gentlemen on the "the sober" state policy of our leaders is great, considerably greater than is desirable. This influence is reflected in the policy which defends and cultivates bureaucratism (with no attempts to change it entirely, but just to improve it). This policy is particularly obvious in the sphere of our foreign trade with the capitalist states, which is just beginning to spring up: the commercial relations are carried on over the heads of the Russian as well as the foreign organized workers. It finds its expression, also, in a whole series of measures restricting the self-activity of the masses and giving the initiative to the scions of the capitalist world.

Among all these various groups of the population, our party, by trying to find a middle ground, is compelled to steer a course which would not jeopardize the unity of the state interests. The clear-cut policy of our party in the process of identifying itself with Soviet state institutions is being gradually transformed into a upper-class policy, which in essence is nothing else but an adaptation of our directing centers to the heterogeneous and irreconcilable interests of the socially different mixed population. This adaptation leads to inevitable vacillation, fluctuations, deviations and mistakes. It is only necessary to recall the zigzag-like road of our policy toward the peasantry, which from "banking on the poor peasant" brought us to placing reliance on "the industrious peasant-owner." Let us admit that this policy is proof of the political soberness and "statecraft wisdom" of our directing centers, but the future historian analyzing without bias the stages of our domination will find and point out that in this is evident "a dangerous digression" from the class line toward "adaptation" and a course full of harmful possibilities or results.

Let us take again the question of foreign trade. There exists in our policy an obvious duplicity. This is attested by the constant, unending friction between the Commissariat of Foreign Trade and the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. This friction is not of administrative nature alone: its cause lies deeper, and if the secret work of the directing centers were exposed to the view of rank and file elements, who knows what the controversy dividing the Commissariat on Foreign Affairs and the trade representatives abroad might lead to.

The seemingly administrative friction that is essentially a serious, deep, social friction, concealed from the rank and file, and makes it absolutely necessary for Soviet politics to adapt itself to the three heterogeneous social groups of the population (workers, peasants, and representatives of the former bourgeoisie), constitutes another cause bringing crisis into our party. And we can not but pay attention to this cause. It is too characteristic, too pregnant with possibilities. It is, therefore, the duty of our party in behalf of party unity and future activity to ponder over this cause and derive a necessary lesson from the wide-spread dissatisfaction generated by it in the rank and file.

As long as the working class, during the first period of the revolution, felt itself as being the only bearer of communism there was perfect unanimity in the party. In the days immediately following the October Revolution none could even think of "ups" as something different from "downs," for in those days the advanced workers were busily engaged in realizing point after point in our class-communist program. The peasant who received the

land did not at that time assert himself as a part of and a full-fledged citizen of the Soviet republic. Intellectuals, specialists, men of affairs, the entire petty-bourgeoisie class and pseudo-specialists climbing at present up the soviet ladder rung by rung, under the guise of "specialists," in watchful waiting stepped aside, giving freedom for the advanced working masses to develop their creative abilities.

At present, however, it is just the other way. The worker feels, sees and realizes at every step that specialists, and, what is still worse, untrained illiterate pseudo-specialists and practical men, throw out the worker and fill up all the high administrative posts of industrial and economic institutions. And the Party, instead of putting the brakes on this tendency from the elements which are altogether foreign to the working class and communism, encourages it and seeks salvation from the industrial chaos not in the workers, but in these very elements. Not in the workers, not in their union organizations, does the Party repose its trust, but in these elements. The working masses feel it, and instead of unanimity and unity in the party there appears a break.

The masses are not blind. Whatever words the most popular leaders might use in order to conceal the deviation from the clear-cut class policy and the compromises made with the peasants and world capitalism, and the trust that they place in the disciples of the capitalist system of production, the working masses feel where the digression begins.

The workers may cherish an ardent affection and love for such personalities as Lenin; they may be fascinated by the incomparable flowery eloquence of Trotsky and his organizing abilities; they may receive a number of other leaders as leaders, but when the masses feel that they and their class are not trusted, it is quite natural that they say: "No, halt. We refuse to follow you blindly. Let us examine the situation. Your policy of picking out the middle ground between the three socially opposed groups is a wise one indeed but it smacks of the well-tried and familiar adaptation and opportunism. For the present day we may gain something with the help of your sober policy, but let us beware lest we find ourselves on a wrong road that through zig-zags and turns will lead from the future to the debris of the past."

Distrust of the workers toward the leaders is steadily growing, and the more these leaders are sages, the more clever statesmen they become with their policy of sliding over the blade of a sharp knife between communism and compromise with bourgeoisie past, the deeper becomes the abyss between the "ups" and the "downs," the less understanding there is and the more painful and inevitable becomes the crisis within the party itself.

The third reason causing the crisis in the party is that in fact, during these three years of the revolution the economic situation of the working class, of those who work in factories and mills, has not only not been improved, but become more unbearable. This nobody dares to deny. The suppressed and widely spread dissatisfaction among workers (workers—mind you) has a real justification.

Only the peasants gained directly by the revolution. As far as the middle classes are concerned they very cleverly adapted themselves to the new conditions, along with the representatives of the rich bourgeoisie, who have occupied all the responsible and directing positions in the Soviet institutions (particularly in the sphere of directing state economy), in the industrial organizations and the reestablishment of commercial relations with foreign nations. Only the basic class of the Soviet republic, which bore all the burdens of the dictatorship, as a mass ekes out a shamefully pitiful existence.

The workers' republic controlled by the communists, by the vanguard of the working class which, to quote Lenin's words, "has absorbed all the revolutionary energy of the class," has not had time enough to ponder over and improve the conditions of all the workers (those not in individual establishments which happened to gain the attention of the Council of the People's Commissars in one or another of the so-called "shock industries,") but of all the workers in general and lift their conditions of life to a human standard of existence.

The Commissariat of Labor is the most stagnant institution of all the commissariats. In the whole of the Soviet policy there was never seriously raised on a national scale and discussed, the question: what must and can be done in the face of an utter collapse of industry at home and a most unfavorable external situation, in order to improve the workers' conditions and preserve their health for productive labor in the future, and to better the lot of workers in the shops?

Until recently the Soviet policy was devoid of any worked-out plan for improving the lot of the workers and their conditions of life. All that was done in this field was done rather incidentally, or at random, by local authorities under the pressure of the masses themselves. During these three years of civil war the proletariat heroically brought to the altar of the revolution their innumerable sacrifices. They waited patiently, but at present, at the turn of affairs, when the pulse of life in the republic is again transferred to the economic front, the rank and file worker considers it unnecessary "to suffer and wait." Why? Is he not the creator of life on the communist basis? Let us ourselves take up this reconstruction for we know better than the gentlemen from the centers where it hurts us the most.

The rank and file worker is very observant. He sees that so far the problems of hygiene, sanitation, improving conditions of labor in the shops, in other words, the betterment of the workers' job, has occupied the last place in our policy. Further than housing of workers' families in the inconvenient bourgeois mansions we did not go in our solution of the housing problem, and, what is still worse, so far we have not even touched the practical problem of housing in regard to workers. To our shame, in the heart of the republic, in Moscow itself, they are still living in filthy, overcrowded and unhygienic workers' quarters, one visit to which makes one think that there was no revolution at all. We all know that the housing problem can not be solved in a few months, even years, and that due to our poverty its solution is confronted with serious difficulties, but the facts of ever growing inequality between the privileged groups of the population in Soviet Russia and the rank and file workers, "the frame-work of the dictatorship," breed and nourish the dissatisfaction.

The rank and file worker sees how the soviet official and the practical man lives and how lives he—he on whom rests the dictatorship of the proletariat? He can not but see that during the revolution the life and health of the workers in the shops commanded the least attention; that where prior to the revolution there existed more or less bearable conditions, they are still maintained by the shop committees, and where the latter did not exist, where dampness, foul air and gases poisoned and destroyed the workers' health, these conditions remained unchanged. "We could not attend to that; pray, there was the military front." And yet whenever it was necessary to make repairs in any of the houses occupied by the Soviet institutions they were able to find both the materials and the labor power. What would happen if we tried to shelter our specialists or practical men engaged in the sphere of commercial transactions with foreign capitalists in those huts, in which the masses of workers still live and labor? They would raise such a howl that it would become necessary to mobilize the entire housing department in order to correct "the chaotic conditions" that interfere with the productivity of our specialists.

The service of the Workers' Opposition consists in that it included the problem of improving the workers' lot together with all the other secondary demands of workers into the general economic policy. The productivity of labor can not be increased unless the life of workers will have been organized on the new communist basis.

The less that is undertaken and planned out (I do not speak of something that has been carried out) in this sphere, the deeper is the misunderstanding, the estrangement, and still greater is the mutual distrust between the directing centers of the Party and the rank and file workers. There is no unity, no sense of their identity of needs, demands and aspirations. "The leaders are one thing, and we are something altogether different. Maybe it is true that the leaders know better how to rule over the country, but they fail to understand our needs,

our life in the shops, its requirements, and immediate needs: they do not understand, and do not know." From this reasoning follows the instinctive leaning toward the unions, and consequent dropping out of the party. "It is true that they are a part of us, but as soon as they get into the centers, they leave us altogether; they begin to live differently; if we suffer what do they care; our sorrows are not theirs any longer."

And the more our industrial establishments and unions are drained of their best elements by the party which sends them either to the front or to the Soviet institutions, the weaker becomes the direct connection between the rank and file workers and the directing party centers. A chasm is growing, and at present, therefore, this division manifests itself even in the ranks of the party itself. The workers through their Workers' Opposition ask: Who are we? Are we really the prop of the class dictatorship, or are we just an obedient flock that serves as a support for those who, having severed all ties with the masses, carry out their own policy and build up industry without any regard to our opinions and creative abilities under the reliable cover of the party label?

Whatever the party leaders might do in order to drive away the Workers' Opposition the latter will always remain that growing healthy class force, which is destined to inject vitalizing energy into the rehabilitation of the economic life as well as into the communist party which begins to fade and bend low to the ground.

Thus, there are three causes that bring about a crisis into our party. There are first of all the supreme objective conditions under which communism in Russia is being carried out and realized (the Civil War, economic backwardness of the country, its utter industrial collapse as an aftermath of the long years of war). The second cause is the heterogeneous composition of our population—(7 millions of workers, the peasantry, the middle classes, and, finally, the former bourgeoisie, men of affairs of all professions, who influence the policy of Soviet institutions and penetrate into the party). The third cause is the inactivity of the party in the field of immediate improvement of the workers' life coupled with the inability and weakness of the corresponding Soviet institutions to take up and solve these problems.

What then is it that the Workers' Opposition wants? What service does it perform?

Its service consists in that it put up before the party all the perturbing questions, that it gave form to all that heretofore was causing only a subdued agitation in the masses and led the non-partisan workers ever further from the party; that it clearly and fearlessly shouted to the leaders: "Stop, look and think!"

Where do you lead us? Do we not go off the right road? It will be very bad for the party to find itself on one side of the foundation of the dictatorship, and the working class on the other. In this lies the greatest danger to the revolution."

The task of the party at its present crisis is to fearlessly face the mistakes and lend its ear to the healthy class call of the wide working masses. Through the creative powers of the rising class in the form of industrial unions we shall go toward reconstruction and development of the creative forces of the country; toward purification of the party itself from the elements foreign to it; toward correction of the activity of the party by means of going back to democracy, freedom of opinion and criticism inside the party.

The Part to be Played by the Trade Unions, and Their Problems

In a basic yet brief outline we have already explained what it is that causes the crisis in our party. Now we shall make clear what are the most important points of the controversy between the leaders of our party and the Workers' Opposition. There are two such points: The part to be played and by the problems confronting the trade unions during the reconstruction period of the national economy, coupled with the organization of production on the communist basis, and the question of self-activity of the *masses coupled* with bureaucracy in the party and Soviets.

Let us answer the first question, as the second is the sequence of the first. The period of "making theses" in our party has already ended. Before us we find six different platforms, six party tendencies. Such a variety and such minute variations of shades in its tendencies our party has never seen before, and the party thought has never been so rich in formula on one and the same question. It is, therefore, obvious that the question is a basic one and very important.

And such it is. The whole controversy simmers down to one basic question: Who shall build the communist economy, and how shall it be built? This is, moreover, the essence of our program; this is its heart. This question is equally important as the question of seizure of the political power by the proletariat. Only the Bubnov group of so-called political centralism may be so nearsighted as to underestimate its importance and to say: "The question concerning trade unions at the present moment has no importance whatsoever, and presents none of the theoretical difficulties."

It is, however, quite natural that the question seriously agitates the party as it is in reality the question: in what direction shall we turn the wheel of history—shall we turn it back or move it forward? It is also natural that there is not a single communist in the party who would remain non-committal during the discussion of this question. As a result we have six different groups.

If we begin, however, to carefully analyze all the theses of these most minutely divergent groups we find that on the basic question—who shall build the communist economy and organize the production on the new basis—there are only two points of view. One is that which is expressed and formulated in the statement of principles of the Workers' Opposition, and the other is one that unites all the rest of the groups, differing only in shades, but identical in substance.

What does the statement of the Workers' Opposition stand for, and how does the latter understand the part that is to be played by the trade unions, or, to be more exact, by the industrial unions at the present moment? "We believe that the question of reconstruction and development of the productive forces of our country may be solved only if the entire system of control over the people's economy is changed." (From Shliapnikov's report, Dec. 30th). Take notice, comrades,—“only if the entire system of control is changed.” What does it mean? "The basis of the controversy,"—goes on the report,—“revolves around the question: by what means during this period of transformation can our Communist Party carry out its economic policy—whether by means of workers organized into their class unions, or—over their heads—by bureaucratic means, through canonized functionaries of the state.” The basis of the controversy is namely this: whether we shall realize communism through workers or over their heads, by the hands of Soviet officials. And let us, comrades, ponder whether it is possible to attain and build a communist economy by the hands and creative abilities of the scions from the other class, who are imbued with their routine of the past? If we begin to think as Marxists, as men of science, we shall answer categorically and explicitly—no.

The root of the controversy and the cause of the crisis has in the supposition that "practical men," technicians, specialists and managers of capitalist production can suddenly release themselves from the bonds of their traditional conceptions of ways and means of handling labor, which had been deeply ingrained into their very flesh through the years of their service to capital, and acquire the ability to create new forms of production, of labor organization and of incentives to work.

To suppose that, is to forget the incontestable truth that a system of production can not be changed by a few individual geniuses, but *only* by the requirements of a class.

Just imagine for a moment that during the transitory period from the feudal system founded on slave labor to the system of capitalist production, with its alleged free hired labor in the industries, (the bourgeois class lacking at that time the necessary experience

in the organization of capitalist production), were to invite all the clever, shrewd, experienced managers of the feudal estates who had been accustomed to deal with servile chattel slaves, and entrust to them the task of organizing production on a new capitalist basis. What would happen? Would these specialists in their own sphere, depending on the whip to increase productivity of labor, succeed in handling a "free," though hungry, proletarian, who had released himself from the curse of involuntary labor and had become a soldier or a day laborer? Would not these experts wholly destroy the newly born and developing capitalist production? Individual overseers of the chattel slaves, individual former landlords, and their managers were able to adapt themselves to the new forms of production, but it was not from their ranks that the real creators and builders of the bourgeois capitalist economy were recruited.

The class instinct whispered to the first owners of the capitalist establishments that it is better to go slowly and use common sense in place of experience in search of the new ways and means in establishing relations between capital and labor, than to borrow the antiquated useless methods of exploitation of labor from the old outlawed system. The class instinct quite correctly told the first capitalists during the first period of capitalist development that in place of the whip of the overseer they must apply another incentive: rivalry, personal ambition of workers facing unemployment and misery. And the capitalists, having grasped this new incentive to labor, this new conqueror of labor, were wise enough to use it in order to promote the development of bourgeois capitalist forms of production by increasing the productivity of "free" hired labor to a high degree of intensity.

Five centuries ago the bourgeoisie acted also in a cautious way carefully listening to the dictates of their class instincts. They relied more on their common sense than on the experience of the skillful specialists in the sphere of organizing production on the old feudal estates. The bourgeoisie was perfectly right as history has showed us.

We possess a great weapon that can help us to find the shortest road to the victory of the working class, diminish suffering along the way, and more quickly bring about the new system of production—communism. This weapon is the materialistic conception of history. However, instead of using it, widening our experience and correcting our researches in conformity with history we are ready to throw this weapon aside, and follow the encumbered circuitous road of blind experiments.

Whatever our economic distress happens to be we are not justified in going to such an extreme degree of despair. It is the capitalist governments, standing with their backs to the wall, who should despair; after exhausting all the creative impulses of capitalist production they find no solution to their problems. As far as toiling Russia is concerned, for whom since the October Revolution has been opened new unprecedented opportunities of economic creation, as well as development of new unheard-of forms of production, with an immense increase in productivity of labor, there is no room for despair. It is only necessary not to borrow from the past, but, on the contrary, give complete freedom to the creative powers of the future. This is what the Workers' Opposition is doing. Who can be the builder and the creator of communist economy? That class—and not individual geniuses of the past—which is organically bound with newly developing, painfully born forms of production of a more productive and perfect system of economy. Which organ—the pure class industrial unions, or the heterogeneous Soviet economic establishments—can formulate and solve the creative problems in the sphere of organizing the new economy and its production? The Workers' Opposition considers that it can be done only by the first, that is, by the workers' collective, and not by the functional bureaucratic socially-heterogeneous collective with a strong admixture of elements of the old capitalist type, whose mind is clogged by the refuse of capitalistic routine.

"The workers' unions must be drawn from the present position of passive assistance to the economic institutions into an active participation in the management of the entire economic structure" (the theses of the Workers' Opposition). To seek, find, and create new and more perfect forms of economy, to find new incentives to the productivity of labor—all this can be done only by the workers' collectives that are closely bound with the new forms of production. Only they, from their everyday experience may draw certain conclusions which, at first glance seem only practically important and yet contain exceedingly valuable theoretical conclusions about handling the new labor power in a new labor state where misery, poverty, unemployment and competition on the labor market ceases to be the incentives to labor.

To find a stimulus, an incentive to work—this is the greatest task of the working class standing on the threshold to communism. None other, however, but the working class itself in the form of its class collective is able to solve this great problem.

The solution of this problem, as it is proposed by the industrial unions, consists in giving complete freedom to the workers as regards experimenting, class training, adjusting and feeling out the new forms of production, as well as expression and development of their creative abilities, that is, to that class which alone can be the creator of communism. This is the way the Workers' Opposition proposes to handle this difficult problem from which follows the most essential point of their theses. "Organization of control over the social economy is the prerogative of the All-Russian Congress of Workers, who are united in the trade and industrial unions which elect the central body directing the whole economic life of the republic." (Theses of the Workers' Opposition). This point secures freedom for the manifestation of class creative abilities, not restricted and crippled by the bureaucratic machine which is saturated with the spirit of routine of the bourgeois capitalist system routine of production and control. The Workers' Opposition relies on the creative powers of its own class—the workers. It is from this premise that the rest of the program is drawn.

The deviation of the Workers' Opposition from the line that is followed by the party leaders begins at this juncture. Distrust of the working class (not in the sphere of politics, but in the sphere of economic creative abilities) is the whole essence of the theses signed by our party leaders. They do not believe that the rough hands of workers, technically untrained, can create those basic outlines of the economic forms which, in time, will develop a harmonious system of communist production.

To all of them—Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev and Bukharin—production is such a "delicate thing" that it is impossible to get along without the assistance of "directors." First of all we shall "bring up" the workers, "teach them," and only when they grow up shall we remove from them all the teachers of the Supreme Council of National Economy and let the industrial unions take control over the production. It is significant that all the theses written by the party leaders coincide in one essential feature: for the present we shall not give control over the production to the trade unions; for the present we "shall wait." It is also true that Trotsky, Lenin, Zinoviev and Bukharin's points of view differ on why the workers should not be entrusted with running the industries at present, but they all unanimously agree that at the present time the management over the production must be carried on over the workers' heads by means of a bureaucratic system inherited from the past.

On this point all the leaders of our party are in complete accord. "The center of gravitation in the work of the trade unions at the present moment assert" the "Ten" in their theses must be shifted into the economic industrial sphere. The trade unions as class organizations of workers built up in conformity with their industrial functions must take on themselves the major work in organization of production. "Major work" is an indefinite term which permits various interpretations, and yet it would seem that the platform of the "Ten" gives more leeway to the trade unions in running the industries than Trotsky's centralism.

Is this the case, however? Moreover, the theses of the "Ten" go on to explain what they mean by "major work" of the unions. They say that "major work" consists of "the most energetic participation in the centers which regulates production and control, register and distribute labor power, organize exchanges between cities and villages, fight against sabotage and implementation of decrees on different compulsory labor obligations, etc." This is all. This is neither new nor more than what the trade unions have already been doing, and can not save our production nor help in the solution of the basic question—raising and developing the productive forces of our country.

Illustrating the fact that the program of the "Ten" does not give to the trade unions any of the directing functions, but assigns to them only an auxiliary role in the management of production, the authors state: "In a developed stage (not at present, but in a developed stage) the trade unions in their process of social revolution must become organs of the social authority, working as such, in subordination to other organizations, toward carrying out the new principles of organization of the economic life." By this they mean to say that the trade unions must work in subordination to the Supreme Council of National Economy and its branches. What is the difference then with that and "joining by growth" which was proposed by Trotsky. The difference is only in methods. The theses of the "Ten" strongly emphasize the educational nature of the trade unions. In their formulation of problems for the trade unions, mainly in the sphere of organization, industry and education, our party leaders as clever politicians suddenly convert themselves into "teachers."

This peculiar controversy is revolving not around the system of management in industry, but primarily around the system of educating the masses. In fact when one begins to turn over the pages of the stenographic minutes and speeches made by our prominent leaders, one is astonished by the unexpected manifestation of their pedagogic proclivities. Every author of the theses proposes the most perfect system of educating the masses, but all these systems of "education" lack provisions for freedom of experimentation, for training and the expression of creative abilities by those who are to be taught; in this respect all our pedagogues are also behind the times.

The trouble is that Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin and others limit the functions of the trade unions not to the control over production or taking over the industries, but to a mere school of educating the masses. During the discussion it seemed to some of our comrades that Trotsky stood for a gradual "absorption of the unions by the state"—not suddenly, but gradually—and that he wanted to reserve for them the right of ultimate control over production, as it is expressed in our program. It seemed at first that this point put Trotsky on a common ground with the Opposition at a time when the group represented by Lenin and Zinoviev, being opposed to "the absorption by the state," saw the object of the union activity and their task as "training for communism." "Trade unions"—thunder Trotsky and Zinoviev—"are necessary for the rough work" (page 22 of the report, Dec. 30th). Trotsky himself, it would seem, understands the task somewhat differently; in his opinion the most important work of the unions consists of organizing production. In this he is perfectly right; he is also correct when he says: "Inasmuch as unions are schools of communism they are such schools not in carrying on general propaganda (for in that case they would play the part of clubs), not in mobilizing their members for military work or collecting the produce tax, but for the purpose of an all-round education of their members on the basis of their participation in production." (Trotsky's report, December 30th). All this is true, but there is one grave omission; the unions are not only schools for communism, but are its creators as well.

The creativity of the class is being overlooked. Trotsky substitutes for it the initiative of "the real organizers of production," by communists inside the unions (from Trotsky's report, Dec. 30th). What communists? According to Trotsky, those communists who are appointed by the party to responsible administrative positions in the unions for reasons that quite often contrary to the industrial and economic problems of the unions. Trotsky is frank.

He does not believe that workers are ready to create communism and through pain and suffering to seek, to blunder, and still create new forms of production. He has expressed this frankly and openly. He has already carried out his system of "club education" of the masses and by training them for the role of "master" in the Central Administrative body of Railways and adopting all those methods of educating the masses which were practiced by our traditional journeymen on their apprentices. It is true that a beating on the head by a boot-stretcher does not make an apprentice a successful shop-keeper after he becomes a journeyman, and yet as long as the boss-teacher's stick hangs over his head he works and produces.

This, in Trotsky's opinion, is the whole essence of shifting the central point "from politics to industrial problems." To raise even temporarily productivity by every and all means is the crux of the task. The whole course of training in the trade unions must be directed towards this end, in Trotsky's opinion.

Comrades Lenin and Zinoviev, however, disagree with him. They are "educators" of "a modern trend of thought." It has been stated many times that trade unions are schools for communism. What does that mean—schools for communism? If we take this definition seriously, it will mean that in schools for communism it is necessary first of all to teach and educate, but not to command (this allusion to Trotsky's views meets with applause). Later Zinoviev adds: the trade unions are performing a great task both for the proletarian and communist cause. This is the fundamental role to be played by the trade unions. At present, however, we forget this and think that we may handle the problem of trade unions too recklessly, too roughly, too severely.

It is necessary to remember that these organizations have their own particular tasks—not of commanding, supervising or dictating, but drawing the working masses into the channel of the organized proletarian movement. Thus, the teacher Trotsky went too far in his system of educating the masses, but what does comrade Zinoviev himself propose? To give the first lessons in communism within the unions, "to teach them (the masses) the basics of the proletarian movement." How? Through practical experience, through practical creation of new forms of production (just what the opposition wants)? Not at all. Zinoviev-Lenin's group favors a system of educating the masses through reading, giving moral precepts and good, well chosen examples. We have 500,000 communists (among whom we regret to say, are many "strangers"—stragglers from the other world) to 7,000,000 workers.

According to comrade Lenin the party has drawn itself "the proletarian vanguard." The best communists, in co-operation with specialists from the Soviet economic institutions, are searching hard in their laboratories for the new forms of communist production. These communists working at present under the care of "good teachers" in the Supreme Council of National Economy or other centers, these Peters and Johns are the best pupils, it is true, but the working masses in the trade unions must look to these exemplary Peters and Johns and learn something from them without touching with their own hands the rudder of control, for it is too early and they have not learned enough.

In Lenin's opinion the trade unions, that is, working class organizations, are not the creators of the communist forms of people's economy for they serve only as a connecting link between the vanguard and the masses,—*"the trade unions in their everyday work persuade masses, masses of that class..."* etc.

This is not Trotsky's "club system," not a medieval system of education. This is the Froebel-Pestalozzi's German system founded on studying examples. Trade unions must do nothing vital in the industries, but persuade masses and keep the masses in touch with the vanguard and the party, which (remember this!) does not organize production as a collective but creates the Soviet economic institutions of a heterogeneous composition to which it appoints communists.

Which system is better? This is the question. Trotsky's system, whatever it may be in other respects, is clearer and therefore more real. On reading books and studying examples taken from good-hearted Peters and Johns one can not advance education too far. This must be remembered and remembered well.

Bukharin's group occupies the middle ground, or rather, attempts to incorporate both systems of education. We must notice, however, that this system also does not recognize the principle of independent creativity of unions in industry. In the opinion of Bukharin's group the trade unions play a dual role (so it is proclaimed in its theses); on the one hand it (obviously "the role") takes on itself the functions of a "school for communism," and on the other hand, the functions of an intermediary between the party and the masses (this is from Lenin's group). In other words it takes the role of a machine injecting the wide proletarian masses into the active life (notice, comrades—"into the active life," but not into the creation of *the* new form of economy or search for new forms of production). Moreover, they (obviously the unions) in ever increasing degree must become the component part both of the economic machine and the state authority. This is from Trotsky's "joining together."

The controversy again revolves not around the trade union problems, but around the methods of educating the masses by means of unions. Trotsky stands, or rather stood for a system which, along the lines of one he had introduced among the railway workers, might hammer into the organized workers' heads the wisdom of communist reconstruction. This system by means of "appointees," "shake-ups," and all kinds of miraculous measures promulgated in conformity with "the shock system," would remake the unions so that they might join the Soviet economic institutions and become obedient tools in the realization of economic plans worked out by the Supreme Council of National Economy.

Zinoviev and Lenin are not in a hurry to join the trade unions to the Soviet economic machine. The unions, they say, shall remain unions. Production will be run and managed by men whom we choose. When the trade unions have educated obedient and industrious Peters and Johns we will "inject" them into the Soviet economic institutions and thus the unions will gradually dissolve and disappear.

The creation of new forms of national economy we entrust to the Soviet bureaucratic institutions; to the unions we leave the role of "schools." Education, education, and more education. Such is the Lenin-Zinoviev slogan. Bukharin, however, wanted "to bank" on radicalism in the system of union education, and, of course, fully merited the rebuke from Lenin together with the nickname of "Simidicomist." Bukharin and his group, while emphasizing the educational part to be played by the unions in the present political situation, stand for the most complete workers' democracy inside the unions, for wide elective powers to the unions—not only for the elective principle generally applied, but for *unconditional* election of delegates nominated by the unions. Pray, what a democracy! This smacked of the Opposition itself, if it were not for one difference. The Workers' Opposition sees in the unions the managers and creators of the communist economy whereas Bukharin together with Lenin and Trotsky leave to them only the role of "schools for communism," and no more. Why should he not play with the elective principle when everybody knows that it will *not benefit* nor harm the system of running the industry? As a matter of fact, the control over industry will still remain outside the unions beyond their reach in the hands of the Soviet institutions. Bukharin reminds us of those teachers who carry on education in conformity with the old system by means of "books"—"You must learn that far and no further," while encouraging student "initiative" in organizing dances, entertainments, etc.

In this way the two systems quite comfortably live together, and square one with another. What the outcome of all this will be and what duties the students of these teachers of eclectics will be able to perform is a different question. If comrade Lunacharsky were to waste his time at all the educational meetings disapproving "eclectic heresies" like these the position of the People's Commissariat on Education would be precarious indeed.

However, there is no need to underestimate the educational methods of our leading comrades in regard to the trade unions. They all, Trotsky included, realize that in the matter of education the "initiative" of the masses is not the least factor. Therefore, they are in search of a plan where the trade unions, without interfering with the prevailing bureaucratic system of running the industry, may develop their initiative and economic creative powers. The least harmful sphere where the masses could actualize their initiative as well as their "participation in active life" (according to Bukharin) is the improvement of the workers' lot. The Workers' Opposition gives a great deal of attention to this question, and yet it knows that the basic sphere of class creation is the creation of new industrial economic forms, of which the improvement of the workers' lot is only a part.

In Trotsky and Zinoviev's opinion production must be created and adjusted by Soviet institutions while the trade unions are advised to perform a rather restricted, though useful, task of improving the lot of the workers. For instance, Comrade Zinoviev sees in distribution of clothing the "economic role" of the unions. He explains: "There is no other more important problem than that of the economy; to repair one bath house in Petrograd at present is ten times more important than delivering five good lectures."

What is this? A naive mistaken view, or a conscious substitution of restricted tasks of home economics and house-hold duties for the original and organize role of trade unions in the sphere of production and the development of productive forces? In somewhat different language the same thought is expressed by Trotsky. He very generously encourages the trade unions to develop the greatest possible initiative in the economic field. But where shall this initiative express itself? In "putting glasses" in the shop window or filling up a pool in front of the factory (from Trotsky's speech at the Miner's Congress). Comrade Trotsky, take pity on us! For this is merely the sphere of "house-running," and if you intend to reduce the creativity of the unions to such a scope then the unions will become not schools for communism, but places where they train people to be janitors. It is true that comrade Trotsky attempts to widen the area of "worker initiative" not by allowing them to participate in the improvement of the workers' lot on the job (only the "insane" Workers' Opposition goes that far), but by taking lessons from the Supreme Council of National Economy on this subject.

"Whenever a question concerning workers is to be decided, such as the distribution of food or labor power, it is necessary that the trade unions know exactly (not participate themselves in the matter, but only know), and not just in general outline as mere citizens, but thoroughly understand the whole current work that is being done by the Supreme Council of National Economy" (Trotsky speech of Dec. 30th). The teachers from the Supreme Council of National Economy not only force the trade unions "to implement" their plans, but also "explain to their pupils their decrees." This is already a step forward in comparison with the present system on the railways.

To every thinking worker it is clear, however, that installing glass, as useful as that may be, has nothing in common with running industry. Productive forces and their development do not find expression in this work. The really important question still is: how to develop them, how to build such a state of economy by squaring the new life with production, in order to eliminate unproductive labor as much as possible. The party may bring up a Red soldier, a political worker or executive worker to carry out the projects already laid out, but it cannot develop a creator of communist economy. Only the trade unions offer an opportunity for developing creative abilities along new lines.

Moreover, this is not the task of the party. The party task is, by ensuring their freedom, to create conditions among the working masses, who are united by common economic industrial aims, so that they can become a worker-creators, find new impulses for work, work out a new system to utilize labor power, and distribute workers in order to reconstruct society and thus create a new economic order of things founded on the communist basis.

Only workers can generate in their mind new methods of organizing labor as well as running industry.

This is a simple Marxist truth, and yet at present the leaders of our party do not share it with us. Why? Just because they place more emphasis on bureaucratic technicians, descendants of the past, than on the healthy elemental class creativity of the working masses. In every other sphere—education, scientific development, organization of the army, care of public health—we may hesitate as to who is to be in the control, whether the workers' collective or the bureaucratic specialists, but there is one place, that of the economy, where the question as to who shall have the control is very simple and clear for everyone who has not forgotten history.

It is well known to every Marxist that the reconstruction of industry and the development of creative forces of a country depend on two factors: the development of technique and the efficient organization of labor by means of increasing productivity and finding new incentives to work. This has been true during every period of transformation from a lower stage of economic development to one higher throughout all the history of human existence.

In a workers' republic the development of productive forces by means of technique plays a secondary role in comparison with the second factor, that of the efficient organization of labor and creation of a new system of economy. Even if Soviet Russia succeeds in carrying out completely its project of general electrification without introducing any essential change in the system of control and organization of the people's economy and production, it would only catch up with the advanced capitalist countries in the matter of development. Yet in the efficient utilization of labor power and in building a new system of production Russian labor finds itself in exceptionally favorable circumstances. These give her the opportunity to out-distance all the bourgeois capitalist countries in the development of the productive forces. Unemployment as an incentive to labor in Soviet Russia has been eliminated. Therefore, new possibilities are available for the working class, which has been freed from the yoke of capital, to have its own new creative say in finding new incentives to labor and creating of new forms of production, which will have unprecedented in human history. But who can develop the necessary creativity and discernment in this sphere? Bureaucratic elements and heads of Soviet institutions, or the industrial unions whose members are experienced in organizing workers in the shop and who possess the creative, useful, practical methods that can be applied in the process of reorganizing the entire system of the people's economy? The Workers' Opposition asserts that administration of the people's economy is the trade unions' job, and therefore it is more Marxist in thought than the theoretically trained leaders.

The Workers' Opposition is not so ignorant as to wholly underestimate the great value of technical progress or the usefulness of technically trained men. It has no intent of electing, at a workers' congress, a directing agency over industry and then dismissing the Supreme Council of National Economy, the central industrial committees, economic centers, etc. Not at all. And yet the Workers' Opposition thinks that it must assert its own control over these technically valuable administrative centers, give them theoretical tasks, and use their services as the capitalists did when they hired the technicians to carry out their own schemes. Specialists indeed can do valuable work in developing industries; they can make the workers' manual labor easier; they are necessary and indispensable, as science is indispensable to every rising and developing class. However, the bourgeois specialists, even those who are communists, are physically powerless and mentally too weak to develop the productive forces in a non-capitalist state; to find new methods of labor organization, and to develop new incentives for intensification of labor. This belongs to the working class—to the industrial unions.

When the class of rising bourgeoisie, having reached the threshold leading from medieval to modern times, entered into the economic battle with the decaying class of feudal lords it did not possess any of the technical advantages over the latter. The merchant—the first capitalist—was compelled to buy goods from that craftsman or journeyman who by means of hand files, knife and primitive spindles was producing goods both for his “master,” the landlord, and for the outside merchant, with whom he entered into a “free” trade agreement. Feudal economy having reached a culminating point in organization, ceased to give any surplus, and there began a decrease in the growth of productive forces. Humanity stood face to face with the alternative of either economic decay or finding new incentives for labor, of creating, consequently, a new economic system which would increase productivity, widen the scope of production, and open new possibilities for the development of productive forces.

Who could have found and evolved the new methods in the sphere of industrial reorganization? None but those class representatives who had not been bound by the routine of the past, who understood that the spindle and cutter in the hands of a chattel slave produce incomparably less than in the hands of supposedly free hired workers behind whose back stands the incentive of economic necessity.

Thus, the rising class having found where the basic incentive to work lies, has built on it a complex system great in its own way; the system of capitalist production. The technicians have come to the aid of capitalists only much later. The basis was the new system of labor organization and the new relations that were established between capital and labor.

The same is true at present. No specialist or technician imbued with the routine of the capitalist system of production can ever introduce any new creative motive and vitalizing innovation into the fields of labor organization and creating the communist economy. Here the function belongs to the workers' collective. The great service of the Workers' Opposition is that it has put this very important question frankly and openly before the party.

Comrade Lenin believes that we can implement the communist plan on the economic field by means of the party. Is it so? First of all let us consider how the party functions. According to comrade Lenin, “it attracts to itself the vanguard of workers;” then it scatters itself over various Soviet institutions (only a part of the vanguard gets back into the trade unions where the communist members, however, are deprived of an opportunity of directing and building up the people's economy). There these well trained, faithful and, perhaps, very talented communist-economists disintegrate and decay in the general atmosphere of routine, which pervades all our Soviet economic institutions. In such an atmosphere the influence of these comrades is weakened, marred or entirely lost.

The trade unions are a different matter. There the class atmosphere is thicker, the composition of forces is more homogeneous, the tasks that the collective face are more closely bound with the immediate life and labor needs of the producers themselves, of the members of factory and shop committees, of the factory management and the unions' centers. Creativity, the research for new forms of production and labor incentives, in order to increase productivity, may be generated only in the bosom of this natural class collective. Only the vanguard of this class can create revolution, but only the whole class through everyday experience is capable of creating the economic base for a communist society.

Whoever does not believe in the creative spirit of a class collective—and this collective is most fully represented by the trade unions—must renounce the communist reconstruction of society. Neither Krestinsky nor Preobrazhensky nor even Lenin and Trotsky can, without fail, by the means of their party machine, discern those workers who are able to find and apply new approaches to a new system of production. Such workers can be advanced only by life-experience itself from the ranks of those who actually produce and organize production.

Nevertheless, this consideration, very simple and clear to every practical man, is lost sight of by our party leaders. It is impossible to decree communism. It can be created only in the process of practical research, through mistakes perhaps, though the creative powers of the working class itself.

The cardinal point of the controversy that is taking place between the party leaders and the Workers' Opposition is this: In whom will our party place the trust of building the communist economy—in the Supreme Council of National Economy with all its bureaucratic branches or in the Industrial Unions? Comrade Trotsky wants "to join" the trade unions to the Supreme Council of People's Economy so that with the assistance of the latter it might be possible to swallow the first. Comrades Lenin and Zinoviev, on the other hand, want to "educate" the masses to such a level of communist understanding that they could be painlessly absorbed into the same Soviet institutions. Bukharin and the rest of the factions express essentially the same view, varying only in the way it is stated. Only the Workers' Opposition expresses something entirely different and defends the class proletarian viewpoint in the very process of creation and realization of its tasks.

The administrative economic body in the workers' republic during the present transitory period must be a body directly elected by the producers themselves. The rest of the administrative economic Soviet institutions shall serve only as executive centers of the economic policy of that all-important economic body of the labor republic. All else is a goose-stepping that manifests distrust toward the creative abilities of workers, a distrust which is not compatible with the professed ideals of our party, whose very strength depends on the perennial revolutionary creative spirit of the proletariat.

It will not be surprising if at the approaching party congress the sponsors of the different economic reforms, save the single exception of the Workers' Opposition, will come to a common understanding through mutual compromises and concessions, since there is no essential controversy among them.

The Workers' Opposition alone will not and must not compromise. This does not, however, mean that it "desires to a split." Not at all. Its task is entirely different. Even in the event of defeat at the congress it must remain in the party and step by step stubbornly defend its point of view, thereby saving the party and clarifying its class lines.

Once more in brief: what is it that the Workers' Opposition wants?

- 1) To form a body from the workers—the producers themselves—for administering the people's economy.
- 2) For this purpose, to arrive at a place where the unions, instead of a role of passive assistance to the economic bodies takes an active role and manifest their creative initiative, the Workers' Opposition proposes a series of preliminary measures to an orderly and gradual realization of this aim.
- 3) Transferring of the administrative functions of industry into the hands of the union should not take place until the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the trade unions has found the unions to be able and sufficiently prepared for the task.
- 4) All appointments to the administrative economic positions shall be made with consent of the union. All candidates nominated by the union are non-removable. All responsible officials appointed by the union are responsible to, and may be recalled, by it.
- 5) In order to carry out all these proposals it is necessary to strengthen the rank and file nucleus in the unions and to prepare factory and shop committees to run the industries.
- 6) By concentrating in one body the entire administration of the public economy (without the existing dualism of the Supreme Council of National Economy and the All-Russian Executive Committee of the trade unions) *a oneness of will* must be created that will make it easy to implement our plan and put into life the communist system of production. Is this syndicalism? On the contrary, is not this the same principle that is stated in our party program and are not the statements of principles signed by the rest of the comrades deviations from it?

On Bureaucracy and Initiative of the Masses

Bureaucracy or the initiative of the masses? This is the second point of the controversy between the leaders of the party and the Workers' Opposition. The question of bureaucracy was raised but only superficially addressed at the Eighth Soviet Congress, just as in the question of the role of the trade unions and their problems was misdirected. The controversy on this question is more fundamental than it might seem. The essence of it is this: what system of administration in a workers' republic during the period of creating the economic basis for communism secures more freedom for class creativity, a bureaucratic state system or a system of wide practical initiative of the working masses? This question relates to the system of administration, and the controversy arises between two diametrically opposed principles—bureaucracy or initiative. Yet they try to relegate it along with the problem of "animating the Soviet institutions." Here we observe the same substitution of the subjects discussed, as the one that occurred in the debates on the trade unions. It is necessary to state definitely and clearly that half-measures, changes in relations between central bodies, local economic organizations, and other such petty non-essential innovations as replacing responsible officials and injecting party members into the Soviet institutions, where these communists are subjected to the bad influences of the prevailing bureaucratic system and thereby disintegrate among the elements of the former bourgeois class, will not "democratize" or animate the Soviet institutions.

This is not the point, however. Every child in Soviet Russia knows that the vital problem is to draw the wide toiling masses of workers, peasants, and others into the reconstruction of economy of the proletarian state and thus change the conditions of life accordingly. In other words the task is clear: To wake up initiative and self-activity in the masses. But what is being done in order to encourage and develop that initiative? Nothing at all. Quite the contrary. It is true that at every meeting we call upon the working men and women "to create a new life, build and assist the Soviet authorities," but no sooner do the masses or individual groups of workers take our admonition seriously and attempt to implement them than some of the bureaucratic institutions, feeling that they are being ignored, hastily cut short the efforts of over zealous initiators.

Every comrade can easily recall scores of instances when the workers themselves attempted to organize dining rooms, day nurseries for children, transportation of wood, etc., and each time a lively immediate interest in the undertaking died from the red tape, interminable negotiations with various institutions that brought no definite results, refusals, requests for new information, etc. Wherever the masses themselves attempted to equip a dining room, to store a supply of wood or to organize a nursery, refusal always followed from the central institutions with explanations that there was no equipment for the dining room, a lack of horses for transporting the wood and absence of an adequate building for the nursery. And how much bitterness is generated among working men and women when they see and know that if they had been given the right materials and an opportunity to act, they themselves would completed the project. How painful it is to receive a refusal of necessary materials when they had already been found and procured by the workers themselves. Therefore, the initiative is slackening and the desire to act is dying out. It is a case of "let the officials themselves take care of us." The result is a most harmful division: We are the toiling people, and they are the Soviet officials, on whom everything depends. This is the whole trouble.

Meanwhile, what are our party leaders doing? Do they attempt to find the cause of this evil and admit openly that the very system itself, which was carried out into the life through the Soviets, paralyzes and deadens the masses, even though it was meant to encourage their initiative? No, our party leaders do nothing of the kind. Just the opposite—instead of finding means to encourage the mass initiative which should fit perfectly into our flexible Soviet institutions under certain conditions, our party leaders all of a sudden appear in the role of defenders and knights of bureaucracy. How many comrades, while following Trotsky's example, repeat that "we do not suffer because of adopting the bad sides of

bureaucracy but because we have failed so far to learn the good ones." ("On one common plan," by Trotsky.)

Bureaucracy, as it exists, is a direct negation of mass initiative. Therefore, whoever accepts the principle of worker participation in governmental and economic affairs as a basis for a communist system cannot look for good or bad aspects of bureaucracy, but must openly and resolutely reject this useless system. Bureaucracy is not a product of our misery, as Comrade Zinoviev asserts. Neither is it a reflex of "the blind sub-ordination" to superiors generated by militarism, as others claim. This phenomenon has a deeper cause. It is a by-product of the same cause that explains our policy of double-dealing toward the trade unions: the growing influence in the Soviet institutions of those elements which are hostile in spirit not only to communism, but to the elementary aspirations of the working masses as well. Bureaucracy is a scourge that pervades the very marrow of our party as well as of the Soviet institutions, and this fact is emphasized not only by the Workers' Opposition but is also recognized by many thoughtful comrades not belonging to this group.

The restrictions on initiative are put not only on the activity of non-party masses (this would be only a logical and reasonable condition in the suppressed atmosphere of the civil war), but also on the initiative of party members. Every independent attempt, every new thought that had not passed through the censorship of our center is considered as "heresy," as a violation of the party discipline, as an attempt to infringe on the prerogatives of the center, which must "foresee" everything and "decree" anything and everything. If anything is not decreed one must wait, for the time will come when the center at its leisure will issue a decree and only then within sharply restricted limits may one express his "initiative." What would happen if some of the members of the Russian Communist party—those, for instance, who are very fond of birds—decided to form a society for preservation of birds. The idea itself seems very useful and does not in any way undermine the "state projects," but it only seems this way. Suddenly, some bureaucratic institution would appear, and claim its right to the management of that particular undertaking. This institution would immediately "incorporate" the society into the Soviet machine, deadening, thereby, direct initiative. Instead a heap of paper decrees would appear, and regulations which would give enough work for hundreds of officials and further complicate the work of mails and transport.

The harm in bureaucracy lies not only in the red tape, as some comrades would want us to believe when they narrow the whole controversy to the "animation of Soviet institutions," but also in the solution of all problems by means of formal decisions handed down from the central institutions and arrived at either by one person or an extremely restricted collective, rather than by an open exchange of opinions or by immediate efforts of all concerned. Interested people quite often are excluded entirely. Some third person decides your fate, this is the whole essence of bureaucracy.

In the face of the growing suffering of the working class brought about by the confusion of the present transitory period, bureaucracy finds itself particularly weak and impotent. The miracle of enthusiasm that is necessary for stimulating productive forces and alleviating the labor conditions can be performed only by the animated initiative of the interested workers themselves, *when they are not* restricted and repressed at every step by a hierarchy of "permissions and decrees."

All Marxists, Bolsheviks in particular, have been strong and powerful in that they never stressed the policy of immediate success of the movement (this line, by the way, has always been followed by the opportunists-compromisers), but always attempted to put the workers in such conditions which would give them the opportunity to temper their revolutionary will and develop their creative abilities. The workers' initiative is indispensable for us, and yet we do not give it a chance to develop.

Fear of criticism and freedom of thought, joined to a bureaucratic system, quite often produces ridiculous forms.

There can be no initiative without freedom of thought and opinion. Initiative manifests itself not only in action and work, but in independent thought as well. We are afraid of mass-activity. We are afraid to give freedom to the creative spirit of the proletariat. We are afraid of criticism. We have ceased to rely on the masses and hence we have *our* bureaucracy. That is why the Workers' Opposition considers that bureaucracy is our enemy, our scourge and the greatest danger for the future existence of the Communist party itself.

In order to do away with the bureaucracy that is finding shelter in Soviet institutions, we must first of all get rid of all bureaucracy in the party itself. That is where we face the immediate struggle against this system. As soon as the party—not in theory but in practice—recognizes self-activity of the masses as the basis of our state, the Soviet institutions will again automatically become those living institutions which are destined to carry out the communist project. They will cease to be the institutions of red tape and laboratories for stillborn decrees into which they had very rapidly degenerated.

What shall we do, then, in order to destroy bureaucracy in the party and replace it with the workers' democracy? First of all it is necessary to understand that our leaders are wrong when they say: "Just now we agree to loosen the reins loose somewhat, for there is no immediate danger on the military front, but as soon as we again feel danger we will return to 'the military system' in the party." They are wrong. We must remember what heroism saved Petrograd, more than once defended Lugansk, other centers and whole regions. Was it the Red Army alone? No, the heroic self-activity and initiative of the worker masses was also involved. Every comrade will recall that during the moments of supreme danger the party always appealed to the self-activity of the masses, for it saw in them the anchor of salvation. It is quite true that in times of danger party and class discipline must be more strict and there must be more self-sacrifice, exactitude in performing duties etc. However, there is a great difference between these manifestations of class spirit and the "blind subordination" that is being developed lately by the party.

The Workers' Opposition, together with a group of responsible workers in Moscow, in the name of party regeneration and elimination of bureaucracy from Soviet institutions demands the complete implementation of all democratic principles, not only for the present period of respite but also for times of internal and external tension. This is the first and basic prerequisite for the party's regeneration, for its return to the principles of its program, from which it is in practice deviating more and more under the pressure of elements that are foreign to it.

The second prerequisite, fulfillment of which is adamantly insisted upon by the Workers' Opposition, is the expulsion from the party of all non-proletarian elements. As Soviet authority increases, the number of middle class and openly hostile elements who join the party increase. The elimination of these elements must be complete and thorough. Those in charge of it must take into account the fact that all the most revolutionary elements from the non-workers had joined the party during the first period of the October Revolution. The party must become a workers' party, for only then will it be able to forcefully repel the influences that are being brought to bear upon it by the petty-bourgeois elements, peasants or the faithful servants of capital—the specialists.

The Workers' Opposition proposes to register all members who are non-workers and who have joined the party since 1919, while granting them the right to appeal the decisions within three months so that they might join the party again. At the same time it is necessary to establish "a working status" for all non-working element which will attempt to return to the party, by providing that every applicant for membership in the party must have worked a certain period of time at manual labor under general working conditions before he becomes eligible for enrollment into the party.

The third decisive step toward democratization of the party is the elimination of all non-workers' elements from all the administrative positions. In other words, the central, provincial, and county committees of the party must be composed so that workers closely connected with the working masses would have the preponderant majority therein.

Another demand which is closely tied to this aspect of the Opposition's position is the conversion of all our party centres, beginning with the Central Committee and including the provincial and county committees, from institutions dictating the details of the daily life of Soviet politics and petty interference in this or that activity into institutions of control over Soviet policy.

We have already remarked that the crisis in our party is a direct outcome of the three contradictory tendencies that correspond to the three different social groups, viz.: the working class, the peasantry together with the middle class and the elements of former bourgeoisie (specialists, technicians, and men of affairs). The problems of national importance compel both the local and central state institutions, including the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, to lend an ear to and conform with the distinct tendencies of these groups which compose the population of Soviet Russia. As a result the class line of the general policy is blurred and the necessary stability is lost. Considerations of general interests begin to outweigh the interests of workers.

In order that the Central Committee and party committees can stand firmly behind our class policy and call all our state institutions to order each time one of their decisions deviate from the party program (as it happened, for instance, in the question dealing with the trade unions) it is necessary to *reduce the number* of such responsible [party] officials who at the same time hold responsible posts in the state institutions. We must remember that Soviet Russia so far has not been a socially homogeneous unit, but on the contrary, represents a heterogeneous social conglomeration. Therefore the state authority is compelled to reconcile all these sometimes even hostile interests by choosing the middle ground.

In order for the Central Committee of our party to become the supreme directing center of our class policy, the organ of class thought and control over the practical policy of the soviets and the spiritual personification of our basic program, it is necessary, particularly in the Central Committee, to restrict to a minimum the multiple office holding by those who hold membership in the Central Committee and occupy high posts in the Soviet government. For this purpose the Workers' Opposition proposes the formation of party centers which would serve as organs of ideal control over the Soviet institutions and would direct their actions along clear-cut class policies. Moreover, in order to increase party activity it will be necessary to decree that at least one-third of the actual party members in the centers must be permanently forbidden to act as party members and Soviet officials at the same time.

The fourth basic demand of the Workers' Opposition is that the party must *return* to the elective principle. Appointments should be permissible only as exceptions, but lately they have become the rule. Appointments are very characteristic of bureaucracy and currently they are a general, legalized and well recognized daily occurrence. The procedure of appointments produces a very unhealthy atmosphere in the party and disrupts the relationship of equality among the members by rewarding friends and punishing enemies as well as by other harmful practices in our party and Soviet life. Appointments lessen the sense of duty and responsibility to the masses in the ranks of appointees because they are not responsible to the masses. This condition makes the line of division between the leaders and the rank and file members still sharper.

Every appointee, as a matter of fact, is beyond any control because the leaders are unable to supervise his activity, while the masses cannot call him to account and discharge him if necessary. As a rule every appointee is surrounded by an atmosphere of officialdom, servility and blind subordination, which infects all subordinates and discredits the party.

The practice of appointments completely rejects the principle of collective work and it breeds irresponsibility. Appointments by the leaders must be eliminated and replaced by the elective principle on all levels in the party. Candidates shall be eligible to occupy responsible administrative positions only when they have been elected by conferences and congresses.

Finally, in order to eliminate bureaucracy and make the party healthier it is necessary to revert to the time when important questions pertaining to party activity and Soviet policy were submitted to the rank and file for consideration before being submitted to party leaders. This was the state of affairs when the party was forced to carry on its work in secret, and even as late as the signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

The current state of affairs is altogether different. In spite of the widely circulated promises made by the All-Russian Party Conference held in September, a question as important as that of concessions was decided for the masses quite arbitrarily. Only as a result of the sharp controversy which arose within the party centers themselves was the question of trade unions opened to debate.

Wide publicity, freedom of opinion and discussion, the right to criticize within the party and among the trade union members are decisive steps that can put an end to the prevailing system of bureaucracy. Freedom of criticism, the right of different factions to freely present their views at party meetings and the freedom of discussion are no longer the demands of the Workers' Opposition alone. Under growing pressure from the masses, a whole series of measures that were demanded by the rank and file long before the All-Russian Conference was held are presently recognized and officially promulgated. If one reads the proposals of the Moscow Committee regarding party structure one becomes proud of the great influence that is being exerted on the party centres. If it were not for the Workers' Opposition, the Moscow Committee would never have taken such a sharp "turn to the left." However, we must not overestimate this "leftism," for it is only a declaration of principles to the congress. It may happen, as it has happened many times with the decisions of our party leaders during these years, that this radical declaration will be forgotten. Usually these principles are accepted by our party centers only when mass impetus is felt and as soon as life returns to normal the decisions are forgotten.

Did not this happen to the decision of the Eighth Congress, when it resolved to use discretion in accepting non-working elements and eliminate from the party elements who joined it for some selfish motives? What has become of the decision made by the party Conference in 1920 to replace the practice of appointments by recommendations? The inequality in the party still exists in spite of the repeated resolutions passed on this subject. Comrades who dare to disagree with the decrees from the above continue to be persecuted. There are many such instances. If these decisions are not enforced then it is necessary to eliminate the basic cause that interferes with their enforcement, that is, to remove from the party those who are afraid of publicity, strict accountability before the rank and file, and freedom of criticism.

Non-working members of the party and those workers who fell under their influence are afraid of all this. It is not enough to cleanse the party of all non-proletarian elements by registration and increasing the control during enrollment, etc. It is also necessary to create opportunities for the workers to join the party. It is necessary to simplify the admission of workers to the party, to create a more friendly atmosphere in the party itself so that the workers might feel themselves at home and might see responsible party officials not as superiors but as more experienced comrades who seriously consider workers' needs and interests and are ready to share their knowledge, experience and skill. How many comrades, particularly young workers, are driven away from the party because we manifest our impatience with them by our assumed superiority and strictness instead of teaching them and educating them in the spirit of communism.

In addition to the spirit of bureaucracy, an atmosphere of officialdom finds a fertile ground in our party. If there is any comradeship in our party it exists only among the rank and file members.

The task of the party congress is to take into account this unpleasant reality and ponder over the question: why does the Workers' Opposition insist on introducing equality, eliminating all privileges in the party and making those administrative officials who are elected by the masses accountable to them. Thus in its struggle to establishing democracy in the party and eliminate all bureaucracy the Workers' Opposition advances three cardinal principles:

(1) The return to the principle of election along with elimination of bureaucracy and make all responsible officials answerable to the masses.

(2) The introduction of extensive publicity within the party concerning both general questions and ones involving individuals; paying more attention to the voice of the rank and file (wide discussion of all issues in general assemblies, and the leaders paying attention to those; the admission of any member to the meetings of party centers except when problems discussed require particular secrecy); the establishment of freedom of opinion and expression (giving the right not only to criticize freely during discussions, but to use funds for publication of literature proposed by different party factions).

(3) Making the party more of a workers' party with limitations imposed on those who occupy simultaneously offices in the party and in Soviet institutions.

This last demand is particularly important and essential for the reason that our party must not only build communism but prepare and educate the masses for a prolonged period of struggle against world capitalism which may take on new and unexpected forms. It would be childish to imagine that having repelled the invasion of the White Guard and imperialism on the military fronts we are free from the danger of a new attack from the world capital which is striving to seize Soviet Russia by roundabout ways such as penetrating into our life and using the Soviet republic for its own ends. This is the potent danger that we must guard against and herein lies the problem for our party—how to prepare to meet the enemy and how to rally all the proletarian forces around the clear-cut class positions (the other groups of the population will always gravitate to capitalism). It is the duty of our leaders to carry on preparations for this new page of our revolutionary history.

The correct answer to the question will be possible only when we succeed in uniting the party on all levels not only together with the Soviet institutions, but with the trade unions as well. In the latter case the holding of multiple offices—in both the party and the trade unions—not only does not lead the party to deviate from the clear-cut class line, but on the contrary renders the party more immune to the influences of world capitalism during this coming epoch, influences that are exerted through concessions and trade agreements. To make the Central Committee one with the workers is to create a central committee where representatives of the lower levels, connected with the masses, would not play the role of "parading generals" or a merchant's wedding party. Instead the committee would become closely tied to the wide non-party working masses in the trade unions, thus enabling them to formulate the slogans of the time, express workers' needs, and aspirations and direct the policy of the party along class lines.

Such is the line of the Workers' Opposition. Such is its historic task. Regardless of derisive remarks the leaders of our party may employ in order to drive away the Opposition, it is the only vital active force with which it is compelled to contend and to which it will have to pay attention.

Historical Necessity of the Opposition

Now the question remains: Is the Opposition necessary? Is it necessary, on behalf of the world workers' liberation from the yoke of capital, to welcome its formation? Or is it an

undesirable movement, detrimental to the fighting energy of the party and destructive to its ranks?

Every comrade not prejudiced against the Opposition and who wants to approach the question with an open mind and analyze it, not in accordance with what the recognized authorities tell him, will see even from these brief outlines that the Opposition is useful and necessary. It is useful primarily because it has awakened slumbering thought. During these years of revolution we have been so preoccupied with our pressing affairs that we had ceased to appraise our actions from the standpoint of principle and theory. We have forgotten that it is not only during the period of struggle for political power that the proletariat can commit grave mistakes and turn toward the morass of opportunism. Even during the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat such mistakes are possible, particularly when we are surrounded on all sides with stormy waves of imperialism and when the Soviet republic is compelled to act in the capitalist environment. At such times our leaders must be not only wise "statesman-like" politicians but also be able to lead the party and the whole working class along the line of class reconcilability and class creativity, and to prepare it for a prolonged struggle against the new forms of attack on the Soviet republic by bourgeois influences of world capitalism. "Be ready, be clear—but along the class lines"—such must be the slogan of our party, now more than ever.

The Workers' Opposition has put these questions forward, thus rendering its historical service. The thought begins to move, members began to analyze what has already been done. Wherever there is criticism, analysis and where thought moves and works, there is life, progress and advancement forward toward the future. There is nothing more frightful and harmful than sterility of thought and standards of routine. We have been retiring into routine and might inadvertently have gone off the direct class road leading to communism if it were not for the Workers' Opposition injecting itself into the situation at a time when our enemies were about to burst into joyful laughter. At present this is already impossible. The Congress and, therefore, the party will be compelled to contend with the point of view expressed by the Workers' Opposition and either compromise or make essential concessions under its pressure and influence.

The second service of the Workers' Opposition is that it has brought forward for discussion the question of who, after all, shall be called upon to create new forms of economy will it be the technicians, men of affairs who by their psychology are bound-up with the past, and state officials with communists scattered among them, or the working class collectives which are represented by the unions? The Workers' Opposition has said what has long ago been printed in "the Communist Manifesto" by Marx and Engels, viz.: "Creation of communism can and will be the work of the toiling masses themselves. Creation of communism belongs to workers." Finally, the Workers' Opposition has raised its voice against bureaucracy, and has dared to say that bureaucracy binds the wings of self-activity and the creativity of the working class. It deadens thought and hinders initiative and experimentation when exploring new avenues of production. In a word—it hinders the development of new forms of production and life.

Instead of a system of bureaucracy it proposes a system of self-activity for the masses. In this respect the party leaders are even now making concessions and "recognizing" the deviations as being harmful to communism and detrimental to the working class interests (the rejection of centralism). The Tenth Congress we understand, will make another series of concessions to the Workers' Opposition. Thus, in spite of the fact that the Workers' Opposition appeared just as a mere group inside the party only a few months ago, it has already fulfilled its mission and has compelled the directing party centers to listen to the workers' sound advice. At present, whatever might be the wrath toward the Workers' Opposition it has the historical future to support it.

Because we believe in the vital forces of our party we know that after some hesitation, resistance and circuitous political moves our party will ultimately follow that path which has been blazed by the elemental forces of the class organized proletariat. There will be no split. If some groups leave the party they will not be the ones that make up the Workers' Opposition. Only those will leave the party who attempt to transform certain temporary deviations from the Communist program (caused by the long civil war) into principles and a line of political action. That part of the party which has reflected the class point of view of the ever growing proletariat will absorb and digest everything that is wholesome, practical and sound in the Workers' Opposition. The rank and file worker not in vain, will speak with assurance and reconciliation: "Ilyich (Lenin) will ponder, think matters over, listen to us, and then will decide to turn the party rudder toward the Opposition. Ilyich will be with us yet."

The sooner the party leaders take into account the Oppositions' work and follow the road marked by the rank and file members, the quicker we shall pass through the party crisis at such a difficult time and the sooner we shall step over the destined line beyond which humanity, having freed itself from the objective economic laws and profiting by the rich scientific treasure of the workers' collective, will consciously begin to create the human history of the Communist epoch.

A. Kolontay [Kollontai], *The Workers' Opposition in Russia* (Chicago: Industrial Workers of the World, 1922), extensively modified.



PEASANT REVOLT: THE TAMBOV, OR ANTONOV, REBELLION

Late Winter-Early Spring, 1921

Peasant armed resistance to the Soviet government's confiscatory agrarian policies was one of the major features of 1920 and early 1921. Although even the largest peasant revolts, such as that in Tambov province, never seriously threatened the Soviet state, the fear of peasant rebellion spreading to the extent where it could was an old one in Russia. The peasant revolt in Tambov, sometimes called the Antonov revolt after its main leader, S. A. Antonov, was perhaps the most important such revolt. It illustrated the extent of peasant discontent in 1920. Nicknamed the "Greens" for their forest refuges, these peasant bands opposed both the Reds and Whites of the Civil War. It was no accident that the Tambov revolt developed after the threat of a White victory was past. The history of the Tambov, and other peasant revolt, is, by the nature of the event and the scarcity and tendentiousness of sources, difficult to reconstruct. The account given here, from an emigre Socialist Revolutionary newspaper in Prague, Volia Rossii, 22 and 23 April 1921, summarizes the history of the Tambov uprising and peasant resistance to Bolshevik exactions. It would have been based on information from early 1921, when the uprising was still at its height but before the fierce fighting of Spring 1921 that broke the Antonov forces and before the declaration of the New Economic Policy which undercut peasant opposition. The existence of the Tambov and lesser peasant revolts must be considered one of the factors leading Lenin to the "peasant Brest," as he called the New Economic Policy—see documents below. This account is written from the perspective of the Socialist Revolutionaries whose resistance to the Soviet regime was in its last stages. Therefore, claims for their role in the Tambov Peasant's Union and about

Antonov's relationship to the party should be treated cautiously as should its claims of the extent of desertions from the Red Army. Of particular note is the "Program of the Tambov Peasant's Union," which is included. It gives an insight into the outlook of the peasants and into the amalgam of peasant values and Socialist Revolutionary ideology which served as programs for such revolts.

The Peasant Revolt in the Province of Tambov

Rebellious sentiment has been smoldering for a long time in the Tambov plains, having been engendered almost simultaneously with the coming into power of the Soviet rule. From time to time this sentiment breaks into open flame, and then the bells of the villages are tolling ominously across the fields, multitudes of insurgent peasants are gathering, railway tracks are taken apart, the hateful 'Commissars' disappear from the villages, and not a trace remains of the Communist 'nuclei.' This is followed by the arrival of troops, and then savage vengeance is meted out to the rebels. The so-called 'Peasants' Government of the Bolsheviki makes cruel reprisals on the peasants, extirpating by fire and sword the very thought of a genuine peasant government.

Stifling their exasperation, the peasants once more harness themselves to the Bolshevik yoke and watch silently the Bolshevik officials returning to the villages and making themselves comfortable on the 'broad backs of the peasantry.'

Then again there comes an end to the patience of the Tambov peasants, and again the village bells are heard tolling across the plains. This story has been repeating itself every year since 1918. And only the village cemetery knows how many gray and blond heads the Tambov peasants have laid down in their struggle for freedom.

In the Fall of 1920 the Tambov peasantry once more revolted and attacked the Soviet authorities with clubs and pitchforks. Ever since there has been a state of open rebellion; and, now subsiding, now flaring up again in full force, the struggle has been going on continuously, being carried on by partisan detachments scattered broadcast and disappearing from view entirely if too greatly outnumbered.

In common with other revolutionary organizations, the Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries organized in the Spring of 1920 the 'Tambov Peasants' Union' which succeeded within a brief period in covering the entire Tambov district with a network of branches. The Union had not yet fully succeeded in organizing the whole peasantry when, quite unexpectedly for its leaders, a spontaneous peasant insurrection broke out in the south of the Tambov district. This movement started on the 12th of August in the village of Kamenka at the very moment when a well attended district convention of the peasantry was being held at a place about 10 miles distant from the city of Tambov.

The occasion for that particular uprising among the peasants of Kamenka was furnished by the arrival of a requisitioning detachment which began to collect additional levies of grain. Seven members of the detachment were killed by the peasants, and the village then realized that it would not escape Bolshevik retaliation. Thereupon a peasant 'Staff' was hastily organized, trenches were dug, and the villagers prepared under the leadership of the local branch of the Peasant Union to repel the punitive expedition of the Bolsheviki. The latter was not slow in making its appearance. Soon there appeared 20 cavalymen from the direction of the Sampur railway station. A brief fusiliade of shots was exchanged, as a result of which the punitive expedition was beaten and fled. This first expedition was followed by a second and third one, with increasing numbers of soldiers, but these, too, were routed by the peasants.

A Secret Meeting in the Night

Learning of the happenings at Kamenka, the regional committee of the Peasants' Union, whose headquarters was at the village of Khitrovo, held a meeting of its members during the night in a barn, to decide upon the attitude to be taken with respect to the Kamenka

events. Although the meeting voted to abstain from rendering assistance, the participants had not yet managed to leave the barn when they found themselves surrounded on all sides by a detachment of about 30 cavalymen which galloped up to the scene. Thanks to the darkness, however, most of the members succeeded in making their escape, but three of the peasant were held and driven off along the road towards Sampur under the convoy of the detachment. The villagers of Khitrovo then decided to free the prisoners by force, and in the morning they started out in pursuit of the soldiers. They surrounded the detachment, defeated it and freed the prisoners. The remnant of the detachment were captured, while several of the soldiers who turned out to be Communists were shot by the peasants. In this manner the peasants of Khitrovo were also, against their own will, drawn into the sanguinary strife that had commenced in Kamenka.

The ensuing events came about with amazing swiftness. For the suppression of the insurrection there were despatched from the Sampur station and from Tambov, one after another, several detachments of the 'Vokhra' (special police force for putting down insurrections in Bolshevik Russia) and military cadets. By the time they arrived the news of the events at Kamenka and Khitrovo had spread throughout the whole region, and one village after another began to make preparations for the inevitable clash with the troops. All the concealed supplies of arms were brought forward in the villages, 'Staffs' were elected and here and there some trenches were dug.

The most stubborn resistance of all was offered by the peasants of Kapteva village. Three times in succession they repelled the attacks of the Government troops, each time routing them completely. Meanwhile one village after another was overthrowing its Soviet and, arming itself with anything that came to hand,—rifles, pitchforks, but mostly clubs—it made preparations for battle. The Soviet Executive Committee of Verkhodnie was killed by the peasants to the last man. From other villages the Bolshevik authorities fled themselves, and some even joined the rebels.

The strength of the rebels was growing from day to day. The troops sent to suppress them showed little energy and mostly retreated without a fight, and even in cases where they did make use of their arms they soon gave way before the onslaught of the peasants.

Encouraged by their successes, the peasants resolved to take Tambov. This army of peasants on the march to Tambov presented a striking appearance. Along the highway there was moving forward, amidst clouds of dust, silently and ominously, a multitude of thousands of peasants. They had their own cavalry as well as infantry. Most of them were only armed with weapons made by themselves, such as axes, pitchforks, clubs, etc.

The villages along the road welcomed the marching peasants with the ringing of churchbells, and furnished them with provisions and arms, adding detachments of their own to the army of peasants. As they were drawing nearer and nearer to Tambov, the insurgents were growing more and more numerous. All Bolshevik attempts to repel the peasants and to force them to give up their plan of marching on Tambov ended in failure. The insurgents advanced like an avalanche, easily beating off all attacks, and on the 1st of September they were already at Kuzminka, the last railway station before the city of Tambov along the Balashoff R. R. line. The Bolshevik authorities at Tambov were in a panic. To their luck, however, aid arrived at this most critical moment from neighboring provinces, and the insurgents were forced to retreat from Tambov after having come to within 10 miles of the city.

For some time the Bolsheviks again became masters of the situation. New punitive expeditions were organized and sent to the insurgent regions, where they established a bloody reign of all-around responsibility among the peasants for individual acts of hostility. Not to mention the large masses of peasants shot and killed, the exact number of which is beyond calculation, the punitive detachments also burned down to the ground several villages of the Tambov district. The first to suffer was the village of Kaptevo, which was put

to the torch simultaneously in several places and more than one-half of which was destroyed in the fire. The Bolsheviks also burned the villages of Khitrovo, Verkho-Denie, Verkhen-Spasskoie and others.

Who Is Antonov?

Wholesale shootings and fires concluded the first period of the Tambov peasant insurrection. That period was one of spontaneous, unorganized mass risings, without definite leadership. The second period commences from the moment when Antonov takes over the leadership of the defeated insurgents.

Antonov took part in the Revolution of 1905, while still a youth, and was imprisoned by the Tsar's Government for it. He spent 12 years at hard labor, and only the Revolution of 1917 opened the prison doors for him. Returning to his native city of Tambov, he was appointed chief of militia of the Kirsanov district of Tambov Province under the Provisional Government, which post he continued to hold for a brief period after the Bolshevik revolt.

In 1918 Antonov made an unsuccessful attempt to cross the line to the Samara front to join the anti-Bolshevik troops there, and had to go into hiding, having been condemned to death by the Bolsheviks. But from that moment on he becomes the hero of the masses throughout Tambov Province. The peasants are aiding him gladly, regarding him as the avenger of their downtrodden rights, while the Bolsheviks call him a bandit and send regular armies against him, but have failed during a period of two years to catch him, and vent their spleen on the innocent peasant population.

In the intervals between his acts of anti-Bolshevist terrorism Antonov managed to strengthen his ties with the peasantry, organizing them into local branches of the Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries, although he proved personally unwilling to submit to the orders of the Party Organization. But the rank and file of the peasantry were honestly convinced that by joining Antonov branches of the Party they were doing the bidding of that Party in their struggle against the Bolsheviks. The Tambov peasantry, in its search for a leader, rallied to the name of Antonov, and thus set in the second period of the peasant movement. Its main feature is the struggle by scattered partisan bands. From the offensive the peasants now turned to the defensive manner of warfare, breaking up into small, elusive detachments.

However, at first Antonov, too, succeeded in gathering about him rather formidable forces which enabled him from time to time to assume the offensive. His first appearance he made among the defeated peasants who were retreating from Tambov, in the beginning of September. He discharged all poorly armed insurgents, retaining only those who had either guns or rifles. Of these he formed a small detachment of cavalry and infantry.

His very first important engagement with the Bolshevik troops near the village of Zolotovka, in the district of Kirsanov, ended in the defeat of the latter, among whom there was also the so-called 'Trotsky Unit.' The first engagement was soon followed by others, and many of these, too, were victorious for the men of Antonov.

From the end of September the insurgents under Antonov's general command, apparently, begin to break up into several more or less independent partisan detachments. We say 'apparently' because otherwise, if we are to discard the theory of the multiplicity of the 'Antonov' army, it would be incredible that Antonov could ever attack in one day different places frequently located as far as 100 miles distant from each other.

Passing through villages, the insurgents disperse the Soviets; sometimes they burn the official archives and tell the peasants to take back the grain the Bolsheviks have made them haul to the Soviet granaries.

As for the punitive expeditions following in the wake of the Antonov partisan bands, they show but little inclination to fight against armed peasants. Almost every detachment of the Red Army sent out to 'pacify' the peasants gradually dwindles down by deserting on the way over the Tambov plains. Thus, out of two trainloads of troops despatched from

Griazy to the station of Mordovo with orders to recapture the sugar refinery, there arrived at the final destination only 50 soldiers.

We have already spoken about the villages burned down to the ground by the Bolsheviks' punitive expeditions, with all the ruined peasant families which that implies. Another favorite method of dealing with the refractory peasants of Tambov frequently used by the Bolsheviks consists of wholesale shooting. Within the brief period which the author of this article spent in the city of Tambov he had the opportunity to read three official lists giving the names of peasants shot there by the Bolsheviks. More than 150 names were given there. But what of the victims not mentioned in these lists?

Insurgents Forming Large Units Again

With the beginning of 1921, encouraged by their successful campaigns, the insurgents once more, as during the first period, began to form large 'regiments,' organized this time, however, according to sound military strategy, under the direction and command of regular Staffs. Although, according to an official statement of the Tambov Provincial Supply Commissariat, a Red Army of 100,000 men had been massed against Antonov by the middle of February, the soldiers were still reluctant to take the offensive against him, and went even as far as taking the part of the population in many instances against the punitive and foraging expeditions. So, for instance, there was a case in the village of Mordovo, in which the indignant soldiers forced the Bolshevik authorities to set at liberty about 100 old men, women and children brought there from the village of Politovo under the convoy of a detachment of Hungarians, as a punishment for a shot fired into that detachment (the young men of the village having fled before that).

More than once the regular troops which were sent to suppress the insurrections joined the partisans, or else turned over to them their arms and munitions. The only units of the Red Army to be relied on for prompt execution of official commands are the so-called 'international' ones, made up largely of Chinese and Hungarians, with only a few Russian units.

The insurgents, on the other hand, are acting with energy and precision, delivering short but telling blows. Recently they succeeded in capturing at the village of Inzhavino the whole itinerant staff of the Tambov Extraordinary Commission in the act of making the circuit of the district, in company with a detachment of executioners, and they dealt with them most severely.

Among particularly dramatic incidents of this insurrection the following deserves to be mentioned:

Towards the village of Yermolovka in the district of Usman, just abandoned by Antonov's men, a Government detachment of several hundred soldiers is making its way. Outside of the village, in the open field, they are met by five aged peasants who commence calmly and point-blank to shoot at them. Finally the peasants are surrounded and captured.

'Have you, idiots, gone mad altogether?' they are asked. 'What made you shoot?'

'It's the chaff we were defending,' answered the old fellows. 'Our grain has been taken away from us, but we are not going to give up our chaff, too!'

The peasants were led away, and nothing could be learned about their fate.

In conclusion, we shall quote a most interesting document which goes to show the sentiments of the insurgents. It is entitled 'Statutes of the Tambov Provincial Peasants' Union.' The document does not show great political skill in its composition. It is written in plain and unpolished peasant language, which only tends to enhance its intrinsic value as the true voice of the peasantry.

THE PROGRAMME OF THE PEASANTS' UNION.

The Peasants' Union regards it as its foremost task to overthrow the rule of the Communist-Bolsheviks who have brought the country to a state of destitution, disgrace and ruin.

For the purpose of destroying this oppressive power and its system, the Union, by forming volunteer partisan detachments, is carrying on an armed struggle, with the following objects in view:

- 1) Political equality of all citizens, without class distinctions, except the house of the Romanovs.
 - 2) Convocation of the Constituent Assembly on a basis of universal, direct, equal and secret ballot, without predetermining its acts in the matter of choosing and establishing a political system, and with the right for the voters to recall representatives who fail to express the will of the people.
 - 3) Pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, temporary local and central authorities are to be set up on an elective basis by associations and parties which are taking part in the struggle against the Communists.
 - 4) (Omitted, either in original text or through error in setting up the newspaper issue.)
 - 5) Freedom of speech, conscience, press, associations and assembly.
 - 6) Carrying out in real life the provisions of the law on the socialization of the land, adopted and confirmed by the former Constituent Assembly.
 - 7) Supplying with articles of prime necessity, with food in the very first place, the inhabitants of town and country through the medium of the co-operative societies.
 - 8) Regulation of wages and prices of commodities manufactured by factories and mills which are operated by the State.
 - 9) Partial denationalization of factories and mills. Essential industries (coal mining and metallurgical) should remain in the hands of the State.
 - 10) Workers' control and State supervision over industry.
 - 11) Admission of Russian and foreign capital to restore the economic life of the country.
 - 12) Immediate resumption of political and economic relations with foreign powers.
 - 13) Free self-determination for the nationalities and population of the former Russian Empire.
 - 14) Opening of extensive Government credits to individuals.
 - 15) Freedom to engage in cottage industries.
 - 16) Free instruction at school and general compulsory primary education.
 - 17) The partisan and volunteer detachments organized and operating at present shall not be disbanded until the convocation of a Constituent Assembly and until it shall have solved the problem of a regular army.
- The Tambov Provincial Peasants' Union.
 Long live the Peasants' Union!
 Long live the battle eagles who are leading the people along the path of truth!

Information Bulletin, 28 May 1921, pp. 113-117.



SEMASHKO ON PUBLIC HEALTH UNDER SOVIET POWER

[March] 1921

Public health in its various aspects—sanitation, medical care, etc.—was a major concern of the young Soviet state. This was seen as important both as a way to improve the life of the

population and as a way to facilitate building the new society and economy. In this article N. A. Semashko, the Commissar of Health, reported on achievements thus far and presented the regime's emphasis on preventive health measures. He refers also to the taking over of private facilities and mansions and turning them into state-run sanitoriums and clinics. These facilities and structures became a distinctive feature of the Soviet Union. That such an optimistic article falls, chronologically, in the midst of rebellion, famine, and the general crisis that led to the New Economic Policy, reflects the contradictory features of the early Soviet regime, and is an example of why foreign observers could draw such differing conclusions about it depending on which features and characteristics impressed them.

N. A. Semashko

The Soviet Power and the Public Health

To form an idea of the profound change brought about by the November Revolution, we must look into one of our "peaceful" activities: the protection of public health.

This activity felt the influence of the March Revolution less than any other. The March Revolution was as unfruitful for the medical organization and the practice of medicine as the biblical fig-tree. The November Revolution succeeded to what had existed in January: the same selfish bureaucracy, the same "hierarchy" of medicine (the best for the rich, the "leavings" for the poor) camouflaged by middle-class, democratic slogans, such as the best medical aid free and accessible to all. But the most important point, the organization of medical affairs, was absolutely wrong. The landowners and capitalists were not at all concerned with the health of the masses of the people; all they did was mend the health of the worker just enough to drive him back again to the sweat-shop. The result of such organization appeared in the budget as follows: 95 per cent of the whole budget (a very small one, of course) was fixed for medicaments, and only five per cent for prophylactic (the most important) medicine.

Under the old regime it could not be otherwise. As long as labor was unprotected, the health of the workers was unprotected. Regulations for the protection of labor ran up against an insurmountable wall—the interests of capitalist profit.

The bourgeoisie permitted only the discussion of mothers' and childrens' health protection, but never indulged in any serious reform. Without wholesome living quarters, good health is an impossibility; private property has secured the apartment houses for merchants' wives with their lapdogs, while underground dwellings are allotted to workers' wives with their children. Caste (i.e., class) medicine is inevitably bound up with the capitalist system.

The Soviet Government has done away with this deplorable state of affairs. It has surmounted the difficulties brought about by private property and profits. Medical activities are no longer hampered by social obstacles. Labor protection has taken children out of the factories; it has given sick-leave to women before and after childbirth; it has accomplished many other reforms, but, most important of all, it has entrusted the workers to the trade unions by turning over entirely to the latter all questions of labor protection.

The socialization of buildings and apartments made it possible to rescue pale-faced, weak, and sickly children from their basement dwellings. Nowhere else in the world has so much been done for the children as in struggling Soviet Russia during the last three years. Hundreds of thousands are now living in colonies housed in the former luxurious homes of the parasites of the working masses and their lap-dogs. This destitute republic, for the first time in the history of the world has introduced gratuitous feeding for children to the age of sixteen; for the first time also, it has been declared that there are no criminals under eighteen years of age, that they are only violators of law, mentally or physically sick, to be cured either under the Commissariat of Education or under that for Public Health; but not to be taken before the common law courts. For the first time, also, physical care and entertainment are being thought of. Children's establishments, such as orphan

asylums, homes, etc., are increasing from day to day; for the protection of mothers and children we have 402 establishments (of which 123 are asylums for babies and minors, 151 creches, 100 consultation depots and milk kitchens, 80 homes for mother and child, and lying-in hospitals).

In the sphere of medical science, medical aid is accessible and absolutely free to all. The number of sanitariums for the civilian population has, in spite of all kinds of difficulties, increased about 80 per cent over that of pre-war times. Over 100,000 beds were organized for use in epidemics last winter.

A long stride forward has been taken in regard to quality of medical service. In the sanitariums for tuberculosis (in the Russian Federal Soviet Republic alone, the other Soviet republics not included) more than 20,000 new beds and 100 new ambulatories for venereal diseases were established. Six are still to be opened (in the territory of Soviet Russia alone). New establishments of so high a grade as physical-mechanical therapeutic institutions were created (five are to be opened). Health resorts, once resorts of recreation and debauchery for the bourgeoisie, have been transformed into real health resorts for workers; according to incomplete statistical data, our health resorts (not including the Crimea) were frequented last summer by 65,000 patients, 75 per cent of whom were workers, peasants, and Red Army soldiers. All healing powers and remedies have been taken from private individuals and placed at the service of the whole nation. The private sanitariums have ceased to be a means of enrichment to their proprietors, and are now nationalized; the sale of drugs by speculators has been stopped, and all drugs are now in the hands of the government.

Special attention has been given to the Red Army. In the field of army-sanitary administration, the Soviet Government inherited only atrocities and brutalities from the Tsarist regime. Here literally everything had to be created from nothing. We now have 397,496 beds in military hospitals and 242 completely equipped ambulances. We have improved institutions, equipping trains with bathrooms, laundries, and provisioning trains so that they would now be the pride of any European military medical organization. And most important of all, we have a vast rigidly disciplined organ for the valuation of requirements of the Red Army.

All this had to be accomplished under very difficult conditions, known only to those engaged in this task.

Russia has never ceased to be a victim of epidemics. Suffering from cold and famine, ruined by the world war, Russia was overwhelmed by epidemics, one more virulent than another, with spotted typhus, intermittent fever, and typhoid; Spanish influenza and cholera relieved and followed each other. It is a characteristic fact that the former White Guard border provinces (Siberia and Ukraine) infected our Red Army (not inversely) and through them our civilian population. Even their larger food supplies and the aid of the Almighty Entente, could not save them from the results of their sanitary and social laws. Where work, sweating, and ignorance exist, there will always be epidemics: the best remedy is Socialism.

What gave us the power not only to fight epidemics, but to overcome other difficulties as well? How did the Soviet power overcome them? Most of all by the mobilization of the whole population: "The health of the working class is properly the worker's affair." We not only preached but practiced this. Anti-epidemic commissions, made up of workers, peasants, and soldiers of the Red Army were organized "to fight for cleanliness" in every city, in each body of troops, and in the villages. Every important sanitary decision was first discussed with the representatives of the trade unions, the women's division, and the young people's organization, and then it was executed. The whole task was supported by an educational activity unknown before not only in Russia, but in the whole world. The Commissariat for Public Health published during two years (the National publications, the committee in memory of W. M. Bonch-Bruyevich and the local publication not included) over 8

million announcements, 395,000 placards, and 434,000 copies of popular pamphlets. Only the cooperation of the whole working population made it possible to overcome difficulties which sometimes seemed insurmountable.

Indeed, there is still much to be finished, much more to be begun, there are still defects and imperfections. But in spite of these we survived the most critical period and have come off victorious. The most difficult achievements lie behind us. The future is guaranteed by the amelioration of our position in general, the social basis on which we stand, and the experience which we have acquired.

Soviet Russia, Vol. 4, No. 10 (5 March 1921), pp. 238-239.



RESOLUTION OF THE KRONSTADT SAILORS

1 March 1921

The winter of 1920-21 saw widespread discontent, peasant rebellions and worker unrest. These were fed by the shortage of food, hard living conditions, and resentment of the forced labor policies, among other factors. The immediate spark for the Kronstadt uprising was a strike movement in Petrograd, with anti-communist as well as economic demands, to which the government responded with force. In reaction to the events in the city, the sailors of the Kronstadt naval base, in the harbor of Petrograd, sent a delegation to investigate. The Kronstadt sailors had a long history of turbulence, had been among the most radical elements in 1917, and were among the most reliable forces the Bolsheviks had during the Civil War. Trotsky had called them the pride of the revolution. Therefore their actions had special significance for the regime. The combination of their growing disillusionment with the Soviet government and the strike activities in Petrograd produced this resolution, which in turn led to the Kronstadt revolt. The nature of the demands of the Kronstadters were a basic threat to the monopoly of power held by the Communist Party, and the latter reacted with a furious assault, both propaganda and military, which turned general discontent into armed revolt.

RESOLUTION OF THE GENERAL MEETING OF THE 1ST AND 2ND SQUADRONS, HELD ON 1 MARCH 1921

Having heard the report of the representatives sent by the general meeting of ships' crews to Petrograd to investigate the situation there, we resolve:

1. In view of the fact that the present soviets do not express the will of the workers and peasants, immediately to hold new elections by secret ballot, with freedom to carry on agitation beforehand for all workers and peasants;
2. To give freedom of speech and press to workers and peasants, to anarchists and left socialist parties;
3. To secure freedom of assembly for trade unions and peasant organizations;
4. To call a nonparty conference of the workers, Red Army soldiers, and sailors of Petrograd, Kronstadt, and Petrograd province, no later than March 10, 1921;
5. To liberate all political prisoners of socialist parties, as well as all workers, peasants, soldiers, and sailors imprisoned in connection with the labor and peasant movements;

6. To elect a commission to review the cases of those being held in prisons and concentration camps;

7. To abolish all political departments because no party should be given special privileges in the propagation of its ideas or receive the financial support of the state for such purposes. Instead, there should be established cultural and educational commissions, locally elected and financed by the state;

8. To remove immediately all roadblock detachments;

9. To equalize the rations of all working people, with the exception of those employed in trades detrimental to health;

10. To abolish the Communist fighting detachments in all branches of the army, as well as the Communist guards kept on duty in factories and mills. Should such guards or detachments be found necessary, they are to be appointed in the army from the ranks and in the factories and mills at the discretion of the workers;

11. To give the peasants full freedom of action in regard to the land, and also the right to keep cattle, on condition that the peasants manage with their own means, that is, without employing hired labor;

12. To request all branches of the army, as well as our comrades the military cadets (*kursanty*), to endorse our resolution;

13. To demand that the press give all our resolutions wide publicity;

14. To appoint an itinerant bureau of control;

15. To permit free handicrafts production by one's own labor.

Petrichenko, Chairman of the Squadron Meeting

Perepelkin, Secretary

Paul Avrich, *Kronstadt, 1921* (1970), pp. 73-74, and *Pravda o Kronshadtie* (Prague, 1921), pp. 9-10.



KRONSTADT: SOVIET ULTIMATUMS

5 March 1921

Any prospect for ending the Kronstadt affair—see 1 March above—by negotiation was quickly dissipated by the harsh demands of the Bolshevik leadership, which denied all legitimacy to their grievances and branded it a counterrevolutionary movement led by White generals. The two following ultimatums, the first by Trotsky as Commissar of War and the second issued by the Petrograd Defense Committee, led by Zinoviev, were typical of the confrontational approach. Kozlovsky was a Red Army general and former Tsarist officer, an artillery specialist serving on Kronstadt at the time. He became the focus of Bolshevik efforts to portray Kronstadt as a vast counterrevolutionary plot, but in fact did not play any leadership role in the Kronstadt movement except in his technical capacity as artillery specialist. See also the Kronstadt response, 8 March, below.

I

A LAST WARNING

To the garrison and inhabitants of Kronstadt
and the Mutinous Forts

The Workers' and Peasants' Government has decreed that Kronstadt and the rebellious ships must immediately submit to the authority of the Soviet Republic. Therefore, I command all who have raised their hands against the socialist fatherland to lay down their arms at once. The obdurate will be disarmed and turned over to the Soviet authorities. The arrested commissars and other representatives of the government must be liberated at once. Only those who surrender unconditionally may count on the mercy of the Soviet Republic. At the same time, I am issuing orders to prepare to quell the mutiny and subdue the mutineers by force of arms. Responsibility for the harm that may be suffered by the peaceful population will fall entirely upon the heads of the counterrevolutionary mutineers. This warning is final.

[signed] Trotsky, Kamenev,
Tukhachevsky, Lebedev

II

TO THE DECEIVED PEOPLE OF KRONSTADT.

Do you see where the rascals have led you? Here is your position. The greedy fangs of former Tsarist generals are already showing themselves behind the Social-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. All these Petrichenkos and Toukins are manipulated like puppets by the Tsarist general Kozlovsky, Captain Borkser, Kostromitinoff, Chirmanovsky and other proved White guards. They are duping you! They tell you that you are struggling for *democracy*, but two days have hardly passed and you see that you are not really fighting for democracy but for Tsarist generals. You have permitted a new Wiren to put a rope around your necks.

They lie to you that Petrograd is with you, that Siberia and the Ukraine support you. All these are only cynical lies. The last sailor in Petrograd turned his back on you when he learned that Tsarist generals like Kozlovsky were among you. Siberia and the Ukraine firmly defend the Soviet power. Petrograd, the Red city, sneers at the pitiful pretensions of a handful of Social-Revolutionaries and White guardists.

You are completely surrounded. In a few more hours you will have to surrender. Kronstadt has neither bread nor fuel. If you persist you will be shot like partridges. Naturally, all these generals—Kozlovsky and Borkser—all the wretches like Petrichenko and Toukin, will flee at the last moment to the White guardists in Finland. But you others, simple deceived sailors and Red soldiers, where will you go? If they are promising to provide for you in Finland, they are fooling you again. Don't you know that the soldiers of General Wrangel, led away to Constantinople, died like flies of hunger and disease? The same fate awaits you if you don't come to your senses immediately.

Surrender right away, without losing a moment! Lay down your arms and come over to us! Disarm and arrest the criminal leaders, especially the Tsarist generals! The errors of anyone who surrenders immediately will be forgiven. Surrender immediately!

Petrograd Defence Committee.

Paul Avrich, *Kronstadt, 1921*, p. 144; Alexander Volinc, *The Unknown Revolution*, pp. 233-234; *Pravda*, (8 March 1921).



KRONSTADT: "WHAT WE ARE FIGHTING FOR"

8 March 1921

See headnote to 1 March above. After the Communist forces launched their attack on Kronstadt, the sailors issued the following explanation of the basic principles they were defending in the hope of gathering widespread support in Russia. They issued many such appeals and declarations, but this one perhaps best states the underlying ideals which they defended in the face of an increasingly hopeless situation. After a battle of tremendous ferocity and with thousands of deaths, Kronstadt was finally taken on 18 March. The uprising and its suppression had a strong impact on the events of the Communist Party as it gathered for the Tenth Party Congress, which opened while the assault was still underway.

WHAT WE ARE FIGHTING FOR

After carrying out the October Revolution, the working class had hoped to achieve its emancipation. But the result was an even greater enslavement of the human personality. The power of the police and gendarme monarchy passed into the hands of the Communist usurpers, who, instead of giving the people freedom, instilled in them the constant fear of falling into the torture chambers of the Cheka, which in their horrors far exceed the gendarme administration of the tsarist regime. The bayonets, bullets, and gruff commands of the Cheka *oprichniki*—these are what the workingman of Soviet Russia has won after so much struggle and suffering. The glorious emblem of the workers' state—the sickle and hammer—has in fact been replaced by the Communist authorities with the bayonet and barred window, for the sake of maintaining the calm and carefree life of the new bureaucracy of Communist commissars and functionaries.

But most infamous and criminal of all is the moral servitude which the Communists have inaugurated: they have laid their hands also on the inner world of the toilers, forcing them to think in the Communist way. With the help of the bureaucratized trade unions, they have fastened the workers to their benches, so that labor has become not a joy but a new form of slavery. To the protests of the peasants, expressed in spontaneous uprisings, and those of the workers, whose living conditions have driven them out on strike, they answer with mass executions and bloodletting, in which they have not been surpassed even by the tsarist generals. Russia of the toilers, the first to raise the red banner of labor's emancipation, is drenched in the blood of those martyred for the glory of Communist domination. In this sea of blood, the Communists are drowning all the great and glowing pledges and watchwords of the workers' revolution. The picture has been drawn more and more sharply, and now it is clear that the Russian Communist party is not the defender of the toilers that it pretends to be. The interests of the working people are alien to it. Having gained power, it is afraid only of losing it, and therefore deems every means permissible: slander, violence, deceit, murder, vengeance upon the families of the rebels.

The long-suffering patience of the toilers is at an end. Here and there the land is lit up by the fires of insurrection in a struggle against oppression and violence. Strikes by the workers have flared up, but the Bolshevik *okhrana* agents have not been asleep and have taken every measure to forestall and suppress the inevitable third revolution. But it has come nevertheless, and it is being made by the hands of the toilers themselves. The generals of Communism see clearly that it is the people who have risen, convinced that the ideas of socialism have been betrayed. Yet, trembling for their skins and aware that there is no escape from the wrath of the workers, they still try, with the help of their *oprichniki*, to terrorize the rebels with prison, firing-squads, and other atrocities. But life under the yoke of the Communist dictatorship has become more terrible than death.

The rebellious working people understand that there is no middle ground in the struggle against the Communists and the new serfdom that they have erected. One must go on to the end. They give the appearance of making concessions: in Petrograd province roadblock detachments have been removed and 10 million gold rubles have been allotted for the

purchase of foodstuffs from abroad. But one must not be deceived, for behind this bait is concealed the iron hand of the master, the dictator, who aims to be repaid a hundred-fold for his concessions once calm is restored.

No, there can be no middle ground. Victory or death! The example is being set by Red Kronstadt, menace of counterrevolutionaries of the right and of the left. Here the new revolutionary step forward has been taken. Here is raised the banner of rebellion against the three-year-old violence and oppression of Communist rule, which has put in the shade the three-hundred-year yoke of monarchism. Here in Kronstadt has been laid the first stone of the third revolution, striking the last fetters from the laboring masses and opening a broad new road for socialist creativity.

This new revolution will also rouse the laboring masses of the East and of the West, by serving as an example of the new socialist construction as opposed to the bureaucratic Communist "creativity." The laboring masses abroad will see with their own eyes that everything created here until now by the will of the workers and peasants was not socialism. Without a single shot, without a drop of blood, the first step has been taken. The toilers do not need blood. They will shed it only at a moment of self-defense. In spite of all the outrageous acts of the Communists, we have enough restraint to confine ourselves only to isolating them from public life so that their malicious and false agitation will not hinder our revolutionary work.

The workers and peasants steadfastly march forward, leaving behind them the Constituent Assembly, with its bourgeois regime, and the dictatorship of the Communist party, with its Cheka and its state capitalism, whose hangman's noose encircles the necks of the laboring masses and threatens to strangle them to death. The present overturn at last gives the toilers the opportunity to have their freely elected soviets, operating without the slightest force of party pressure, and to remake the bureaucratized trade unions into free associations of workers, peasants, and the laboring intelligentsia. At last the policeman's club of the Communist autocracy has been broken.

Paul Avrich, *Kronstadt, 1921*, pp. 241-243.



THE TRADE UNION CONTROVERSY AT THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS

14 March 1921

The role of the trade unions in the Soviet state, their relationship to the Communist Party, their role in factory management, their independence in representing worker interests, and related issues were subjects of intense debate in 1920-21. These issues were the focus of the resolutions introduced at the Tenth Party Congress and debated on 14 March. The resolution introduced by a group led by Trotsky and Bukharin reflected the former's penchant for compulsion and centralized authority in labor and economic issues. A competing resolution on behalf of the "Workers' Opposition" was introduced by Alexander Shliapnikov, a former Commissar of Labor and at this time Chairman of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Union of Metalworkers. It argued for the important role of the trade unions in the running of the economy "In its final...form, the organizational structure of the economy...should lead to the concentration of the entire economic administration in the hands of the industrial trade

unions." In between these two in defining the role of the unions was the "Platform of the Ten," introduced by Lenin and Zinoviev. It carried the day with minor changes and became the resolution of the Congress. All three are given here, abridged for reasons of space, as abridged by the original editor-translator, James Bunyan. The summaries of omitted material are also Bunyan's. See also the article by Kollontai on the Workers' Opposition platform, above, February-March 1920.

I

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE 10TH CONGRESS ON THE QUESTION

"ABOUT THE ROLE AND TASKS OF TRADE UNIONS,"

PROPOSED BY L. TROTSKY, N. BUKHARIN AND OTHERS

Introduction

The comprehensive Party discussion on the role of the trade union has already accomplished a positive result in that it helped to clarify the basic issues at stake and to remove imaginary differences and plain misunderstandings. As a result of this discussion, it is possible now to affirm that there exist within the party three points of view on the trade-union question.

The position of the "Ten" is essentially an endorsement of the old practice of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions, which repudiates the need of a "*radical change in the methods and the tempo of work*" of the trade unions, sanctioned by the Ninth Party Congress. The position of the "Ten" completely ignores the deep crisis which the trade unions are passing through, a crisis which expresses itself in the utter aloofness in which the trade unions stand in relation to the economy and the lack of coordination between the methods and procedures of trade-union work and the production problems which the unions are facing.

While justly emphasizing the need for a resolute transition to methods of workers' democracy, the position of the "Ten" shuts its eyes to the fact that in and by themselves the methods of democracy within the unions—*without changing the position and the role of the unions in the workers' state*—will fail to solve the problem and bring the crisis to an end.

In some of its practical conclusions, the platform of the "Ten" is making a number of concessions to our point of view, but by and large it retains and sanctifies the condition of aloofness existing between the trade unions and the economic organizations. At times the two sides enter into temporary agreements, at others they are in conflict.

The platform of the "Workers' Opposition," while expressing a legitimate aim of concentrating the administration of industry in the hands of the trade unions, gives to this aim an utterly erroneous expression, both from a theoretical and practical point of view, and is shifting more and more in the direction of syndicalism.

Completely ignoring the fact that our economic organizations came into existence with the help of the trade unions and that, with all their bureaucratic traits, these economic organizations incorporate the accumulated organizational and economic experience of the workers' state, the "Workers' Opposition" proposes to consider dead and buried what has been done in the past in the field of economic construction and, rather than reorganize the existing economic organizations by the inclusion of larger numbers of workers in them, they propose to replace them mechanically by an elective representation of workers, starting with the plant and the mine and ending with the higher economic institutions of the Republic. Such a solution must inevitably lead, no matter what the intentions of the authors of these proposals may have been, to a disruption in the relations among factories and plants, to the destruction of the centralized economic machinery, and to the loss of the Party's leading influence over the trade unions, as well as over the economy....

The Nature of the Trade-Union Crisis

1. Concerning the question of the role and aims of the trade-union organizations during the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat, our Party program says: "The organizational apparatus of socialized industry must be based, first and foremost, on a trade-union foundation. Since, according to the laws of the Soviet Republic and existing practice, they are already participating in all local and central organs of industrial administration, *the trade unions must achieve a de facto concentration of the whole national economy* considered as a single economic unit. This will ensure the closest possible tie between the central machinery of state administration, the national economy, and the large masses of the toilers. In this way the trade unions will facilitate the widest possible participation of the toiling masses in the conduct of economic affairs. *The participation of the trade unions in the administration of the economy is at the same time the most important factor in the fight against the bureaucratization of the Soviet economic apparatus* and will make possible a genuine people's control over the results of production."

2. This self-evident and undisputable idea, expressed in the Party program, points to the fact that the taking over of production [management] by the trade unions, under the leadership of the Party and the general supervision of the workers' state, is something which cannot be achieved by a single act, but requires a long process of training, organization and grouping of the working class, necessitated by the economics of socialism. This process has already gone through a number of stages corresponding to the forms in which the trade unions participated in the organization of the economy. Thus, soon after the October Revolution the working class, mainly through the medium of the trade unions, created elementary organs to take over the nationalized enterprises. With the further development of economic institutions, an inevitable segregation between these economic institutions and the trade unions has taken place. The parallelism is leading to jurisdictional disputes, organizational friction, and conflicts. The efforts of the economic organizations during this period of specialization and segregation were directed toward limiting trade-union interference in economic life....

3. What is most urgently needed at this time is an earnest effort on the part of the trade-union leaders, as well as of the Party as a whole, to revitalize and strengthen the trade unions as soon as possible, to create a more intimate connection between the unions and the economic organizations, to correlate trade-union methods of work with the tasks in the economic field, and to ensure a greater influence of the trade unions in the organization of production. These are the objectives of the Party during the new epoch of economic construction.

The Trade Unions as the Prop of the Party

4. In presently undertaking their basic work directed toward the organization of the economy, the trade unions must not only preserve but also expand and intensify their role as mass organizations of the working class and draw systematically the millions of toilers, no matter how backward they may be, into participation in the life of the Soviet state. Real, i.e., living and conscious, as opposed to formal, consolidation of millions of workers into trade unions can be achieved only on the basis of active and creative participation of the trade unions in the economic life of the country. At the same time the conscious participation of millions of workers in economic construction will secure for the Party a firm class foundation and will enable the Soviet government to meet the difficulties arising from the economic fragmentation and the political backwardness of the multimillion masses of the peasantry.

Educational Work of the Trade Union ("The School of Communism")

5. The greatest problem of our epoch is the transformation of the trade unions into production unions, not in name only but in content as well. Under present-day conditions,

the educational work of the trade unions can unfold itself only on condition that greater and greater masses of workers are drawn into the work of organizing production.

[Paragraphs 6 and 7 repeat points that were stressed by Trotsky again and again: trade unions must shift their work to problems of industrial production rather than concentrate on workers' welfare.]

8. It is important to implant into the minds of working masses the idea that their interests are best defended by those who try to raise the productivity of labor, who are trying to improve the operation of the economy and to increase the amount of material goods. It is this type of organizer and administrator, if he satisfies the necessary political prerequisites, who should be elected to the leading positions in the trade unions on the same bases as workers from the bench [are elected]. The trade unions should train and support a new type of trade-union leader, [a leader] full of energy, economic initiative, looking upon economic activity not from the point of view of distribution and consumption, but from the viewpoint of expanded production, looking not with the eyes of a man bargaining with the Soviet government, but with the eyes of an economic organizer.

9. Production propaganda, which is a component part of production education, has as its basic aim the establishment of new relationships between the workers and what they are producing. Under capitalism the worker's ideas [about production] were determined by the fact that he was trying to liberate himself from the clutches of hired labor. But under present conditions the thoughts, the initiative, and the will of the workers must be centered first and foremost on improving the organization of production and on the more efficient use of machines and mechanisms....

The Fusion of the Trade Unions with the State

10. The fusion of the trade unions with the state has already gone a long way insofar as the claims of the state upon the workers are concerned. It is through the medium of the trade union that the state registers the worker, puts him on a specific job, sets norms for his output and wages for his work, and punishes him for infraction of labor discipline.

The other side of the fusion process, viz., the influence of the workers' trade unions on the organization of the economy, is lagging behind to a considerable extent. And yet, it is only the development of this second aspect of the fusion process that is capable of securing a proper place for the trade unions in the workers' state, and making it possible for the great masses of workers to understand the socialist character of compulsory labor which the trade unions are called upon to enforce and without which no solid economic improvement is possible.

11. The gradual concentration of production management in the hands of the trade unions, as is required by our [party] program, means the transformation, according to plan, of the trade unions into agencies of the workers' state, i.e., the gradual fusion of the trade union with the Soviet apparatus....

12. Fortifying the trade-union positions in the economic sphere is the most effective method of fighting against bureaucracy. On this point our party program states: "Participation of trade unions in economic management and the drawing of large masses of workers into this work are the principal methods of fighting against the bureaucratization of the economic apparatus." It follows that the fight against bureaucracy is not an independent problem that can be solved by means of special organizational measures. It is a component part of trade-union work directed toward training the masses in the processes of production and in the management of production. It follows that the fight against bureaucracy requires not so much the creation of new control organs as the improvement of existing economic organizations.

Methods of Persuasion and Methods of Compulsion in the Trade Unions

13. The principal method of trade-union work is not the method of compulsion but the method of persuasion, which does not in the least exclude the possibility that in case of

necessity the trade unions should also apply the methods of proletarian compulsion (mobilization of thousands of trade-union members for service, disciplinary courts, etc.). Reorganizing the trade unions by orders from above is certain to defeat its own end. The methods of workers' democracy, which were sharply curtailed in the three years of the most cruel civil war, should be re-established on a wide scale and first of all in the trade-union movement. It is necessary first of all to re-establish the system of electing officials for the various trade-unions organs and to reduce to an unavoidable minimum the practice of appointments from above. The trade unions should be built on the principle of democratic centralism. At the same time care should be taken to ensure that centralization and militarized forms of work do not degenerate into bureaucracy and "standpatism." The recourse to labor militarization made necessary by events will be crowned with success only to the extent that the Party, the Soviets, and the trade unions succeed in explaining to the masses of toilers the necessity of these measures for the salvation of the country.

The Party and the Trade Unions

14. In view of the exceptional importance which the trade-union movement is bound to acquire in the near future the Party should pay greater attention to the unions than it has done in the past. Party leadership within the trade-union movement should be greatly increased. But this leadership should involve, mainly, steering the ideological work of the trade unions and should not turn into petty tutelage over them or excessive interference in their daily work. The Communist factions within the trade unions are under control of the party organizations. The selection of the leading trade-union personnel should be under the supervisory control of the Party, which uses the party factions of the trade unions to ensure that the leading positions in the trade unions are occupied by men recommended by the Party. But the party organizations must strictly adhere to the normal methods of proletarian democracy, especially in the trade unions, where the selection of leaders must be made by the organized masses themselves.

15. [In this paragraph Trotsky maintains that only under the above conditions will the Party be in a position to exercise complete control over trade unions and at the same time to leave a certain amount of local independence to trade union leaders.]

The Trade Unions and the Political Departments

16. In the past, when the attention and the energies of the Party were directed predominantly to the [civil war] fronts, the Party was forced, under pressure of economic necessity, to create special organs, known as political administrations, for the purpose of carrying out special tasks which the trade unions were unable to perform. It was for this reason that the temporary organ—*Glavpolitput*—came into existence. The Ninth Party Congress has authorized that body "to adopt extraordinary measures necessitated by the terrific collapse of the transport system, so as to prevent its complete paralysis and the ruin of the Soviet Republic."

The Tenth Congress recognizes that the economic objective for which *Glavpolitput* was created has been accomplished (as indicated in the resolution of the Eighth Congress of Soviets) and endorses the liquidation of that organization.

17. The All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions, the organization which unites several million trade-union members, should be transformed by the party into a powerful organization, capable of carrying out the gigantic tasks which the Russian trade-union movement is facing.

It would have been impossible to build the Red Army without abolishing the elected committees of the old type. On the other hand, the national economy cannot be raised to the necessary level without, at the same time, raising the level of trade-union organization by using the methods of workers' democracy.

18. The transition to the methods of workers' democracy should be made effective in all trade unions. At the same time, the Tenth Congress recognizes that, *without changing the position and the role of the unions within the workers' state*, the transition to workers' democracy within the trade unions will not solve the basic question of socialist economic construction.

Practical Steps to Be Taken

19. The present position of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions and the central committees of individual industrial unions is such that they stand outside the basic economic activity [of the country]. This cannot be recognized as normal. It is necessary to remedy a situation under which nearly every trade-union worker who demonstrates high qualities as an organizer and economic administrator is torn away from the union, as well as from the masses of workers, and is swallowed up by the machinery of production.

20. To establish better relationships [between trade unions and economic organizations], it is necessary that the trade unions themselves participate directly in the elaboration of economic plans, as well as in the methods of plan implementation.

In the workers' state there can be no organizational separation between specialists in production management and specialists in the trade-union movement. As a general principle, it should be recognized that anyone needed for work as a production specialist is, by the same token, needed by the trade unions and vice versa. Every valuable trade-union worker should also be a participant in the organization of production. With this in view, the Tenth Party Congress considers it essential to establish a central committee (consisting of [representatives of] the Central Council of Trade Unions, the Supreme Council of National Economy, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, the People's Commissariat of Railways, and others) to coordinate the relationships between the trade unions and the economic organizations in a manner that would correspond to the facts of production experience....

[The rest of the Trotsky and Bukharin platform contains a number of suggestions for bringing about better coordination between the trade unions and the economic organizations.]

II

THE TASKS OF THE TRADE UNIONS

(for the 10th Party Congress)

[THESES of the WORKERS' OPPOSITION]

1. The role and the aims of the trade unions in the present transitional period were clearly defined in the resolutions of the All-Russian Congresses of Trade Unions. The First All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions, in January, 1918, thus defined the aims of the trade unions: "The center of gravity in the work of the trade unions at the present moment must be shifted to the field of economic organization. Trade unions, being class organizations of the proletariat organized on industrial lines, must take upon themselves the principal task of organizing production and restoring the shattered productive forces of the country."

The Second [All-Russian] Congress, in February, 1919, declared that "in the process of practical collaboration with the Soviet government, directed toward the strengthening and the organization of the national economy, the trade unions have made the transition from control over production to the organization of industry by taking an active part in the management of individual enterprises, as well as of the entire economic life of the country." The resolution concludes as follows: "Directly participating in every sphere of Soviet activity by contributing to the formation of state institutions, the trade unions must, by enlisting both their own organizations as well as the broad masses of the workers, train and prepare them for the management not only of production, but also of the entire state machinery."

The Third Congress, which took place in April, 1920, approved the basic decisions of the two preceding congresses and gave a few specific instructions as to the manner in which the trade unions should participate in the organization of the national economy.

The clearest definition of the role of the trade unions and of their practical work is given in the Program of the Russian Communist Party, adopted by the Eighth Party Congress in March, 1919. In the chapter of the Program entitled "In the Economic Sphere," we find the following in paragraph 5: "The organization apparatus of the socialized industry must be based primarily on a trade-union foundation....[Omission in the text.] Since, according to the laws of the Soviet Republic and existing practice, they are already participating in all local and central organs of industrial administration, the trade unions must achieve a *de facto* concentration of the entire administration of the whole national economy considered as a single economic unit."

2. The transition from military tasks to economic construction uncovered a crisis of the trade-union movement, arising from the fact that the daily work of the unions was far removed from the tasks formulated in the [trade-union] congresses and in the Party program. During the past two years the Party and the state organizations were engaged in narrowing the sphere of operations of the trade unions and they have reduced the influence of the workers' unions in the Soviet state to zero. The role of trade unions in the organization and the administration of industry has been debased to that of an information and recommendation bureau [Charges are made that the trade unions have no paper or printing facilities.]

3. The downgrading of the role and importance of the trade unions has been taking place at a time when the experience of the past three years of the proletarian revolution has shown that the unions had fully and consistently followed the Communist line, and have been leading the great masses of non-party workers in the same direction. [This downgrading of the trade unions has been taking place at a time] when it became clear to everyone that the realization of the program of the Russian Communist Party in our country, where the overwhelming majority of the population are small producers, required a strong, authoritative mass organization, accessible to the widest proletarian circles. The downgrading of the role of the trade unions in Soviet Russia is an expression of bourgeois and class hostility directed against the proletariat and should be ended immediately.

The Present Tasks of the Trade Unions

4. The experience of the last three and a half years of Soviet construction has demonstrated that the successful accomplishment of a task was made possible only in the degree that there was mass participation of the workers in it. We should take account of this experience and direct our activity in a way that would attract the laboring masses to take part in the direct management of the country's economy.

5. Victory over disruption and the restoration of the productive forces of our country is possible, and can be attained only on condition that the existing system and methods of organization and administration of the national economy of the Republic are radically changed. The methods of administration which lean on cumbersome bureaucratic machinery preclude any creative initiative and in independence of the union-organized producers. It is this bureaucratic system, operating over the heads of organized producers and employing appointed officials and dubious specialists, that has created a split in the administration of the economy, and is now leading to perpetual conflicts between the shop committees and plant administration, between trade unions and economic organizations. This system must be repudiated unequivocally.

6. The present tendency to ignore the resolutions of the [Eighth] Party Congress on the role and objectives of trade unions in the Soviet state is direct testimony of the lack of confidence in the potentialities of the working class. The class-conscious and advanced elements of the working class and organized Communists should exert every effort to overcome this distrust and to resist the bureaucratic stagnation within the Party....

7. The critical economic position of the country requires heroic measures to prevent the approaching catastrophe. The basic measures capable of raising productivity relate to the adoption of an economic policy that confers upon the industrial trade unions a decisive voice in the state economic organizations. Management of the national economy is at the same time the management of the laboring masses. By introducing a system of national economic organization and administration based on the trade unions, a unity of leadership will emerge which will remove the opposition between the laboring masses and the specialists and create wide opportunities for the organizational and the administrative activities of men of science, theory, and practical experience.

8. Trade unions are workers' organizations, built on the principles of workers' democracy and accountability of every organ from the lowest to the highest. During the period of their existence the unions have gained a good deal of experience, and they include [in their membership] people with talents in the field of economic administration. Entire branches of our war-production, machine building, metallurgical industries and other industries are being administered by workers. Hundreds of highly complicated industrial enterprises are managed by collegiums or by individual worker-administrators. But these administrators have no responsibility and are not accountable to the trade unions which placed them in these positions, and they are required to report only to the economic agencies. The unification of industrial leadership with the trade unions in charge will remove this unhealthy state of affairs.

9. The transition from the existing system of bureaucratic administration of the economy, alienated from the initiative of the toiling masses, should be made in an orderly way and should begin with the strengthening of the nuclei of the trade unions, such as factory-shop committees, with the view of giving them the training needed for economic management....[A list of eight steps is given by which this objective can be attained.]

10. The entire work and attention of the trade unions should be transferred to factories, plants and institutions and concentrated on the development of the mentality of the worker. Therein lies the role of the trade unions as schools of communism. In developing the intelligence of the liberated producer, the trade unions should organize their work in such a way as to transform the laborer from a mere appendage of a moribund economic machine into an intelligent builder of communism. Every screw of the machinist, every thread of the weaver, every nail of the blacksmith, and every brick of the bricklayer should serve as a connecting link and foundation of the new production relationships. Communist education must be built on this foundation.

The Administration of the National Economy

11. In its final and fully developed form, the organizational structure of the economy, as well as the relationship of the various economic organs, should lead to the concentration of the entire economic administration in the hands of the industrial trade unions.

12. This administrative concentration of the unified economy of the Republic can be achieved by establishing an organizational framework under which all organs of national economic management, both central and local, are elected by the representatives of the organized producers. In this way a unity of will is created, which is essential to the organization of the national economy, and which ensures a wide participation of the laboring masses in the administration of our economy.

13. Organizing the administration of the entire national economy should be within the jurisdiction of an all-Russian congress of producers, united in industrial trade unions, which will elect a central organ to take charge of the management of the entire national economy of the Republic.

a. All-Russian congresses of industrial trade unions representing individual branches of the economy are to elect organs for the management of sectors and branches of the economy.

b. *Oblast, guberniya, uezd*, regional, etc., organs of administration are to be created by the corresponding local congresses of industrial trade unions. In this way a fusion of centralized production and local initiative and independence will be achieved. *Oblast, guberniya, uezd*, regional, etc., departments of economic administration are to be established, in every case, by the trade unions concerned.

14. Enterprises with related output are to be combined into groups (*Kusty* and *Glavki*) to ensure the best utilization of technical means and materials. Similar enterprises located in the same city are to be combined under a common management created by the trade union. Administrations for consolidated enterprises located in non-contiguous territories are to be created by congress of workers' committees of the given enterprises, at the initiative of the trade unions.

Organization of Workers' Committees

15. In order to bring about a more rapid organization of labor and production on socialist principles, all workers and employees in every enterprise and institution of the Republic, being members of trade unions, should participate in an active and orderly manner in the administration of the national economy.

16. All workers and employees, irrespective of their position or trade, who work for individual economic establishments, such as factories, plants, mines, in all transport and communication establishments, and in every variety of agriculture are the direct administrators of the property which is in their charge. They are responsible for the safeguarding and the rational utilization of this property before all the toilers of the Republic.

17. As participants in the organization of management for the various enterprises, the workers and employees in factories, plants, shops, institutions, in transport and communication services, as well as agricultural and other enterprises, elect a Workers' Committee which is the directing organ of a given enterprise.

18. The Workers' Committee is the primary organizational cell of the union of a given trade and is to be constituted under the supervision and control of the corresponding union.

19. The duties of a Workers' Committee consist in the management of a given plant or enterprise and include:

a. Directing the production activities of all workers and employees of the economic unit in question;

b. Taking care of the needs of the producers.

20. [This section states that the work program of an enterprise and its internal procedures are within the competence of the workers engaged in the enterprise.]

Organization of the Workers' Standard of Living

21. An indispensable condition for the improvement of the national economy is the need of introducing a system of wages in kind. This will raise the productivity of labor and improve the living conditions of the workers. The measures listed below should be made part of the wage agreements and included in the payments in kind.

a. To abolish payment for the rations (*pack*) and for other articles of mass consumption rationed to the workers by the food organs;

b. To abolish payment for meals distributed to workers and their families;

c. To abolish payment for the use of bathhouses, street cars, theaters, etc.;

d. To abolish payment for housing, heat and light;

e. In localities where the housing problem is critical, it is necessary to reduce the quarters occupied by Soviet and military institutions in order to make available more housing space for workers;

f. To organize the repair of workers' apartments at the expense of the industrial enterprises, on condition that the fulfillment of the basic production targets of the enterprise is guaranteed;

g. To give a high priority to the construction of workers' settlements and communal living quarters, which should be included in the program of the Committee on Urban Construction during the nearest construction period;

h. To place special trains and street cars in operation at the beginning and end of the work day;

i. To give preferential treatment to workers in the distribution of consumer goods;

j. To simplify and speed up the distribution of bonuses in kind, both basic and supplemental;

k. To attach to factories or to establish shoe-repair shops and clothing-repair shops to serve the needs of workers of a given factory. These shops are to receive every assistance from the factory in securing necessary instruments and materials;

l. If an enterprise has communal garden plots, these should be supplied with necessary implements and tools, to be paid for by the enterprise;

m. The expenditures connected with the above-enumerated measures should be included in the plant's budget....

III

ON THE ROLE AND TASKS OF THE TRADE UNIONS

The Role of the Trade Unions under the Proletarian Dictatorship

[Lenin's resolution, adopted by the Congress]

1. The general aims and the role of the trade unions during the dictatorship of the proletariat were adequately defined at the preceding congresses and conferences of the Party and the trade unions. Already the First All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions, which took place early in January, 1918, i.e., shortly after state power passed into the hands of the Soviets, stated in its resolution the following: "At the present moment, the center of gravity in the work of the trade unions must be shifted to the field of economic organization. Trade unions, being class organizations of the proletariat, organized on industrial lines, must take upon themselves the principal task of organizing production and restoring the shattered productive forces of the country. They should aim to participate most emphatically in the work of all centers regulating production, to organize workers' control and the registration and distribution of workers, to organize exchange between villages and cities, to participate most actively in the demobilization of industry, to fight against sabotage, to enforce the duty of universal labor, etc.

"In their developed form, after having been transformed by the socialist revolution which is now taking place, the trade unions will become instruments of state authority, working in subordination to other organizations for the realization of new principles in the organization of economic life."

Already our Party Program of 1919 called attention to the fact that "the organizational apparatus of the socialized industry must be based, first and foremost, on a trade-union foundation. Since according to the laws of the Soviet Republic and the existing practice, they are already participating in all local and central organs of industrial administration, the trade unions—so declares our party program—must achieve a *de facto* concentration of the entire administration of the whole national economy considered as a single economic unit. This will ensure the closest possible tie between the central machinery of state administration, the national economy, and the large masses of the toilers. In this way the trade unions will facilitate the widest possible participation of the toiling masses in the management of the economy."

Likewise, the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party (in 1920) resolved: "The tasks of the trade unions are mainly in the sphere of economic organization and education. In accomplishing these tasks, the trade unions are to act not as a self-contained and organizationally isolated force, but as a component part of the basic machinery of the Soviet state

under the leadership of the Communist Party." The [resolution of the] Ninth Congress further states: "Since the Soviet state is the widest organization which concentrates the entire social strength of the proletariat, it is clear that the trade unions, in the course of development of the proletarian consciousness and the growth of creative initiative of the masses, must gradually become transformed into auxiliary instruments of the proletarian state and not *vice versa*."

The Second and Third All-Russian Congresses of Trade Unions, as well as the Fifth All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions, defined the general tasks of trade unions during the period of the proletarian dictatorship in the same spirit.

These definitions retain their full force at the present moment and stand in no need of any change. The problem facing the Tenth Congress is not that of finding new theoretical formulations of the role of trade unions during the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but rather one of determining the ways in which the theories already formulated are to be realized in life.

Position of the Trade Unions after Three Years of Civil War

2. The critical conditions of the three years of civil war kept the trade unions from the successful discharge of their aims. The trade unions, like other workers' organizations, had to give almost all their forces to the front. Nevertheless, the unions played an important role in economic construction. Immediately following the November Revolution, the trade unions were the only organization which, concurrently with the introduction of workers' control, could take and had to take upon themselves the work of organizing production and managing industrial enterprises. The state apparatus for the management of the national economy in the first period of Soviet rule had not yet been in working order, and the sabotage of factory owners and of the higher technical personnel presented in an acute form the problem of preserving industry and re-establishing the normal functioning of the country's economy.

In the next period, when the management of enterprises was being organized by the Supreme Council of National Economy, the trade unions worked side by side with the state economic organization. This parallelism was explained and justified by the weakness of the state [economic] organizations. The role of the trade unions in the organization of production was confined mainly to participation in the formation of *Glavki* and *Tsentry*. This work was of a sporadic nature, and what is more, it frequently led to situations in which the delegated workers lost touch with the trade unions which sent them [to the *Glavki*]. This, in turn, prevented the trade unions and their representatives in the economic organizations from influencing the work of these organizations. If the participation of workers in the operation of the economic organs is to become more effective, it is essential that the workers who are assigned [to the *Glavki*] by the trade unions should maintain uninterrupted contact with these unions and that the trade unions should participate more closely in the organization and the administration of production....

The inauguration of a new period [with the end of the civil war] finds the trade unions in a rather weak position relative to the enormous tasks which the economic front is placing before them. The peculiarities of the present transitional period, as of every transitional period, create formidable difficulties for the trade unions. Nevertheless, what the trade unions are going through now is *not a typical trade-union crisis, not a breakdown, but the beginning of a new growth*. In this respect the fortunes of the trade unions do not differ from those of the Party and of the Soviets.

The Trade Unions as the Prop of the Proletarian Dictatorship

3. The Russian Communist Party is maintaining the dictatorship of the proletariat in a country where the peasant population has a preponderant majority. However, since at this time the peasantry is no longer threatened with the restoration of the power of the landlords, the preservation of the proletarian dictatorship is bound to encounter new difficulties. The successful realization of this dictatorship is possible only when the trade unions

are imbued with a unity of purpose and will and are functioning as mass organizations that are open to every proletarian, no matter what the level of his class-consciousness.

Trade Unions as a School of Communism

4. The most important role of the trade unions in Soviet Russia is their role as a *school of communism*. Only the trade unions, insofar as they are concerned with every aspect of a worker's life, can perform the task of giving the large masses of backward workers the rudiments of a political education. The predominant mass of trade-union membership (6,970,000 members, of whom about half a million are members of the Party) consists of non-party men. Communism is built with the human material which we inherited from capitalism. The trade unions of Soviet Russia are gradually turning into organizations which include every worker. The trade unions are organizing toilers who under capitalism were alien to the proletarian family (store clerks, hospital attendants, art workers, etc.). Re-educating these vast masses, bringing them closer to the more advanced proletarian groups, and training them for the task of socialist construction constitute the most important objectives of the trade unions in their role as a school of communism....

The half a million party men, who are now members of the trade unions, should by patient, continuous, and persistent effort win over to the side of our party the millions of non-party workers who at present constitute the majority in the trade-union movement.

The Fusion of the Trade Unions with the State

5. The rapid fusion of the trade unions with the state would be a great political mistake. At the present stage of development this would greatly interfere with carrying out the above-mentioned tasks by the trade unions. The present position of the trade unions *vis-à-vis* the state is unique. The trade unions at present are already discharging a number of functions of state organs. These Soviet state functions are bound to increase gradually. Nevertheless, the Congress is bound to state that any artificial speeding up of the fusion of the trade unions with the state, while contributing little to the improvement of the economic position of the Republic, would greatly hamper the role of trade unions as a school of communism. The main problem is to conquer the vast non-party masses.

Methods of Persuasion and Methods of Compulsion

6. The principal method of trade-union work is not the method of compulsion, but the method of persuasion. This does not in the least exclude the possibility that in case of necessity the trade unions should apply the principles of proletarian compulsion (compulsory mobilization of tens of thousands of trade-union members, disciplinary courts, etc.). Reorganizing the trade unions by orders from above is certain to defeat its own end. The methods of workers' democracy, which were so sharply curtailed in the three years of cruel civil war, should be re-established first of all, and on a wide scale, in the trade-union movement. It is necessary first of all to re-establish the system of electing officials for the various trade union organs, instead of appointing them from above. The trade unions should be built on the principle of democratic centralism. At the same time the most energetic struggle should be undertaken to ensure that centralization and militarized forms of work do not degenerate into bureaucracy and "standpatism." The recourse to labor militarization will be crowned with success only to the extent that the Party, the Soviets, and the trade unions succeed in explaining to the masses of toilers the necessity of these measures for the salvation of the country.

The Party and the Trade Unions

7. The Russian Communist Party, as represented by its central and local organizations, is unquestionably directing, as it did in the past, the ideological work of the trade unions. The Communist factions of the trade unions are wholly subordinate to the party organizations as defined by a special statute. At the same time the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party warns, in the most insistent and categorical form, all party organizations,

as well as individual comrades, against petty tutelage and excessive interference in the daily work of the trade unions. To be sure, the selection (*podpor*) of the leading personnel of the trade-union movement must be under the supervisory control of the Party. But the party organizations [in exercising that control] must strictly adhere to the methods of proletarian democracy, particularly in the trade unions, where the selection (*otbor*) of leaders must be made by the organized masses themselves.

In selecting leaders for the most important trade-union positions, the Party must make sure that the appointees are good managers who fully understand the significance attached to the production aims [of the trade unions]. The Party must also make sure that the above qualifications of the prospective leaders are combined with devotion to communism, a sense of discipline, and, especially, with experience in working with large masses of workers and skill in handling them. It cannot be forgotten, not even for a minute, that trade-union work requires great attention and sympathetic response to the minutest needs of the toiling masses.

The Trade Unions and the Political Departments

8. In the course of the civil war, the Party was forced, in exceptional cases, to sanction the organization of political departments which, to a certain extent, were replacing the trade unions. Such an exception was *Glavpolitput*.

The Ninth Party Congress, which adopted a resolution establishing *Glavpolitput*, underlined the temporary character of this institution. In practice, however, *Glavpolitput* and its adjunct, *Tsektan*, manifested a tendency to break away from the trade-union masses and to oppose the trade-union organizations. This resulted in a deviation from the normal methods of trade-union democracy.

The Tenth Party Congress endorses the abolition of *Glavpolitput*, as well as the decision of the Party Central Committee which called upon *Tsektan* to give up its peculiar methods of work and to adopt the procedures of normal workers' democracy....

[The remaining part of the Resolution enumerated the measures that would re-establish the methods of trade-union democracy. These measures can be briefly summarized as follows:

- 1) Participation of trade unions in the preparation of a unified economic plan and of a production program;
- 2) Participation in the formation of economic administrative organizations;
- 3) Control over production by assisting the economic agencies in carrying out the production plans;
- 4) Registration and distribution of the labor force;
- 5) Establishment of wage scales, both in money and in kind;
- 6) Production propaganda directed toward raising labor productivity and assistance in labor mobilization;
- 7) Enforcing labor discipline by means of disciplinary courts and the Committees on Labor Desertion.]

Bunyan, *The Origins of Forced Labor in the Soviet State*, pp. 221-245, with minor modifications.



The key act of NEP and the fundamental economic reform—and retreat—was the new agricultural tax in kind which replaced the requisitioning of the War Communism era. The purpose of this retreat—Lenin called it the “Peasant Brest-Litovsk”—was to calm popular discontent and to get the economy functioning again. The policy was introduced by Lenin and approved at the Tenth Party Congress on 15 March. Lenin repeatedly explained the importance of the new act for the domestic and international politics of the regime. The resolution of the Congress was translated into law by an act of the Central Executive Committee on 21 March—see below. Lenin explained the new policy repeatedly over the next year.

V. I. LENIN

REPORT OF THE SUBSTITUTION OF A TAX IN KIND FOR THE SURPLUS GRAIN APPROPRIATION SYSTEM

Comrades, the question of substituting a tax for surplus-grain appropriation is primarily and mainly a political question, for it is essentially a question of the attitude of the working class to the peasantry. We are raising it because we must subject relations of these two main classes, whose struggle or agreement determines the fate of our revolution as a whole, to a new or, I should perhaps say, a more careful and correct re-examination and some revision. There is no need for me to dwell in detail on the reasons for it. You all know very well of course what totality of causes, especially those due to the extreme want arising out of the war, ruin, demobilisation, and the disastrous crop failure—you know about the totality of circumstances that has made the condition of the peasantry especially precarious and critical and was bound to increase its swing from the proletariat to the bourgeoisie.

A word or two on the theoretical significance of, or the theoretical approach to, this issue. There is no doubt that in a country where the overwhelming majority of the population consists of small agricultural producers, a socialist revolution can be carried out only through the implementation of a whole series of special transitional measures which would be superfluous in highly developed capitalist countries where wage-workers in industry and agriculture make up the vast majority. Highly developed capitalist countries have a class of agricultural wage-workers that has taken shape over many decades. Only such a class can socially, economically, and politically support a direct transition to socialism. Only in countries where this class is sufficiently developed is it possible to pass directly from capitalism to socialism, without any special country-wide transitional measures. We have stressed in a good many written works, in all our public utterances, and all our statements in the press, that this is not the case in Russia, for here industrial workers are a minority and petty farmers are the vast majority. In such a country, the socialist revolution can triumph only on two conditions. First, if it is given timely support by a socialist revolution in one or several advanced countries. As you know, we have done very much indeed in comparison with the past to bring about this condition, but far from enough to make it a reality.

The second condition is agreement between the proletariat, which is exercising its dictatorship, that is, holds state power, and the majority of the peasant population. Agreement is a very broad concept which includes a whole series of measures and transitions. I must say at this point that our propaganda and agitation must be open and above-board. We must condemn most resolutely those who regard politics as a series of cheap little tricks, frequently bordering on deception. Their mistakes have to be corrected. You can't fool a class. We have done very much in the past three years to raise the political consciousness of the masses. They have been learning most from the sharp struggles. In keeping with our world outlook, the revolutionary experience we have accumulated over the decades, and the lessons of our revolution, we must state the issues plainly—the interests of these two classes differ, the small farmer does not want the same thing as the worker.

We know that so long as there is no revolution in other countries, only agreement with the peasantry can save the socialist revolution in Russia. And that is how it must be stated, frankly, at all meetings and in the entire press. We know that this agreement between the working class and the peasantry is not solid—to put it mildly, without entering the word “mildly” in the minutes—but, speaking plainly, it is very much worse. Under no circumstances must we try to hide anything; we must plainly state that the peasantry is dissatisfied with the form of our relations, that it does not want relations of this type and will not continue to live as it has hitherto. This is unquestionable. The peasantry has expressed its will in this respect definitely enough. It is the will of the vast masses of the working population. We must reckon with this, and we are sober enough politicians to say frankly: let us re-examine our policy in regard to the peasantry. The state of affairs that has prevailed so far cannot be continued any longer.

We must say to the peasants: “If you want to turn back, if you want to restore private property and unrestricted trade in their entirety, it will certainly and inevitably mean falling under the rule of the landowners and the capitalists. This has been proved by a number of examples from history and examples of revolutions. The briefest examination of the ABC of communism and political economy will prove that this is inevitable. Let us then look into the matter. Is it or is it not in the interest of the peasantry to part ways with the proletariat only to slip back—and let the country slip back—to the rule of the capitalists and landowners? Consider this, and let us consider it together.”

We believe that if the matter is given proper consideration, the conclusion will be in our favour, in spite of the admittedly deep gulf between the economic interests of the proletariat and the small farmer.

Difficult as our position is in regard to resources, the needs of the middle peasantry must be satisfied. There are far more middle peasants now than before, the antagonisms have been smoothed out, the land has been distributed for use far more equally, the kulak's position has been undermined and he has been in considerable measure expropriated—in Russia more than in the Ukraine, and less in Siberia. On the whole, however, statistics show quite definitely that there has been a levelling out, an equalisation, in the village, that is, the old sharp division into kulaks and cropless peasants has disappeared. Everything has become more equable, the peasantry in general has acquired the status of the middle peasant.

Can we satisfy this middle peasantry as such, with its economic peculiarities and economic roots? Any Communist who thought the economic basis, the economic roots, of small farming could be reshaped in three years was, of course, a dreamer. We need not conceal the fact that there were a good many such dreamers among us. Nor is there anything particularly bad in this. How could one start a socialist revolution in a country like ours without dreamers? Practice has, of course, shown the tremendous role all kinds of experiments and undertakings can play in the sphere of collective agriculture. But it has also afforded instances of these experiments as such playing a negative role, when people, with the best of intentions and desires, went to the countryside to set up communes but did not know how to run them because they had no experience in collective endeavour. The experience of these collective farms merely provided examples of how not to run farms: the peasants around either laughed or jeered.

You know perfectly well how many cases there have been of this kind. I repeat that this is not surprising, for it will take generations to remould the small farmer, and recast his mentality and habits. The only way to solve this problem of the small farmer—to improve, so to speak, his mentality—is through the material basis, technical equipment, the extensive use of tractors and other farm machinery and electrification on a mass scale. This would remake the small farmer fundamentally and with tremendous speed. If I say this will take generations, it does not mean centuries. But you know perfectly well that to obtain

tractors and other machinery and to electrify this vast country is a matter that may take decades in any case. Such is the objective situation.

We must try to satisfy the demands of the peasants who are dissatisfied and disgruntled, and legitimately so, and who cannot be otherwise. We must say to them: "Yes, this cannot go on any longer." How is the peasant to be satisfied and what does satisfying him mean? Where is the answer? Naturally it lies in the demands of the peasantry. We know these demands. But we must verify them and examine all that we know of the farmer's economic demands from the standpoint of economic science. If we go into this, we shall see at once that it will take essentially two things to satisfy the small farmer. The first is a certain freedom of exchange, freedom for the small private proprietor, and the second is the need to obtain commodities and products. What indeed would free exchange amount to if there was nothing to exchange, and freedom of trade, if there was nothing to trade with! It would all remain on paper, and classes cannot be satisfied with scraps of paper, they want the goods. These two conditions must be clearly understood. The second—how to get commodities and whether we shall be able to obtain them—we shall discuss later. It is the first condition—free exchange—that we must deal with now.

What is free exchange? It is unrestricted trade, and that means turning back towards capitalism. Free exchange and freedom of trade mean circulation of commodities between petty proprietors. All of us who have studied at least the elements of Marxism know that this exchange and freedom of trade inevitably lead to a division of commodity producers into owners of capital and owners of labour-power, a division into capitalists and wage-workers, i.e., a revival of capitalist wage-slavery, which does not fall from the sky but springs the world over precisely from the agricultural commodity economy. This we know perfectly well in theory, and anyone in Russia who has observed the small farmer's life and the conditions under which he farms must have seen this.

How then can the Communist Party recognise freedom to trade and accept it? Does not the proposition contain irreconcilable contradictions? The answer is that the practical solution of the problem naturally presents exceedingly great difficulties. I can foresee, and I know from the talks I have had with some comrades, that the preliminary draft on replacing surplus-grain appropriation by a tax—it has been handed out to you—gives rise to legitimate and inevitable questions, mostly as regards permitting exchange of goods within the framework of local economic turnover. This is set forth at the end of Point 8. What does it mean, what limits are there to this exchange, how is it all to be implemented? Anyone who expects to get the answer at this Congress will be disappointed. We shall find the answer in our legislation; it is our task to lay down the principle to be followed and provide the slogan. Our Party is the government party and the decision the Party Congress passes will be obligatory for the entire Republic: it is now up to us to decide the question in principle. We must do this and inform the peasantry of our decision, for the sowing season is almost at hand. Further we must muster our whole administrative apparatus, all our theoretical forces and all our practical experience, in order to see how it can be done. Can it be done at all, theoretically speaking: can freedom of trade, freedom of capitalist enterprise for the small farmer, be restored to a certain extent without undermining the political power of the proletariat? Can it be done? Yes, it can, for everything hinges on the extent. If we were able to obtain even a small quantity of goods and hold them in the hands of the state—the proletariat exercising political power—and if we could release these goods into circulation, we, as the state, would add economic power to our political power. Release of these goods into circulation would stimulate small farming, which is in a terrible state and cannot develop owing to the grievous war conditions and the economic chaos. The small farmer, so long as he remains small, needs a spur, an incentive that accords with his economic basis, i.e., the individual small farm. Here you cannot avoid local free exchange. If this turnover gives the state, in exchange for manufactured goods, a certain

minimum amount of grain to cover urban and industrial requirements, economic circulation will be revived, with state power remaining in the hands of the proletariat and growing stronger. The peasants want to be shown in practice that the worker who controls the mills and factories—industry—is capable of organising exchange with the peasantry. And, on the other hand, the vastness of our agricultural country with its poor transport system, boundless expanses, varying climate, diverse farming conditions, etc., makes a certain freedom of exchange between local agriculture and local industry, on a local scale, inevitable. In this respect, we are very much to blame for having gone too far; we overdid the nationalisation of industry and trade, clamping down on local exchange of commodities. Was that a mistake? It certainly was.

In this respect we have made many patent mistakes, and it would be a great crime not to see it, and not to realise that we have failed to keep within bounds, and have not known where to stop. There has, of course, also been the factor of necessity—until now we have been living in the conditions of a savage war that imposed an unprecedented burden on us and left us no choice but to take war-time measures in the economic sphere as well. It was a miracle that the ruined country withstood this war, yet the miracle did not come from heaven, but grew out of the economic interests of the working class and the peasantry, whose mass enthusiasm created the miracle that defeated the landowners and capitalists. But at the same time it is an unquestionable fact that we went further than was theoretically and politically necessary, and this should not be concealed in our agitation and propaganda. We can allow free local exchange to an appreciable extent, without destroying, but actually strengthening the political power of the proletariat. How this is to be done, practice will show. I only wish to prove to you that theoretically it is conceivable. The proletariat, wielding state power, can, if it has any reserves at all, put them into circulation and thereby satisfy the middle peasant to a certain extent—on the basis of local economic exchange.

Now a few words about local economic exchange. First of all, the co-operatives. They are now in an extreme state of decline, but we naturally need them as a vehicle of local economic exchange. Our Programme stresses that the co-operatives left over from capitalism are the best distribution network and must be preserved. That is what the Programme says. Have we lived up to this? To a very slight extent, if at all, again partly because we have made mistakes, partly because of the war-time necessity. The co-operatives brought to the fore the more business-like, economically more advanced elements, thereby bringing out the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in the political sphere. This is a law of chemistry—you can't do anything about it! (*Laughter.*) The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are people who either consciously or unconsciously work to restore capitalism and help the Yudeniches. This too is a law. We must fight them. And if there is to be a fight, it must be done the military way; we had to defend ourselves, and we did. But do we have to perpetuate the present situation? No, we do not. It would be a mistake to tie our hands in this way. Because of this I submit a resolution on the question of the co-operatives; it is very brief and I shall read it to you:

"Whereas the resolution of the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P. on the co-operatives is based entirely on the principle of surplus-grain appropriation, which is now superseded by a tax in kind, the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. resolves:

"That the said resolution be rescinded.

"The Congress instructs the Central Committee to draw up and carry out through Party and Soviet channels decisions to improve and develop the structure and activity of the co-operatives in conformity with the Programme of the R.C.P. and with a view to substituting the tax in kind for the surplus-grain appropriate system."

You will say that this is rather vague. Yes, it is, and should necessarily be so to some extent. Why necessarily? Because if we are to be absolutely definite, we must know exactly what we are going to do over the year ahead. Who knows that? No one.

But the resolution of the Ninth Congress ties our hands by calling for "subordination to the Commissariat for Food." This is a fine institution, but it would be an obvious political mistake to subordinate the co-operatives to it and to no other, and to tie our hands at a time when we are reviewing our attitude to the small farmers. We must instruct the newly elected Central Committee to elaborate and carry out definite measures and changes, and to check up on every step we take forward or back—to what extent we must act, how to uphold our political interests, how much relaxation there must be to make things easier, how to check up on the results of our experience. Theoretically speaking, in this respect we are facing a number of transitional stages, or transitional measures. One thing is clear: the resolution of the Ninth Congress assumed that we would be advancing in a straight line, but it turned out, as has happened again and again throughout the history of revolutions, that the movement took a zigzag course. To tie one's hands with such a resolution would be a political mistake. Annulling it, we say that we must be guided by our Programme, which stresses the importance of the co-operative machinery.

As we annul the resolution, we say: work with a view to replacing surplus-grain appropriation by a tax. But when are we to do this? Not before the harvest, that is, in a few months' time. Will it be done the same way everywhere? In no circumstances. It would be the height of stupidity to apply the same pattern to central Russia, the Ukraine, and Siberia. I propose that this fundamental idea of unrestricted local exchange be formulated as a decision of this Congress. I presume that following this decision the Central Committee will without fail send out a letter within the next few days and will point out—doing it better than I can do here (we shall find the best writers to polish up the style)—that there are to be no radical changes, no undue haste, or snap decisions, and that things should be done so as to give maximum satisfaction to the middle peasantry, without damaging the interests of the proletariat. Try one thing and another, study things in practice, through experience, then share your experience with us, and let us know what you have managed to do, and we shall set up a special commission or even several commissions to consider the experience that has been accumulated. I think we should issue a special invitation to Comrade Preobrazhensky, the author of *Paper Money in the Epoch of the Proletarian Dictatorship*. This is a highly important question, for money circulation is a splendid test of the state of commodity circulation in the country; when it is unsatisfactory, money is not worth the paper it is printed on. In order to proceed on the basis of experience, we must check and recheck the measures we have adopted.

We shall be asked where the goods are to come from, for unrestricted trade requires goods, and the peasants are shrewd people and very good at scoffing. Can we obtain any goods now? Today we can, for our international economic position has greatly improved. We are waging a fight against the international capitalists, who, when they were first confronted by this Republic, called us "brigands and crocodiles" (I was told by an English artiste that she had heard these very words spoken by one of the most influential politicians). Crocodiles are despicable. That was the verdict of international capital. It was the verdict of a class enemy and quite correct from his point of view. However, the correctness of such conclusions has to be verified in practice. If you are world capital—a world power—and you use words like "crocodile" and have all the technical means at your disposal, why not try and shoot it! Capital did shoot—and got the worst of it. It was then that the capitalists, who are forced to reckon with political and economic realities, declared: "We must trade." This is one of our greatest victories. Let me tell you that we now have two offers of a loan to the amount of nearly one hundred million gold rubles. We have gold, but you can't sell gold, because you can't eat it. Everybody has been reduced to a state of impoverishment, currency relations between all the capitalist countries are incredibly chaotic as a result of the war. Moreover, you need a merchant marine to communicate with Europe, and we have none. It is in hostile hands. We have concluded no treaty with France; she considers that we are her debtors and, consequently, that every ship we have is hers.

They have a navy and we have none. In these circumstances we have so far been in a position to make use of our gold on a limited and ridiculously insignificant scale. Now we have two offers from capitalist bankers to float a loan of one hundred million. Of course, they will charge us an exorbitant rate of interest. Still it is their first offer of this kind; so far they have said: "I'll shoot you and take everything for nothing." Now, being unable to shoot us, they are ready to trade with us. Trade agreements with America and Britain can now be said to be almost in the bag; the same applies to concessions. Yesterday I received another letter from Mr. Vanderlip, who is here and who, besides numerous complaints, sets forth a whole series of plans concerning concessions and a loan. He represents the shrewdest type of finance capitalist connected with the Western States of the U.S.A., those that are more hostile to Japan. So it is economically possible for us to obtain goods. How we shall manage to do it is another question, but a certain possibility is there.

I repeat, the type of economic relations which on top looks like a bloc with foreign capitalism makes it possible for the proletarian state power to arrange for free exchange with the peasantry below. I know—and I have had occasion to say this before—that this has evoked some sneers. There is a whole intellectual-bureaucratic stratum in Moscow, which is trying to shape "public opinion." "See what communism has come to!" these people sneer. "It's like a man on crutches and face all bandaged up—nothing but a picture puzzle." I have heard enough of gibes of this kind—they are either bureaucratic or just irresponsible. Russia emerged from the war in a state that can most of all be likened to that of a man beaten to within an inch of his life; the beating had gone on for seven years, and it's a mercy she can hobble about on crutches! That is the situation we are in! To think that we can get out of this state without crutches is to understand nothing! So long as there is no revolution in other countries, it would take us decades to extricate ourselves, and in these circumstances we cannot grudge hundreds of millions' or even thousands of millions' worth of our immense wealth, our rich raw material sources, in order to obtain help from the major capitalists. Later we shall recover it all and to spare. The rule of the proletariat cannot be maintained in a country laid waste as no country has ever been before—a country where the vast majority are peasants who are equally ruined—without the help of capital, for which, of course, exorbitant interest will be extorted. This we must understand. Hence, the choice is between economic relations of this type and nothing at all. He who puts the question otherwise understands absolutely nothing in practical economics and is side-stepping the issue by resorting to gibes. We must recognise the fact that the masses are utterly worn-out and exhausted. What can you expect after seven years of war in this country, if the more advanced countries still feel the effects of four years of war?!

In this backward country, the workers, who have made unprecedented sacrifices, and the mass of the peasants are in a state of utter exhaustion after seven years of war. This condition borders on complete loss of working capacity. What is needed now is an economic breathing space. We had hoped to use our gold reserve to obtain some means of production. It would be best of all to make our own machines, but even if we bought them, we would thereby build up our industry. To do this, however, you must have a worker and a peasant who can work; yet in most cases they are in no condition for it, they are exhausted, worn-out. They must be assisted, and contrary to our old Programme the gold reserve must be used for consumer goods. That Programme was theoretically correct, but practically unsound. I shall pass on to you some information I have here from Comrade Lezhava. It shows that several hundred thousand poods of various items of food have already been bought in Lithuania, Finland, and Latvia and are being shipped in with the utmost speed. Today we have learned that a deal has been concluded in London for the purchase of 18,500,000 poods of coal, which we decided to buy in order to revive the industry of Petrograd and the textile industry. If we obtain goods for the peasant, it will, of

course, be a violation of the Programme, an irregularity, but we must have a respite, for the people are exhausted to a point where they are not able to work.

I must say a few words about the individual exchange of commodities. When we speak of free exchange, we mean individual exchange of commodities, which in turn means encouraging the kulaks. What are we to do? We must not close our eyes to the fact that the switch from the appropriation of surpluses to the tax will mean more kulaks under the new system. They will appear where they could not appear before. This must not be combated by prohibitive measures but by association under state auspices and by government measures from above. If you can give the peasant machines you will help him grow, and when you provide machines or electric power, tens or hundreds of thousands of small kulaks will be wiped out. Until you can supply all that, you must provide a certain quantity of goods. If you have the goods, you have the power; to preclude deny or renounce any such possibility means making all exchange unfeasible and not satisfying the middle peasant, who will be impossible to get along with. A greater proportion of peasants in Russia have become middle peasants, and there is no reason to fear exchange on an individual basis. Everyone can give something in exchange to the state: one, his grain surplus; his garden produce; a third, his labour. Basically the situation is this: we must satisfy the middle peasantry economically and go over to free exchange; otherwise it will be impossible—economically impossible—in view of the delay in the world revolution, to preserve the rule of the proletariat in Russia. We must clearly realise this and not be afraid to say it. In the draft decision to substitute a tax in kind for the surplus appropriation system (the text has been handed out to you) you will find many discrepancies, even contradictions, and that is why we have added these words at the end: "The Congress, approving in substance [this is a rather loose word covering a great deal of ground] the propositions submitted by the Central Committee to substitute a tax in kind for surplus-grain appropriation, instructs the Central Committee of the Party to co-ordinate these propositions with the utmost dispatch." We know that they have not been co-ordinated, for we had no time to do so. We did not go into the details. The ways of levying the tax in practice will be worked out in detail and the tax implemented by a law issued by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. The procedure outlined is this: if you adopt the draft today, it will be given the force of a decision at the very first session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, which will not issue a law either, but modified regulations; the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence will later make them into a law, and, what is still more important, issue practical instructions. It is important that people in the localities should understand the significance of this and help us.

Why must we replace surplus appropriation by a tax? Surplus appropriation implied confiscation of all surpluses and establishment of a compulsory state monopoly. We could not do otherwise, for our need was extreme. Theoretically speaking, state monopoly is not necessarily the best system from the standpoint of the interests of socialism. A system of taxation and free exchange can be employed as a transitional measure in a peasant country possessing an industry—if this industry is running—and if there is a certain quantity of goods available.

The exchange is an incentive, a spur to the peasant. The proprietor can and will surely make an effort in his own interest when he knows that all his surplus produce will not be taken away from him and that he will only have to pay a tax, which should whenever possible be fixed in advance. The basic thing is to give the small farmer an incentive and a spur to till the soil. We must adapt our state economy to the economy of the middle peasant, which we have not managed to remake in three years, and will not be able to remake in another ten.

The state had to face definite responsibilities in the sphere of food. Because of this the appropriation quotas were increased last year. The tax must be smaller. The exact figures have not been defined, nor can they be defined. Popov's booklet, *Grain Production of the Soviet and Federated Republics*, gives the exact data issued by our Central Statistical Board and shows why agricultural production has fallen off.

If there is a crop failure, surpluses cannot be collected because there will be none. They would have to be taken out of the peasants' mouths. If there is a crop, everybody will go moderately hungry and the state will be saved, or it will perish, unless we take from people who do not eat their fill as it is. This is what we must make clear in our propaganda among the peasants. A fair harvest will mean a surplus of up to five hundred million poods. This will cover consumption and yield a certain reserve. The important thing is to give the peasants an economic incentive. The small proprietor must be told: "It is your job as a proprietor to produce, and the state will take a minimum tax."

My time is nearly up, I must close; I repeat: we cannot issue a law now. The trouble with our resolution is that it is not sufficiently legislative—laws are not written at Party congresses. Hence we propose that the resolution submitted by the C.C. be adopted as a basis and that the C.C. be instructed to co-ordinate the various propositions contained in it. We shall print the text of the resolution and Party officials in the various localities will try to co-ordinate and correct it. It cannot be co-ordinated from beginning to end; this is an insoluble problem, for life is too varied. To find the transitional measures is a very difficult task. If we are unable to do this quickly and directly, we must not lose heart, for we shall win through in the end. No peasant with the slightest glimmer of political consciousness will fail to understand that we, as the government, represent the working class and all those working people with whom the labouring peasants (and they make up nine-tenths of the total) can agree, that any turn back will mean a return to the old, tsarist government.

Lenin, Vol. 32, pp. 214-228.



ON PARTY UNITY—THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS

16 March 1921

In retrospect it is possible that the most important action of the Tenth Congress was neither NEP nor the trade union issue—which had been expected to dominate it—but two resolutions which were taken unexpectedly at the very end of the Congress: "On Party Unity" and "On the Anarchist and Syndicalist Deviation in our Party." The former is one of the most important resolutions in the history of the party. It is more ironic, therefore, that Lenin introduced both at the very end, when the work of the Congress seemed to be over and many delegates had already left. The resolution on party unity appears to have been many things: Lenin's belated response to the emergence of persistent opposition groups within the party such as the Workers' Opposition; a reaction to Kronstadt; perhaps a preparation of the party for the NEP era; perhaps simply weariness with arguing with opponents. For whatever reason it was introduced, the ban on groups and factions, article six, became the source of later actions to silence opponents of the leadership and thus was a major weapon in the struggles for power of the 1920s and Stalin's consolidation of power, as was article seven—kept secret and published only in 1924—which provided for expulsion from the party. With an insight

he could never have expected to be true, Karl Radek, who was to be one of its victims in the Stalin purges of the 1930s, endorsed the resolution stating that "In voting for this resolution I feel that it could be turned back against us, but nevertheless I support the resolution," even if in its application the Central Committee makes mistakes. The resolution "On the Anarchist and Syndicalist Deviation in Our Party" was introduced at the same time and specifically attacked the Workers' Opposition and reinforced the resolution "On Party Unity."

ON PARTY UNITY

1. The Congress draws the attention of all party members to the fact that the unity and cohesion of their ranks, and the achievement of full trust among party members and truly friendly work that truly embodies the unity of will of the proletarian vanguard, are particularly necessary at the present moment, when a number of circumstances are intensifying the waverings of the petty bourgeois population in the country.

2. However, even before the general party discussion on the trade unions, there had come to light within the party certain signs of factionalism, i.e., of the appearance of groups with platforms of their own and with a will to close ranks to a certain extent and create their own group discipline.

It is essential that all class-conscious workers clearly realize the harmfulness and inadmissibility of any factionalism whatsoever which inevitably leads, in practice, to less friendly work and to repeated and intensified attempts by enemies of the ruling party who have attached themselves to it under false pretenses, to deepen the divisions and use them for purposes of counter-revolution.

The fact that the enemies of the proletariat take advantage of all deviations from a strictly consistent communist line was seen most clearly in the example of the Kronstadt uprising, when the bourgeois counter-revolution and White Guards in all the world's countries immediately manifested their readiness to accept even slogans favouring a Soviet system, if only the dictatorship of the proletariat could be overthrown in Russia; when the Socialist Revolutionaries and the bourgeois counter-revolution in general made use, in Kronstadt, of slogans allegedly favouring an uprising in favour of a Soviet system but opposed to the Soviet government in Russia. Such instances fully prove that the White Guardists are striving—and are able—to assume the guise of communists and even to assume positions to the 'left' of communism, if only they can weaken and overthrow the bulwark of the proletarian revolution in Russia. The Menshevik leaflets in Petrograd on the eve of the Kronstadt uprising show in the same way how the Mensheviks were using differences within the RKP in order, by deeds, to incite and support the Kronstadt rebels, Socialist Revolutionaries, and White Guardists, while presenting themselves—in words—as opponents of uprisings and champions of the Soviet system with, allegedly, only minor modifications.

3. Propaganda on this matter takes the form on the one hand, of detailed explanations of the harm and danger of factionalism from the standpoint of party unity and of achieving unity of will of the proletarian vanguard as a basic condition for the success of the dictatorship of the proletariat and, on the other hand, of an explanation of the elements peculiar to the latest tactical devices of the enemies of the Soviet system. These enemies, who have become convinced of the fact that counter-revolution under an openly White Guardist flag is hopeless, are bending every effort today to use differences within the RKP to advance the cause of counter-revolution in one sense or another by a transfer of power to the political groups which come closest, externally, to recognizing the Soviet system.

Propaganda should also explain the experience of previous revolutions, in which the counter-revolution supported the petty bourgeois groups that were closest to the extreme revolutionary party, in order to shake and then overthrow the revolutionary dictatorship,

thus opening the way for the subsequent complete victory of counter-revolution, the capitalists, and the landowners.

4. It is essential that every party organization be very strict in seeing to it that the unquestionably necessary criticism of party short-comings, that all analyses of the general party line, or stocktaking of practical experience results, that verification of the fulfillment of party decisions and of ways for correcting mistakes, etc., not be submitted for discussion by groups formed on the basis of some 'platform' or other, but that they be submitted for discussion by all party members. For this purpose, the Congress directs that 'Discussion Pamphlets' and special anthologies be published on a more regular basis. Every person who voices criticism must be mindful of the party's situation, in the midst of enemy encirclement, and must also, through direct participation in Soviet and party work, strive in practice to correct the party's mistakes.

5. While instructing the Central Committee to carry out the complete destruction of all manner of factionalism, the Congress at the same time states that where questions are involved which command particular attention of party members—questions of purging the party of non-proletarian and unreliable elements, of combating bureaucratism, of developing democratism and initiative among the workers, etc.—all businesslike proposals whatsoever are to be considered with the greatest of attention and are to be tested in practice. All members of the party should know that on these questions the party is not taking all necessary measures, meeting, as it is, with a number of obstacles of various types, and that while resolutely refusing unbusinesslike and factional criticism, the party will continue tirelessly—constantly testing new methods—to use every means to combat bureaucratism, to expand democratism and initiative, and to seek out, expose, and expel those who have adhered to the party under false pretenses.

6. The Congress orders the immediate dissolution, without exception, of all groups that have been formed on the basis of some platform or other, and instructs all organizations to be very strict in ensuring that no manifestations of factionalism of any sort be tolerated. Failure to comply with this resolution of the Congress is to entail unconditional and immediate expulsion from the party.

7. In order to ensure strict discipline within the party and in all Soviet work, and to achieve maximum unity while eliminating all factionalism, the Congress gives the Central Committee full powers to apply all measures of party punishment up to and including expulsion from the party in cases of violation of discipline or of a revival or toleration of factionalism, and where members of the Central Committee are involved, to go as far as to reduce them to candidate members and even—as an extreme measure—to expel them from the party. The condition for the application of such an extreme measure to Central Committee members and candidate members and to members of the Control Commission is the convening of a Central Committee plenum, to which all candidate members of the Central Committee and all members of the Control Commission are to be invited. If such a general meeting of the most responsible party officials decides by a two-thirds majority that it is necessary to demote a Central Committee member to the status of candidate member or to expel him from the party, then such action must be taken immediately.

McNeal/Gregor, pp. 119-121.



ANGLO-SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT

16 March 1921

Chicherin called this agreement a turning point in Soviet foreign policy. The needs of Soviet Russia as a state among states—if one in desperate economic conditions—and the reevaluation of the prospects for world revolution led to a sort of NEP in international relations in an effort to put Soviet relations with other states on a better footing. Central to this were relations with Great Britain, with whom trade negotiations had been going on throughout 1920. Finally, with the Polish war effectively over, negotiations quickly produced a treaty in early 1921, signed in fact almost immediately after the promulgation of NEP. The treaty provided that "each party refrains from hostile actions or undertakings against the other and from conducting outside of its own borders any official propaganda" against the other, a provision which became common in Soviet agreements—insisted on by the other parties because of the Bolsheviks' involvement in the Comintern and encouraging world revolution—and one which provided many later controversies. The treaty also cleared away a host of economic claims and issues which had previously inhibited agreements. This treaty established the first de facto recognition of the Soviet government by one of the victor great powers and was followed by trade and other treaties with most of the countries of Europe. Some Soviet spokesmen criticized the treaty because it did not provide for de jure recognition, while others objected that it would prop up capitalism and delay revolution in England and elsewhere.

TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN
SOCIALIST FEDERATED SOVIET REPUBLIC,
WITH DECLARATION

Whereas it is desirable in the interests both of Russia and of the United Kingdom that peaceful trade and commerce should be resumed forthwith between those countries, and whereas for this purpose it is necessary pending the conclusion of a formal general Peace Treaty between the Governments of those countries by which their economic and political relations shall be regulated in the future that a preliminary Agreement should be arrived at between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Soviet Government;

The aforesaid parties have accordingly entered into the present Agreement for the resumption of trade and commerce between the countries.

The present Agreement is subject to the fulfillment of the following conditions, namely:

(a) That each party refrains from hostile action or undertakings against the other and from conducting outside of its own borders any official propaganda, direct or indirect, against the institutions of the British Empire or the Russian Soviet Republic respectively, and more particularly that the Russian Soviet Government refrains from any attempt, by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda, to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire, especially in India and in the Independent State of Afghanistan. The British Government gives a similar particular undertaking to the Russian Soviet Government in respect of the countries which formed part of the former Russian Empire and which have now become independent.

(b) That all British subjects in Russia are immediately permitted to return home, and that all Russian citizens in Great Britain or other parts of the British Empire who desire to return to Russia are similarly released.

It is understood that the term "conducting any official propaganda" includes the giving by either party of assistance or encouragement to any propaganda conducted outside its own borders.

The parties undertake to give forthwith all necessary instructions to their agents and to all persons under their authority to conform to the stipulations undertaken above.

Art. I. Both parties agree not to impose or maintain any form of blockade against each other and to remove forthwith all obstacles hitherto placed in the way of the resumption of trade between the United Kingdom and Russia in any commodities which may be legally exported from or imported into their respective territories to or from any other foreign country, and not to exercise any discrimination against such trade as compared with that carried on with any other foreign country, or to place any impediments in the way of banking, credit, and financial operations for the purpose of such trade, but subject always to legislation generally applicable in the respective countries. It is understood that nothing in this article shall prevent either party from regulating the trade in arms and ammunition under general provisions of law which are applicable to the import of arms and ammunition from, or their export to, foreign countries.

Nothing in this article shall be construed as overriding the provisions of any general international Convention which is binding on either party by which the trade in any particular article is or may be regulated (as, for example, the Opium Convention).

Art. II. British and Russian ships, their masters, crews, and cargoes, shall, in ports of Russia and the United Kingdom respectively, receive in all respects the treatment, privileges, facilities, immunities, and protections which are usually accorded by the established practice of commercial nations to foreign merchant ships, their masters, crews, and cargoes, visiting their ports, including the facilities usually accorded in respect of coal and water, pilotage, berthing, dry docks, cranes, repairs, warehouses, and, generally, all services, appliances, and premises connected with merchant shipping.

Moreover, the British Government undertake not to take part in, or to support, any measures restricting or hindering, or tending to restrict or hinder, Russian ships from exercising the rights of free navigation of the high seas, straits, and navigable waterways which are enjoyed by ships of other nationalities.

Provided that nothing in this article shall impair the right of either party to take such precautions as are authorized by their respective laws with regard to the admission of aliens into their territories.

Art. III. The British and other Governments having already undertaken the clearance of the seas adjacent to their own coasts and also certain parts of the Baltic from mines for the benefit of all nations, the Russian Soviet Government on their part undertake to clear the sea passages to their own ports.

The British Government will give the Russian Soviet Government any information in their power as to the position of mines which will assist them in clearing passages to the ports and shores of Russia.

The Russian Government, like other nations, will give all information to the International Mine Clearance Committee about the areas they have swept and also what areas still remain dangerous. They will also give all information in their possession about the mine-fields laid down by the late Russian Governments since the outbreak of war in 1914 outside Russian territorial waters, in order to assist in their clearance.

Provided that nothing in this section shall be understood to prevent the Russian Government from taking or require them to disclose any measures they may consider necessary for the protection of their ports.

Art. IV. Each party may nominate such number of its nationals as may be agreed from time to time as being reasonably necessary to enable proper effect to be given to this Agreement, having regard to the conditions under which trade is carried on in its territories, and

the other party shall permit such persons to enter its territories, and to sojourn and carry on trade there, provided that either party may restrict the admittance of any such persons into any specified areas, and may refuse admittance to or sojourn in its territories to any individual who is *persona non grata* to itself, or who does not comply with this Agreement or with the conditions precedent thereto.

Persons admitted in pursuance of this article into the territories of either party shall, while sojourning therein for purposes of trade, be exempted from all compulsory services whatsoever, whether civil, naval, military, or other, and from any contributions, whether pecuniary or in kind, imposed as an equivalent for personal service, and shall have right of egress.

They shall be at liberty to communicate freely by post, telegraph, and wireless telegraphy, and to use telegraph codes under the conditions and subject to the regulations laid down in the International Telegraph Convention of St. Petersburg, 1875 (Lisbon Revision of 1908).

Each party undertakes to account for and to pay all balances due to the other in respect of terminal and transit telegrams, and in respect of transit letter mails in accordance with the provisions of the International Telegraph Convention and Regulations, and of the Convention and Regulations of the Universal Postal Union respectively. The above balances when due shall be paid in the currency of either party at the option of the receiving party.

Persons admitted into Russia under this Agreement shall be permitted freely to import commodities (except commodities such as alcoholic liquors, of which both the importation and the manufacture are or may be prohibited in Russia) destined solely for their household use or consumption to an amount reasonably required for such purposes.

Art. V. Either party may appoint one or more official agents to a number to be mutually agreed upon, to reside and exercise their functions in the territories of the other, who shall personally enjoy all the rights and immunities set forth in the preceding article and also immunity from arrest and search provided that either party may refuse to admit any individual as an official agent who is *persona non grata* to itself or may require the other party to withdraw him should it find it necessary to do so on grounds of public interest or security. Such agents shall have access to the authorities of the country in which they reside for the purpose of facilitating the carrying out of this Agreement and of protecting the interests of their nationals.

Official agents shall be at liberty to communicate freely with their own Government and with other official representatives of their Government in other countries by post, by telegraph, and wireless telegraphy in cipher, and to receive and dispatch couriers with sealed bags subject to a limitation of three kilograms per week which can be exempt from examination.

Telegrams and radio telegrams of official agents shall enjoy any right of priority over private messages that may be generally accorded to messages of the official representatives of foreign Governments in the United Kingdom and Russia respectively.

Russian official agents in the United Kingdom shall enjoy the same privileges in respect of exemption from taxation, central or local, as are accorded to the official representatives of other foreign Governments. British official agents in Russia shall enjoy equivalent privileges, which, moreover, shall in no case be less than those accorded to the official agents of any other country.

The official agents shall be the competent authorities to *visa* the passports of persons seeking admission in pursuance of the preceding article into the territories of the parties.

Art. VI. Each party undertakes generally to ensure that persons admitted into its territories under the two preceding articles shall enjoy all protection, rights, and facilities which are necessary to enable them to carry on trade, but subject always to any legislation generally applicable in the respective countries.

Art. VII. Both contracting parties agree simultaneously with the conclusion of the present Trade Agreement to renew exchange of private postal and telegraphic correspondence between both countries as well as the dispatch and acceptance of wireless messages and parcels by post in accordance with the rules and regulations which were in existence up to 1914.

Art. VIII. Passports, documents of identity, powers of attorney, and similar documents issued or certified by the competent authorities in either country for the purpose of enabling trade to be carried on in pursuance of this Agreement, shall be treated in the other country as if they were issued or certified by the authorities of a recognized foreign Government.

Art. IX. The British Government declares that it will not initiate any steps with a view to attach or to take possession of any gold, funds, securities, or commodities, not being articles identifiable as the property of the British Government, which may be exported from Russia in payment for imports or as securities for such payment, or of any movable or immovable property which may be acquired by the Russian Soviet Government within the United Kingdom.

It will not take steps to obtain any special legislation not applicable to other countries against the importation into the United Kingdom of precious metals from Russia, whether specie (other than British or Allied), or bullion, or manufactures, or the storing, analyzing, refining, melting, mortgaging, or disposing thereof in the United Kingdom, and will not requisition such metals.

Art. X. The Russian Soviet Government undertakes to make no claim to dispose in any way of the funds or other property of the late Imperial and Provisional Russian Governments in the United Kingdom. The British Government gives a corresponding undertaking as regards British Government funds and property in Russia. This article is not to prejudice the inclusion in the general Treaty, referred to in the preamble, of any provision dealing with the subject matter of this article.

Both parties agree to protect and not to transfer to any claimants pending the conclusion of the aforesaid Treaty any of the above funds or property which may be subject to their control.

Art. XI. Merchandise, the produce or manufacture of one country imported into the other in pursuance of this Agreement, shall not be subject therein to compulsory requisition on the part of the Government or of any local authority.

Art. XII. It is agreed that all questions relating to the rights and claims of nationals of either party in respect of patents, trade marks, designs, and copyrights, in the territory of the other party, shall be equitably dealt with in the Treaty referred to in the preamble.

Art. XIII. The present Agreement shall come into force immediately, and both parties shall at once take all necessary measures to give effect to it. It shall continue in force unless and until replaced by the Treaty contemplated in the preamble so long as the conditions laid down both in the articles of the Agreement and in the preamble are observed by both sides. Provided that at any time after the expiration of 12 months from the date on which the Agreement comes into force either party may give notice to terminate the provisions of the preceding articles, and on the expiration of six months from the date of such notice those articles shall terminate accordingly.

Provided also that if as the result of any action in the Courts of the United Kingdom dealing with the attachment or arrest of any gold, funds, securities, property, or commodities not being identifiable as the exclusive property of a British subject, consigned to the United Kingdom by the Russian Soviet Government or its representatives, judgment is delivered by the Court under which such gold, funds, securities, property, or commodities is held to be validly attached on account of obligations incurred by the Russian Soviet Government or by any previous Russian Government before the date of the signature of

this Agreement, the Russian Soviet Government shall have the right to terminate the Agreement forthwith.

Provided also that in the event of the infringement by either party at any time of any of the provisions of this Agreement or of the conditions referred to in the preamble, the other party shall immediately be free from the obligations of the Agreement. Nevertheless, it is agreed that before taking any action inconsistent with the Agreement the aggrieved party shall give the other party a reasonable opportunity of furnishing an explanation or remedying the default.

It is mutually agreed that in any of the events contemplated in the above provisions, the parties will afford all necessary facilities for the winding up in accordance with the principles of the Agreement of any transactions already entered into thereunder, and for the withdrawal and egress from their territories of the nationals of the other party and for the withdrawal of their movable property.

As from the date when six months' notice of termination shall have been given under this article the only new transactions which shall be entered into under the Agreement shall be those which can be completed within the six months. In all other respects the provisions of the Agreement will remain fully in force up to the date of termination.

Art. XIV. This Agreement is drawn up and signed in the English language. But it is agreed that as soon as may be a translation shall be made into the Russian language and agreed between the parties. Both texts shall then be considered authentic for all purposes.

Signed at London, this sixteenth day of March, nineteen hundred and twenty-one.

R.S. Home,
L. Krassin.

DECLARATION OF RECOGNITION OF CLAIMS

At the moment of signature of the preceding Trade Agreement both parties declare that all claims of either party or of its nationals against the other party in respect of property or rights or in respect of obligations incurred by the existing or former Governments of either country shall be equitably dealt with in the formal general Peace Treaty referred to in the preamble.

In the meantime, and without prejudice to the generality of the above stipulation, the Russian Soviet Government declares that it recognizes in principle that it is liable to pay compensation to private persons who have supplied goods or services to Russia for which they have not been paid. The detailed mode of discharging this liability shall be regulated by the Treaty referred to in the preamble.

The British Government hereby makes a corresponding declaration.

It is clearly understood that the above declarations in no way imply that the claims referred to therein will have preferential treatment in the aforesaid Treaty as compared with any other classes of claims which are to be dealt with in that Treaty.

Signed at London, this sixteenth day of March, nineteen hundred and twenty-one.

R.S. Home,
L. Krassin.

Soviet Russia, Vol. 4, No. 16 (16 April 1921), pp. 374-377.



A. A. Joffe, chairman of the Soviet delegation, commented on the treaty's importance for Soviet foreign policy, especially regarding the newly independent states of the former Russian Empire. During 1920 a series of treaties had been signed with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland ending any existing war status, defining borders, and spelling out economic, citizenship and other issues involved in their complete separation from the Russian empire. The armistice with Poland on 12 October 1920 and the peace treaty of 18 March 1921 completed the process. The treaties, which are quite technical and detailed, can be found in Soviet Treaty Series and in the League of Nations Treaty Series, various volumes.

[Speech by A. A. Joffe on Signing the Treaty of Riga with Poland]

In the name of the Russo-Ukrainian peace delegation I should first like to associate myself with those expressions of gratitude to the Latvian people, to their Government, and to the hospitable town of Riga which have already been voiced by the respected chairman of the Polish peace conference. I have already had occasion to note that a significant role is played in peace conferences by the atmosphere in which they are held, and I permit myself to stress with complete satisfaction the fact that whereas during the period of the Russo-Ukrainian-Polish peace negotiations international conditions have altered several times, in Riga reigned an atmosphere which has helped in the conduct of negotiations and made it easier for us to reach a satisfactory conclusion. I have no doubt, the holding of peace negotiations in the capital of Latvia will further strengthen the good-neighbourly and friendly relations which were formed between the Russian, Ukrainian, White Russian, and Latvian peoples from the moment when Russia first recognized the rights of peoples, both great and small, to decide their own fate, and gave proof in deed of its readiness to render strong aid to small nations. The very fact of the signing of peace here today will further strengthen those ties, since the peace between Russia and the Ukraine on one side and Poland on the other, elaborated on the basis of the principles contained in the agreement of 12 October 1920 on preliminary conditions, once more and with magnificent conviction affirms that Russia and the Ukraine will not allow their policy to be dependent on the successes or defeats of war, and will never utilize the principles of the liberty and self-determination of the nations for the purpose of a new enslavement of those nations, as has been done by others, but will always and in all circumstances remain true to their declared principles. No matter how much the enemies of the Soviet Republics, convinced of the futility of military intervention, have endeavoured and still endeavour to lead a new intervention against Russia and the Ukraine by the method of discrediting them in the eyes of the nations who long to live in peace with them, the facts speak for themselves, and while a cleverly directed campaign of lies and slander aims to convince the world of the weakness of Soviet Russia and the Ukraine, the Soviet power is in fact being established not only where it has already long been, but in places where it has not existed before. On the other hand, when these same enemies of the Soviet Republics attempted to frighten the neighbours of Russia and the Ukraine with the customary slanders, rumours of 'Soviet aggressive intentions', and information about the concentration of vast forces of the Red Army on the frontiers, here in Riga we were able to conduct negotiations peaceably, and we have not only shown no aggressive intention but have signed a peace which entirely satisfies all the essential, vital, and just demands of the Polish people. Thanks to the peaceful policy of Russia and the Ukraine the old view of 'if you wish for peace prepare for war' is gradually receding into the region of legends, and is being replaced by the other view, so frequently brought to the fore by myself, that peaceful relations between the peoples are not concluded at the signing of a peace treaty but are only then begun. There is not one peace treaty concluded by Russia or the Ukraine that is superfluous, nor that contains the seeds of a new war, for not one question in any of these treaties has been decided on the

basis of the simple relationship of power, as was always the custom before, to the detriment of the nations with whom such a peace was concluded. Even those nations which receive all that is essential to them must continually worry about the durability of the peace. The signing of peace with Poland completes the circle of peaceful relations between all the States which previously formed part of the old Russian Empire. The Tsarist policy of violence is liquidated and the peoples who have agreed in amity, without malice and hatred, to go their separate ways, may and must now develop in feelings of true friendship and neighbourliness those ties arising out of their economic proximity and common interest which were none the less built up during many centuries of State-imposed unity. It was with the greatest satisfaction that I listened to the words of the respected chairman of the Polish delegation when he sketched the basis of the positive programme of the Polish Government, and I for my part, on behalf of Russia and the Ukraine, am happy to declare that if in fact no interests foreign to the Polish people are allowed to govern Polish policy, those friendly and good-neighbourly relations of which the respected chairman of the Polish delegation spoke will most certainly be established between the States which have here signed this treaty. The creation of a close economic link with a free Poland pursuing its own policy is the aim of the Governments of Russia, the Ukraine, and White Russia, and in the realm of economic interrelationship the latter are ready now, as always, to aid their neighbours to the limit of their power. The peace negotiations have occupied several months, meeting with many extreme difficulties, particularly in the settlement of financial and economic questions. But despite all it must be stated that both during the period when blood was still being shed and the clangour of war was heard at the front, and during the later period in more peaceful circumstances, the sincere desire for peace and the tact shown by the Polish delegation, and in particular by its respected chairman, were extremely helpful both for the conduct of negotiations and for the achievement of a satisfactory settlement. On behalf of the Russo-Ukrainian delegation I wish, in closing, to express my gratitude for this to the Polish delegation and in particular to its chairman.

Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, Vol. 1, pp. 242-244.



SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

20, 25 March 1921

Soviet attitudes toward the United States were complex and contradictory. Sometimes the US was seen as the potential new leader of capitalism against Russia, at others as potentially more sympathetic to the Soviet state than the European governments. Yet, the United States proved especially reluctant to enter into any relations with the Soviet government and made no moves toward trade negotiations such as were going on with Britain and other European governments. The Soviets took advantage of the recent treaty with Britain and the inauguration of the new Harding administration in the US to propose improved relations, especially trade. Five days later Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes replied that no relations were possible as long as Russia did not recognize "the sanctity of private property, the sanctity of contract, and the right of free labor." Litvinov (Litvinoff) was at the time Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

I

*The Soviet Representative in Esthonia (Litvinov) to the Congress
of the United States and President Harding*

Reval [undated].

[Received March 21, 1921.]

Have the honor to transmit as instructed by my government following message,

Litvinov

*Plenipotentiary Representative
of Russian Republic to Esthonia*

"March 20th.

From the first days of her existence Soviet Russia had nourished the hope of the possibility of a speedy establishment of friendly relations with the great Republic of North America and had firmly expected that intimate and solid ties would be created between the two republics to the greater advantage of both. At the time when the Entente powers had begun their invasion of Soviet Russia, unprovoked and without declaration of war, the Soviet government repeatedly addressed itself to the American government with the proposal to adopt measures for the cessation of bloodshed. Even when the American troops together with the others participated in the attack upon Soviet Russia, the government of the Russian Republic still expressed the hope of a speedy change of America's policy towards her and demonstrated this by its particularly considerate treatment of the Americans in Russia. But President Wilson who, without cause and without any declaration of war, had attacked the Russian republic showed during his whole administration a growing hostility towards the Russian republic. Soviet Russia hopes that the American republic will not persist in obdurately following this path and that the new American government will clearly see the great advantage for the two republics of the reestablishment of business relations, and will consider the interests of both peoples which imperatively demand that the wall existing between them should be removed. The Soviet republic, entirely absorbed in the work of internal reconstruction and of building up its economic life, has not the intention of intervening in the internal affairs of America and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee makes herewith a categorical declaration to this effect. At the present time, after Soviet Russia has concluded treaties and established regular relations with numerous states, the absence of such relations with America seems to Soviet Russia particularly abnormal and harmful to both peoples. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee addresses to you the formal proposal of opening trade relations between Russia and America and for that purpose the relations between the two republics have to be on the whole regularised.

The All-Russian Central Executive Committee, therefore, proposes to send a special delegation to America, which will negotiate upon this matter with the American government in order to solve the question of business relations and of resumption of trade between Russia and America.

President of the All-Russian Executive Committee, M. Kalinin; Secretary P. Zalutsky."

II

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Reval (Albrecht)

Washington, March 25, 1921.

You may hand to Litvinoff the following statement which is made public here today: "The Government of the United States views with deep sympathy and grave concern the plight of the people of Russia and desires to aid by every appropriate means in promoting proper opportunities through which commerce can be established upon a sound basis. It is manifest to this Government that in existing circumstances there is no assurance for the development of trade, as the supplies which Russia might now be able to obtain would be wholly inadequate to meet her needs and no lasting good can result so long as the

present causes of progressive impoverishment continue to operate. It is only in the productivity of Russia that there is any hope for the Russian people and it is idle to expect resumption of trade until the economic bases of production are securely established. Production is conditioned upon the safety of life, the recognition by firm guarantees of private property, the sanctity of contract, and the rights of free labor. If fundamental changes are contemplated, involving due regard for the protection of persons and property and the establishment of conditions essential to the maintenance of commerce, this Government will be glad to have convincing evidence of the consummation of such changes, and until this evidence is supplied this Government is unable to perceive that there is any proper basis for considering trade relations."

Hughes

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 2 (1921), pp. 763-764, 768.



THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY—THE AGRICULTURAL TAX IN KIND

21 March 1921

This is the actual law enacting the new agricultural policy. It differed from the earlier resolution of the Party congress in that it specified individual responsibility for the tax, point seven, whereas the resolution had suggested communal responsibility. See also Lenin's speech to the congress, 15 March, above, and efforts to explain the new law in the following document.

ON THE REPLACEMENT OF THE REQUISITIONING OF FOOD AND RAW MATERIALS BY A TAX IN KIND

1. In order to assure an efficient and stable economic life on the basis of a freer disposition by the farmer of the products of his labor and of his economic resources, in order to strengthen the peasant economy and raise its productivity and also in order to calculate precisely the obligation to the state which falls on the peasants, requisitioning, as a means of state collection of food supplies, raw material and fodder, is to be replaced by a tax in kind.

2. This tax must be less than what the peasant has paid up to this time through requisitions. The sum of the tax must be calculated so as to cover the most essential needs of the Army, the city workers, the non-agricultural population. The general sum of the tax must be decreased inasmuch as the reestablishment of transportation and industry will permit the Soviet Government to receive agricultural products in exchange for factory and handicraft products.

3. The tax is to be taken in the form of the percentage or partial deduction from the products raised in the peasant holding, taking into account the harvest, the number of consumers in the holding and the number of cattle on hand.

4. The tax must be progressive; the percentage deducted must be lower for the holdings of the middle-class and poorer peasants and of town workers. The holdings of the poorest peasants may be exempted from some and, in exceptional cases, from all forms of the tax in kind.

The industrious peasants who increase the sown-areas and the number of cattle in their holdings and those who increase the general productivity of their holdings on the whole, receive benefits when paying the tax in kind.

5. The taxation law must be so framed, and published within such a time limit, that the peasants will be informed as exactly as possible about the amount of their obligations before the beginning of the spring field work.

6. The delivery to the state of the products listed in the tax ends within definite time limits, which are precisely established by law.

7. The responsibility for paying the tax rests with each individual household and the organs of the Soviet Government are requested to prosecute everyone who does not fulfill his obligations. Communal responsibility is abolished. In order to control the assessment and the payment of the tax, organizations of local peasants are formed, consisting of groups of payers of various tax rates.

8. All the reserves of food, raw material and fodder which remain with the peasants after the tax has been paid, are at their full disposition and may be used by them for improving and strengthening their holdings, for increasing personal consumption and for exchange for products of factory and handicraft industry and of agriculture.

Exchange is permitted within the limits of local economic turnover, both through co-operative organizations and through markets.

9. Those farmers who wish to deliver to the state the surplus in their possession after the tax has been paid must receive, in exchange for the voluntary delivery of this surplus, objects of general consumption and agricultural machinery. With this end in view, a permanent state reserve fund of agricultural machinery and objects of general consumption is being created. It includes both domestic products and goods purchased abroad. Part of the state gold reserve and part of the ready raw materials are set aside for the purpose of making purchases abroad.

10. The supply to the poorest classes of the agricultural population is arranged according to special legislation.

11. As a development of the present decree, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee requests the Council of People's Commissars to issue corresponding detailed instructions within one month.

Meisel and Kozera, pp. 127-218.



LENIN ON NEP

27, 28 May 1921

The Tenth Party Conference was called to deal with problems of implementing NEP, including clarifying it for the Party cadres and local officials. Lenin played the key role. Given the role Lenin's presumed intentions played in later political and economic debates in the Soviet Union, these two statements are important for any interpretation—and they are ambiguous. Lenin's draft resolution, nearly identical with the one adopted, defines NEP as established for "a long period of years," while his closing speech to the Conference seemed to confirm Osinsky's reference to "for a long time." How long was "long" to be? See Lenin's further comments, 27 March 1922, below.

I

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON QUESTIONS
OF THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

1. The fundamental political task of the moment is for all Party and Soviet workers to gain a complete understanding of the New Economic Policy and to implement it to the letter.

The Party regards this policy as being established for a long period of years, and demands that everyone should carry it out unconditionally with thoroughness and diligence.

2. Commodity exchange is brought to the fore as the principal lever of the New Economic Policy. It is impossible to establish a correct relationship between the proletariat and the peasantry, or an altogether stable form of economic alliance between these two classes in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, without regular commodity exchange or the exchange of products between industry and agriculture.

The exchange of commodities, in particular, is required to stimulate the extension of the peasants' area under crop and improvement of peasant farming.

Local initiative and enterprise must be given all-round support and development at all costs.

Gubernias with the greatest grain surpluses must be placed on the priority list for commodity exchange.

3. Considering co-operatives to be the main apparatus for commodity exchange, the conference recognises as correct the policy of contracts between the agencies of the People's Commissariat for Food and the co-operative societies, and the transfer, under government control, by the former to the latter of commodity-exchange stocks to fulfil the assignments of the government; the co-operatives to be given broad opportunities for procurement and all-round development of local industry and revival of economic life in general;

support for credit operations by the co-operatives;

anarchic commodity exchange (that is, exchange which eludes all control and state supervision) to be combated by concentration of exchange chiefly in the hands of the co-operatives, without, however, any restrictions on regular free market operations; market analysis.

4. Support for small and medium (private and co-operative) enterprises, chiefly those not requiring supplies from state raw material, fuel and food reserves.

Permission to lease government enterprises to private persons, co-operatives, artels and associations. The right of local economic agencies to conclude such contracts without authorisation from superior agencies. Obligatory notification of the Council of Labour and Defence in each such case.

5. Review of (certain sections of) production programmes for large-scale industry towards increasing the manufacture of consumer goods and peasant household articles.

Extension of enterprise and initiative by each large establishment in the disposal of financial and material resources. Submission of a precise decree to that effect for approval by the Council of People's Commissars.

6. Development of the system of bonuses in kind and the establishment by way of experiment of a collective supply system.

Establishment of a more correct distribution of foodstuffs with the aim of increasing labour productivity.

7. The need to maintain and enlarge the apparatus for the full and expeditious collection of the tax in kind everywhere. Investment of food agencies with the necessary Party authority for that purpose. Maintenance and enhancement of the centralisation of the food apparatus.

8. To concentrate all the enumerated measures on the current year's practical and urgent task: collection of at least 400 million poods of grain stocks as a basis for the rehabilitation of large-scale industry and the implementation of the electrification plan.

9. To adopt in principle the draft Instructions of the C.L.D., authorising the All-Russia Central Executive Committee group to enact them into law.

To recognise the strict fulfillment of the Instructions in general and the recruitment and promotion of non-Party people for work, in particular, as the Party's unconditional and primary task.

10. To establish special responsibility on the part of central agencies for any hampering of local initiative and insufficient support of it. To authorise the All-Russia Central Executive Committee group to work out a corresponding decision and have it adopted at the very next session.

11. The conference authorises the Central Committee and all Party organisations to carry out a system of measures to intensify agitation and propaganda and effect the necessary transfer of Party cadres to ensure complete understanding and steady implementation of the enumerated tasks.

12. To set as the Party's most important task the careful and all-round publicising and study in the press and at trade union, Soviet, and Party meetings, conferences, congresses, etc., of the practical experience gained in economic development locally and at the centre.

II

SPEECH IN CLOSING THE CONFERENCE

May 28

Comrades, I think that I can confine myself to a very short speech. As you are aware, we convened this special conference mainly for the purpose of achieving complete understanding on economic policy between the centre and the localities, among Party and all Soviet workers. I think that the conference has fully achieved its object. Some speakers noted that Comrade Osinsky gave the correct expression to the feelings of very many, probably, the majority of local Party workers when he said that we must remove all doubt about the fact that the policy adopted by the Tenth Party Congress and subsequently reinforced by decrees and orders has unquestionably been accepted by the Party in earnest and for a long time. This is what the conference most emphatically expressed and amplified by a number of points. When the comrades return to their localities, not the slightest possibility of wrong interpretation will remain. Of course, in adopting a policy to be pursued over a number of years we do not for a moment forget that everything may be altered by the international revolution, its rate of development and the circumstances accompanying it. The current international situation is such that some sort of a temporary, unstable equilibrium, but equilibrium for all that, has been established; it is the kind of equilibrium under which the imperialist powers have been compelled to abandon their desire to hurl themselves at Soviet Russia, despite their hatred for her, because the disintegration of the capitalist world is steadily progressing, unity is steadily diminishing, while the onslaught of the forces of the oppressed colonies, which have a population of over a thousand million, is increasing from year to year, month to month, and even week to week. But we can make no conjectures on this score. We are now exercising our main influence on the international revolution through our economic policy. The working people of all countries without exception and without exaggeration are looking to the Soviet Russian Republic. This much has been achieved. The capitalists cannot hush up or conceal anything. That is why they so eagerly catch at our every economic mistake and weakness. The struggle in this field has now become global. Once we solve this problem, we shall have certainly and finally won on an international scale. That is why for us questions of economic development become of absolutely exceptional importance. On this front, we must achieve victory by

a steady rise and progress which must be gradual and necessarily slow. I think that as a result of the work of our conference we shall certainly achieve this goal. (*Applause*)

Lenin, Vol. 32, pp. 433-437.



EXPULSION AND ADMISSION OF PARTIES TO THE COMINTERN: REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

9 June 1921

The Third Comintern Congress met in the aftermath of the Kronstadt rebellion, the dramatic shift of Russian policy represented by NEP, and the failure of a Communist inspired uprising in Germany, March 1921. These events dominated the Congress. One of the more important issues was the relationship of the Communist parties to other socialist parties. The report reflects the stringent application of the "21 Conditions" for admission laid down at the Second Congress—see 4 August 1920. In his closing speech Zinoviev termed the expulsion of the Italian socialist party as one of the two most important actions of the Congress. Ironically, the fading prospects for revolution in Europe soon led to an about face and a policy of "united front" with other socialists against capitalism. Whether to pursue a policy of cooperation with, or hostility toward, the non-Communist left was to be one of the ongoing conflicts within the Comintern and the Soviet leadership.

RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The Congress having favorably considered the report of the Executive Committee hereby declares that the policy and activities of the Executive during the past year have been carried out in accordance with the resolutions of the Second Congress. The Congress approves in particular of the application of the 21 Conditions laid down by the Second Congress in the different countries and sanctions the work of the Executive with regard to the formation of large Communist mass parties and the relentless struggle against the opportunist tendencies which manifested themselves in various parties.

1. In Italy the attitude of Serrati and his group immediately after the Second World Congress showed that they did not take the resolutions of the World Congress and the Communist International seriously. The role played by these leaders during the September struggle, its conduct in Livorno and still more its policy since that time, have clearly proved that Serrati and his colleagues only wish to use Communism as a shield for their opportunist policy. The split was inevitable under such conditions. The Congress declares that the Executive has acted with firmness and determination in this very important situation. It sanctions the resolution of the Executive Committee which at the time recognized the Communist Party of Italy to be the only Communist section of that country.

After the Communists had left, the Livorno Congress adopted the following resolution by Bentivoglio:

"The Congress reaffirming its adherence to the Third International hereby refers the entire conflict to the coming Congress and pledges itself in advance to abide by and execute its resolution."

The Third Congress of the Communist International declares that this decision of the Serrati group had been forced upon them by the revolutionary workers. The Congress trusts

that these same revolutionary elements of the working class are going to see to it that the decisions of the Third World Congress be actually carried out.

In reply to the appeal of the Livorno Congress the Third World Congress hereby submits the following ultimatum: The Socialist Party of Italy cannot remain within the ranks of the Communist International so long as the participants of the reformist-conference at Reggio-Emilia and their supporters have not been expelled from the party.

After this ultimatum has been fulfilled the Executive is to take the necessary steps to bring about a union between the Communist Party of Italy and the Socialist Party in Italy, after the latter has purified itself of all reformist and centrist elements, and combine both organizations into a unified section of the Communist International.

2. In Germany the Party Conference of the U.S.P.D. [Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany] in Halle was the consequence of the resolutions of the Second World Congress which in their turn were based on the development of the labor movement. The work of the Executive was directed towards the formation of a strong Communist Party in Germany, and experience has proven that this policy was a correct one. The Congress also completely approves of the attitude of the Executive towards the events within the V.K.P.D. [Communist Party of Germany].

It expresses the hope that the policy applied today in enforcing the fundamental principles of international revolutionary discipline will also be followed by the Executive Committee in the future.

3. The acceptance of the K.A.P.D. [Communist Workers' Party of Germany] as a sympathizing party of the Communist International had for its aim to put the K.A.P.D. on trial and ascertain if it would adapt itself to the requirements of the Communist International.

This period of trial should suffice and the K.A.P.D. should be required to join the V.K.P.D. within a set period; otherwise the K.A.P.D. is to be excluded from the Communist International as a sympathizing party.

The Congress approves of the manner in which the Executive applied the 21 Conditions to the French party. By its actions it has succeeded in getting the laboring masses which are tending towards Communism away from the Longuet opportunists and centrists, and to promote their development. The Congress trusts that the Executive will do its utmost for the furtherance of an active and class conscious Communist Party.

4. In Czecho-Slovakia the Executive has followed up with great patience and tact the revolutionary development of a proletariat which has already given proof of its determination and readiness to take a share in the revolutionary struggle. The Congress approves of the decision of the Executive to accept the Czech Communist Party as a member of the Communist International. The Congress trusts that the Executive will insist that the 21 Conditions be unswervingly carried out by the Czech Communist Party and that a united Communist Party be formed comprising all the nationalities of Czecho-Slovakia with a purely Communist program under firm Communist leadership and on a centralized basis, and also that the trade unions of that country will be speedily and decisively won over and united internationally.

5. With regard to the work of the Executive Committee on the countries of the Near and Far East, the Congress welcomes its extensive activity, and considers that the transition to intensified organization work in these countries not possible of postponement.

Finally the Congress repudiates the objections which have been raised by the open and disguised adversaries of Communism against vigorous international centralization of the Communist movement. It expresses its deep conviction that all the parties will send their best forces to the Executive, and thereby bring about a still more militant political central leadership which is necessary for the indissoluble unions of the affiliated Communist Parties. The lack of such a leadership made itself felt, for instance, in the unemployment and reparation question in which the Executive did not act promptly and effectively. The Congress trusts that, with increased co-operation of the affiliated parties in the organization of

a more efficient apparatus and with the intensified collaboration of the parties in the Executive, the latter will be enabled to fulfill its ever increasing tasks on a still larger scale than it has done hitherto.

Theses and Resolutions Adopted at the Third World Congress of the Communist International, pp. 71-74, with minor modifications.



THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE COMINTERN

4 July 1921

These theses, drafted by Trotsky and Eugene Varga (Hungarian Communist), presented a less optimistic picture of the international situation and the prospects for revolution than had characterized the first and second congresses. Trotsky acknowledged that capitalism had reestablished "a temporary stability" and that the revolutionary movement "might well be forced on the defensive." He projected the possibility of a much longer and more complex revolutionary process than previously expected. This marked a new awareness that previous theories might need reexamination in the face of the failure of revolution to spread beyond the bounds of the old Russian empire. These theses have been abridged for space; most of the deletions refer to analyses of the internal situation in various countries or general economic theory.

THESIS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

I. The Root of the Problem.

1. The revolutionary movement at the close of the imperialist war and during the succeeding period has been marked by unprecedented intensity. The month of March, 1917, witnessed the overthrow of Tsarism. In May, 1917, a vehement strike movement broke out in England. In November, 1917, the Russian proletariat seized the power of Government. The month of November, 1918, marked the downfall of the German and Austro-Hungarian monarchies. In the course of the succeeding year, a number of European countries were being swept by a powerful strike movement constantly gaining in scope and intensity. In March, 1919, a Soviet Republic was inaugurated in Hungary. At the close of that year the United States was convulsed by turbulent strikes involving the steel workers, miners and railwaymen. Following the January and March battles of 1919 the revolutionary movement in Germany reached its culminating point shortly after the Kapp uprising in March, 1920. The internal situation in France became most tense in the month of May, 1920. In Italy we witnessed the constant growth of unrest among the industrial and agrarian proletariat leading, in September, 1920, to the seizure of factories, mills and estates by the workers. In December, 1920, the Czech proletariat resorted to the weapon of the proletarian mass strike. March, 1921, marked the uprising of workers in Central Germany and the coal miners' strike in England.

Having reached its highest point in those countries which had been involved in the war, particularly in the defeated countries, the revolutionary movement spread to the neutral countries as well. In Asia and in Africa, the movement aroused and intensified the revolutionary spirit of the great masses of the colonial countries. But this powerful revolutionary wave did not succeed in sweeping away international capitalism, nor even the capitalist order of Europe itself.

2. A number of uprisings and revolutionary battles have taken place during the year that elapsed between the Second and Third Congress of the Communist International, which resulted in sectional defeats (the Red Army offensive near Warsaw in August, 1920, the movement of the Italian proletariat in September, 1920, and the uprising of the German workers in March, 1921).

Following the close of the war which has been characterized by the elemental nature of its onslaught, by the considerable formlessness of its methods and aims, and the extreme panic of the ruling classes, the first period of the revolutionary movement may now be regarded as having reached its termination. The self-confidence of the bourgeoisie as a class, and the apparent stability of its government apparatus have undoubtedly become strengthened. The panic of Communism haunting the bourgeoisie, not having disappeared, has nevertheless somewhat relaxed. The leading spirits of the bourgeoisie are now even boasting of the might of their government apparatus, and have assumed the offensive against the laboring masses everywhere, on both the economic and the political fields.

3. This situation presents the following questions to the Communist International and to the entire working class:

To what extent does this transformation in the relations between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat correspond to the actual balance of the contending forces? Is it true that the bourgeoisie is about to restore the social balance which had been upset by the war? Is there any ground to suppose that the period of political upheaval and of class-war is going to be superseded by a new epoch of restoration and capitalist development? Does not this necessitate revision of program or tactics of the Communist International?

II. The War, Artificial Business Stimulation, The Crisis and the Countries of Europe.

4. The high tide of capitalism was reached in the two decades preceding the war. The intervals of prosperity were superseded by periods of depression of comparatively shorter duration and intensity. The general trend was that of an upward curve: the capitalist countries were growing rich.

Having scoured the world market through their trusts, cartels, and consortiums, the masters of world-capitalism well realized that this mad growth of capitalism will finally strike a dead wall, confining the limits of the capacity of the market created by themselves. They therefore tried to get out of the difficulty by a surgical method. In place of a lengthy period of economic depression which was to follow and result in wholesale destruction of productive resources, the bloody crisis of the world war was ushered in to serve the same purpose.

But the war proved not only extremely destructive in its methods, but also of an unexpectedly lengthy duration. Besides the economic destruction of the "surplus" productive resources, it also weakened, shattered, and undermined the fundamental apparatus of European production. At the same time it gave a powerful impetus to the capitalist development of the United States and quickened the aggrandisement of Japan. Thus the centre of gravity of world industry was shifted from Europe to America.

5. The period following upon the termination of the four years' slaughter, the demobilization of the armies, the transition to a peaceful state of affairs, and the inevitable economic crisis coming as a result of the exhaustion and chaos caused by the war—all this was regarded by the bourgeoisie with the greatest anxiety as the approach of the most critical moment. As a matter of fact during the two years following the war, the countries involved became the arena of a mighty movement of the proletariat.

One of the chief causes which enabled the bourgeoisie to preserve its dominant position was furnished by the fact that the first months after the war, instead of bringing about the seemingly unavoidable crisis, were marked by economic prosperity. This lasted approximately for one year and a half. Nearly all the demobilized workers were absorbed in

industry. As a general rule wages did not catch up with the cost of living, but they nevertheless kept rising, and that created the illusion of economic gains.

It was just this *commercial and industrial revival of 1919 and 1920* which, to some extent, relieved the tension of the postwar period, that caused the bourgeoisie to assume an extremely self-confident air, and to *proclaim the advent of a new era of organic capitalist development*. But as a matter of fact, the industrial revival of 1919-20 was not in essence the beginning of the regeneration of capitalist industry, but a mere prolongation of the artificially stimulated state of industry and commerce, which was created by the war, and which undermined the economy of capitalism....

8. By means of a continuous derangement of the economic system, accumulation of inflated capital, depreciation of currency (speculation instead of economic restoration), the bourgeois governments in league with the banking combines and industrial trusts succeeded in putting off the beginning of the economic crisis till the moment when the political crisis consequent upon the demobilization and the first squaring of accounts was somewhat allayed. Thus, having gained a considerable breathing space, the bourgeoisie imagined that the dreaded crisis had been removed for an indefinite time. Optimism reigned supreme. It appeared as if the needs of reconstruction had opened a new era of lasting expansion of industry, commerce and particularly speculation. But the year 1920 proved to have been a period of shattered hopes.

The crisis—financial, commercial and industrial, began in March, 1920. Japan saw the beginning of it in the month of April. In the United States, it opened by a slight fall of prices in January. Then it passed on to England, France and Italy (in April). It reached the neutral countries of Europe, then Germany and extended to all the countries involved in the capitalist sphere of influence during the second half of 1920.

9. Thus *the crisis of 1920* is not a periodic stage of "normal" industrial cycle, but a profound *reaction consequent upon the artificial stimulation that prevailed during the war and during the two years thereafter and was based upon ruination and exhaustion*.

The upward curve of industrial development was marked by turns of good times followed by crises. During the last seven years, however, there was no rise in the productive forces of Europe but, on the contrary, they kept at a downward sweep. The crumbling of the very foundation of industry is only beginning and is going to proceed along the whole line. European economy is going to contract and expand during a number of years to come. The curve marking the productive forces is going to decline from the present fictitious level. The expansions are going to be only short lived and of a speculative nature to a considerable extent, while the crises are going to be hard and lasting. The present European crisis is one of under-production. It is the form in which destitution reacts against the striving to produce trade, and resume life on the usual capitalist level....

III. The United States, Japan, Colonial Countries and Soviet Russia.

14. The development of the United States during the war proceeded, in a certain sense, in an opposite direction to that of Europe. The part played by the United States in the war was chiefly that of a salesman. The destructive consequences of the war had no direct effect upon that country, and the damage caused to its transport, agriculture, etc., was only of an indirect nature and of a far smaller degree than that caused to England, not to speak of either France or Germany. At the same time, the United States, taking full advantage of the fact that European competition had either been removed entirely or had become extremely weak, succeeded in raising some of its most important industries (such as petroleum production, ship-building, automobile and coal industry) to such a height as it had never anticipated. Today most of the countries of Europe are dependent on America not only for their petroleum and grain, but also for their coal.

While America's export prior to the war consisted chiefly of agricultural products and raw materials (making up more than two-thirds of the entire export), her main export at the

present time is made up of manufactured articles (60 per cent of her entire export). Having been in debt prior to the war, the United States is now the world's creditor, concentrating within her coffers about one-half of the world's gold reserve and continually augmenting her treasury. The dominating part played by the pound sterling has now been taken over by the American dollar.

15. This extraordinary expansion of American industry was caused by a special combination of circumstances, namely the withdrawal of European competition and, above all, the demands of the European war market. But, American capitalism today has also got out of balance. Since devastated Europe as a competitor of America is not in a position to regain its pre-war role on the world market, the American market as well can preserve only an insignificant part of its former position with Europe as a customer. At the same time America today is producing goods for export purposes to a much greater extent than prior to the war. The over-expansion of American industry during the war cannot find any outlet owing to the scarcity of world markets. As a consequence, many industries have become part time or seasonal industries, affording employment to the workers only part of the year. The crisis in the United States resulting from the decline of Europe signifies the beginning of a profound and lasting economic disorganization. This is the result of the fundamental disturbance of the world's subdivision of labor.

16. Japan also took advantage of the war in order to extend her influence on the world market. Her development has been of a much more limited scope than that of the United States and some branches of Japanese industry have acquired the character of what might be termed "hothouse" production. Her productive forces were sufficiently strong to enable her to take hold of the market while there were no competitors. But they are utterly insufficient to retain that market in a competitive struggle with the more powerful capitalist countries. Hence the acute crisis which had its starting point particularly in Japan.

17. The Transatlantic countries and the colonies (such as South America, Canada, Australia, China, Egypt and others), which used to export raw materials in their turn, took advantage of the rupture in international relations for the development of their home industries. But the world crisis has now involved these countries as well, and their internal industrial development is going to be checked, thereby serving as an additional cause for trade handicaps to England and of the whole of Europe.

18. Thus, there is no ground whatsoever to speak of any restoration of lasting balance today either in the sphere of production, commerce or credit with reference to Europe or even with reference to the world as a whole. The economic decline of Europe is still going on and the decay of the foundation of European industry will manifest itself in the near future.

The exchange of goods on the world market is being greatly hindered by the devaluation of currency in Western European countries, reaching in some cases 99 per cent. The incessant rapid fluctuation of the rate of exchange has converted capitalist production into wild speculation.

The world market is in a state of disorganization. Europe wants American products for which, however, it can give nothing in return. While the body of Europe is suffering from anemia, that of America is affected with plethora. The gold standard has been destroyed and the world market has been deprived of its general exchange medium. The only way by which the restoration of the gold standard in Europe could be achieved would be by getting the export to exceed the import. But this is just what devastated Europe is not in a condition to do. America, on the other hand, is trying to check the influx of European goods by raising her tariff.

Thus, Europe has become a bedlam. Prohibitive measures concerning import and transit and increasing the protective tariff manifold have been passed by many a state. England has introduced prohibitive customs duties. The export as well as the entire economic life of Germany is at the mercy of the Allies and particularly by the French speculators. The

former Austria-Hungary is now broken up into a number of provinces divided by custom borders. The net in which the Versailles Treaty has entangled the world is becoming more and more tightened. The elimination of Soviet Russia as a market for manufactured goods and as a supply of raw materials has contributed in a very high degree to the disturbing of the economic equilibrium of the world.

19. The reappearance of Russia on the world market is not going to produce any appreciable changes in it, Russia's means of production have been always completely dependent upon the industrial conditions of the rest of the world and this dependence particularly with regard to the Allied countries has become intensified during the war when her home industry was almost completely mobilized for war purposes. But the blockade cut off these vital connections between Russia and the other countries. There could be no question of setting up any new branches of industry which were needed to prevent the general decay caused by the wear and tear of machinery and equipment in a country completely exhausted during three years of incessant civil war. In addition to this, hundreds and thousands of our best proletarian elements, comprising a great number of skilled workers had to be recruited for the Red Army. Under these conditions, surrounded by the iron ring of the blockade, carrying on incessant wars and suffering from the heritage of an industrial collapse no other regime could have maintained the economic life of the country and create such conditions as would permit of centralized administration. There is no denying, however, that the struggle against world imperialism was carried on at the price of the progressive diminution of the productive resources of industry in various branches. Now, since the blockade has relaxed and the relations between town and country are becoming more regular, the Soviet power for the first time, has been enabled to gradually and steadily direct the country upon the road to economic prosperity in a centralized manner.

IV. Social Contradictions Intensified.

20. The unprecedented destruction of industrial resources brought about by the war did not check the process of social differentiation. Quite the contrary, the proletarianization of the intermediary classes, including the new middle-groupings of employees, officials, etc., and the concentration of wealth in the hands of the small clique of trusts combines and so on, have, for the last ten years, made enormous strides in the more backward countries. The Stinnes combine is now the most important factor of the economic life of Germany. The soaring of prices on all commodities coincident with the catastrophic depreciation of currency in all countries involved in the war meant a redistribution of the national incomes to the disadvantage of the working class, officials, employees and small owners and all other persons with a more or less fixed income.

Thus we see that though Europe has been thrown back for a number of decades as to its material resources, the intensification of the social contradictions has not only not retrograded or been suspended but has, on the contrary, assumed a particular acuteness. This cardinal fact is, of itself, sufficient to dispel any illusions of the possibility of a lasting and peaceful development under a democratic form of Government. *The social differentiation proceeding along the line of economic decline predetermines the most intense convulsive and cruel nature of the class struggle.*

The present crisis is only a continuation of the destructive work done by the war and the post-bellum speculative boom.

21. The prices of agricultural products have risen, bringing about an apparent prosperity in the country and increasing in reality the income and the property of the rich peasantry.... At the same time large numbers of the poorer peasantry have become proletarians and paupers, the village has become a breeding place of discontent, and the class-consciousness of the country proletariat has become sharpened. On the other hand, the general impoverishment of Europe, making it incapable of purchasing sufficient American grain, has caused a heavy crisis in the farm industry across the ocean. We are approaching a crisis

of peasant and farming economy, not only in Europe, but also in the United States, Canada, Argentine, Australia and South Africa.

22. Owing to the fall of the purchasing power of money, the position of the State and private employees has, as a rule, become even worse than that of the proletarians. Having lost their usual stability the middle and lower officials are becoming factors of political unrest and undermine the Government apparatus which they are called upon to serve. This "new middle estate" which has been regarded by the Reformists as the bulwark of conservatism, can be utilized as a factor in the revolution in the present transitional period.

23. Capitalist Europe has completely lost its dominating position in the world economy. But it was just this domination that had lent some relative equilibrium between its social classes. All the efforts of the European countries (England and partly France) to restore former conditions only tend to intensify their instability and disorganization.

24. While the concentration of wealth going on in Europe has its foundations in the ruinous conditions of that Continent, in the United States the concentration of property and the extreme intensification of class distinctions are proceeding on the basis of the feverish growth of capitalist accumulation. The class struggle now being waged on American soil is assuming an extremely tense revolutionary character owing to the sharp vacillations produced by the general instability of the world market. The period of an unprecedented rise of capitalism is bound to be followed by an extraordinary rise of revolutionary struggle.

25. The emigration of workers and peasants across the ocean has always served as a safety-valve to the capitalist regime in Europe. It grew during prolonged periods of depression and after unsuccessful revolutionary outbreaks. At present, however, America and Australia are putting ever-growing obstacles in the way of emigration. Thus, this safety-valve, so necessary to the capitalist regime, has ceased to exist.

26. The vigorous development of capitalism in the East, particularly in India and in China, has created new social foundations for the revolutionary struggle. The bourgeoisie of the Eastern countries has bound up its fate even more closely with foreign capital, and has thus become a very important weapon of capitalist domination. The contest between this bourgeoisie and foreign imperialism is the contest of a weaker competitor against his stronger rival, and is by its very nature only half-hearted and ineffective. The development of the native proletariat paralyzes the nationalistic-revolutionary tendencies of the capitalist bourgeoisie. At the same time the great masses of the peasants of the Oriental countries look upon the Communist vanguard as their real revolutionary leader. This is particularly true of the more progressive elements of these masses.

The combination of the military nationalistic oppression of foreign imperialism, of the capitalist exploitation by foreign and native bourgeoisie, and the survivals of feudalism are creating favorable conditions in which the young proletariat of the colonial countries must develop rapidly and take the lead in the revolutionary movement of the peasant masses. The revolutionary national movement in India and in other colonies is today an essential component part of the world revolution to the same extent as the uprising of the proletariat in the capitalist countries of the old and the new world.

V. International Relations.

27. The economic conditions of the world in general, and the decline of Europe in particular, presage a long period of hard times, disturbances, crises of both a general and partial character, and so forth. The international relations inaugurated by the war and the Versailles Treaty are rendering the situation more and more hopeless. The trend of the economic forces tending to sweep away national boundaries and convert Europe and the rest of the world into one economic territory gave birth to imperialism. But, on the other hand, the struggle between the contending forces of this imperialism led to the creation of a multiplicity of new national boundaries, new custom-barriers and new armies. In regard to State administration and economy, Europe has been thrown back to the Middle Ages.

The soil which has been exhausted and laid waste is now being called upon to feed an army one and a half times as large as that of 1914, in the hey-day of "armed peace"....

31. Both the original causes that called forth the recent great slaughter and the chief combatants that took part in it marked it as a European war, the crucial point of which was the antagonism between England and Germany. The intervention of the United States only widened the scope of the struggle, but it did not divert it from its original direction. The European conflict was being settled by world-wide means. The war, having settled the English-German and German-American quarrel in its own way, not only did not solve the problem of the relations between the United States and England but has, for the first time, put that problem prominently forward as one of the first order and the question of the American-Japanese as one of the second order. Thus, the last war was in reality only a prelude to a genuine world war which is to solve the problem of *imperialist autocracy*.

32. This, however, forms only one focus of international policy which has yet another focus located in the Russian Soviet Federated Republic and the Third International, brought about by the war. All the forces of the world revolution are arraying themselves against all the imperialist combinations. Whether the alliance between England and France is going to be maintained or broken up, whether the Anglo-Japanese treaty is going to be renewed or not, whether the United States is going to join the League of Nations or not—all this is of little value as far as the interests of the proletariat or the securing of peace is concerned. The proletariat can see no guarantee for peace in the vacillating, predatory, and treacherous combinations of capitalist powers, whose policy turns to an every-increasing extent around the antagonism between England and America, fostering that antagonism and preparing for a new bloody outbreak.

The fact that some of the capitalist governments have concluded peace and commercial treaties with Soviet Russia does not mean that the bourgeoisie of the world has given up the idea of destroying the Soviet Republic. What we are witnessing now is nothing but a change, a temporary change perhaps, of the forms and methods of struggle. The uprising caused by the Japanese troops in the Far East may serve as an introduction to a new stage of armed intervention.

It is altogether obvious that the longer the revolutionary movement of the world proletariat will go on, the more inevitably will the bourgeoisie be impelled by the contradiction of the international economic and political situation to make another bloody denouement on a world-wide scale. If this should come to pass, the "restoration of capitalist equilibrium" consequent upon a new war would have to proceed under conditions of economic exhaustion and barbarity in comparison with which the present state of Europe might be regarded as the height of well-being.

33. In spite of the fact that the late war has furnished terrible evidence that wars are unprofitable—a truth lying at the bottom of bourgeois and socialist pacifism—the process of political, economic, ideological and technical preparation for a new war is going on at full speed all through the capitalist world. Humanitarian anti-revolutionary pacifism has become an auxiliary force to militarism. The social-democrats of every variety and the Amsterdam trade unionists, who are trying to make the workers of the world believe that they ought to adapt themselves to the economic and political conditions resulting from the war, are rendering the imperialist bourgeoisie most valuable services in the matter of preparing a new slaughter which threatens to completely annihilate civilization.

VI. The Working Class and the Post-Bellum Period.

34. The problem of capitalist reconstruction along the lines outlined above essentially puts forward the question as to whether the working class is willing to bear any more heavy sacrifices in order to perpetuate its own slavery, which is going to be even more heavy and more cruel than it was prior to the war. The industrial and economic reconstruction of Europe requires the setting up of new machinery to replace that destroyed during the war

and the effective recreation of capital. This would be possible only if the proletariat were willing to work more under a far lower standard of living. The capitalists are insisting on this, and the treacherous leaders of the Yellow International urge the proletariat to assist in the reconstruction of capitalism in the first place, and then proceed fighting for the betterment of their own conditions. But, the European proletariat is not ready to make this sacrifice. It demands a higher standard of living, which is utterly incompatible with the present state of the capitalist system. Hence the everlasting strikes and uprisings; hence the impossibility of the economic reconstruction of Europe.

To restore the value of paper money means for a number of European countries (Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Poland, the Balkans, etc.) first of all to throw off the burden of too heavy obligations, i.e., to declare themselves bankrupt; but this would be a strong impulse to the struggle of all classes for a new distribution of the national income. To restore the value of paper money means further reduction of state expenditures to the detriment of the masses (to forego the regulation of wages and of articles of prime necessity); to prevent the import of cheaper foreign manufactures and increase the amount of exported articles by lowering the cost of production which can be achieved, above all, by increasing the exploitation of labor.

Every real measure tending to restore capitalist equilibrium must by the very nature of the case tend to disturb class equilibrium to a still greater extent than heretofore, and lend additional impetus to the class war. Thus, the attempt at a revival of capitalism involves a contest of vital forces, of classes and parties. If one of the two contending classes, namely the proletariat, should decide to refrain from the revolutionary struggle, the bourgeoisie would undoubtedly establish some sort of a new capitalist equilibrium, an equilibrium based upon material and spiritual deterioration, leading to new wars, to the progressive impoverishment of entire countries, and to the continuous dying out of these millions of toiling masses. But the frame of mind of the world proletariat today furnishes no ground whatever for any such supposition.

35. The elements of stability, of conservatism, and of tradition have to a considerable extent lost their power over the minds of the laboring masses. It is true, that social democracy and the trade unions still exercise an influence over a considerable part of the proletariat, thanks to the apparatus of organizations that has come down to them from former times. But the nature of this influence as well as that of the proletariat itself has undergone considerable changes in no way consistent with the "step by step" methods of the pre-war period.

In the upper crust of the proletariat the labor bureaucracy, having grown out of proportion, being closely knit together, resorting to certain methods of domination that have become habitual, still preserves its usual position and is bound up by numerous ties with the institutions and organizations of the capitalist state. Then come those of the rank and file whose position is more favorable than that of the rest of the workers, who occupy or look forward to occupying some administrative post in the industry itself, and on whom the labor bureaucracy mainly relies for its support. The older generation of social-democrats and trade union men consisting in the main of skilled workers, have become attached to their organizations through decades of struggle and cannot make up their minds to sever connections with them, regardless of the treacherous nature of their activity. But, in many industries, unskilled workers, and female workers are entering the ranks in considerable numbers.

Millions of workers having gone through the experience of the war and having acquired the ability to use the rifle are now prepared to a large extent to turn the weapons against their class enemies, provided they be given the strong leadership and serious training which are essential for victory. Millions of working men and particularly women have been newly

recruited for industrial pursuits during the war. These new workers brought with themselves their petty-bourgeois prejudices. But they also brought along their impatient claims for better conditions of life.

There are also millions of young working men and women who have grown up in the storm and stress of war and revolution, who are more susceptible to the Communist ideas and are anxious to act.

The ebb and flow of the gigantic army of unemployed, some of whom are unattached to any class while others possess only partial class attachments, form a striking illustration of the disintegration of capitalist production and represent a constant menace to the bourgeois order. All these proletarian elements, varying so much in origin and character, have been enlisting in the post-bellum revolutionary movement at various times and in varying degrees. This explains the vacillations, the ebbs and flows, the attacks and retreats, characterizing the revolutionary war. But the shattering of old illusions, the terrible uncertainty of existence, the arbitrary domination of the trusts and bloody methods of the militarized state—all these are rapidly welding the overwhelming majority of the proletarian masses together. The great masses are searching for a determined and definite leadership and for a closely welded and centralized Communist Party to take the lead.

36. During the war, the condition of the working class became perceptibly worse. It is true some groups of workers improved their condition, and in those cases where several members of a working man's family were in a position to hold their place near the loom, the workers succeeded in maintaining and even in raising their standard of life. But as a general rule wages did not keep up with the rise in prices. The proletariat of Central Europe has been doomed to ever-greater privations, ever since the war began. The lowering of the standard of life was not so noticeable in the allied countries till lately. In England, the proletariat succeeded in stopping the process of lowering the standard of life by means of an energetic struggle carried on during the last period of the war. In the United States, some strata of the workers succeeded in improving their conditions, others only retained their previous standard of living, while still others had their standard of living lowered. The economic crisis has come down upon the proletariat with terrific force. The falling of wages began to exceed the fall of prices. The number of unemployed and semi-employed has reached such dimensions as have never been equalled in capitalist history.

The ups and downs in the condition of existence not only have an unfavorable effect on productivity, but also prevent the restoration of class equilibrium in its most essential domain, that of production. *The instability of the conditions of life reflecting nationally and internationally the general instability of economic conditions is to-day the most revolutionary factor of social development.*

VII.—The Perspective and Problems Involved

37. The war did not have as its immediate consequence a proletarian revolution, and the bourgeoisie has some ground to register this fact as a great victory for itself.

Only petty bourgeois dullards can imagine that the fact that the European proletariat did not succeed in overthrowing the bourgeoisie during the war or immediately after it, is an indication that the programme of the Communist International failed. The Communist International is basing its policy on the proletarian revolution, but this by no means implies either dogmatically fixing any definite date for the revolution, or any pledge to bring it about mechanically at a set time. Revolution has always been, and is today, nothing else but a struggle of living forces carried on within given historic conditions. The war has destroyed capitalist equilibrium all over the world. It has thus created conditions favoring the proletariat, which is the fundamental force of the revolution. The Communist International has been exerting all its efforts to take full advantage of these conditions.

The distinction between the Communist International and Social-Democrats of all colors does not consist in the fact that we are trying to force the revolution and set a definite date for it while they are opposed to any utopian and immature uprisings. No, the distinction lies in the fact that Social-Democrats hinder the actual development of the revolution by rendering all possible assistance in the way of restoring the equilibrium of the bourgeois state while the Communists, on the other hand, are trying to take advantage of all means and methods for the purpose of overthrowing and destroying the capitalist government and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But, during the two and a half years following the war, the proletarians of various countries have exhibited their self-sacrifice, energy, and readiness for the struggle to such an extent as would amply suffice to make the revolution triumphant, provided there had been a strongly centralized international Communist Party on the scene ready for action. But, during the war, and immediately thereafter, by force of historic circumstances, there was at the head of the European proletariat the organization of the Second International which has been and remains up to date, the invaluable political weapon in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

38. By the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919, the power of the Government in Germany was practically in the hands of the working class, but the Social-Democracy, the Independents, and the unions used all their traditional influence and their whole apparatus for the purpose of returning the power into the hands of the bourgeoisie.

In Italy, the stormy revolutionary movement of the proletariat during one and a half years has been marked by powerful currents and it was only thanks to the petty bourgeois impotence of the Socialist Party, to the treacherous policy of the parliamentary factions, and to the cowardly opportunism of the trade union organizations, that the bourgeoisie got into a position to reconstruct its apparatus, to mobilize its white guards and to assume the offensive against the proletariat which has thus been temporarily discouraged by the bankruptcy of its leading organs.

The mighty strike movement in England was frustrated again and again during the last year, not so much by the government forces as by the conservative trade unions whose apparatus was most shamefully used to serve counter-revolutionary ends. Had the leaders of the trade unions remained faithful to the cause of the working class, the machinery of the trade unions could have been used for revolutionary battle despite their defects. The recent crisis of the Triple Alliance furnished the possibility of a break with the bourgeoisie, but this was frustrated by the conservatism, cowardice and treachery of the trade union leaders. Should the machinery of the English trade unions develop half the amount of energy in the interests of socialism which it had been using in the interests of capitalism, the English proletariat would conquer power and would start the reconstruction of the economic organization of the country with only an insignificant amount of sacrifice. The same refers to a greater or less extent to all other capital countries.

39. It is absolutely beyond dispute that in many countries the open revolutionary struggle of the proletariat for power has been temporarily delayed. But, in the very nature of the case it was impossible to expect that the revolutionary offensive after the war not having resulted in an immediate victory, should go on developing incessantly along an upward curve. Political evolution proceeds in cycles and has its ups and downs. The enemy does not remain passive, but fights for his existence. If the offensive of the proletariat does not lead to direct victory, the bourgeoisie embraces the first opportunity for a counter-offensive. The proletariat in losing some of its positions which were too easily won usually experiences some temporary depression in its ranks. *But it is an undoubted mark of our time that the curve of the capitalist evolution proceeds, through temporary rises, constantly downwards, while the curve of revolution proceeds through some vacillations constantly upwards.*

Since the reconstruction of capitalism presupposes a great intensification of exploitation, the annihilation of millions of lives, the lowering of millions of other lives below the minimum of existence, the constant insecurity of the conditions of the proletariat, the working class will be forced to repeated revolts, to continuous strikes and riots. Under this pressure and in the course of these struggles the will of the masses to overthrow the capitalist order will grow in strength.

40. The fundamental task of the Communist Party in the current crisis is to conduct, extend, widen and unite the present defensive fight of the proletariat and sharpen it towards the final political struggle in accordance with the course of evolution. Should, however, the pace of development slacken and the present economic crisis be followed by a period of prosperity in a greater or lesser number of countries, this would by no means be an indication of the beginning of the "organic" epoch. So long as capitalism exists periodic vacillations are inevitable. These vacillations are going to accompany capitalism in its death agony as was the case during its youth and maturity. In case the proletariat should be forced to retreat under the onslaught of capitalism in the course of the present crisis, it will immediately resume the offensive, as soon as a more favorable combination of circumstances sets in. The offensive character of the economic struggle of the proletariat which would inevitably be carried on under the slogan of revenge for all the deceptions of the war period, and for all the plunder and abuses of the crisis, will tend to turn into an open civil war just as the present defensive stage of the struggle does.

41. Whether the revolutionary movement in the near future is going to proceed at a rapid or protracted rate, the Communist Party must, in either case, be the *party of action*. This Party stands at the head of the struggling masses. It must firmly and clearly formulate its slogans and must expose and sweep aside all equivocal slogans of the Social Democrats, which always tend toward compromise. Whatever the turns in the course of the struggle, the Communist Party should always strive to fortify the contested positions, to get the masses used to active maneuvering, to equip them with new methods calculated to lead to an open conflict with the enemy forces. Taking advantage of every breathing space offered in order to appreciate the experience of the preceding phase of the struggle, the Communist Party should strive to deepen and widen the class conflicts, to combine them nationally and internationally by unity of goal and practical activity, and in this way, at the head of the proletariat, shatter all resistance on the road to its dictatorship and the social revolution.

Theses and Resolutions Adopted at the Third World Congress of the Communist International, pp. 5-33, with minor modifications.



WORK AMONG WOMEN AND THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE PARTY: THESES OF THE COMINTERN

8 July 1921

The "women's question" had been given only cursory attention at the first two congresses of the Comintern. The third congress, perhaps reflecting the general approach that the world revolution would require more time and work than first thought, passed a lengthy resolution on women in the party and party work among women. The theses restated the orthodox

Marxist position that there was no specific women's question as such apart from the class struggle. However, it did acknowledge special problems in work among women. It sought to tie the interests of women to the success of communism and encouraged women's enrollment in communist parties. The long section on work in "socialist countries" referred to the areas under Soviet control, Ukraine, Armenia, etc., soon to be the USSR.

THESIS ON METHODS OF WORK AMONG THE WOMEN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

1. The Third Congress of the Comintern in conjunction with the Second International Womens' Congress confirms the decision of the First and Second Comintern Congresses on the necessity for increasing the work of all the Communist Parties of the East and West among proletarian women. The masses of women workers must be educated in the spirit of Communism and so drawn into the struggle for Soviet Power and into the construction of the Soviet Labor Republic. In all countries the working classes, and consequently the women workers, are faced with the problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The capitalist economic system has gotten into a blind alley, for there is no room for the further development of industrial forces within that system. The general impoverishment of the workers, the impotence of the bourgeoisie to revive production, the development of speculative enterprises, the decay in the production system, unemployment, the fluctuation of prices out of keeping with wages, all this leads inevitably to the deepening of the class struggle in all countries. This struggle is to decide who shall conduct, administer, and organize production, and upon what system that should be done—whether it should be in the hands of a clique of bourgeois exploiters, and be carried on upon the principles of capitalism and private property, or in the hands of the producing class and carried on upon a Communist basis.

The newly rising class, the class of producers, must in accordance with the laws of economic production take the productive apparatus into its own hands and set up new forms of public economy. Only in such a way will it be possible to create the necessary impetus for the development of the economic forces to the maximum and for the removal of the anarchy of capitalist production.

So long as the power of government is in the hands of the bourgeois class, the proletariat has no power to organize production. No reforms, no measures, carried out by the democratic or socialistic governments of the bourgeois countries, are able to save the situation. They cannot alleviate the unbearable sufferings of the working women and working men, sufferings which are due to the disorganization of the capitalist system of production, and which are going to last as long as power is in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Only by seizing the power of government will the proletariat be able to take hold of the means of production, and thus secure the possibility of directing the economic development in the interests of the toilers.

In order to hasten the hour of the decisive conflict between the proletariat and the degenerating bourgeois world, the working class must adhere to the firm and unhesitating tactics outlined by the Third International. The most fundamental and immediate goal determining the methods of work and the line of struggle for the proletariat of both sexes must be the dictatorship of labor.

As the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat is the vital question before the proletariat of all the capitalist countries, and the construction of Communism is the important task of those countries where the dictatorship is already in the hands of the workers, the Third Congress of the Communist International maintains that the conquest of power by the proletariat, as well as the achievement of Communism in those countries where the

capital state has already been overthrown, can be realized only with the active participation of the wide masses of the proletarian and semi-proletarian women. At the same time the Congress once more calls the attention of all women to the fact that without the support of the Communist parties in all the tasks and undertakings leading to the liberation and enfranchisement of the women, this task is practically impossible to achieve.

2. The interest of the working class, especially at the present moment, imperatively demands the recruiting of women into the organized ranks of the proletariat, fighting for Communism. The economic ruin throughout the world is becoming more acute and more unbearable to the entire city and country poor. Before the working class of the bourgeois-capitalist countries the question of the social revolution rises more and more clearly, and before the working class of Soviet Russia the question of reconstructing the public economy of the land on a new Communist basis, becomes more and more vital. Both these tasks will be more easily realized, the more active and the more conscious and willing the participation of the women.

3. Wherever the question of the conquest of power arises, the Communist Parties must consider the great danger to the revolution represented by the inert, uninformed masses of women workers, housewives, employees, peasant women, not liberated from the influence of the bourgeois church and bourgeois superstitions, and not connected in some way or other with the great liberating movement of Communism. Unless the masses of women of the East and West are drawn into this movement, they inevitably become the stronghold of the bourgeoisie and the object of counter-revolutionary propaganda. The experience of the revolution in Hungary, where the ignorance of the masses of women played such a pitiful part, should serve, in this case, as a warning for the proletariat of all other countries entering upon the road of social revolution.

On the other hand, the experience of the Soviet Republic showed in practice how important the participation of the women workers and peasants has been in the civil war in the defence of the Republic, as well as in all other activities of the Soviet construction. Facts have proven the importance of the part which the women workers and peasants have already played in the Soviet Republic in the organization of defence, strengthening the rear; the struggle against desertion, and against all sorts of counter-revolution, sabotage, etc. The experience of the Workers' Republic must serve as a lesson to all other countries.

Hence, the direct task of the Communist Parties: spreading the influence of the Communist Party to the widest circles of the women population of their countries; organizing a special party body and applying special methods; appealing to the women outside of it, freeing them from the influence of the bourgeoisie and the compromising parties, and educating them to be real fighters for Communism and therefore for the complete enfranchisement of the women.

4. Putting before the Communist Parties of the East and West the direct task of extending the activity of the Party among the women proletariat the Third Congress of the Comintern declares also to the women of the entire world that their emancipation from age-long slavery and inequality depend upon the victory of Communism. What Communism offers to the women, the bourgeois women's movement will never afford her. As long as the power of capitalism and private property continue to exist, the emancipation of woman from subservience to her husband cannot proceed further than her right to dispose of her property and earnings, as she sees fit, and also to decide on equal terms with her husband the destiny of their children.

The most definite aim of the feminists—to grant the vote to the women—under the regime of bourgeois parliamentarism, does not solve the question of the actual equalization of women, especially of those of the dispossessed classes. This has been clearly demonstrated by the experience of the working woman in those capitalist countries where the

bourgeoisie has formally recognized the equality of the sexes. The right to vote does not remove the prime cause of women's enslavement in the family and in society. The replacement of the church marriage by civil marriage does not in the least alleviate the situation. The dependence of the proletarian woman upon the capitalist and upon her husband as the economic mainstay of the family remains just the same. The absence of adequate laws to safeguard motherhood and infancy and the lack of proper social education render entirely impossible the equalization of woman's position in matrimonial relations. As a matter of fact, nothing that can be done under the capitalist order will furnish the key to the solution of the problem of the relationship of the sexes.

Only under Communism can not merely the formal, but the actual equalization of women be achieved. Then woman will be the rightful owner, on a par with all the members of the working class, of the means of production and distribution. She will participate in the management of industry and she will assume an equal responsibility for the well-being of society. In other words, only by overthrowing the system of exploitation of man by man, and by supplanting the capitalist mode of production by the Communist organization of industry will the full emancipation of woman be achieved. Only Communism affords the conditions which are necessary in order that the natural functions of woman—motherhood—should not come into conflict with her social obligations and hinder her creative work for the benefit of society. On the contrary, Communism will facilitate the most harmonious and diversified development of a healthy and beautiful personality that is indissolubly bound together with the whole life and activities of entire society. Communism should be the aim of all women who are fighting for complete emancipation and real freedom.

But, Communism is also the final aim of the proletariat. Consequently, the struggle of the working women for this aim must be carried on in the interests of both, under a united leadership and control, as "one and indivisible" to the entire world movement of the revolutionary proletariat.

5. The Third Congress of the Comintern confirms the basic proposition of revolutionary Marxism, i.e., that there is no "specific woman question" and no "specific women's movement," and, that every sort of alliance of working women with bourgeois feminism, as well as any support by the women workers of the treacherous tactics of the social-compromisers and opportunists leads to the undermining of the forces of the proletariat, delaying thereby the triumph of the social revolution and the advent of Communism, and thus also postponing the great hour of women's ultimate liberation.

Communism will be achieved not by "united efforts of all women of different classes," but by the united struggle of all the exploited. In their own interests the masses of proletarian women should support the revolutionary tactics of the Communist Party and take a most active and direct part in all mass-actions and all forms of civil war on a national and international scope.

6. Woman's struggle against her double oppression (capitalism and her home and family subservience), at its highest stage of development assumes an international character, becoming identified with the struggle of the proletariat of both sexes under the manner of the Third International for the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Soviet System.

7. The Third Congress of the Comintern warns women workers against entering into any form of alliance and co-operation with the bourgeois feminists. At the same time, it points out to the working women of all countries that it is an illusion to think that proletarian women can support the Second International or any of the opportunistically inclined elements adhering to it without causing serious damage to the cause of women's emancipation. That will prove infinitely detrimental for the struggle of the proletariat for liberation. The women must constantly remember that women's present-day slavery has grown out of the bourgeois order. In order to put an end to women's slavery it is necessary to

inaugurate the new Communist organization of society. Any support rendered to the Second and the Second-and-a-half Internationals hampers the social revolution, delaying the advent of the new order. The more resolutely and uncompromisingly the women masses will turn away from the Second and the Second-and-a-half Internationals, the more certain will be the triumph of the social revolution. It is the sacred duty of all women Communists to condemn those who flinch from the revolutionary tactics of the Comintern and to demand their expulsion from the ranks of the Comintern. The women ought to remember that the Second International never created and never attempted to create any organ whose task would be to carry on an active struggle for the complete emancipation of woman. The organization of an International alliance of women socialists was started outside the Second International by the initiative of the women workers themselves. The women Socialists who devoted themselves to work among women had neither representation nor a decisive vote in the Second International.

At its first Congress, in 1919, the Third International defined its attitude towards enlisting the support of women in the struggle for the dictatorship. On its initiative, the first conference of women Communists was convened in 1920 and an International Secretariat for work among women was constituted with a permanent representation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern. It is the duty of all class-conscious women workers to break unconditionally with the Second and Second-and-a-Half Internationals and support wholeheartedly the revolutionary tactics of the Comintern.

8. The support of the Comintern by the women workers of all occupations should, first of all, express itself in their willingness to enter into the ranks of the Communist Party of their respective countries. In those countries and parties where the struggle between the Second and Third Internationals has not yet come to a head, it is the duty of the women workers to support, by all means, the Party and groups that stand for the Comintern and carry on a relentless warfare against all vacillating and avowedly treacherous elements, irrespective of any authorities holding a different view. The class-conscious women who are striving for emancipation should not remain in any parties which have not joined the Comintern. Those who are opposed to the Third International are the enemies of the emancipation of women.

The place of conscious working women in Eastern and Western countries is under the flag of the Communist International and in the ranks of the Communist Parties of their own countries. All wavering on the part of the working women and the fear to sever connection with the parties of compromise, and the hitherto acknowledged authorities have a pernicious influence on the satisfactory progress of the great proletarian struggle which is assuming the nature of an open and relentless civil war on a World scale.

Methods and Form of Work Among Women

Owing to all the above mentioned reasons, the Third Congress of the Comintern holds that the work among the proletarian women should be carried on by the Communist Parties of all countries, on the following basis:

1. Women must be enlisted as full-fledged members of the Party, on the basis of equality and independence, in all militant class organizations, trade unions, co-operatives, factory committees, etc.

2. To recognize the importance of recruiting women into all branches of the active struggle of the proletariat (including military service for the defence of the proletariat) and into the construction of new forms of society and the organization of industry and life on a Communist basis.

3. To recognize the functions of motherhood as a social function, promoting and supporting appropriate measures to aid and protect women as the bearer of the human race.

The Third Congress is strongly opposed to the separate organization of women into all sorts of parties, unions, or any other special women's organizations. Nevertheless, that in

view of: a) the present conditions of subjection prevailing not only in the bourgeois-capitalist countries, but also in countries under the Soviet system undergoing transition from capitalism to Communism; b) the great inertness and political ignorance of the masses of women, due to the fact that they have been for centuries barred from social life and subjected to age-long slavery in the family, and c) the special functions imposed upon women by nature—childbirth and the peculiarities attached to this, which call for the protection of her strength and health in the interests of the entire community, the Third Congress therefore considers it necessary to find special methods of work among the women of the Communist Parties and to establish a special apparatus within the Communist Parties for the realization of this work. The apparatus for this work among the women in the Party should be the Sections or Committees for work among women, organized by all Party Committees commencing with the Executive Committee and ending with the city districts or village Party Committees. This decision is obligatory for all parties attached to the Comintern.

The Third Congress points out that, among the tasks set before the Communist Parties carried out through the sections, are: 1) to educate the wide masses of women in the spirit of Communism, drawing them into the ranks of the Party; 2) to fight against the prejudices of male proletarians towards the women, strengthening in the working men and women the consciousness of mutual interests of the proletarians of both sexes; 3) to increase the will-power of the women by drawing them into all kinds and forms of political struggle, to awaken their activity and participation in the struggle against capitalist exploitation in the bourgeois countries, by mass demonstrations against the high cost of living, against the housing conditions, unemployment and in other revolutionary forms of the class war; the participation of the women workers in the construction of the Communist State and in the Soviet republics; 4) to put on the order of business among the tasks of the parties and to pass rules tending to the direct enfranchisement of women, recognizing their equality and the protection of their interests as the perpetuator of the race; 5) to wage a well-planned fight against traditions, bourgeois customs and religion, clearing the way for better and more harmonious relations between the sexes, protecting the physical and moral strength of laboring humanity.

The entire work of the Sections or Committees should be carried on under the direct control and responsibility of the Party Committees. A member of the local Party Committee should be at the head of such Section or Committee. Communists should be members of these committees or collegiums wherever it is possible.

All measures and problems of the committees or sections of work among the women must not be handled by them independently, but in the Soviet Republics through the respective economic and political organs (branches of the Soviets, Commissariats, Trade Unions, etc.) and, in the capitalist countries, with the support of the respective organs of the proletarian parties, unions, factory Committees, etc.

In all places where the Communist Parties exist illegally or semi-legally, the Party should organize an illegal apparatus for work among women. In all illegal bodies there must be at least one party member to organize the women for illegal work.

The present period requires that Trade and Industrial Unions should form the principle basis for work among women, both in countries which still carry on the struggle for the overthrow of the capitalist yoke, as well as in the Soviet Labor Republics.

Work among women should be imbued with the spirit of unity of the Party movement and organization, yet show independent initiative and act independently of other Commissions and Sections for a speedy and complete emancipation of women, to be brought about by the Party. What should be striven after is not parallelism in activity, but assistance in the activity of the Party by means of self-development and initiative of the working women.

Work of the Party Amongst Women in Soviet Countries

It is the task of the Sections of the Soviet Labor Republics to educate the masses of working women in a spirit of Communism, by attracting them to the Communist Party; to inspire and develop activity and self-reliance, by drawing them into the work of constructive Communism and bringing them up as staunch defenders of the Communist International.

It is the task of the Sections to attract the women to every form of Soviet Construction, including questions of defense, as well as all the many economic plans of the Republic. In the Soviet Republics the Sections should see that all the regulations of the Eighth Congress of Soviets regarding the attraction of working and peasant women to the work of building up and organizing public production, as well as their participation in the work of all those organs which direct, manage, control and organize production should be carried out. The Sections should participate through their representatives and through the Party organs in the elaboration of new laws and exercise an influence on the alteration of such as require much alteration in the interest of the enfranchisement of women. The Sections should take the greatest interest and show most initiative in the development of those laws which deal with the protection of the labor of women and children.

It is the duty of the Sections to attract the greatest possible number of working and peasant women to all election campaigns of Soviets, as also to see to it that working and peasant women are elected as members of Soviets and Executive Committees.

The Sections should make it their business to assist in every way possible in making a success of political and economic campaigns carried on by the Party.

It is the task of the Sections to assist the growth of skilled women labor by means of professional education, as well as to facilitate the admission of the working and peasant women to the corresponding educational establishments.

The Sections should facilitate the entrance of working women into the Commission for the Protection of Labor in various enterprises, and should also accelerate the activity of the auxiliary Committees for the Protection of Mother and Child.

The Sections should make it their business to assist the development of all social institutions, such as communal kitchens, laundries, repairing shops, institutions of social education, communal houses, etc., which, basing as they do, the conditions of life upon a new Communist principle, ameliorate the difficulties which women experience during the transition period; assist their rapid enfranchisement and transform the slave of the family and the home into a free co-worker in the great social renaissance, a fellow creator of new forms of life.

Through the organizers working among women elected by the Communist fraction of trade unions, the Sections should assist in the education of the women workers, members of the trade unions, in the spirit of Communism.

The Sections should look after the due attendance of the working women at all general factory delegates conferences.

The Sections should carry out a systematic distribution of auxiliary workers, for all the Soviet, economic and trade union work.

The Sections must first of all take deep and firm root among the proletarian women, wage-earners, and organize propaganda among employees, housewives, and peasant women.

To build up a firm connection between the Party and the mass of the people, and to spread its influence over the non-party members of society, and also, to develop the method of the education of the women in the spirit of Communism, by teaching self-activity and participation in practical work, the Women's Sections are to organize delegate meetings of women workers. The delegate meetings are the best means to educate the women workers and peasants, and to spread the Party influence amongst the backward masses of women workers and peasants.

These delegate meetings are formed from factory and shop representatives of a certain region, city or volost. In Soviet Russia, the women delegates are drawn into all kinds of political and economic campaigns. They are sent into different committees in industry, are invited to control Soviet institutions, and used for regular work in the Soviet Departments, in the capacity of clerks, for two months (Law of 1921).

The women delegates should be elected at general meetings of the shop workers, of the housewives and employees, according to a certain rate of representation fixed by the Party. The Women's Sections are obliged to carry on propaganda and agitation among the delegates, for which purpose special meetings of women delegates are to be arranged not less than twice a month. The delegates are requested to make reports of their activities either in the shops where they work, or at meetings arranged in the city districts. The delegates should be elected for a period of three months.

Another form of agitation among the women is the organization of large non-party conferences of women workers and peasants. Representatives to conferences are to be elected at meetings held for women workers—at their place of work, and for peasant women—in the villages. The Section for work among women is charged to convene the conferences, as well as to supervise their work.

In order to make the best use of the experience that the women workers have secured by participating in the work and activities of the Party, the Branches and Committees carry on an elaborate campaign of propaganda by word of mouth and press. The Sections arrange meetings and discussions for the women workers at the shops and for the housewives at the city clubs. They exercise control over the delegate meetings and carry on house to house agitation.

To train active workers among the women and to widen their understanding of Communism, the party must organize, with the help of the Sections, special courses for work among the women, at each Party school or school for Soviet work.

In Capitalist Countries

The current tasks of the Committees or Sections for work among women are initiated by the circumstances of the period. On the one hand, the ruin of world economy, the rampant growth of unemployment, especially affecting the women workers and tending to increase prostitution, the high cost of living, the acute housing question, and the threats of new imperialistic laws, and on the other hand the unceasing strikes in all countries, repeated outbursts of armed uprisings of the proletariat, and the ever more violent civil war throughout the world, are the prologue to the inevitable world social revolution.

The women's committees must put forward the most important tasks of the proletariat, fight for the unabridged slogans of the Communist Party, of the Communists against the bourgeoisie and social-compromisers. The committees must see to it that the women are not only registered as equal members of the Party, trade unions and other militant workers' organizations, which are waging the fight against all injustice or inequality of the women workers, but also that the women should be allowed to occupy responsible positions in the Party, Union or Cooperative on an equal basis with the men.

The Committees or Sections must facilitate the work of the wide masses of the women proletarians and peasant women in utilizing their franchise in the interests of the Communist Parties during election to the parliament and to all the public institutions, explaining at the same time the limitations of those rights, in the sense of weakening the capitalist exploitation, promoting enfranchisement of women, and replacing parliamentarism by the Soviet system.

The Committees must also aid the women workers, employees and peasant women to take a most active part in the elections of revolutionary, economic and political soviets of workers deputies, obtaining representation in them; awakening the political activity of the

housewives, and carrying on a propaganda of the Soviet idea among the peasant women. The special concern of the Committees must be the realization of the principle of equal pay for equal work. It is the task of the Committee to start a campaign, drawing men and women workers into it, for free, universal education, aiding the women to become highly qualified in their work. The Committees should see to it that women Communists take part in the legislative, municipal and other legislative organizations, in fact, wherever women have the right to vote.

While participating in the legislative, municipal and other organizations of bourgeois States, Communist women should strictly adhere to the tactics of the Party, not concerning themselves so much with the realization of reforms within the limits of the bourgeois world order, as with taking advantage of every live question and demand of the working women as watch-words by which to lead the women into the active mass struggle for these demands through the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Committees or Sections must explain the disadvantages and waste of the system of individual house-keeping, the bad bringing up and education of the children by the bourgeoisie, rallying the women workers to the struggle for practical improvement of the conditions of the working class, waged or supported by the Party.

The Committees must aid in recruiting the women to the Communist Party from the Trade Unions, for which purpose the Communist fraction of the Trade Unions appoints an organizer for work among the women, under the direction of the Party and the local branch. The entire work of the Committee must be carried on with one purpose in view: the development of the revolutionary activity of the masses and the hastening of the social revolution.

In Economically Backward Countries (the East)

In conjunction with the Communist Party the Women's Section should do everything possible, to achieve in industrially weak countries, the recognition of the legal equality, the equality both of rights and obligations, of women in the Parties, Unions and other organizations of the working class.

The Sections or Committees should carry on, in conjunction with the Party, a struggle against prejudice, religious customs and habits which maintain an oppressive hold upon the women; to achieve this, it is also necessary to carry on propaganda among the men. The Communist Party, together with the Sections or Commissions, should carry out the principle of the equality of women in matters of education of children, family relations and general social life.

The Sections should look for support in their work, first of all, among the large classes of women who are exploited by capitalism in the capacity of workers in home industries, as laborers on rice, cotton and other plantations, and assist in the general establishment of communal workshops and home co-operatives; this applies especially to all Eastern peoples living within the borders of Soviet Russia; the Sections should also assist in the general organization of all women engaged in plantation work with the working men united in trade unions.

The raising of the general educational level of the population is one of the best means of fighting the general stagnation of the country as well as religious prejudices. The Committees or Sections should, therefore, assist in the opening of schools for adults and children, such schools also to be accessible to the women. In bourgeois countries the Committees should carry on a direct agitation to counteract the influence of the bourgeois schools.

Wherever possible, the Sections or Committees should carry the agitation into the homes of the women and utilize the field work of the women for purposes of agitation. They should also organize clubs for working women, doing everything to attract to these

clubs the most backward section of the women. These clubs should represent cultural and educational centers and model institutions, illustrating what can be achieved by women for their emancipation, through such means of self-activity as the organization of creches, kindergartens, schools for adults and so forth.

Special clubs should be organized for nomadic peoples.

In Soviet lands the Sections, together with the Party, should assist in the transformation of the existing pre-capitalist forms of production and economics into a communal form of production. They should be practically propagated, in a manner to convince the working women that the former home-life and home-production oppressed and exploited them, while communal labor will emancipate them.

With regard to the peoples of the East who live within the borders of Soviet Russia, the Sections should take care that Soviet legislation should equalize men and women, and that the interests of the women should be properly protected. For this purpose, the Sections should assist in appointing women to the position of judges, and as members of juries in national Courts of law.

The Sections should also get the women to participate in Soviets, taking care that working and peasant women should be elected into the Soviets and Executive Committees. All work among the women proletariat of the East should be done on a class basis. It should be the task of the Sections to expose the powerlessness of the Moslem feminists in the solution of the question of the enfranchisement of women. For enlightening purpose in all the Soviet countries of the East, the intelligent feminine forces should be utilized, as, for instance, women teachers and sympathizers, avoiding all tactless and vulgar treatment of religious faiths and national traditions. The Sections or Committees working among the women of the East should definitely fight against nationalism and the hold of religion on the women's minds.

All of the organizations of the workers should, in the East as well as in the West, be built not upon the basis of defending national interests, but upon the unity of the International proletariat of both sexes striving for the same class aims.

Notice: The work among the Eastern women being of great importance, and at the same time representing a new problem for the Communist Parties, the Conference deems it necessary to add to those theses special instructions on the methods of Communist propaganda among the women of the Eastern countries, appropriate to their local habits and conditions.

Propaganda and Agitation Methods

In order to fulfill the principle task of the Sections, dealing with the Communist education of the large masses of the proletariat, and in order to reinforce this body of fighters, it is necessary that all Communist Parties of the West and of the East should realize that the principle of work among women is "agitation and propaganda by deed."

Agitation by deed, first of all, signifies an ability to arouse a sense of independence in the working women, to eradicate the distrust in themselves and, by attracting them to the practical work of construction, to teach them by practical experience, that every conquest of the Communist Party, that every action which is directed against the capitalist exploitation, is one more step toward the improvement of the position of women. The method which the Communist Party and its Sections for work among women should use, can be expressed in the following words: "From experience and action, to a knowledge of the ideas of Communism and of its theoretical principles."

In order that the Section should represent organs not of verbal propaganda alone, but also of activity, it is necessary that they should work in contact with the Communist fractions of the various enterprises and workshops, for which purpose the latter should supply an organizer for the work among the women of the respective enterprise or workshop. The Sections should come into contact with the trade unions through their representatives or

organizers who are appointed for that purpose by the trade union fraction, and who should carry on work under the direction of Sections.

Propaganda, by deed, of Communist ideas in Soviet Russia signifies that all the women workers, peasant women, housewives and employees in all spheres of Soviet life, from every franchised district, should be drawn into the work on the organization of Communal Housekeeping, of increasing the number of institutions for Public Education, for the Protection of Motherhood, and so forth. A special task is to draw the laboring women into the bodies that control production, etc.

Active propaganda, by deeds, in the capitalist countries, means first of all the enlistment of the women workers to take part in strikes, demonstrations and other forms of the class struggle, fortifying and enlightening the revolutionary will and consciousness; it means the recruiting of women workers to all sorts of Party activity, their utilization for purposes of illegal work, particularly in despatch service, the organization of Party "Saturdays" or "Sundays" at which all women sympathizers of Communism, the wives of labor and professional men, in this way, learn to be useful to the Party. The principle of propaganda by acts and deeds is also aided by drawing the women into all political, economic or educational campaigns, from time to time carried on by the Communist Parties.

While organizing the feminine forces for the Party the Sections must, first of all, leave deep and firm roots among the women workers, developing propaganda activity also among the housewives, employees and peasant women.

In order to carry out the work of propaganda by word of mouth, according to a plan, the Sections must arrange meetings in the factories and workshops, also open meetings for women workers and employees according to profession or location, as well as general public meetings of housewives. They must see to it that canvassers and organizers are elected by the Communist groups of the trade unions, co-operative and industrial councils in capitalist states, and that women members are elected in all the organizing, controlling and administrative bodies of the Soviet institutions. In a word the labor women must be elected to all organizations, which in capitalist countries must be used to revolutionize the exploited and oppressed masses, and assist them in their struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat; and in Soviet countries to such organizations as serve to defend and realize Communism.

The Sections must delegate experienced women Communists as workers or employees to enterprises where great numbers of women are employed. These comrades must settle down in large proletarian districts and centers, as practiced with success in Soviet Russia. In the same way as the working women's organizations of the Communist Party in Soviet Russia organize meetings and conferences of delegates not belonging to any party, the Communist women's committee in the capitalist countries must convene public meetings of women workers, female employees of every kind, peasant women and housewives, to discuss various questions and needs of the day, and elect committees to serve as connecting links between their respective constituencies and the Communist women's organizations and to attend to the questions raised. They should also send speakers representing their views to gatherings of opposing organizations. Public propaganda by means of meetings, etc., must be supplemented by constant and regular home propaganda.

Each Communist woman engaged in this work should not have more than ten women visit at their homes, on whom she ought to call regularly at least once a week, and also on every occasion of importance to the Communist Party, on the proletarian masses.

In order to promote agitation, organization and education among the masses by written word, the women's Section of the Communist Parties are charged to work for the establishment: 1) of a central women's Communist journal in every country, 2) to secure the appearance of women's department in the Communist press, as also the printing of articles in the political and industrial papers. They must provide editors for such publications, and every franchised district should be drawn into the work on these activities which most

directly emancipate women, such as find adequate assistance for them in the ranks of professional and militant women. The Sections must publish and distribute simple, stimulating and adequate literature in pamphlets and leaflets. They must strive to make the best possible use of their members.

Women Communists should be sent to attend courses in Party schools in order to intensify their class consciousness and to prepare them for work among the masses of women. Special courses, lectures and discussions for women can be organized only in case of special conditions and urgent necessity.

In order to enhance the spirit of comradeship among male and female workers it is desirable not to organize separate courses of schools, but to establish, in the general Party schools, Sections for courses for work among women. The Sections exercise a right to elect a certain number of their women members for attendance at the general Party courses.

Structure of [Women's] Sections

Construction of the Sections or Committees of work among women must be organized by each Party local executive, District Executive and the Central Executive Committee of the Party. Each party decides for itself the numbers of members in these Sections or Committees. The number of members of the Sections, who are paid by the Party, is also fixed by each Party according to the possibilities.

The director or chairman of the local Committees or Sections must be a member of the local Party Committee. Where this is not the case, the Director of the Section is present at all meetings of the Party Committee with the right of decisive vote on all questions of the women's Committees and with a consultative vote on all other questions.

Besides the duties of the district Section or Committee above mentioned, the following tasks are also part of their work: to maintain connections between the Sections of one district; to mobilize the efficient party workers for work activity of the district Sections or Committees; to facilitate the exchange of material between the local branches; to supply the district with literature; distribute agitators among the districts; to mobilize the efficient Party workers for work among women; to call district conferences of the women Communists, representatives of branches, with a representation of one or two from each Branch, at least twice a year; to call non-party conferences of women workers, peasant women and housewives of a particular district.

The members of the Section or the Committee are approved by the provincial Committee or the county Committee on recommendation by the Director of the Section. The director and the other members of the county Committees and province Committees are elected at the conferences of the county.

Members of the district or local Sections or Committees are elected at a general city, county or district conference, or are appointed by the respective Section in agreement with the Party Committee. A director of the Section who is not a member of the district Party Committee has the right to be present at all meetings of the Party Committee with a decisive vote on all questions of the Branch, and with a consultative vote on all other questions.

Besides all the functions, above mentioned, which are the duties of the district Sections, the Central Section must fulfill the following additional functions: instruct the Sections and their workers; investigate the work of the Section; take charge, in connection with the respective organs of the party, of the transfer of workers from one Section to another; observe the conditions and development of work, considering the changes in the legal or economic situation of the women, through its representatives or appointees; participate in Special Committees, solving the questions of bettering the conditions of existence of the working class, protection of labor, protection of childhood, etc.; publish a central "page" and edit periodical journals for women; call conferences of the representatives of all the district Sections not less than once a year; organize agitational excursions of instructors on work among the women of the country; take charge of the recruiting of women and of the

participation of all Sections in all sorts of political and economic campaigns and demonstrations of the Party; send delegates to the International Secretariat of Women Communists; take charge of the annual International Women's Day.

A Director of the Women's Section of the Executive Committee of the Party who is not a member of the Executive Committee has the right to be present at all the meetings of the Executive Committee with a decisive vote on all questions concerning the Sections, and with a consultative vote on all others. The director of the Section or the chairman of the Committee is appointed by the Central Executive or is elected at the general Party Congress. The decisions and resolutions of all Sections or Committees are subject to the final sanction of the respective Party Committee.

Work on an International Basis

The direction of the work of the Communist Parties of all countries, uniting the women workers for the tasks set by the Comintern, and drawing the women of all countries and nations into the revolutionary struggle for the Soviet system and the dictatorship of the working class, on a world basis, is the task of the Women's Secretariat of the Comintern.

Theses and Resolutions Adopted at the Third World Congress of the Communist International, pp. 155-178, with minor modifications.



THE RED INTERNATIONAL OF TRADE UNIONS: THESES OF THE COMINTERN 12 July 1921

Communist leaders, anticipating world revolution, looked to winning over or splitting the trade union movement and the socialist parties of Europe. By 1921 that led to establishing a Red International of Trade Unions whose first congress met simultaneously with the Comintern's third congress and worked closely with it. Nominally separate from the Comintern and the Bolshevik leadership in Russia, its political leadership rested with the Comintern and ultimately with the Soviet leadership.

THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL AND THE RED INTERNATIONAL OF TRADE UNIONS (Struggle Against the Yellow Trade Union International of Amsterdam)

1. The Fallacy of "Neutrality"

The bourgeoisie is holding the working class in subjection, not only by means of violence but also by the most refined deception. The school, the church, parliament, art, literature, the daily press—all of them represent powerful means of deceiving the working masses, and of imbuing the proletariat with the ideas of the bourgeoisie.

One of the bourgeois ideas, which the ruling classes have succeeded in inculcating among the working masses, is the idea of trade union neutrality, that is, the idea of the non-political and non-party character of the trade unions. For the last decades of modern history, and especially after the close of the imperialist war, the trade unions throughout Europe and in America have become the largest proletarian organizations, in some countries embracing the entire working class. The bourgeoisie is fully aware that the near future of the capitalist system depends on the extent to which the trade unions are going to free

themselves from bourgeois influences. Hence, the frantic efforts of the bourgeoisie and their myrmidons, the social-democrats throughout the world, to keep the trade unions at any price in the thralldom of bourgeois social-democratic ideas. The bourgeoisie cannot very well invite the trade unions quite openly to support the bourgeois parties. It is urging them, therefore, not to support any party, the revolutionary Communist Party included, but in reality the bourgeoisie means that the trade unions must not support the party advocating Communism.

The doctrine of neutrality (the non-political and non-party character of the trade unions) is not of recent growth. For decades this bourgeois idea has been inculcated in the trade unions of Great Britain, Germany, America and other countries by the representatives of the priest-ridden Christian trade unions, as well as by the leaders of the bourgeois Hirsch-Duncker trade unions, the leaders of the old pacifist British trade unions, the representatives of the so-called free trade unions of Germany and by many representatives of syndicalism. Legien, Gompers, Jouhaux, Sidney Webb have been preaching neutrality to the trade unions for decades. But in reality the trade unions have never been and could never be neutral. Not only is neutrality harmful to the trade unions, it cannot positively be maintained. In the struggle between capital and labor no mass organization of workers can remain neutral. Consequently, it is impossible for the trade unions to remain neutral in their relations to the bourgeois parties and to the party of the proletariat. This the leaders of the bourgeoisie know full well. But just as it is imperative for the bourgeoisie that the masses should believe in the after life it is imperative for them that the trade unions should maintain neutrality with regard to politics and with regard to the worker's Communist Party. For the exploitation of and the mastery over the workers the bourgeoisie needs not only the priest, the policeman and the general, but also the trade union bureaucrats, the "leaders" who preached to the workers neutrality and non-participation in political struggles.

The fallacy of the neutrality idea had become more and more apparent to the advanced proletariat of Europe and America even before the imperialist war. This fallacy became still more apparent as the class contrasts became more acute. When the imperialist mass-murders began in real earnest, the old trade union leaders were obliged to drop the mask of neutrality and to side quite openly with their respective bourgeoisies. During the imperialist war those social-democrats and trade unionists who had been preaching neutrality to the trade unionists for many years, while driving the workers into the service of the most dastardly murder policy, unblushingly assume the role of agents for certain political parties, not for the parties of the working class, but for those of the bourgeoisie.

After the imperialist war these same social-democratic and trade union leaders have again been trying to put on the mask of trade union neutrality, etc. Now that the abnormal war conditions are at an end, these agents of the bourgeoisie are trying to adapt themselves to the new circumstances and want to lure away the workers from the path of revolution to the only path which is profitable for the bourgeoisie.

Economics and politics are closely connected. This connection becomes especially evident in such epochs as the present. There is not a single important question of political life which does not concern not only the labor party, but also the trade unions, and vice versa. If the French imperialistic government orders the mobilization of a certain class for the occupation of the Ruhr basin and for the strangulation of Germany in general, can it be said that this purely political question does not concern the French trade unions? Can a truly revolutionary French trade unionist remain neutral, and take up a non-political attitude on such a question? Or to use another illustration, if there is in England a purely economic struggle such as the present lockout of the miners, can the Communist Party declare that this does not concern it, that it is a purely trade union question? At a time when the struggle against misery and poverty is the order of the day for millions of workers, when the requisitioning of bourgeois houses is imperative for the solution of the housing

problem of the proletariat, when the practical experiences of life force the workers to interest themselves in the question of the arming of the working class, when the seizure of factories by the workers is taking place in various countries, can it be asserted that in such a period the trade unions must not take part in such a struggle and must remain neutral, which really means that they must serve the bourgeoisie?

With all the wealth of nomenclature of the political parties in Europe and America, these parties are to be divided into three groups with regard to their nature:

1) Parties of the bourgeoisie; 2) Parties of the petty bourgeoisie (chiefly the social-democrats), and 3) The party of the proletariat. All trade unions, which proclaim themselves to be non-party and declare their neutrality with regard to the above mentioned party groups, are practically supporting the parties of the petty-bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie.

2. Amsterdam a Bulwark of Capitalism

The International Trade Union Association of Amsterdam represents the organization in which the Second International and the Second and a Half International meet each other and join hands. The whole international bourgeoisie looks upon this organization with assurance and confidence. The principal idea of the International Trade Union Association is at present the idea of the neutrality of trade unions. It is not mere chance that this watchword is used by the bourgeoisie and their lackeys, the social-democrats, as well as the Right Trade Unionists to unite the wide masses of workers in Western Europe and America. While the political Second International that openly took the side of the bourgeoisie experienced a complete collapse, a certain success may be noted in regard to the International Trade Union Association of Amsterdam which wants to act under cover of the idea of neutrality.

Under the flag of neutrality the Amsterdam Trade Union Association undertakes the execution of the dirtiest and most difficult commissions of the bourgeoisie: the strangling of the miners' strike in England (that task was fulfilled by the well-known Thomas, who is at the same time president of the Second International and one of the best known leaders of the Amsterdam Yellow Trade Union Association); the decrease of wages, the organized plundering of the German workers for the sins of imperialist German bourgeoisie; Leipart and Grassmann, Wiesel and Bauer, Robert Schmidt and J.H. Thomas and Jouhaux, Daszinsky and Zulawsky—they have all distributed their roles among themselves: some have exchanged their posts as trade union leaders for ministerial posts in the service of bourgeois governments or for minor government positions, while others who are allied to them in body and soul are at the head of the Amsterdam Trade Union International preaching to the workers of the trade unions neutrality in political struggles.

At the present moment the Amsterdam International Trade Union Association represents the chief support of International Capital. Whoever does not fully understand the necessity of the fight against the false idea of non-political and non-party character of the trade unions cannot fight successfully against this capitalist fortress. In order to decide upon the most efficient fighting methods to be used against the yellow Amsterdam International, it will be necessary to clearly and definitely ascertain the mutual relations between the Communist Party and the trade unions of each country.

3. The Communist Party and the Trade Unions

The Communist Party is the vanguard of the proletariat that clearly recognized the ways and means to be used for the liberation of the proletariat from the capitalist yoke and consciously accepted the Communist program.

The trade unions represent mass organizations of the proletariat which develop into organizations uniting all the workers of a given branch of industry; they include not only the conscious Communists but also the medium and backward ranks of the proletariat, who through the lessons taught by their life's experience are gradually educated to understand

Communism. The part played by the trade associations in the period preceding the struggle of the proletariat for the conquest of power, and during the period of struggle for power, is in many respects different from the part played by them in the period succeeding the conquest of power. But throughout the different periods, the trade unions represent a wider organization, uniting a greater mass of people than the Party and the relations between the Party and the unions must be the same as between the centre and the periphery. Prior to the securing of power, the truly proletarian trade unions have to organize the workers principally on an economic basis to fight for improvements that can be obtained before capitalism is completely defeated. Their principal objective, however, must be the organization of the proletarian mass fight against capitalism and for the proletarian revolution. During this revolution the truly revolutionary trade unions, conjointly with the Party, organize the masses for the immediate attack on the forts of capitalism and undertake the laying of a foundation for social revolution. After the power has been secured by the proletariat the trade unions concentrate the greatest part of their activity to the organization of the economic conditions on a Socialist basis.

During all these three phases of the campaign, the trade union must support the proletarian vanguard, the Communist Party, which takes the lead throughout the proletarian fight. In order to achieve this end, the Communists together with sympathizing elements must organize Communist fractions within the trade unions, (which must be completely under the control of the Communist Party).

The tactics adopted by the Second Congress of the Communist International in regard to the formation of Communist fractions in every trade union proved to be fully up to the mark during the course of last year and have given good results in Germany, England, France, Italy and a number of other countries. The principles of the Communist International respecting the participation of Communists in the trade union movement must not be influenced by the circumstance that considerable numbers of politically inexperienced workers have lately left the free social-democratic trade unions not expecting to have any direct advantage from the membership in the same (as has lately been the case in Germany). It is the task of the Communists to explain to the proletarians that they will not find salvation in leaving the old trade unions before creating new ones as this will only turn the proletariat into a disorganized mob; they must be told that it is necessary to revolutionize the trade unions, to expel the spirit of reformism together with the treacherous reformist leaders, and thus convert the trade unions into a real support of the revolutionary proletariat.

4. The Tasks of Our Parties

During the next epoch the principal task of all Communists will be to concentrate their energy and perseverance on winning over to their side the majority of workers in all labor unions. They must not be discouraged by the present reactionary tendency of the labor unions, but take part actively in the daily struggles of the unions and win them over to the cause of Communism in spite of all resistance.

The real test of the strength of every Communist Party is the actual influence it has on the workers in the labor unions. The Party must learn how to influence the unions without attempting to keep them in leading strings. Only the Communist fraction of the union is subject to the control of the Party, not the labor union as a whole. If the Communist fractions persevere, if their activity is devoted and intelligent, the Party will reach a position where its advice will be accepted gladly and readily by the unions.

In France the labor unions are now passing through a wholesome period of fermentation. The working class is regaining strength after the crisis in the workers' movement and is learning to recognize and punish the past treachery of the reformist Socialists and trade unionists. Many of the revolutionary trade unionists of France are still unwilling to take

part in the political fight and are prejudiced against the idea of a political proletarian party. They still hold to the idea of neutrality as expressed in the well-known *Charte d'Amiens* of 1906. The point of view of this fraction of the revolutionary trade unionists may be regarded as a source of great danger for the movement. If this fraction should gain control of the majority in the unions, it would not know what to do with this majority. It would be helpless against the agents of capitalism, the Jouhaux and the Dumoulins.

The revolutionary trade unionists of France will remain without definite lines of demarcation as long as the Communist Party itself lacks such lines. The Communist Party of France must strive to work in friendly cooperation with the best elements of revolutionary trade unionism. It is, however, essential that the Party should rely solely upon its own elements. Sections should be formed wherever three Communists are to be found. The Party must at once undertake a campaign against neutrality. It must point out in a friendly but decided manner the defects in the position of revolutionary trade unionism. This is the only possible way to revolutionize the trade union movement in France and to establish close cooperation between the Party and the trade union movement.

In Italy the situation is very peculiar. The majority of the trade union members are revolutionary, but the leadership of the Confederation del Lavoro is in the hands of reformists and centrists whose sympathies are with Amsterdam. The first task of the Italian Communists will be to organize a persistent daily struggle in every section in the trade unions; endeavor to systematically and patiently expose the treachery and indecision of the leaders and to wrest the trade unions from their control. In regard to the revolutionary trade unions elements of Italy, the Italian Communists will have to adopt the same measures as the Communists in France.

In Spain we have a strong revolutionary trade union movement which still lacks a clearly defined goal, and a young and relatively weak Communist Party. In view of the existing conditions, the Party must do everything possible to secure a firm foothold in the trade unions. It must support the unions in word and deed and exercise a clarifying influence on the whole trade union movement. It must likewise establish friendly relations with the unions and make every effort to organize the whole struggle in common.

Important developments are taking place in the British trade union movement which is rapidly becoming more and more revolutionary. The mass movement is growing and the influence of the old trade union leaders is on the wane. The Party must do its utmost to establish itself firmly in the great trade unions (miners, etc.). Every member of the Party must work actively in some trade union, and must endeavor to make Communism popular through active and persevering work. Every effort must be made to get into closer contact with the masses.

The same process is taking place in America, although at a slower rate. Communists must on no account leave the ranks of the reactionary Federation of Labor. On the contrary, they should get into the old trade unions in order to revolutionize them. Co-operation with the best sections of the I.W.W. is imperative; this does not, however, preclude an educational campaign against the prejudices of the I.W.W.

In Japan a great trade union movement has rapidly come into being, but it lacks an enlightened leadership. The Communistic elements of Japan must support this movement and use every effort to direct it into Marxist channels.

In Czecho-Slovakia, our party is backed by the majority of the working class, but the trade union movement is, to a great extent, still in the hands of the social patriots and centrists and is therefore divided by nationalities. This is because the Party itself has lacked organization and clearly defined principles among the revolutionary-minded trade unionists. The Party must make a great effort to put an end to these conditions, and to get control of the trade unions. For this purpose the creation of nuclei and of a united Communist Central trade union organization to include all nationalities is absolutely indispensable.

The utmost efforts must be applied in the direction of uniting the various divided national associations.

In Austria and Belgium the social patriots have with great cunning succeeded in getting control of the trade union movement. The trade union movement is the chief field for revolutionary action in these countries. That is why it should have received more attention from the Communist Parties.

In Norway the Party which has the majority of workers behind it, must become more influential over the trade union movement.

In Sweden the Party has not only to contend with reformism, but also with petty bourgeois tendencies in the Socialist movement.

In Germany the Party is gradually getting control of the trade union movement. On no account should concessions be made to the partisans of the "Leave the Trade Unions" movement. This would play into the hands of the social-patriots. All attempts to expel Communists from the unions must be met by constant and energetic resistance if we are to win over to Communism the majority of the organized workers.

5. Relations of the Communist International to the Red Trade union International

These considerations will define the mutual relations to be established between the Communist International on the one hand, and the Red International of Trade Unions, on the other.

The task of the Communist International is not only to direct the political struggle of the proletariat in the narrow sense of the word, but to guide its entire struggle for liberation, whatever form it may acquire. The Communist International must be not only the arithmetical total of the central organizations of the Communist Parties of different countries. The Communist International must stimulate and coordinate the work throughout class struggle of all proletarian organizations, the purely political organizations, trade unions, the Soviet and cultural organizations, etc.

Quite unlike the Yellow International, the Red International of Trade Unions will in no way adopt the point of view of non-partyism or neutrality. Any organization which would wish to remain neutral with regard to the Second, the "Two and a Half," and the Third International, would unavoidably become a pawn in the hands of the bourgeoisie. The program of action of the International Council of the Red Trade Unions which the Communist International will lay before the First Congress of Red Trade Unions, will be defended in reality by the Communist Parties alone and by the Communist International. On these grounds alone if we are to succeed in carrying out the new revolutionary tasks of the trade unions, the red trade unions will have to work hand in hand and in close contact with the Communist Party, and the Red International of Trade Unions will have to bring each step of its work in agreement with the work of the Communist International.

The prejudices of neutrality, of "independence," of non-party and non-political tactics, with which certain revolutionary syndicalists of France, Spain, Italy and other countries are infected, are objectively nothing more than a tribute paid to bourgeois ideas. The Red Trade Unions cannot conquer the Yellow Amsterdam International and consequently capitalism without repudiating the bourgeois ideas of independence and neutrality once for all. From the point of view of economizing and concentrating blows, the formation of a single united proletarian International would unite in its ranks political parties and all other forms of labor organizations. The future will undoubtedly belong to this type of organization. However, in the present transitional period, given the actual variety of trade unions in the different countries, it is unavoidably necessary to create an International Association of Red Trade Unions, which will on the whole stand for the platform of the Communist International, but which will admit members much more freely than is done by the Communist International.

The Third Congress of the Communist International promises its support to the Red International of Trade Unions, which is to be organized on these lines. To bring about a

closer union between the Communist International and the Red International of Trade Unions, the Third Congress of the Communist International proposes that it should be represented by three members on the Executive of the Red International of Trade Unions and vice versa.

The program of action which in the opinion of the Communist International should be accepted by the Constituent World Congress of Red Trade Unions, runs approximately as follows:

The Program of Action

1) The acute economic crisis spreading all over the world, the catastrophic fall of wholesale prices, the over production of goods combined with an actual lack of sale, the militant policy of the bourgeoisie towards the working class, the tenacious tendency towards the reduction of wages and the throwing of the workers far backwards and the growing exasperation of the masses on one side and the impotence of the old trade unions and their methods on the other, impose new problems on the revolutionary class trade unions all over the world. New methods of economic struggle are required. Called forth by the decomposition of capitalism, a new aggressive economic policy of the trade unions is necessary in order to parry the attacks of capital, and strengthen the old position—passing over to the offensive.

2) The basis of the tactics of the trade unions is the direct action of revolutionary masses and their organizations against capitalism. The gains of the workers are in proportion to the degree of direct action and revolutionary activity of the masses. Under "direct action" we mean all forms of direct pressure of the workers upon the employers and the state: boycotts, strikes, street demonstrations, seizure of the factories, armed uprisings and other revolutionary activities, which tend to unite the working class in the fight for Socialism. The aim of the revolutionary trade unions is, therefore, to turn direct action into a weapon of education and fighting ability of the working masses for the social revolution and institution of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

3) The last year of the struggle has shown with particular vividness the impotence of strictly trade union organizations. The fact that workers in one industrial enterprise belong to several unions weakens the struggle. It is necessary—and this should be the starting point of a tenacious struggle—to reorganize the unions so that they are based on a whole industry rather than separate trades or crafts. "One union for one enterprise"—this is the militant motto in the organization structure. The fusion of related unions into one union should be effected in a revolutionary way, putting this question directly before the members of the unions in the factories and concerns and further, before district and regional conferences, as well as before the national congresses.

4) Each factory and each mill should become a citadel of the revolution. Old forms of communication between rank and file members of the union and the union itself such as money collectors, representatives, proxies and others should be replaced by the formation of factory committees. The factory committees must be elected by the workers engaged in the given enterprise, independently of the political creed they profess. The problems imposed upon the supporters of the Red International of Trade Unions is to involve all the workers of a given concern into the election of their representative organ. The attempt to elect the factory committees exclusively among adherents of the same party, casting aside the broad non-party rank and file workers, should be severely condemned. This would be only a nucleus and not a factory committee. The revolutionary workers should influence and act upon the general meetings as well as upon committees of action and their rank and file members.

5) The first question to be put before the workers and the factory committees is the maintenance at the expense of the enterprise of the workers discharged on account of unemployment. It should not be permitted that workers should be thrown out into the streets without the enterprise being in the least concerned with it. The owner must be compelled

to pay full wages to the unemployed and mainly to the workers engaged in the enterprises, explaining to the latter at the same time that the problem of unemployment is not to be solved within the capitalist regime, and that the only way to abolish it is the social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

6) The closing down of enterprises and curtailing of the workers' hours are at the present time the most efficient weapon for the cleansing of the industrial establishments of unreliable elements with the help of which the bourgeoisie is compelling the workers to accept the reduction of wages, increasing of the working day and the abolition of collective bargaining. The lock-out is taking more and more definitely a form of direct action on the part of the employers. For this purpose special controlling commissions should be instituted with regard to fulfilling orders controlling raw materials, in order to verify the quantities of available raw material necessary for production, as well as money resources in the banks. Specially elected controlling commissions must investigate in a most careful manner the financial correlation existing between the given enterprise and other concerns and the practical task of abolishing commercial mastery should be imposed upon the workers for this purpose.

7) One of the ways of struggling against the closing down of concerns for the purpose of reduction of wages and standard of living, should be the taking hold of the factories and mills by the workers and proceeding with production by themselves despite the owners.

Owing to the lack of goods it is highly important to continue production, and the workers should therefore oppose the premeditated closing down of factories and mills. In connection with local conditions and the condition of production, the political situation, and the tension of the social struggle, the seizure of the enterprises may and should be followed by other means of pressure upon capital. On taking hold of the concern the management of the same should be confined to factory and workshop committees and a representative of the union specially appointed for the purpose.

8) The economic struggle should follow the motto of an increase in wages and of the improvements of the labor conditions to a much higher degree as compared with the pre-war period. The attempts to bring back the workers to the pre-war conditions of labor must meet with the most resolute revolutionary resistance. The exhaustion of the working class as a consequence of the war must be compensated by an increase in wages and the improvement of the labor conditions. The reference of capitalists to foreign competition should by no means be taken into consideration. The revolutionary trade unions are bound to approach the question of wages and labor conditions not from the point of view of the competition between rapacious capitalists of different nations, but solely from that of the preservation and the defense of the living labor force.

9) If capitalists take advantage of an economic crisis to reduce wages, then the task of the revolutionary trade unions should be to prevent the reduction in wages by turn in each separate industrial concern, in order not to be defeated in parts. The workers of enterprises affecting public welfare, such as the mining, railroad, electric, gas concerns and others, should be drawn in at once, in order that the struggle against the onslaughts of capital should touch the very nerve of the economic organism. All means of resistance, from the separate intermittent strike up to the general strike embracing all large fundamental industries on a national scale, are in such a case not only advisable but strictly necessary.

10) The trade unions must consider it their practical task to prepare and organize international action in each separate industry. The interruption in transport or coal mining on an international scale is a mighty weapon in the struggle against the reactionary attempts of the world bourgeoisie. The trade unions must attentively study the course of events all over the world, choosing the most appropriate moment for their economic action, not forgetting for a single instant that international action is possible only when real revolutionary class conscious trade unions are formed on an international scale, having nothing in common with the Yellow Amsterdam International.

11) The belief in the absolute value of collective agreements propagated by the opportunists of all countries, must be met with a resolute and keen resistance from the part of the revolutionary trade union movement. The collective agreement is nothing more than an armistice. The owner always violates these collective compacts when the smallest opportunity presents itself for doing so. The respectful attitude toward collective agreements testifies only that the bourgeois conceptions are deeply rooted in the minds of the leaders of the working class. The revolutionary trade unions, without rejecting as a rule the collective agreements, must realize their relative value and clearly define the methods to abolish these agreements when it proves to be profitable to the working class.

12) The struggle of the labor organizations against the individual and collective employer, while adapting itself to national and local conditions, should utilize all the experience acquired during the previous periods of the struggle for the liberation of the working class. Therefore, every large strike should not only be well prepared but simultaneously with the declaration of it, there must be organized special detachments for the struggle against scabbing and for counteracting the provocative movement on the part of all kinds of white guard organizations, encouraged by the bourgeoisie and the government. The Fascisti in Italy, the Technical Aid in Germany, the civil white guard organization consisting of ex-commissioned and non-commissioned officers in France and in England—all these organizations pursue the aim of disorganizing and forestalling the actions of the workers with the purpose not only to replace the strikers by scabs, but to destroy materially their organizations and kill the leaders of the labor movement. The organization of special strike militia and special self-defense detachments is a question of life and death to the workers under similar conditions.

13) These militant organizations should not only struggle against the attacks of the employers and the strike-breaking organizations, but take the initiative by stopping all freight and products transported to their respective factories and all other enterprises, and the union of the transport workers ought to play a specially prominent part in such cases. The task of stopping the transportation of freight which has fallen on their shoulders can be realized by the unanimous support of all the workers of the given locality.

14) All the economic struggles of the working class should center around the slogan of the Party—"Workers' control over production." This control ought to be realized as soon as possible without waiting for the ruling classes and the government to prevent the initiation of the same. It is necessary to carry on a merciless struggle against all the attempts of the ruling classes and reformists to establish intermediary labor affiliations and intermediary control committees. Only when control is realized directly by the workers themselves will the results be definitive. The revolutionary trade unions ought to fight resolutely against that perverted socialism and graft with which the leaders of the old trade unions, aided by the ruling classes, are practising. All the talk of these gentlemen about the peaceable socialization of the industry is done with the sole aim to divert the attention of the working class from revolutionary action and the social revolution.

15) In order to divert the workers from their direct problem and instill in them petty bourgeois aspirations, the idea is put forth of workers participating in the profits. This means the return to the workers of an insignificant part of the wealth created by them, and which is called surplus value. This slogan, meant only for the demoralization of the workers, should be met by severe and rigorous criticism: "Not participation in profits, but the entire elimination of all capitalist profit," should be the slogan of the revolutionary unions.

16) For the purpose of crippling or breaking the fighting power of the working class, the bourgeois states have resorted, under the pretense of protecting vital industries, to temporary militarization of individual industrial enterprises or entire branches of industry. For the ostensible purpose of preventing economic disturbances, they introduced compulsory arbitration and exchange of agreements for the further protection of capitalism. Also in the interests of capitalism, the burden of war expenditures has been placed entirely on the

shoulders of workers by the introduction of the direct subtraction of taxes from their wages, which turns the employer into a tax-collector. Against these state measures calculated to serve only the interests of the capitalist class the bitterest fight must be waged by the trade unions.

17) While carrying on the struggle for the improvement of labor conditions, the elevation of the living standard of the masses and the establishment of workers' control, it is always necessary to remember that it is impossible to solve all these problems within the limits of the capitalist forms of government. Therefore the revolutionary trade unions, while wrenching concessions from the ruling classes everywhere and forcing them to legislate socialistic laws, should always clearly explain to the workers that only the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat can solve that important question. Therefore, every local uprising, every local strike, and every small conflict should be guided by the above mentioned principle. The revolutionary trade unions ought to make these conflicts general, elevating the consciousness of the workers to the comprehension of the inevitability of the social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

18) Every economic struggle is also a political, i.e., a general class struggle. No matter how great a working class section a given country may contain, such a struggle can acquire a real revolutionary character and result in the greatest benefit to the entire working class only when the revolutionary trade unions act in perfect unity and maintain the closest co-ordination with the Communist Party of that country. The theory and practice of fostering a split of the workers in the class struggle into two independent parts is extremely detrimental to the present revolutionary period. This struggle requires the greatest concentration of forces, a concentration characterized by the greatest expression of evolutionary energy of the working class, i.e., of all the Communists and revolutionary elements. Dual actions by the Communist Party on the one hand and the red revolutionary trade unions on the other hand are doomed in advance to failure and miscarriage. Unity of action and organic co-ordination of the Communist Party with the trade unions are therefore preliminary conditions to success in the struggle against capitalism.

Theses and Resolutions Adopted at the Third World Congress of the Communist International, pp. 132-149, with minor modifications.



THE FAMINE: GORKY'S APPEAL

13 July 1921

A famine of massive proportions descended on Russia in 1921. This resulted from a combination of factors including the food requisitioning policies of War Communism, a breakdown of the transportation and agricultural distribution systems, a poor harvest in 1920, and then a major drought and crop failure in 1921. The Soviet leadership used Maxim Gorky, the well-known writer, to address an appeal for world-wide help. See also Hoover's response, 23 July, and other documents on the famine.

RUSSIAN FAMINE RELIEF

Moscow, July 13

The corn-growing steppes are smitten by crop failure, caused by the drought. The calamity threatens starvation to millions of Russian people. Think of the Russian people's exhaustion by the war and revolution, which considerably reduced its resistance to disease

and its physical endurance. Gloomy days have come for the country of Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Meneleyev, Pavlov, Mussergsky, Glinka and other world-prized men and I venture to trust that the cultured European and American people, understanding the tragedy of the Russian people, will immediately succor with bread and medicines.

If humanitarian ideas and feelings—faith in whose social import was so shaken by the damnable war and its victors' unmercifulness towards the vanquished—if faith in the creative force of these ideas and feelings, I say, must and can be restored, Russia's misfortune offers humanitarians a splendid opportunity to demonstrate the vitality of humanitarianism. I think particularly warm sympathy in succoring the Russian people must be shown by those who, during the ignominious war, so passionately preached fratricidal hatred, thereby withering the educational efficacy of ideas evolved by mankind in the most arduous labors and so lightly killed by stupidity and cupidity. People who understand the words of agonizing pain will forgive the involuntary bitterness of my words.

I ask all honest European and American people for prompt aid to the Russian people. Give bread and medicine.

MAXIM GORKY.

American Relief Administration Bulletin, Second Series, No. 16 (1 September 1921), p.2.



SOVIET PROTEST AT BEING EXCLUDED
FROM THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

19 July 1921

Soviet Russia was excluded from the many international conferences which met after the war to deal with various questions. One such was the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, 12 November 1921- 6 February 1922, which focused primarily on Pacific Ocean issues. The Soviets protested their exclusion from a conference which directly affected them. The protest went unanswered as did a later one in November, just before the conference met.

*The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Socialist
Federated Republic (Chicherin) to the Governments of the
United States, China, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan*

The Russian Government learns through the foreign press that a conference of Pacific powers, or powers having special interests on the shores of the Pacific, will shortly be held in Washington. The government of the R.S.F.S.R., as a Pacific power, cannot conceal its astonishment to learn of the existence of the intention to call such a conference without its participation. Although the Russian Republic and the Far Eastern Democratic Republic have territories on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, the powers adopting the decision to meet in Washington did not consider it necessary to invite the Russian and Far Eastern Republics to this conference. This fact, extremely serious as it is, is made still more serious by the circumstance that during the exchange of opinion on this question, reported in the press, the right of Russia to participate in the conference, as a power with subjects for discussion connected with the Pacific, was fully admitted. However, the above-mentioned powers declared that they would themselves undertake to watch the interests of Russia without the latter's representation, and reserve to themselves the right to invite subsequently

a new Russian Government which should replace the present one, to submit to the decisions and agreements they adopt.

The Russian Government can by no means agree to other powers undertaking the right to speak for it, especially as this ostracism is intended to apply only to the Workers' and Peasants' Government and that any counter-revolutionary Government which might replace it would not be ostracised. The position taken up by the aforementioned powers can only be interpreted as an obvious favour for Russian counter-revolution, and yet another demonstration of the system of intervention.

The Russian Government protests against its exclusion from a conference which touches it directly, and protests equally against any intention of any power whatsoever to undertake the decisions touching the Pacific shores without the authority of Russia.

The Russian Government solemnly declares that it will not recognise any decision passed by the above-mentioned conference, inasmuch as it is being called without the participation of Russia. Whatever may be the decisions of this conference the Russian Government, not participating in it, maintains for that reason complete freedom of action in all questions there discussed, and will carry out this freedom of action in all circumstances and by all means which it considers proper. It will thus be able to upset any plans whose realisation may be prepared by this conference which may be hostile towards the Soviet Government or not in accordance with its point of view. The Soviet Government considers that it has grounds for the assertion that the decisions of this conference will be ineffective and devoid of significance in view of the absence from and non-participation in it of one of the principal interested parties.

At the same time the Russian Government considers itself obliged to declare that it considers this action as a hostile act directed against itself and against the Russian workers and peasants whose will it represents, and will regard as hostile any privilege which may be shown by the above-mentioned Governments to any counter-revolutionary Governments replacing the Soviet Government.

The Government of Russia has also learned that a question of the most general interest—that of disarmament, or at least naval disarmament—will be discussed at the coming conference. The Russian Government can only welcome any attempts at disarmament or reduction of the military expenditure under which the toilers in all countries are groaning. It considers it, however, indispensable that preliminary guarantees should be given that this disarmament will really be effected, taking into consideration that the possibility of such guarantees at the present time seem to it highly doubtful. Nevertheless, the very idea of disarmament can only seem to the Soviet Government as worthy of approval. This disarmament in its opinion is one of the results towards which the extension of those social changes which have occurred in Russia is bound to lead. The absence, however, of the Russian Government during international discussion of this subject will merely have the effect of forcing Russia to ignore its decisions, in which the Russian Government, not being represented, will have no part. A policy tending to leave Russia outside collective decisions of various powers on questions concerning it not only cannot assist the settlement of the conflicts at present disturbing the world, it can only render them more acute and more complicated.

Chicherin

Soviet Union and Peace, pp. 77-80, with modifications.



THE FAMINE: HOOVER'S RESPONSE TO GORKY'S APPEAL

23 July 1921

Herbert Hoover, the chairman of the American Relief Administration (A.R.A.), responded to Gorky's letter (see above, 13 July), setting in motion what became a massive American famine relief effort. The A.R.A. had been established earlier to carry out relief efforts in post-war Europe. See also the response of the Soviet government (28 July), the A.R.A. Soviet agreement (20 August), and other documents on the famine.

Maxim Gorky, Petrograd

I have read with great feeling your appeal to Americans for charitable assistance to the starving and sick people of Russia, more particularly the children. To the whole American people the absolute *sine qua non* of any assistance must be the immediate release of the Americans now held prisoner in Russia and adequate provision for administration. Once these steps have been taken the American Relief Administration, a purely voluntary association and an entirely unofficial organization of which I am chairman, together with other cooperating charitable American organizations supported wholly through the generosity of the American people, have funds in hand by which assistance for the children and for the sick could be undertaken immediately. This organization previously during the last year intimated its willingness to undertake this service as one of simple humanity, disengaged absolutely from any political, social or religious motives. However, for obvious administrative reasons it has been and is compelled to stipulate for certain undertakings. Subject to the acceptance of these undertakings we are prepared to enter upon this work. We are today caring for three and one half millions of children in ten different countries and would be willing to furnish necessary supplement of food, clothing and medical supplies to a million children in Russia as rapidly as organization could be effected. The administrative conditions that we are obliged to make are identically the same as those that have been established in every one of the twenty-three countries where operations have been conducted one time or another in care of upwards of eight million children.

The conditions are that the Moscow Soviet authorities should give a direct statement to the Relief Administration representatives in Riga:

- A. That there is need of our assistance.
- B. That American representatives of the Relief Administration shall be given full liberty to come and go and move about Russia.
- C. That these members shall be allowed to organize the necessary local committees and local assistance free from governmental interference.
- D. That they shall be given free transportation, storage and handling of imported supplies with priority over other traffic, that the authorities shall assign necessary buildings and equipment and fuel free of charge.
- E. That in addition to the imported food, clothing, and medicines the children and the sick must be given the same rations of such local supplies as are given to the rest of the population.
- F. That the Relief Administration must have the assurance of non-interference of the government with the liberty of all of its members.

On its side the Relief Administration is prepared as usual to make a free and frank undertaking:

First. That it will, within its resources supply all children and invalids alike without regard to race, creed or social status.

Second. That its representatives and assistants in Russia will engage in no political activities.

I desire to repeat that these conditions are in no sense extraordinary but are identical with those laid down and readily accepted by the twenty-three other governments in whose territories we have operated.

HERBERT HOOVER

American Relief Administration Bulletin, Second Series, No. 16 (1 September 1921), pp. 3-4.



SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE A.R.A. OFFER OF FAMINE RELIEF

28 July 1921

The Soviet official response to the A.R.A. and Hoover's offer of help was also transmitted through Gorky. The acceptance, however, is signed by Kamenev, thus making it an official government act. See also documents for 13 and 23 July and 20 August.

[To Herbert Hoover]

July 28th. I have transmitted your proposal to the Soviet Government seeing that the Soviet Government alone can discuss the conditions contained therein. I have received from the Soviet Government the following reply for transmission to you:

"The Russian Government has acquainted itself with the proposal of Mr. Hoover made in the name of the American Relief Administration and finds this proposal quite acceptable as to its basis including the release of the American prisoners. The Russian Government considers it desirable as soon as possible to fix the precise conditions on which this association will begin immediate relations of its humane intentions to guarantee the feeding, medical treatment and clothing of a million children and invalids. For that purpose the Russian government would consider it useful that Director Brown or another person invested with full powers should carry out negotiations and should immediately come to Moscow, Riga or Reval. The Russian Soviet Government awaits a speedy reply as to the place and date of these negotiations. Signed, Chairman of the Commission of the All Russian Central Executive Committee for Helping the Famine Stricken Population, Kameneff."

Signed, Maxim Gorky

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921, Vol. 2, p. 809.



THE FAMINE: THE A.R.A.—SOVIET AGREEMENT

20 August 1921

The A.R.A. insisted on political non-interference in its famine relief activities, freedom of movement, freedom in setting up and staffing of its organization, and other conditions which

it felt were essential to a successful relief operation. This met some opposition from the Soviet negotiator, Maxim Litvinov, who was concerned about the political implications of food relief. However, an agreement was reached which became the model for other relief organizations, American and European, as well as for one between the A.R.A. and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The agreement also declared the intention of the A.R.A. to focus especially on relief for children. The terms of the agreement and scale of the assistance have an extra significance when compared to renewed Western food and medical efforts to the Soviet Union area in the early 1990s. See documents for 13, 23 and 28 July, above.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION
AND THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES IN RUSSIA, SIGNED AUGUST 20, 1921

Whereas a famine condition exists in parts of Russia, and

Whereas Mr. Maxim Gorky, with the knowledge of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, has appealed through Mr. Hoover to the American people for assistance to the starving and sick people, more particularly the children, of the famine stricken parts of Russia, and

Whereas Mr. Hoover and the American people have read with great sympathy this appeal on the part of the Russian people in their distress and are desirous, solely for humanitarian reasons, of coming to their assistance, and

Whereas Mr. Hoover in his reply to Mr. Gorky, has suggested that supplementary relief might be brought by the American Relief Administration to up to a million children in Russia.

Therefore it is agreed between the American Relief Administration, an unofficial volunteer American charitable organization under the chairmanship of Mr. Herbert Hoover, hereinafter called the A.R.A., and the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic hereinafter called the Soviet Authorities

That the A.R.A. will extend such assistance to the Russian people as is within its power, subject to the acceptance and fulfillment of the following conditions on the part of the Soviet Authorities who hereby declare that there is need of this assistance on the part of the A.R.A.

The Soviet Authorities Agree:

First That the A.R.A. may bring into Russia such personnel as the A.R.A. finds necessary in the carrying out of its work and the Soviet Authorities guarantee them full liberty and protection while in Russia. Non-Americans and Americans who have been detained in Soviet Russia since 1917 will be admitted on approval by the Soviet Authorities.

Second That they will, on demand of the A.R.A., immediately extend all facilities for the entry into and exit from Russia of the personnel mentioned in (1) and while such personnel are in Russia the Soviet Authorities shall accord them full liberty to come and go and move about Russia on official business and shall provide them with all necessary papers such as safe-conducts, *laissez passer*, etcetera, to facilitate their travel.

Third That in securing Russian and other local personnel the A.R.A. shall have complete freedom as to selection and the Soviet Authorities will, on request, assist the A.R.A. in securing same.

Fourth That on delivery by the A.R.A. of its relief supplies at the Russian ports of Petrograd, Murmansk, Archangel, Novorossiisk, or other Russian ports as mutually agreed upon, or the nearest practicable available ports in adjacent countries, decision to lie with the A.R.A., the Soviet Authorities will bear all further costs such as discharge, handling, loading and transportation to interior base points in the areas where the A.R.A. may operate. Should demurrage or storage occur at above ports mutually agreed upon as satisfactory, such demurrage and storage is for the account of the Soviet Authorities. For purposes

of this agreement the ports of Riga, Reval, Libau, Hango and Helsingfors are also considered satisfactory ports. Notice of at least five days will be given to Soviet representatives at respective ports in case the Soviet Authorities are expected to take CIF delivery.

Fifth That they will at their own expense supply the necessary storage at interior base points mentioned in paragraph (4) and handling and transportation from same to all such other interior points as the A.R.A. may designate.

Sixth That in all above storage and movement of relief supplies they will give the A.R.A. the same priority over all other traffic as the Soviet Authorities give their own relief supplies, and on demand of the A.R.A. will furnish adequate guards and convoys.

Seventh That they will give free import and re-export and guarantee freedom from requisition to all A.R.A. supplies of whatever nature. The A.R.A. will repay the Soviet Authorities for expenses incurred by them on re-exported supplies.

Eighth That the relief supplies are intended only for children and the sick, as designated by the A.R.A. in accordance with paragraph (24), and remain the property of the A.R.A. until actually consumed by these children and the sick, and are to be distributed in the name of the A.R.A.

Ninth That no individual receiving A.R.A. rations shall be deprived of such local supplies as are given to the rest of the population.

Tenth That they will guarantee and take every step to insure that relief supplies belonging to the A.R.A. will not go to the general adult population nor to the Army, Navy, or Government employees but only to such persons as designated in paragraphs (8) and (24).

Eleventh That Soviet Authorities undertake to reimburse the A.R.A. in dollars at CIF cost or replace in kind any misused relief supplies.

Twelfth That the A.R.A. shall be allowed to set up the necessary organizations for carrying out its relief work free from governmental or other interference. The Central and local Soviet Authorities have the right of representation thereon.

Thirteenth That the Soviet Authorities will provide:

A. The necessary premises for kitchens, dispensaries, and, in as far as possible, hospitals.

B. The necessary fuel and, when available, cooking, distributing and feeding equipment for the same.

C. The total cost of local relief administration, food preparation, distribution, etc., themselves or in conjunction with local authorities. Mode of payment to be arranged at later date.

D. On demand of the A.R.A. such local medical personnel and assistance, satisfactory to the A.R.A., as are needed to efficiently administer its relief.

E. Without cost railway, motor, water or other transportation for movement of relief supplies and of such personnel as may be necessary to efficiently control relief operations. The Soviet Authorities will for the duration of the A.R.A. operations assign to the A.R.A. for the sole use of its personnel, and transport free of cost, such railway carriages as the A.R.A. may reasonably request.

Fourteenth In localities where the A.R.A. may be operating and where epidemics are raging, the A.R.A. shall be empowered by the Soviet Authorities to take such steps as may be necessary towards the improvement of sanitary conditions, protection of water supply, etc.

Fifteenth That they will supply free of charge the necessary offices, garages, store rooms, etc., for the transaction of the A.R.A. business and when available heat, light and water for same. Further that they will place at the disposal of the A.R.A. adequate residential quarters for the A.R.A. personnel in all localities where the A.R.A. may be operating. All such above premises to be free from seizure and requisition. Examination of above premises will not be made except with knowledge and in presence of the chief of the

A.R.A. operations in Russia or his representative and except in case of flagrant delit when examiner will be held responsible in the case examination unwarranted.

Sixteenth That they will give to the A.R.A. complete freedom and priority without cost in the use of existing radio, telegraph, telephone, cable, post, and couriers in Russia and will provide the A.R.A., when available and subject to the consent of competent authorities, with private telegraph and telephone wires and maintenance free of cost.

Seventeenth To accord the A.R.A. and its American representatives and its couriers the customary diplomatic privileges as to passing the frontiers.

Eighteenth To supply the A.R.A. free of cost with the necessary gasoline and oil to operate its motor transportation and to transport such motor transportation by rail or otherwise as may be necessary.

Nineteenth To furnish at the request of the competent A.R.A. Authorities all A.R.A. personnel, together with their impedimenta and supplies, free transportation in Russia.

Twentieth To permit the A.R.A. to import and re-export free of duty and requisition such commissary, transport and office supplies as are necessary for its personnel and administration.

Twenty-first That they will acquaint the Russian people with the aims and methods of the relief work of the A.R.A. in order to facilitate the rapid development of its efficiency and will assist and facilitate in supplying the American people with reliable and non-political information of the existing conditions and the progress of the relief work as an aid in developing financial support in America.

Twenty-second That they will bear all expenses of the relief operation other than

A. Cost of relief supplies at port (see paragraph 4).

B. Direct expenses of American control and supervision of relief work in Russia with exceptions as above. In general they will give the A.R.A. all assistance in their power toward the carrying out of its humanitarian relief operations.

Twenty-third Within the limits of its resources and facilities, to supply, as rapidly as suitable organization can be effected, food, clothing and medical relief to the sick and particularly to the children within the age limit as decided upon by the A.R.A.

Twenty-fourth That its relief distribution will be to the children and sick without regard to race, religion or social or political status.

Twenty-fifth That its personnel in Russia will confine themselves strictly to the ministration of relief and will engage in no political or commercial activity whatever. In view of paragraph (1) and the freedom of American personnel in Russia from personal search, arrest and detention, any personnel contravening this will be withdrawn or discharged on the request of the Central Soviet Authorities. The Central Soviet Authorities will submit to the chief officer of the A.R.A. the reasons for this request and the evidence in their possession.

Twenty-sixth That it will carry on its operations where it finds its relief can be administered most efficiently and to secure best results. Its principal object is to bring relief to the famine stricken areas of the Volga.

Twenty-seventh That it will import no alcohol in its relief supplies and will permit customs inspection of its imported relief supplies at points to be mutually agreed upon.

The Soviet Authorities having previously agreed as the absolute *sine qua non* of any assistance on the part of the American people to release all Americans detained in Russia and to facilitate the departure from Russia of all Americans so desiring, the A.R.A. reserves to itself the right to suspend temporarily or terminate all of its relief work in Russia in case of failure on the part of the Soviet Authorities to fully comply with this primary condition or with any condition set forth in the above agreement. The Soviet Authorities equally reserve the right of cancelling this agreement in case of non-fulfillment of any of the above clauses on the part of the A.R.A.

Made in Riga, August twentieth, nineteen hundred and twenty-one
 On behalf of Council of Peoples Commissaries of the Russian Socialist Federative
 Soviet Republic.

Maxim Litvinoff
*Assistant Peoples Commissary
 for Foreign Affairs*

On behalf of the American Relief Administration

[Walter Lyman Brown]
Director for Europe

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921, Vol. 2, pp. 813-817.



ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI, "THE FIGHT AGAINST PROSTITUTION"
 August 1921

Some Bolsheviks expected the revolution to make fundamental changes in a wide range of social relationships and behavior. These were to follow naturally from the abolition of private property and capitalism on the assumption that they were an outgrowth of the "bourgeois" order. The persistence of undesirable behavior was therefore a source of frustration and puzzlement. Among such was prostitution, which Marxists had explained as a product of capitalist exploitation. Kollontai, who long before the revolution had spoken about the need to end prostitution, turned her attention to the problem of how to eradicate it by a combination of education and providing the economic security for women which would make it unnecessary for them to sell their bodies. The article provides both an illustration of Bolshevik explanations for why certain social phenomena existed and proposals for addressing prostitution—and by inference some other social problems—at the time. It was first given as a speech and then published as a pamphlet.

Alexandra Kollontai
The Fight Against Prostitution

The question of prostitution is a delicate and difficult one, to which but insufficient attention has been paid in the past in Soviet Russia. And yet this dark heritage of the bourgeois capitalist past continues to vitiate the atmosphere of the Workers' Republic, and to influence for the worse the physical and moral health of the working population of Soviet Russia. It is true that under the influence of the changing economic and social conditions during these three years of revolution, prostitution has somewhat altered its earlier form and character. But we are still far from having outlived this evil. It continues to weigh down upon us, inflicting the greatest harm to that feeling of solidarity, of comradeship between the members of the Workers' Republic—the toiling women and men—who constitute the basis, the foundation of the new Communist society which we are aiming to build, to consolidate, and to put into actual practice. It is time that we should devote some attention to this question. It is time seriously to study its causes. It is time to find ways and means for a complete eradication of this evil, which should find no place in a Workers' Republic.

In our Workers' Republic there has hitherto been a lack not only of laws aimed at an eradication of this evil, but also of a clear expression of our attitude toward prostitution, as an evil harmful to the general good. We know that prostitution is an evil; we even understand that now, in this extremely difficult transition period, prostitution is assuming large and intolerably extensive proportions. However, we simply wave it aside, we are silent on this phenomenon, partly through a remnant of hypocrisy that is still with us as the heritage of the bourgeois view of life, partly through inability to properly grasp and become conscious of the damage which a widely developed prostitution is inflicting upon the working society. To this is to be ascribed the neglect of the question of prostitution, and of the ways of combating it, which has been manifest hitherto in our legislation.

Up to the present time the collection of our laws has been lacking in any kind of legislation touching upon prostitution as a dangerous social phenomenon. When the old Tsarist laws were annulled by the Council of People's Commissars, all the legislation on prostitution was abolished together with them. But there were not introduced, as a substitute for the abolished measures, any new laws in the interest of the workers' society. This is because of the unnaturally motley nature of our measures, of the contradiction that characterizes the policy of the Soviet power in various places, on the subject of prostitution and the prostitutes themselves. In certain places there have been carried out regular hunts for prostitutes, conducted "in the old style," with the aid of the militia [police]. In other places, the disorderly houses exist openly (in the Inter-Departmental Commission for Combating Prostitution actual data on this subject are available). In other places still, the prostitutes were declared to have the same status as criminals and were interned in hard labor camps. All this shows that the absence of a clearly formulated legislation creates an extremely confused relation between the local powers and this complicated social phenomenon, producing a number of varied and harmful deviations from our own principles of legislation and morality.

It is necessary therefore not only to approach the question of prostitution directly, but also to seek a solution of it that would be in accordance with the fundamental principles and postulates of the social and national-economic program of the Communist Party.

Definition of Prostitution

It is first of all necessary precisely to define prostitution. Prostitution is a phenomenon closely bound up with an income not earned by labor and it therefore flourished in the epoch of the rule of capitalism and private property. Prostitutes from our standpoint are all women who sell their caresses, their bodies, for temporary or extended periods, for the advantage of men, in return for material compensation, for fine food, clothes, trinkets or adornments, and for the right, obtained by selling themselves to men, not to undertake any labor, not to subject themselves to work of any kind.

Prostitution in our Soviet Republic of Workers is an outright inheritance of the bourgeois capitalist past, in which only an insignificant number of women were occupied with productive labor in the national economy, while an enormous number, more than half of the entire female population, lived from the labor of their husbands or their fathers, their "meal tickets."

Prostitution in Ancient Times

Prostitution arose in remote times under the earliest forms of government, as an inevitable shadow cast by a fixed formulated marriage system, preserving the right of private property, and securing the passing down of possessions along the line of legal heirs. By this means it was possible to save the accumulated or frankly stolen riches from the division that would inevitably result from too great a number of heirs in succeeding generations. But between prostitution as it was in the times of the Greek *dikterions* and the Roman *lupanars*, and the prostitution of our day, there is a great difference. The prostitution of

ancient times was in the first place numerically very insignificant. In the second place, there was no such tinge of hypocrisy connected with the prostitution of pagan antiquity as would enable the people at that time to adorn themselves with the morals of the bourgeois capitalist world and induce bourgeois society respectfully to remove its hat in the presence of the "legal" wife of the capitalist magnate, who sold herself openly to an unloved husband, and to turn away in disgust from the girl thrown into the streets by the force of poverty, homelessness, unemployment, and other social causes arising from the nature of capitalism and private property. Prostitution in ancient times was regarded as a "legal" accompaniment of regular established family relations. Aspasia received more respect from her contemporaries than did their colorless wives at home, their breeding apparatus.

In the Middle Ages

In the middle ages, under the petty guild system, prostitution was recognized as a legal natural phenomenon of life; the prostitutes had a guild of their own, which participated on the same footing as the other as the other guilds in holiday parades and municipal celebrations. Prostitution guaranteed the "chaste" daughters of respectable citizens and secured the fidelity of legally obtained wives, since the bachelors always had an opportunity, in return for a corresponding fee, to indulge in the pleasures of the flesh with the professional guild prostitute. Consequently prostitution was useful to the honorable citizen proprietors, and the latter openly acknowledged this fact.

With the rise of capitalism the picture begins to change. For the first time in history, prostitution began to assume in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the character of a danger to society owing both to its proportions and to its nature. The sale of the labor power of women, which was increasing without interruption, is closely and indissolubly bound up with the sale of the female body, and results in the situation that there enter the ranks of the prostitutes not only the "lost" outcast girl, but even the respectable wife of the worker, the mother for the sake of the children, and the young girl (Sonia Marmeladov) for the sake of the family. It is a picture of horror and hypocrisy, arising from the exploitation of labor by capital.

Wherever wages are insufficient to feed the woman, there appears a tempting underground trade—the sale of love. The hypocritical morality of bourgeois society, on the one hand, breeds prostitution with all the force of its destructive exploiting economy, while on the other hand it mercilessly brands with contempt the girl or the woman who has been forced by need on to this much trodden path.

Prostitution follows as a black shadow in the wake of legal marriage in bourgeois society. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries prostitution assumes enormous proportions, unequalled in history. In Berlin there is one prostitute to every twenty so-called respectable women. In Paris there is one to every eighteen, but in London there is one to every nine. One form of prostitution is that which is open, regulated, legal; another form is that which is secret, underground, "occasional." But all forms appear as a poisonous, unhealthy growth in the rank swamp of the bourgeois system of society.

Inevitably Associated with Capitalist Society

And even children, the tender buds of the future, are not spared by the bourgeois class world, which casts little girls of nine or ten years of age into the filthy embraces of rich old men satiated with vice. So-called disorderly houses with minor and infant inmates are a phenomenon that has been in existence for a long time in bourgeois states. At the present moment, after the war, unemployment, which weights most heavily on women, has caused a tremendous growth in Europe of an army of "street women." Hungry crowds of wealthy purchasers of white slaves cruise nightly through the streets of Berlin, Paris, and the other cultural centers of the respectable capitalist states. Openly, in view of everyone, the market in female flesh is carried on. But why not! The bourgeois world is built up altogether on purchase and sale, and even legal marriage itself includes unquestionable elements of

material or at least economic calculation. Prostitution, as an underground trade, is an outlet for the woman who has not succeeded in obtaining a male supporter for herself. Prostitution under capitalism is a means for men to attain conjugal relations with women without burdening themselves with the obligation to support them for a long period, until death do them part.

But if prostitution is so wide-spread, if it is maintaining itself even in Soviet Russia, how shall we fight against it? To answer this question it is necessary first to recall to mind what are the causes of prostitution, what is the source from which it flows. Bourgeois learning and its representatives have felt it proper to point out to the world that prostitution is a "pathological" phenomenon that is itself called forth by the abnormal qualities of certain women. Just as there are said to be criminal types that are congenital in their origin, so it is declared there exist born prostitutes. Wherever you may put them, no matter what conditions they may be placed in, these women will end in vice, and in the way of all flesh. Of course these misrepresentations of the bourgeois scholars go to pieces when faced with the facts of life. Marx and the more honest of the bourgeois scholars, physicians and statisticians clearly point out that the innate inclinations of the woman play no part. Prostitution is first of all a *social phenomenon*, closely associated with the undefended position of woman and her economic dependence on man, both in the family and in marriage.

Pseudo-Science and "Morality"

The roots of prostitution reach far down into the economic system. The economic exposure of women, on the one hand, and the habit, ingrown in women through many centuries of education, to seek material support from a man by legal or extra-marital relations, on the other hand, that is the root, that is the cause of prostitution. As a matter of fact, if the bourgeois scholars of the school of Lombroso and Tamovsky, who claim that prostitutes are born with indications of perverseness and sexual abnormality, are right in making this claim, how do they explain the very well-known fact that in times of crisis and unemployment the number of prostitutes suddenly increases? How do they explain the fact that the purchasers of "living flesh," of white slaves, who came to Tsarist Russia from other countries, always found a rich harvest in the starving provinces, suffering from poor crops, and came off empty-handed in the provinces that were well fed, with a very small yield of white slaves? Why did there suddenly appear so many perverted types of women, branded for ruin by nature, in years of famine, or unemployment?

And, furthermore, is it not typical that in capitalistic countries, prostitution recruited its numbers for the most part among the *indigent layers of the population*? The greatest percentage of prostitutes are always found in the more poorly paid trades followed by working women, among the more neglected and lonely young women, forced by bitter need and by the necessity of immediately feeding their little brothers and sisters, who have fallen as a care upon the unprotected, young and penniless girl. If the theory of the bourgeois scholars on the innate criminality and perverseness of certain women were correct, as a reason for prostitution, all classes of the population, including the rich and protected classes, would give as high a percentage of criminal and perverse women as the needy classes. But as a matter of fact this is not the case. The professional prostitutes, living by the sale of their bodies, are recruited with rare exceptions from the propertyless class. They are driven to prostitution by poverty, hunger, neglect, or by the crying phenomena of social inequality, these foundations of the bourgeois system.

Let us take another example. The increase in professional prostitution, as is shown by statistics, comes in all capitalist countries from girls between the ages of thirteen and twenty-three, in other words, the age of childhood and youth. And among these girls the majority are those that have been neglected or lonely. It is characteristic that the daughters of comparatively protected families, of whom their well-to-do parents took proper care, enter the ranks of prostitution only in very exceptional cases. In most cases these girls are

victims of a number of tragic circumstances, among which a very important part is played by the traditional lying and hypocritical bourgeois "double standard of morality." The girl who has "sinned" is cast out by her bourgeois family, and, finding herself alone, unaided, branded by the contempt of "society," is placed in a situation that has only one outlet, namely, prostitution.

Economic Causes of Prostitution

Badly paid labor, the striking inequalities of capitalist society, the unhealthy habit of women to depend economically on men, to seek support not in their own labor power, but in pay for love, at the hands of the "feeding" man—this is what breeds prostitution, it is there that we must seek the roots of this long existing, unhealthy phenomenon.

The workers' revolution in Russia, which shook the foundation of capitalism, also dealt a blow to the former dependence of woman on man. All citizens are equal before the workers' society, only they are obliged to work for the common good, and, in case of need, they are entitled to the assistance of the collective system. The woman is protected no longer by marriage, but by her participation in the creation of the national wealth, in other words, by her own productive labor. The mutual relations between the sexes are being transferred to a new basis. But the old views and conceptions are still weighing down upon us. And besides, our economic system is still far from having been fully established along the new line. We are still far from the Communist system of life. Naturally, in this transition period, prostitution still has powerful supports. For many of the reasons that brought it forth have not by any means been removed, although the fundamental causes that bred it—private property and the petrified forms of the bourgeois family—have been eliminated. But there still remain a number of causes: the neglect and lack of protection of childhood, the poor living conditions of the working class, the loneliness of youth, the low pay of female labor, the imperfections of our provisioning apparatus, the general disorganization of the national economy, and a number of other economic and social phenomena which still give rise to the sale of female flesh and thus support prostitution.

Should the Soviet Government Fight Prostitution

The struggle against prostitution means first of all a struggle against all the above mentioned phenomena, in other words, to support the general policy of the Soviet power in the matter of strengthening the beginnings of Communism and perfecting production. This is our chief, our fundamental task. But some will ask: is it necessary in this case to wage a special war on prostitution? This painful phenomenon will outlive itself when we have strengthened the power of the toilers and brought about, in full, the beginnings of Communism. To reason thus is equivalent to ignoring the disintegrating and baneful influence which prostitution exerts on the very structure of the new Communist society. Already at the first All-Russian Congress of Working and Peasant Women, the correct program was proclaimed: "The free and equal citizen woman of the Soviet Workers' Republic cannot and must not be an object of purchase and sale." That was what was said, but as a matter of fact the conditions remain what they have been.

Prostitution injures the Russia of the toilers, principally from the standpoint of the interests of the national economy and the free development of our productive forces. We know that a victory over disorganization, an impetus imparted to the evolution of our industry, is only accessible to us by a supreme exertion of all the working class energies of the Republic, a complete and planned application of all the individual working power, both of men and women.

Down with the unproductive labor of domestic life, with the exploitation of children in the home! Make way for organized labor, productive labor, labor that shall serve the workers. Organization! That is the problem of the moment.

We Must Fight Deserters from Work

Meanwhile, what is the professional prostitute? The professional prostitute is a person whose working energy is not given for the advantage of the collective whole, a person who lives at the expense of others, and who receives a share from the rations of others. Is such a condition of affairs permissible in a workers' republic? By no means, because it decreases the supply of labor power, the number of hands at work at the creation of the national wealth, of social good. How are we to consider the professional prostitute from the standpoint of the interests of national economy? Only as a *deserter from work*. In this sense we may mercilessly condemn prostitution. We must immediately, in the interests of a sensible economic plan, enter into a conflict with this evil, bring about a decrease in the number of prostitutes, and stamp out its manifestations, whatever may be the form in which they appear.

It is time that we understand that the existence of prostitution contradicts the fundamental principles of a workers' republic, in which all forms of earnings not obtained by labor are subject to prostitution. Our understanding of this matter has much changed during the three years of the revolution. We are beginning to form a morality of our own, based on principles unlike those of the former morality. For instance, three years ago we looked upon a merchant as a completely respectable man. If his books were in order, if he did not engage in fraudulent bankruptcy, if he did not openly and outrageously overcharge and underweigh his customers, the merchant was not only not put in jail, but on the other hand, was rewarded with honorable designations: "merchant of the first guild," "of an old merchant family," "a respectable citizen," etc.

The Merchant No Longer Respectable

Now, in the time of the revolution, our relation to commerce and to merchants has been radically changed. We now call the "honorable merchant" a speculator. We not only do not confer flattering epithets upon him, but we hale him before the Extraordinary Commission and intern him in a camp for forced labor. And why this? Simply because we know that we shall be able to create a new Communist economy only by inducing all adult citizens to undertake *productive labor*. Whoever does not work, whoever is living at the expense of others, on the earnings of others, that is, whoever performs no productive labor, he is a danger to the collective society, to the republic. That is why we prosecute the speculators, the traders, the profiteers—in short, all who live on income not obtained by labor, and that is why we must fight against prostitution as one of the forms of desertion from labor.

But when we consider the prostitutes and fight them as a non-productive element of society, we are not placing them in a special category. For us, for the Republic of the Workers, it is absolutely a matter of indifference whether a woman sells herself to one man or to many, whether she is a professional prostitute living by some other source than her own useful labor, or by the sale of her caresses to a legal husband or to an occasional purchaser of female flesh, whose identity may vary from day to day. All women who desert from labor, who take no part in the obligatory work, and who are not performing any work for small children at home, are placed on an equal footing with the prostitute—they must be forced to work. And we cannot make any distinction here between the prostitute and the most lawful wife who lives on her husband's sustenance, whoever her husband may be, even though he be a "commissar."

In other words, we are going to introduce equal treatment for all deserters from labor. From the standpoint of the workers' collective, a woman is to be condemned, not for selling her body, but for the fact that, just like a legally married idle woman, she does no useful work for the collective. This new, absolutely new, procedure with prostitution is dictated by the interest of the workers' collective.

Venereal Diseases

The second reason why we must now immediately wage a conscientious and organized campaign against prostitution is in order to defend the public health. Soviet Russia is interested in preventing illness and disease from weakening the population and lowering its capacity for work. Now, prostitution happens to be *one* of the sources of venereal diseases, but of course not the only source. These diseases may also be communicated in the *regular course* of daily life, by reason of poor domestic conditions, the absence of hygienic appliances, an insufficiency of dishes, which are therefore used in common by a number of persons, common towels, which are often causes of infection. Besides, in our extremely agitated transition period, as far as moral views are concerned, owing to the constant gathering and uninterrupted transfer of the army from one place to another, venereal diseases are spread to a remarkable extent, quite independently of the agency of commercial prostitution. For instance, in the southern fruitful provinces civil war has been in progress. The male Cossack population has been scattered, driven out, has gone off with the Whites, or been scattered to the winds. In the settlements there remain only the woman. They had enough of everything, but there were no men. Red Armies advance and take the town, they are billeted out, and remain in the city for weeks at a time. As a result there are mutual attractions, free alliances, having no similarity whatever with prostitution, since the women in this case voluntarily associate with the men, as a result of inclination and without any calculation of material gain on their side; it is not the Red Army man who feeds the woman, but the reverse, it is she who takes care of him, mends his clothes, shelters him as long as the army is quartered in the settlement. But the army departs, and as a consequence the settlement has become infected with venereal diseases. The same thing has been repeated with cities and villages which are taken by the Whites.

A general contamination is constantly going on. The diseases are spread, increased, and threaten to wipe out the entire unborn generation. In the joint session of the Motherhood Protection Society and the Provincial Women's Sections, Professor Koltsov spoke on hygiene, the science of healing and perfecting mankind. Closely related with this task is the question of the struggle against prostitution, which is one of the most active causes of infection from person to person.

Steps to Fight Venereal Diseases

In the theses of the Interdepartmental Commission for Combating Prostitution, in the Commissariat of Social Welfare, it is declared to be the immediate task of the Commissariat of Public Health to work out special measures for the struggle against venereal infections. Of course these measures include all the sources of infection and must not be limited to the prosecution of prostitution, as was the practice of hypocritical bourgeois society. But at any rate, even if we recognize the fact that the communication of infection is also accomplished to a very great extent in the regular course of daily life, it is very important to furnish the population with a clear understanding of what is the role of prostitution in the spread of venereal diseases. It is extremely important to conduct a proper sexual education of the young, to equip the young with precise information, to enable them to enter life "with their eyes open," to refrain from keeping silent on questions concerning sexual life as was done by the lying, hypocritical, sanctimonious bourgeois morality.

The third reason why prostitution is inadmissible in a Soviet Workers' Republic is that it prevents the development and solidification of the fundamental class qualities of the proletariat, of its new morality. What is the fundamental property of the working class, the most powerful moral weapon in its struggle? The feeling of comradeship, of solidarity. Solidarity is the foundation of Communism. Without this strongly established feeling, among the mankind of the workers, it is inconceivable that we shall erect a new truly Communist society. Of course it is self-evident that conscious Communists must with all their powers aid in the development of this feeling, and conversely, must with all their

might struggle with those forces that would hinder this development and prevent the solidification of such qualities and characteristics of the working class. What is it that follows in the wake of prostitution? A debasement of the feeling of equality, of solidarity and comradeship between the sexes, in other words, between the two halves of the working class. The man who purchases the caresses of women begins at once to look upon women as a commodity. He regards women as dependent upon himself, in other words, as creatures of a lower order, not entitled to equal rights, not of equal value to the workers' government. His contemptuous attitude to the prostitute whose attentions he has purchased for her material gain he transfers to all women. Instead of a growth of the feeling of comradeship, equality and solidarity, we shall have, if prostitution should further develop, a strengthening of the conditions of inequality between the sexes, of the feeling of the superiority of man, the dependence of woman on him, in other words, a decrease in the solidarity of the whole working class.

From the standpoint of the new Communist morality which is in process of formation, of crystallization, prostitution is intolerable and dangerous. Therefore the task of our party as a whole and of the Women's Section in particular, must be to wage the most merciless, open and resolute campaign against this heritage of the past. In bourgeois-capitalist society all the modes of struggle against prostitution turned out to be a useless waste of energy, since the two fundamental causes of prostitution—the existence of private property and the direct economic dependence of the greater number of women on a man (father, husband, lover)—were powerfully and firmly established.

In the Workers' Republic these causes have been eliminated. Private property has been abolished. All the citizens of the Workers' Republic are obliged to work. Marriage ceases to be for woman the means of finding a "meal ticket" and thus to escape the inevitability of working, of nourishing themselves by their own work. The objective fundamental causes of prostitution in Soviet Russia are being outgrown. There remain a number of secondary economic and social causes, which are much easier to deal with. The Women's Sections should apply their energies decisively in this direction for there they will find a wide field of activity opening before them. It is only necessary to bear definitely in mind that the struggle against prostitution may be waged only on the basis of a struggle with the *sources from which it originates*, and consequently the study of these sources, a careful seeking after them, is the first task of the Women's Sections.

Commission to Fight Prostitution

Already last year, at the suggestion of the Central Organ of the People's Commissariat of Social Welfare, there was organized an Interdepartmental Commission to Combat Prostitution. For a number of reasons, the work of the Commission was temporarily abandoned, but in the autumn of this year the Commission was again formed, and with the active co-operation of Dr. Golman and the Central [Women's] Department, this Commission was already beginning an organized activity in accordance with a carefully elaborated plan. In the Interdepartmental Commission there are representatives of the People's Commissariats of Justice, of Health, of Labor, of Social Welfare, Education, of the Working Women's Sections, and the League of Communist Youth. The Commission drew up a set of theses (printed in its Bulletin No. 4), sent out a circular letter to all the provincial sections of the People's Commissariat for Social Welfare, caused the creation of similar commissions in the provinces which carried on their work under the guidance of the Central Commission, and went about the task of elaborating a number of great measures for a systematic struggle with the sources that feed prostitution.

The Interdepartmental Commission considers that the Women's Sections should show the most active and lively interest in this matter, since prostitution is a scourge which falls chiefly upon the women of the propertyless working class. This is our task, the task of the Women's Sections, to begin a general propaganda concerned with questions connected with

prostitution, since it is in our interest to develop the revolution in the domain of the family, to stabilize the relations between the sexes, to approach this question from the interests of the working society. The Inter-departmental Commission, as you surely know from its theses, proceeds from the standpoint that the struggle with prostitution will be waged, in the main, together with the accomplishing of our Soviet policy, in the domain of national economy and the general Soviet structure. We shall dispose definitely of prostitution if we have consolidated the beginnings of Commission. This irrefutable truth is the axiom on which our work is based. But this fundamental task must be supplemented by another task: the declaration of the norms of a new Communist morality. Both these tasks are closely connected with each other. A new morality is created by the new form of our economy, but the new Communist economy cannot be built without securing a support in the new morality. It is necessary to think clearly and consistently on this question. We must not fear the truth. Communists must openly acknowledge that in the sphere of the relations between the sexes a great, unparalleled revolution is taking place. But this revolution has been brought about by the upheaval in the economic system and in the new role that woman plays in the economic activity of the workers' state. At present, in this difficult transition period, when the old is crumbling and the new has only been partly created, the conjugal relations between the sexes very frequently assume forms that are unhealthy and inadmissible in the interests of the generality. But in all these manifold variety of conjugal forms, found in this changing period, there is nevertheless a healthy kernel.

The task, the obligation of our party and of the Women's Sections in particular, is to find and call attention to this healthy kernel, to point out what forms of the relation between the sexes are helpful to the general task of the revolutionary class, serve to solidify the collective life and its interests, and what forms are harmful to the collective life, and must therefore be discarded and condemned by Communists. It was thus that the Central Organ conceived its task in the Interdepartmental Commission. It felt that it was not only necessary to fight by practical means with the causes that had been handed down to us from the past and that still feed prostitution, not only to support the improvements in housing and to struggle against homelessness, against negligent treatment of children, but also to accelerate the means of a resolute participation, the crystallization of the foundations of the morality of the working class still in process of emergence and formation, since the working class is only now consolidating its dictatorship.

The Inter-departmental Commission makes the statement that in Soviet Russia prostitution appears in two forms: 1) in the form of professional prostitution; and 2) in the form of secret earnings. The first form of prostitution is very little developed among us, and is of very slight extent. In Petrograd, for example, where raids were undertaken against prostitutes, this mode of combating prostitution yielded practically no results. The second form of prostitution, although it is highly developed and extremely extensive in bourgeois capitalist countries (in Petrograd, for example, there were from 6,000 to 7,000 registered prostitutes before the revolution, whereas as a matter of fact more than 50,000 women were actually practising prostitution), also assumes a great variety of forms in our country. Prostitution is practised by Soviet office employees, in order to obtain, by the sale of their caresses, boots that go up to the knee; prostitution is resorted to by mothers of families, working women, peasant women, who are out after flour for their children and sell their bodies to the manager of the rations division in order to obtain from him a full bag of the precious flour. Sometimes the girls in the offices associate with their male superiors not for manifestly material gain, for rations, shoes, etc., but in the hope of advancement in office. And there is an additional form of prostitution — "careerist prostitution"—which is also based in the last analysis, however, on material calculations.

Inadvisability of Legal Penalty

How shall we fight these conditions? There was proposed to the Inter-departmental Commission the question of a *punishment of prostitution by law*. Many of the representatives in the Inter-departmental Commission were inclined to favor the method of subjecting the prostitute to legal prostitution, by reason of the fact that the professional prostitute is a frank deserter from work. A recognition of the culpability of the prostitute logically led to an admission of the legality of the hunts for the prostitutes, of their internment in concentration camps, etc.

The Central Organ came out clearly and resolutely against this conception of the matter. If it is proper to permit hunts for prostitutes, it follows that similar hunts should be made for such lawful wives as are existing on the means of their husbands and are of no use to the state. The latter are just as much deserters from work as are the prostitutes. It is proper and logical to put prostitutes into concentration camps only in cases where lawful wives, not occupied in productive labor, are also interned for similar reasons.

Such was the standpoint of the Central Organ, which was supported by the representatives of the People's Commissariat of Justice. If we take the factor of desertion from labor as the defining element of the crime, we shall have no other outlet: all the forms of desertion from labor will be rendered equal by the same punishments. The factor of conjugal relations, of a relation between the sexes is eliminated. That factor cannot serve as the defining element of a crime in the Workers' Republic.

Bourgeois Objections to Prostitution

In bourgeois society the prostitute was branded and persecuted not for the fact that she did not engage in productive and useful labor, and not for selling her kisses (two-thirds of the women in bourgeois society sold themselves) to her lawful husband, but for the informality of her conjugal relationship, for the shortness of its duration.

The basis of marriage in bourgeois society was its *permanence and formality, its registration*. This registration was for the object of securing proper inheritors of property. The absence of formality, the short duration of the relation between the sexes—that is what was despised by the bourgeoisie in extra-marital relations; it was that which was branded with contempt by all the sanctimonious hypocrites, the standard bearers of the bourgeois morality. Can the short duration, the informality, the freedom of the relation between the sexes be regarded, from the standpoint of working humanity, as a crime, as an act that should be subject to punishment? Of course not. The freedom of relations between the sexes does not contradict the ideology of Communism. The interests of the commonwealth of the workers are not in any way disturbed by the fact that marriage is of a short or prolonged duration, whether its basis is love, passion, or even a transitory physical attraction.

The only thing that is harmful to the workers' collective, and therefore inadmissible, is *the element of material calculation between the sexes*, the substitution of crassly materialistic *calculation for gain* for a free association of the sexes on the basis of mutual attraction, whether it be in the form of prostitution or in the form of legal marriage.

This factor is harmful, is inadmissible, will cut a breach in the feeling of equality and solidarity between the sexes. And from this standpoint we must condemn prostitution, as a trade, in all its shapes and forms, even that of the legal "wives," who maintain their sad part, so intolerable in the Workers' Republic.

But is this defining element sufficient to make it punishable by law? Can we prosecute before the law and hold to account persons engaging in a conjugal relationship if the element of "calculation" enters into the relation, in view of the instability and manifold nature of the forms of association now current and in spite of the absence of any declaration of the new responsible norms of conjugal morality in the working class? Where is the line now to be drawn between prostitution and marriage by calculation. In the Interdepartmental Commission the culpability of prostitutes, for prostitution, that is, for "purchase and sale,"

was rejected. There remained only to be decided the point that all persons wandering in the streets and deserting from work should be assigned to the disposition of the Commissariat of Social Welfare, and thence sent out, in accordance with general fundamental considerations, either to the Sections for the Distribution of Labor Power of the People's Commissariat of Labor, or to courses, sanatoria, hospitals. Only after a repeated desertion by the prostitute, in other words, after evidence of malicious intent to desert, would the individual should be subject to forced labor. There is to be no special culpability attached to the prostitutes. They are in no way to be segregated from the other bodies of deserters from work. This is a revolutionary and pregnant step, worthy of the first Workers' Republic of the world.

Punishment for Men Also?

The question of the culpability of the prostitutes was formulated in point fifteen of our theses. When this question was brought up, there was also put before the Commission the other question as to the culpability of the *clients* of prostitution, in other words, of the men. There were advocates of this view in the commission. But this hopeless attempt had to be renounced, as it did not arise logically from our fundamental presuppositions. How shall we define the client of prostitution? And again where is the measure that will define the crime? The purchase and sale of female caresses? For in that case the husband of the most lawful wife might be subject to persecution. Who will undertake to define a client of prostitution? The proposition was put to the Commission, to establish institutions of "Sisters and Brothers of Social Investigation," which was voted down by the majority. The Central Organ came out sharply against this proposition. The representative of the People's Commissariat of Justice stated that as it is not even possible to define precisely the measure of the crime—the question of the culpability of the clients is automatically precluded. The standpoint of the Central Organ was again victorious. But if the Commission recognized that the clients could not be punished by law, it nevertheless definitely expressed its moral condemnation both of those who use prostitutes and those women who enter this occupation.

We have still to point out those purely practical measures which will serve to decrease prostitution, in which the active and energetic participation of the Women's Sections will be required. There is absolutely no doubt that the poor, insufficient pay returned for female labor continues, in Soviet Russia, to serve as one of the real factors pushing women into prostitution in one or the other of its forms. Under the law, the earnings of the working men and working women are equal, but as a matter of fact the women engaged in work are in the great majority of cases unskilled laborers. The question of improving female labor skills through the development of a network of special courses all over the country, is an extremely urgent matter. The task of the Women's Sections is to influence the educational authorities in this direction, to give impetus to the development of the vocational training of working women.

What Women Now Become Prostitutes

The second cause is the political backwardness of women, the absence of social consciousness among them. Who is it that most frequently falls into the much-trodden path, the conscious working woman who has been organized in trade unions, or the colorless woman who has not been seized by the revolutionary wave, who has not been carried away by the great business of the construction of Communism. Of course it is the latter. The task of the Women's Sections is to accelerate the work among the female proletariat. The best form of struggle against prostitution is to raise the political consciousness of the great masses of women, to attract them to the revolutionary struggle and the constructive work of Communism. Prostitution is also strengthened by the fact that the housing question in Soviet Russia is not yet solved. And in this matter the Women's Sections, together with the

Commission for the Struggle against Prostitution, can and must say a decisive word. The Inter-departmental Commission is occupied with the drawing up of propositions for housing communes for the working young people, for an extensive network of houses for the temporary shelter of women arriving in town. But if the Women's Sections and the Commission to Aid Youth do not develop an active initiative and independent work in this matter, the whole thing will remain a mere paper prescription of the Commission, an excellent and beautiful paper set of wishes. But much can be done and much must be done!

The Women's Sections in the provinces also must enter into contact with the national educators, in order to push into the foreground the question of proper provision for sexual enlightenment in the schools. In addition, a number of conversations and lessons must be introduced, of social scientific or scientific hygienic character, as to questions of marriage, the family, the history of the form of the relationship between the sexes, the dependence of these forms, and of sexual morality itself, on purely economic, material causes.

It is time to introduce clearness into the question of the relationship between the sexes. It is time to reach with merciless and rigidly scientific criticism. I have already said that the Inter-departmental Commission has recognized the culpability of professional prostitutes only in so far as we prosecute also all other desertion from labor. Putting the question in this way, the women who have labor books, but who still engage in prostitution as an underground trade, as well as all the women who are supported by their husbands, are not subject to punishment by law. This is stated in our theses, but does this mean that we are not to carry on a struggle by other means against this condition? Far from it. We know—I have said it several times today—that prostitution is a danger to the worker's commonwealth, corrupting the psychology of men and women, disturbing the feeling of equality, of solidarity between the sexes. Our task is to re-educate the psychology of the working commonwealth, to bring it into correspondence with the economic tasks of the working class. We must without reservation discard our old outlived conceptions, to which we are attached as to a bad habit. Economics have now defined our ideology. Look about you and behold the foundations of the former economic institutions crumbling. With them there go down also the foundations of the earlier form of marriage. And yet we are chained to the early marriage system, to the bourgeois form of the family; we are ready to renounce all the accustomed forms of life, ready to hail the revolution in every field, and yet are afraid to touch the family! Only do not touch the marriage system! Even conscious Communists are afraid to look the truth in the face and wave aside those fundamentals which bear witness to the fact that the former family ties are breaking, as the new economic forms dictate also new forms of association between the sexes. This results in outright abnormalities. The Soviet power has recognized woman as a working unit, valued by national economy, has placed her, as a working, toiling force, on the same footing with man, but in the actual conditions of life we are still maintaining the "old regime," and are ready to acknowledge the normality of marriages based on the material dependence of women on men. But if we wage a struggle against prostitution, we should also introduce clearness into these conjugal relations that are still built on the old principle of "purchase and sale." We must learn to be ruthless, to fear no sentimental outcries as to the fact that "by our criticism, our preaching of scientific truths, we violate the sanctity of family ties."

Is the Family Doomed?

It is necessary to declare the truth outright: the old form of the family is passing away. The Communist society has no use for it. The bourgeois world celebrated the isolation, the cutting off of the married pair from the collective weal. In the scattered and disjointed individual bourgeois society, full of struggle and destruction, the family was the sole anchor of hope in the storms of life, the peaceful haven in the ocean of hostilities and competitions between persons. The family represented an independent class in the collective unit. There can and must be no such thing in the Communist society. For Communist

society as a whole represents such a fortress of the collective life, precluding any possibility of the existence of an isolated class of family bodies, existing by itself with its ties of birth, with its female egoism, its love of family honor, its absolute segregation.

New Forms of Social Life

Already ties of blood, of birth, and even of the relationship of conjugal love are weakening in our eyes; in their turn there are growing, spreading and deepening, new ties, ties of the working family, the profound feeling of comradeship, of solidarity, of community of interests, the creation of a collective responsibility, of a belief in the collective welfare as the highest moral-legislative good.

What marriage is to become in the future, or more properly, what are to be the forms of relationship between the sexes in the future, it would be difficult to foretell. But one thing is beyond doubt, that is that under Communism there will be lacking in the conjugal relationship not only all material calculation, all economic dependence of woman on man, but also all the other considerations of "convenience" which frequently characterize present-day marriage. At the basis of the conjugal relation there lies the healthy instinct of reproduction, beautified in the attractive colors of youthful love, in the strong tones of passion, in the delicate tints of spiritual harmony and that of sudden and open outbursts of physiological attraction, which is soon extinguished. All these factors in the conjugal relationship have nothing whatever in common with prostitution. Prostitution is offensive by reason of the fact that is an act of violence on the part of the woman over herself, brought about by the pressure of fortuitous and external advantages; in prostitution there is no place either for love or for passion, nor is there any healthy instinct for the production of offspring. It is an act of deliberate calculation merely. Where passion or attraction enters, prostitution ceases.

Prostitution under Communism is passing into the domain of the forgotten past, together with the morbid forms of the present-day family. In its place there are growing healthy, joyful, and free relations between the sexes. A new generation is growing up to replace the old, with more developed social feelings, with greater mutual independence, with more freedom, health and courage. A generation for whom the welfare of the whole will stand higher than everything else.

Comrades! Together we have thus far only outlined the foundation for the beautiful building of the Communist future. But it is in our power to accelerate the construction of this magnificent and unprecedented edifice. In order to create Communism, we must strengthen the spirit of solidarity in the working class; in order to strengthen this spirit, we must wage a war against all the conditions that disintegrate the working class and foster a mutual estrangement. Prostitution interferes with the growth of this solidarity, and therefore we call upon the Women's Sections to start an immediate campaign for the eradication of this evil.

Comrades! Our task is to destroy the roots that nourish prostitution. Our task is to wage relentless warfare on the vestiges of individualism, which has hitherto been the moral basis of marriage. Our task is to revolutionize thought in the field of marriage relations and to clear the way for a new, healthy, conjugal morality that shall correspond with the interests of the workers' commonwealth. After it has outlived the morality and conjugal forms of the present day, the Communist commonwealth will have disposed also of prostitution.

We must all put our shoulders to the wheel, Comrades! In the place of the family which is passing away, the family of the past, there is already arising, solidifying, and spreading, the new family—the great workers' family of the victorious world proletariat.

Soviet Russia, Vol. 5, No. 2 (August 1921), pp. 42-47, and Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 1921), pp. 118-122, with modifications.



AMERICAN DESCRIPTIONS OF THE VOLGA FAMINE

September-November 1921

The famine killed millions of people and seriously undermined the health of millions more, especially in the Volga River provinces. There were even instances of cannibalism. These two reports by American observers give some sense of the nature and cause of the famine. Note the comparative crop production figures given in Goodrich's letter and the comparison to other famine situations in Kellogg's testimony. James Goodrich was a former Governor of Indiana who travelled in the famine area for two months in October and November 1921. His letter is abridged. Dr. Vernon Kellogg, Secretary of the National Research Council, was there in September-October. Thus they describe the area at what should have been the end of harvest and a time of relative plenty. Both men testified to the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing on famine and relief efforts—Congress had made a large appropriation to help fund the A.R.A. relief effort. Goodrich's letter was read into the record of his testimony and Kellogg testified immediately after him. See also other materials related to the famine and the famine relief efforts of the A.R.A. (American Relief Administration) earlier in this volume. A pood equals thirty-six lbs.

[Letter of J. P. Goodrich]

November 1, 1921.

HERBERT HOOVER, ESQ.,

*The honorable the Secretary of Commerce,
United States Department of Commerce,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. HOOVER: On reaching Moscow on the 8th of October, I found Col. Haskell had gone to Samara, and in accordance with your request that I make a rapid survey of the famine district, I at once arranged to leave Moscow and on the 10th started, going first to Samara. I am now, as you requested, sending you a preliminary report....

In every commune I was in I saw them, in some fields by hand and in others by machine, gathering seeds which grow in profusion on fallow ground and which they call famine seeds because used only in famine years. These they haul to their communes and place in barns and stacks ready for use when all else fails. They did this in 1891 and tell me that while their live stock will not eat it until all else is exhausted, they will eat it when very hungry and it will keep them alive until spring.

I saw on every hand evidences of the greatest care that nothing having any food value be wasted. Cabbage leaves, melon rinds, and articles of this kind ordinarily thrown away are now utilized.

In one commune, Baro in Saratov, I did not notice a single dog, a rather unusual condition for Russia, and on inquiry the local secretary of the commune told me that they had butchered about all of them and made them into bologna and sausage for use this winter.

Following the custom of this people and its tendency to migrate in famine years from the stricken districts to where there is said to be food in plenty, I found many thousands going in all directions, a few toward Moscow and north Russia, many more to Siberia and others down the Volga River and to the Ukraine.

The population of the city of Samara has decreased over 50,000 and the county communes in my opinion, and from the data obtained in the three communes I visited, far more than that. The same thing is true of Saratov. In the German communes alone where the most accurate records are kept, the decrease has been 19 1/2 per cent by migration, cholera, typhus, and starvation, and I am sure it is equally true through the entire famine district. While I am not, as you know, intimately acquainted with the Russian character, this

being my first visit, I am very much impressed by the ability of the people to adapt themselves to the very trying situation that confronts them and to a very considerable extent discount the facts as disclosed by the official figures. While all this is true and while the ridiculous so-called human-interest stories sent out by sensational newspaper correspondents grossly exaggerate the situation, yet going into the situation as carefully as I could in the limited time at my disposal I am certain that the situation is such that if immediate relief is not given, with the assurance of continued aid until July 1 hundreds of thousands of people, men, women, and children, will perish in the famine district who otherwise might live.

In making my hurried investigation I did not trust to Government statistics, to appearances in the bazaars or on the cities' streets, nor in the provincial homes in the large cities, where the children whose parents have died or abandoned them are collected together, dirty, half naked, lousy, half starved, mere skeletons with helpless, hopeless, hunted looks in their eyes, but I went down to these communes, distant from the cities and the railroads, slept in their homes, and ate their bread, selecting for this purpose communes which fairly would represent the average condition throughout the Volga for famine district. I went over their communal records, always well kept, examined their warehouses, the feeding kitchens, their hospitals, and went into the poorer sections of each commune, going into the houses to see for myself the conditions that existed. I am very certain that what I saw there is typical of the conditions that obtain in the Volga Valley from Kazan to the lower Volga, 50 miles below Saratov, which was the limit of my investigation.

The situation is bad at Kazan but worse in Simbirsk, Samara, and Saratov. I am satisfied that as the valley descends below the sea level as it passes through Astrakhan that the situation will grow worse as the low level of the lower Volga, surrounded as it is with lands of much higher elevation, reduces the amount of rainfall.

If I am not able to get the official statistics brought down in October 1 to you in this letter, I will send them out by next courier, but I will here give you the statistics from two communes, one Russian, the other German, that will give you some idea of the situation that confronts some of the worst of the communes. I visited the commune of Schilling, about 40 versts south of Saratov. It has 3,798 people and 4,467 dessiatines of land, 3,595 dessatines of which is plow land and the rest pasture, hay, and willow land. Their crops were as follows, in pounds and dessatines, planted and harvested:

	1919		1920		1921	
	Dessia- tines planted.	Poods yield.	Dessia- tines planted.	Poods yield.	Dessia- tines planted.	Poods yield.
Rye.....	493	4,930	592	3,552	375	150
Oats	56	560	35	245	15	8
Wheat	796	22,880	928	4,640	167	55
Harsen.....	—	—	2	22	53	88
Sunflower	110	2,200	67	2,244	133	600
Potatoes	135	7,000	110	19,800	12	1,450
Total	1,590	37,570	1,734	30,503	1,255	2,351
Government tax.....	12,000 poods.		5,000 poods.		9 poods of sun- flower.	

Live stock in commune during same period.

	1919	1920	1921
Horses	1,223	891	451
Cows	582	461	313
Sheep	1,352	1,156	424
Pigs	731	246	58
Total.....	3,938	2,754	1,246

You will notice that while in 1919 and 1920 they produced more than 10 poods per capita, this year they produced but one pood per capita. They have been selling their live stock and everything they could spare to buy food. They are gathering weeds and making every preparation possible in this commune, but they say one-half at least must starve unless they have help, and the facts seem fully to justify the statement.

They have sowed 330 dessiatines of rye, over half a crop, with seed furnished by the Government and have plowed and are prepared to sow 800 dessiatines of wheat if they can secure the seed. They have 1,146 children under 15 years of age and 800 must have help or die. Eighteen orphans without any parents are being cared for by the commune. Deaths from unusual causes since January 1; Cholera, 25; typhus, 30; starvation, 45.

I examined all their communal warehouses and found a small amount of grain in one house, the others empty. They say they can get along until January 1 if they have the assurance of help after that time. They say the Government has promised help but they are afraid it can not give much relief.

Babaroff, Russian commune, about 10 miles southwest of Schilling, with a population of 2,800 people and an area of 3,100 dessiatines of land, 2,200 of which is plow land. They produced the following amount of foodstuffs, rye, wheat, oats, and potatoes during the past three years:

Years.	Dessiatines planted.	Yield.
1919	1,200	<i>Poods.</i> 48,060
1920	1,080	36,065
1921	1,100	4,160

The yield gave them a good surplus which they sold in 1919 and 1920, and they have some food carried over, but, say, after March 1 they will have nothing....

At Norga, admitted to be the richest commune in the Volga Valley for in the years of plenty they purchased 5,000 dessiatines and paid for them out of their communal earnings, a strong sturdy well-fed looking lot of men met us at the communal hall and presented to us the seriousness of the situation and the amount of food in hands. I examined their warehouses and found them as represented. They told me that entire families had died of starvation and that on one day they had buried eight. I counted as I went out more than 100 new-made graves.

I said to them "Will you tell me why it is in this commune that while the majority of you have enough to eat and a surplus to carry you for at least four months that you allow

your neighbors to die of starvation?" There was a tense silence for a few moments as the interpreter put the question; finally one strong-faced peasant slowly said "You Americans, living in a land of plenty, don't understand. It can not be helped; there is not enough to feed us all; it is necessary that some should die that others might live."

I could tell you stories of want, suffering, and death due to underfeeding and starvation. Of an old peasant found at Kazan last week along the roadside dead with a little dead child in his arms. Of another father at the same place without food, seeking, with three children, to enter a boat to go down the river, where he might find help, and when told but two of the children could go promptly threw the youngest in the river and boarded the boat, saying "If I can not go, all three must die; it is better that one should die and the others live," and they let him go his way. Of two young peasant girls we found on the outskirts of Barn, their parents dead of cholera four days before, and they with nothing to eat for four days but cabbage leaves and carrots eaten raw, poor, hungry looking, frightfully emaciated, half naked waifs shivering in the cold raw wind, and I could tell you of these things until you would be sick at heart, as I have been, but that does not help to solve the situation.

The Government records, the general condition as I found it, the typical communes I visited, and the facts I have been able to gather from every source show famine conditions far worse than in 1891, when over 200,000 perished, because this one follows six years of foreign and civil war—a condition that demands immediate and effective action if the saving of human life is worth while.

The work the American Relief Association is doing under Col. Haskell is wonderfully fine and efficient. He rapidly is perfecting a highly effective organization under very difficult conditions. This work will save the lives of many thousands of children and will not soon be forgotten by the people of Russia. If possible, the rations should be increased from 1,200,000 to at least 1,500,000, and this will by no means reach all.

Adult feeding should go hand in hand with it, if at all possible, and to that end the Soviet Government should be required to lay their cards on the table and tell you frankly what they can do, so that whatever outside help is given will only be to supplement theirs. Hospitals all over Russia are in great need, and Col. Haskell advises me that the American Relief Association is in a position to supply that need.

I had a long talk with Dr. Dagnoff, of the Renza Hospital, of 800 beds. He has but two thermometers in the hospital and is without the drugs so necessary to treat typhus and cholera, both of which are prevalent. He tells me 75 per cent of his patients die when, with proper treatment, less than 50 per should die. His best physician, underpaid and underfed, unable in his condition to stand the work, committed suicide the day before. There is a shortage of 40 per cent of doctors in Russia. At Kazan the hospitals are crowded with patients who are really hungry cases, need food and not medicine, and should be at a feeding station and not a hospital, but the American Relief Association is not now in a position to feed adults outside of hospitals. I was present at the conference with the officials and those in charge of the hospital at Kazan, and they were greatly pleased with the assurance that Col. Haskell gave them at that time that several carloads of supplies were on the way to relieve their distress.

Finally, our Government, through the Grain Corporation or some other organization, should furnish Russia enough hard spring wheat to enable them to sow the millions of dessiatines of land already plowed and ready for sowing in the spring. If this is done, then Russia's immediate famine question is settled for this year and next, and the American Relief Association and all other charitable organizations could and should withdraw from Russia not later than August, next year.

In every commune I visited I asked them the question, "Can you take care of yourself after next July?" and without the slightest hesitation they all answered "Yes." The governors of Kazan, Samara, Saratov, and Markstadt all confirmed this.

I am sending to you, under separate cover, some comments on the political situation, and also send you herewith a rather rough translation of an article that appeared in a Kazan paper the day we were there, and later on this week will forward to you some statistics concerning the famine situation.

J. P. Goodrich.

[TESTIMONY OF DR. VERNON KELLOGG]

DR. KELLOGG. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, in the light of the very full statement of Gov. Goodrich, a well documented statement, I can make my statement very brief indeed. I have been associated with American relief work in Europe for six years. I went into Belgium for Mr. Hoover and was director there for northern France and Belgium in parts of the years 1915 and 1916. I went to Poland immediately after the armistice as chief of Mr. Hoover's first food mission.

The little which I have to say may simply piece in with Gov. Goodrich's statement. It will be based especially on my competence to make some comparison of the present Russian food situation with the food shortage in other parts of Europe to which we have given some relief from America.

We can judge of the food situation in an alleged famine district by either of one or both of two methods. First, we can take the figures of production and consumption. Even in an office like this distant from the scene one can get an idea of what must be the situation of people from an examination of these statistics. For example, just to add one small set of figures to Gov. Goodrich's, in the Province or "Government" of Samara, on the Volga, in the very center of the famine district, statistics have been compiled by a bureau of statistics under the local government there, headed by an engineer, with whom I became acquainted; an intelligent man, and, apparently, an honest one.

In the prewar years, Samara produced an annual average of 120,000,000 poods of the four principal grains. In 1921, they produced 3,000,000 poods. That would be enough if it was spread out evenly among the people of the Province to keep them alive for about one and one-half months.

There is another way of judging the situation and that is to observe the actual conditions that exist among the people in the alleged famine region. In going from Moscow to the Volga—and I had the privilege of going in with the first American food train from Moscow to Kazan—one begins to get signs of the difficulties in the Volga region long before you come to it. Those signs are the so-called refugees, or the people fleeing in panic from the famine regions. They come along, long trainloads of them, coming to the East out of the famine region. These refugees make camps along the railways and rivers. In one camp on the Volga there were 22,000 men, women, and children. These refugee camps are made up of people who have found no food at home and have converted their household goods, as far as they could, into money and have fled, panic-stricken, trying to get away from the country. The Soviet Government is said to have evacuated nearly 500,000 of these people. It is sending large numbers of them out to Siberia and Turkestan, and to some of the northern Provinces, where the food shortage is not so acute. Now, the striking thing in the refugee camps or villages. In addition to the horrible sights of hunger and suffering in the camps, the striking thing to me, having had the opportunity to observe the food shortage in Belgium, Poland, and elsewhere, is that 50 per cent of the persons in those camps are farmers and their families. In Belgium we never fed a single farmer. In Poland the great mass of people fed by us were the poor people in the cities, the workless workmen without money to buy food, the men in industrial and mining sections. But these camps, half of the people fleeing because of lack of food, are the farmers, the food producers. Always in a country producing food, even a small amount of food, the producers have it and do not let loose of it unless there is enough to go further around. To me that was evidence enough in itself of the actual wiping out of the crops in that region.

Gov. Goodrich has touched on the attempts to care for the people in the local regions, particularly children. Mothers and fathers will die if they can keep the children alive. At Kazan and Samara and Saratov the officials of the local governments have made an attempt to establish local children's detention homes. There are 15 of them in Saratov and 15 in Kazan. They use buildings taken over without furniture, and the children are brought there, and what food the local governments can get hold of or the central government of Moscow sends in is given to those children. I was in one of those homes in Saratov at the time of the noon meal, when 200 children were sitting on the floor of a large bare room, ragged, all of them emaciated, mere skeletons, and some of them worse than skeletons, because they had the protuberant "hunger belly" that results from eating the moss and leaf and clay bread, which they cannot digest. In their meal they had a little horse meat and "kasha," a porridge of grain and seed grits. The peasants are killing their farm animals because they have not food to keep them alive; hence there is horse meat in the market. The kasha is made of hominy grits. I asked the women in charge if this was the regular meal. She said, "Yes; only the food does not always come. When it does this is what we have." I asked, "How about sleeping; what do you do for mattresses and blankets?" She said, "We have no blankets or mattresses; they sleep on the floor here in this room, lying down or sitting." When I told them that the food from America had begun to come and that they would have rice and sugar and milk and white bread tomorrow those women broke down.

The situation is simply incredible to one who has not seen it; indescribable even by one who has seen it. I have seen nothing like it in my six years of experience in the food shortage regions of Europe. In a given spot in Poland, for example, 200 children might be found in as bad condition, but that condition is the rule all through the Volga region, a region of great extent, with a vast population. There are at least 15,000,000 people in the famine region of the Volga, while around that famine region is a food-shortage region including 15,000,000 more. Senator Burton, there is not food enough in the surrounding region to keep the people alive, let alone any to send into the famine regions.

As Gov. Goodrich has pointed out, there is an agricultural breakdown in Russia which has been becoming more and more serious for the last two or three years. And then on top of this has come a terrible drought, extending over one of the three chief grain-producing regions of Russia; a region which under normal conditions produces food for Moscow and the industrial regions and even for export to other parts of Europe. That food is gone. It is simply a catastrophe.

The Soviet Government has tried to bring in food. It has been able to bring in only a very small amount. It has tried to bring in seed. I was there when the Government seed trains came down into the Volga and the seeds were parceled out to the farmers. The farmers took the seed and planted it. I talked with many of them and with many of the officials, and there was no one more optimistic in his statement than to say that they had more than one-fifth of their normal needs for planting. Still they can seed more thinly and thus seed more than one-fifth of a crop.

But the individual situation is that millions of people are out of food. I am confident I am telling the truth when I say millions of people are doomed to die in the Volga region unless relief on a large scale comes from outside. The American Relief Administration has paid attention simply to children. We have but limited resources. We do not want to talk politics. But when it comes to the saving of children it is difficult for me to make a distinction between starving children of Belgium, Poland, Russia, or even of America, if that catastrophe should come to us. The children have had nothing to do with the causes of the famine or the present conditions of Russia.

Russia Relief, pp. 24-30, 33-35.



SOVIET NOTE ON DEBTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

28 October 1921

The Soviet government attempted a major initiative which it hoped would bring badly needed economic assistance and obtain Allied diplomatic recognition. It was not successful, but the expression of a willingness even to discuss the debts of the former Imperial government indicates the extent to which the Soviet leaders felt the need for a diplomatic breakthrough and for economic assistance. It also reflects the beginnings of a shift to a foreign policy based on the developing view that general European revolution was not imminent.

NOTE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE R.S.F.S.R

TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY AND THE U.S.A.

The Conference of the Powers at Brussels, according to the Western Press, laid down as a condition for the offering to Russia of credits to help the famine-stricken populations, the recognition by the Russian Government of the debts of preceding Governments.

Up to the present the Russian Government has not been officially informed of the decisions of this Conference. Nevertheless, in view of the famine which afflicts masses of people, the Russian Government has resolved not to heed the niceties of diplomatic etiquette and feels that it is its duty at once to make known its point of view on the Brussels decision.

The English Premier, Mr. Lloyd George, in a speech in the British Parliament on August 16, described the proposal to take advantage of the famine to compel Russia to recognize the Tsarist debt as "diabolical." That did not prevent the Brussels Conference (well aware though it was that the extent of the famine makes it impossible for the Soviet Government to save from its own resources the smitten population) from laying down the recognition by the Soviet Government of the old debts as the condition for the opening of credits without which any adequate assistance to the famished people is impossible.

In drawing the attention of the working masses of all lands and of all citizens to whom the interests of humanity are dear to this conduct of the Brussels Conference, the Russian Government declares at the same time that the proposal to recognize the old debts under certain conditions corresponds with its own intentions at the moment. From the beginning of its existence the Soviet Government has proposed, as one of the principal aims of its policy, economic co-operation with the other Powers. It has always declared its intention of allowing a sufficient profit to foreign capitalists who would assist in developing the national wealth of Russia and in re-establishing its economic machinery.

At the present time in the speeches of the President of the United States and of British Ministers there occurs a constant repetition of the idea that three years after the end of the war there is still no real peace, that the misery of the masses is becoming more and more acute, that public debts are accumulating, and that ruin grows. Now, it is quite obvious that it is impossible to re-establish complete peace without Russia and its 130,000,000 inhabitants, that it is impossible to prevent economic collapse without the revival of Russia and that the question of the relations between Russia and other countries—a world problem of the first importance—cannot be settled except by agreement with the Soviet Government. From the point of view of the permanent interests and of the ever-present needs of all States and all peoples, the economic restoration of Russia is an absolute necessity not only for herself but for them.

The absence of economic relations with other countries makes the economic revival of Russia a very difficult task, for the accomplishment of which a much longer time will be required. The Workers' and Peasants' Government is better able than any other would be to carry out this task. The selfish interests of separate groups of capitalists do not prevent

them from working for the restoration of the national prosperity. The Workers' and Peasants' Government is guided by the interest of the masses, which is in the last analysis that of all society. Having as its aim the interests of all the working people of Russia, the Workers' and Peasants' Government, which has emerged victorious from unparalleled ordeals of civil war and foreign intervention, is offering private enterprise and capital the opportunity of co-operating with the power of the workers and peasants in the task of developing the natural wealth of Russia.

The Soviet Government has re-established private property and private enterprise in small business and concessions and leases in regard to big undertakings. It gives to foreign capital legal guarantees and a share of profits sufficient to satisfy its requirements and to induce it to take part in the economic work of Russia. In this way the Soviet Government aims at establishing economic agreements with all the Powers, for which purpose it is first of all absolutely essential that a definite peace shall be concluded between Russia and the other States.

In pursuit of this object the Soviet Government finds the way barred by the demand of the Powers for the recognition of the debt. The Soviet Government declares that it is firmly convinced that no people is obliged to pay those debts which are as chains riveted on it through long centuries. But in its unshakable determination to come to a full accord with the other Powers, the Russian Government is inclined to consent in this matter to several essential and highly-important concessions. In this it is meeting the wishes of the numerous small holders of Russian bonds (especially in France), for whom the recognition of the Tsarist debt is a matter of vital interest.

For these reasons the Russian Government declares itself ready to recognize the obligations towards other States and their citizens which arise from State loans concluded by the Tsarist Government before 1914, on the express condition that there shall be special conditions and facilities which will make it possible to carry out this undertaking. It follows automatically that the absolute condition of this recognition is that the great Powers undertake simultaneously to put an end entirely to every action which threatens either the security of the Soviet Republics and of the friendly Far Eastern Republic, or their sovereign rights or the inviolability of their frontiers; and that they undertake to observe scrupulously their sovereignty and territorial integrity. In other words, the Soviet Government cannot give the undertaking in question unless the Great Powers conclude with it a definite peace and recognize its Government.

For this purpose the Russian Government proposes as a matter of urgency the calling of an international conference to deal with the above questions, to examine the claims of the Powers against Russia and to draw up a definite treaty of peace between them. Only a conference of this kind can bring about a general pacification.

The approaching fourth anniversary of its existence will emphasize everywhere the fact that the efforts of all its enemies at home and abroad have only served to consolidate the position of the Workers' and Peasants' Government as the true defender and representative of the interests of the working masses of all Russia and of the independence of the country.

The new interventions planned against the Soviet Power, of which the reality is proved by numerous declarations of the influential organs in the Entente countries, will only again strengthen the indissoluble ties which bind the working masses of Russia to the Workers' and Peasants' Government, which represents their will. But the carrying out of these plans might again extend the sufferings of the working masses, and again delay the complete revival of Russia—striking, at the same time, a blow against the interests of all other nations.

The proposal which the Russian Government makes is the best proof of its desire for peace with all States and for economic relations which nothing can disturb. The carrying

out of this proposal harmonizes with the interests of all Governments and all peoples. The Russian Government expresses the sincere hope that this proposal will be speedily followed by the definite establishment of economic and political relations between Russia and other States.

G. Chicherin,
People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs.

Soviet Russia, Vol. 5, No. 6 (December 1921), pp. 260-261, with modifications.



WOMEN IN SOVIET RUSSIA—A REPORT

Fall 1921

A small group of women Bolsheviks struggled constantly to keep the issues confronting women on the agenda of the party in the face of general indifference. The Party leaders were in general sympathetic to the women but simply did not put a high priority on the questions which concerned them. Some thought that the issues were simply part of broader social problems of the transition from capitalism to socialism and hence did not require separate action. Many Party officials—probably most—continued to exhibit traditional pre-revolutionary Russian attitudes toward women. Here Kollontai attempted to explain the issues confronting women, the efforts of the party and especially of Zhenotdel, the Women's Department, to confront them, the contributions of women to the success of the revolution, and especially the role women could and should play in the construction of a new socialist society. "Without the vast mass of proletarian women on the labor front no effective success can be achieved." Despite real gains, however, some of her claims for the achievements of women in Soviet Russia must be read as declarations of intent rather than as accomplishments. Moreover, even as she argued for attention to the needs of women she was forced by official Party policy simultaneously to insist that "there is no separate women's movement in Russia." This was published as a pamphlet in late 1921 and immediately printed in English, with minor abridgement, in Soviet Russia.

Alexandra Kollontai

Peasant and Working Women in Soviet Russia

There is no separate woman's movement in Russia. The struggle for proletarian dictatorship and its realization, as well as all other endeavor tending toward the creation of the new commonwealth, is conducted by the proletariat of both sexes. Moreover, to insure the success of unified work and struggle, the Communist Party considers it imperative to add to its many problems the problem of enlisting all the active women in the constructive work of the Soviet State in the struggle against the enemies of the first Labor Republic of the world, in or outside of Soviet Russia.

At the dawn of the proletarian Revolution, in the spring of 1917, the Executive Committee of the Bolshevik Party began by publishing a special magazine entitled "The Working Women" in which the problem of the enfranchisement of the working women was fully considered. This organ served for agitation purposes among the working women and also helped to rally them under the banner of Bolshevism.

In the rosy period of bourgeois chauvinism and of the Kerensky administration, at the time when the poisonous flowers of "compromise" with the bourgeois government of Russia had not as yet faded away, the editorial board of the "Working Women" organized in June, 1917, an international meeting, as a protest against the bloody world war. This was done as a reply to the threat of military advance fostered by Kerensky. At this international meeting (the first public international meeting in Russia) an appeal was made to the solidarity of the workers of the world. During the period of the hardest struggle of the workers for Soviet Power in autumn 1917 and at the time of the menacing attacks of General Kornilov, the class conscious women followed the Bolsheviks, taking an active part in the Civil War. The vast masses of the working and peasant women, however, stood aloof from the movement. They remained passive, bearing the ever-growing burdens of economic dislocation, misery and suffering, all these being the inevitable consequences of the Civil War.

The October Revolution and the seizure of power by the workers conferred all economic, civil and political rights on women. This opened a new era, putting an end to the century-long inequality. Henceforth women were to enjoy in Soviet Russia equal opportunity in all phases of life, economic and social.

From the very first days of the October Revolution the Communist Party hastened to utilize the assistance of the Communist women and the support of all those working women who were in sympathy with the Soviet Government. Women began to be appointed as commissars and to carry out other responsible state work. Great responsibility and work of importance have been entrusted to them since then. One woman was, from the very beginning of the Soviet Government, a member of the Council of People's Commissars of Russia. The women generally learned to become active in the construction of the newly formed Soviet system. But apart from this, broad masses of women, especially the peasantry, were very antagonistic to the Soviet Government. They failed to realize that only through the power of the Soviets would women be emancipated. For example, the efforts of the Commissariat of Social Welfare to transform the Alexander-Nevsky Monastery into a home for invalids, were met with a storm of opposition. Together with the priests the women marched through the streets of Petrograd singing religious hymns and carrying ikons as a protest against this act.

The most counter-revolutionary utterances were heard chiefly at the food-distribution centres. This was due to a lack of understanding of the new order of government which inaugurated a new system of food distribution. The mechanism of food distribution at the beginning entailed waiting in long lines and the women, already exhausted by four years of capitalist war, and wearied by the high cost of living, lost patience and showed great discontent.

The doors of the Communist Party were wide open to the toiling women but the women stood aside. The laws afforded them full right to participate in the Soviets. Thus through the Soviets they were given the opportunity to improve conditions at large and their own life in particular. But, notwithstanding this, the vast mass of working and peasant women dreaded the Soviet Government. The Communists were regarded by them either as destroyers of order and tradition or as atheists who were intent on separating the Church from the State and on depriving the mothers of their children by giving them over to the State. The fears and discontent of the women, as well as their antagonism toward Communism, were prompted mainly by their suffering, hunger and other privations.

When, in the fall of 1918, the counter-revolutionists, aided by the Czecho-Slovaks, attempted to put an end to the Bolshevik power and to abolish the Soviet Government, the Communist Party realized the necessity of imparting to the proletarian women a feeling of class consciousness. Those women who stood aloof from the work of strengthening the Soviet power became more or less conspicuous factors in the counter-revolution. It was

deemed necessary by the Party and in the very interests of Communism to win the sympathy of the women and to recruit them into staunch supporters of the Soviet order. The general methods of Communist propaganda and agitation proved insufficient. The problem of approaching the poorest strata of the working and peasant women had to be solved in another manner. The conditions called for a method of political work which would practically instruct the women to make use of their rights and enlist them in the constructive work of a new labor state.

Methods of Organizing the Working Women

Thanks to the initiative of a small group of active women members of the Party and supported by the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party, the first All-Russian Congress of Proletarian Women was held in Moscow in November 1918. More than a thousand delegates elected by working and peasant women from all parts of Russia were gathered at this convention. Agitation was fostered, and a new line of political work among the working women was laid. With the guidance of the Communist Party it was decided to organize committees of propaganda among the women. These committees aimed at enlisting the proletarian women in the process of building up the Labor Republic and awakening their activity in the struggle to realize Communism. The efforts made by the committees to achieve this purpose received the full recognition of the Communist Party.

The method of these committees was to carry on propaganda not only by word of mouth, but chiefly by action, by deed and by practical work. The idea was to develop conscious and active Communists by setting the women to actual and constructive work in the Soviet institutions. This would make a practical change for the better in their conditions of life. With this view the committees created a special apparatus: regular conferences of working women's delegates which served as a means of contact between the proletarian women and the Party. Every shop and institution sends one delegate for every 25 to 50 women to the weekly delegates meeting. These delegates are elected for three months. At these meetings the delegates become acquainted with the current political events and the work of the departments which particularly relates to the emancipation of the women, such as education, public kitchens, protection of motherhood, etc. The delegates not only attend the meetings, but their activities also spread to various governmental institutions, such as the Committees for the Improvement of Labor Insurance, Motherhood Welfare, Inspection of Soviet Institutions, etc. They study the practical method and system of Government organization, being appointed, by a special law, to different Soviet departments for two months practice. As the work of the Party among the women expanded, it became necessary to strengthen its forces. In the autumn of 1919 the Party reorganized the Committee of the Working Women into special departments. At present there is a special women's department in every local district committee, as well as at the Central Executive Committee of the Party. The Women's Department does not confine its work merely to enrolling the women, but also encourages initiative in them to participate in the formation of the Communist order. The Central Working Women's Department has presented to the Party and the Soviets various practical measures which are intended to free the women from their drudgery.

Work of the Women's Department

Thanks to the initiative of the Department for Work Among the Women, a law was passed abolishing punishment for abortion. At the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets a resolution was passed calling upon women to actively work in the reconstruction of the economic system of production. This was followed by a provision including women in the various economic and administrative bodies which rule and conduct production in the Soviet State. A special committee for a nation-wide campaign against prostitution, as well as the organization of special committees to assist the work of protection of childhood and motherhood, was inaugurated by the initiative of the Women's Department.

Various other measures pertaining to the welfare of the working women were brought into life by the persistence of the Women's Department; thus for example special points protecting the health and interests of mothers were outlined in April 1920 when the compulsory labor law was worked out. In April 1921 the Council of People's Commissars passed a law worked out by the Women's Department which permits working women to be sent for two months to Soviet institutions with a view to training them into active workers and promoters of social welfare.

Women in the Construction of the Soviet State

During the two and half years of special work done by the Party to win the women for Communism great success has been achieved in paving the way of the Workers' Republic towards Communism. At present the passive and indifferent attitude on the part of the women toward the Soviets has totally vanished with the exception of some very obscure parts of Russia where the Party has not as yet organized strong Women's Departments. The membership of the women in the Party represents 9 or 10 per cent of the total membership.

Indirectly through their delegates the women are drawn into the big field of actual work for the formation of the State based on Communist principles. Thirteen provinces, according to the latest information, had about 110,556 women participating in the special Saturday Work (*subbotniki*), and about 4,459 worker and peasant women have been working in various Soviet institutions. Thus by having these women participate in the economic reconstruction of the country, as well as aiding the Red Army and the peasantry and taking an important part in the infant question, as for instance the "Child Welfare Week," etc., they take an active part in all the Party and Soviet campaigns. The Communist Party not only brings forth fresh workers to function in the Soviet organization, but educates them as conscious and staunch supporters of the Labor Republic and Communism.

Although from the very first days of the Revolution women have been elected to the Soviets, there were only individual cases where women were entrusted with important administrative work. Even at present the women are not adequately represented in the Soviets. In the 13 provinces previously spoken of, 635 members make an average of 53 in each province. The more characteristic fact is that there are 574 women members in the district Soviets and only about seven in the provincial Soviets. In the province of Moscow there are 1,500 members, and only 137 women. In Petrograd there are 340 women members, in Samara 30, in Kharkov 40, in Odessa 10. And still the number of women engaged in various government institutions has grown immensely within the last years. In ten industrial provinces 3,344 women now perform important and responsible work in various government offices. Out of the 704 delegates of the working women who have been sent to perform some practical work in different Soviet departments in the province of Moscow, 41 have become superintendents of various branches of work and 519 women have been delegated to work as students in different institutions. In Petrograd about 733 women are student workers and 4,660 do temporary work in the Soviet institutions. A very significant service to the government has been rendered by the women in the inspection of various institutions such as soup-kitchens, hospitals, children's homes and other institutions of the Social Welfare Department.

The women, owing to their vigilance, were able to detect many errors and the conscious abuse of the work on the part of numerous clerks and professionals of the former bourgeois class. The evil conduct of many of these workers has been ably disclosed by the women. As inspectors the women have shown remarkable ability. This accounts for the fact that there were about 25,000 women inspectors throughout Soviet Russia, according to the last reports of the Commissar of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. In twelve industrial provinces there were 3,436 women inspectors selected from the delegates of the working

women. In Petrograd about 50 women participated in the investigations of the hospital. According to the report of the Department of Health, women have played a great part in the improvement of hospital conditions of the Red Army by organizing sanitary units, by mending the linen of the soldiers and by taking careful notice of all the needs of the hospitals. They have also rendered great comfort to the wounded men by reading to them from papers, books, magazines, and by writing letters for them. All this has proved of great service to the suffering soldiers in the hospitals.

Women in Army Service

While rendering valuable service the country in their medical work, women also served the Republic faithfully and bravely when the Revolution was exposed to danger from attacks by the counter-revolutionaries. The history of the civil war for the past three years reveals episodes in which women have played a conspicuous part. In 1919, when the White Guards were besieging the District of the Don Basin and Lugansk, Denikin threatening Tula, and Yudenich was approaching Petrograd, the women, side by side with their male comrades, helped to smash the enemy forces. These women were determined to defend these cities to their last drop of blood. When Denikin was at Tula and threatening Moscow, the women resolved that he would gain entrance to the city "only over our dead bodies."

The heroism of the Petrograd women when Yudenich in 1919 was but a few miles from the city is well known. The energetic proletarian women not only sent 500 nurses to the front, but performed actual military service. They dug trenches in cold dreary weather, took an active part in machine gun companies and helped to put up barbed wire around the city of Petrograd. In the special detachments against deserters the women also proved to be very alert.

When the Workers' Republic was confronted with military invasion it had to resort to the active support of the women, contrary to the pretense of bourgeois society that "women's place is in the home."

The very thought of having women active in military affairs appears repugnant to bourgeois society. This society fears that it might tend to disrupt family ties and thereby undermine the functions of private ownership and class-rule.

Although during the imperialist war women were engaged in various kinds of war work throughout Europe, especially in England, this was not so much an actual government function as more or less a mere patriotic propaganda gesture.

The attitude towards the women who are called upon to render aid in the protection of the Workers' Republic regards the function of women in the army for the self-defence of the country as essential as their sharing equally the burden of the chief economic problems. Therefore woman's work in military affairs is called for not only by temporary military expedients, as in an imperialist war, but also for the safeguarding of vital interests. In the struggle during the transition period in Russia and in the interest of the New Proletarian State, it is the duty of every citizen not only to work, but also to perform military duties. The ability of each citizen is carefully considered in order to utilize it in the most essential manner. Women, because of the necessity of production, are not eliminated. The more extensive the support of the wide masses becomes, the more successfully the Red Army of workers and peasants protect the country. The women particularly should be as much concerned in the victory of the Red Army at the front as they are in the successful maintenance of the freedom granted them by the Soviet Government. The November Revolution, by abolishing inequality, proclaimed the women as equal citizens and accorded them all the rights of such. The contention of bourgeois society that women must be entirely dependent upon men has rapidly lost ground. Calling women to arms dispelled the last prejudices fostered by the bourgeoisie, reducing them to mere reminiscences of the past.

In 1917, when the first barricades for the class war were being erected, the women's part in the revolution became quite conspicuous. At the formation of the Red Guard, nurses' units were organized by women also. Voluntary groups to aid the brave fighters for the cause were instigated by the women.

However, the participation of women in war work has not been carried on according to a special plan. Only in 1918, when the Red Guard was transformed into the great Red Army, when the Workers' Republic called upon men and women equally to support the front, was a definite plan for the utilization of women's services outlined. At the very beginning, units of Communist Women were organized for the purpose of agitation and political work in the Army. A number of these political workers perished with their male comrades in the defence of the Proletarian Republic.

Communist women were also to be found as members of the Military Revolutionary Councils. In the political branches of the Army a great organizing ability of the women has been discovered, as shown by the brilliant talented organizer Comrade Varsenica Kasparova.

Up to the present the number of women who have been actually performing military duties is not very great. But the militia system tends to bring about a fundamental change in the matter of extending the universal military training to the women. It will cause the women's military forces to become well organized. With the development of the new military machinery all the young women from the ages of 16 to 18 are obliged to drill equally with the young men. Those under military age attend special courses for physical training and preliminary military drill. Universal military training has existed since June 1920. Since then in Moscow alone, over 1,000 women have had regular military training, while about 5,000 more are drilling at present.

Furthermore, the women have shown themselves very efficient in the medical units of the Red Army. Their heroism and self-sacrifice have been proved by their noble deeds. In 1919, special courses for Red Nurses were formed and over 6,000 obtained nurses' certificates.

The following table shows the number of working and peasant women who completed these courses:

Year	No. of Red Nurses			
	throughout Russia	In Moscow	No. of attendants	In Moscow
1919	1,264	280	1,005	440
1920	2,442	***	1,193	447
	<hr/> 3,706	<hr/> 280	<hr/> 2,198	<hr/> 887

The working and peasant women have been the life of this work. They served as an inspiration to the soldiers, whom they regarded as comrades, not merely as our "poor soldier boys" as they were considered by the bourgeois lady-nurses. This comradely attitude plays a great part in the present struggle of Soviet Russia.

In the summer of 1921 the first graduation from the military courses for women in Petrograd took place. Besides the military training, special courses for women's field telephone and telegraph service have been founded. The last graduation in Samara and Simbrisk in 1920 supplied active workers for the southern and southwestern fronts.

The military training conducted all over the country is for the purpose of creating strong reserve forces to guard the country against enemies.

So far the women have responded splendidly to every call issued by the Red Front during the past three years. The industrial centres have been especially responsive, having sent many women to the front. The proletarian women, owing to their class-consciousness, feel the strong ties between themselves, as free citizens of the Republic, and the success of the Red Army on the battlefield. While on the firing line women have faced danger fearlessly during the defensive war and have shown unusual heroism and bravery, which has been noted by Chief Army Headquarters.

According to the statement issued by the latter, about 1,854 women in the Red Army have been killed or wounded. A number of them have been taken prisoners of war, while a great many, such as physicians, nurses, members of machine gun corps, have been decorated with the Order of the Red Flag.

Women and Public Dining Rooms

In the organization and supervision of public dining rooms, women have done enormous work. Particular attention has been paid by them to the children's dining rooms. The women delegates do actual duty in these places, as for instance, in Kiev and in the province of Moscow. Through the energy and the initiative of the women delegates, dining rooms have been opened at many factories and shops.

In the principal cities of Russia, practically all the populations is being fed at the public dining rooms. Thus the idea of relieving the women of their daily drudgeries is becoming more and more nearly realized. While no bourgeois government ever took steps towards freeing women from the humdrum of their daily existence, the Workers' Republic in three and one half years of revolution has already accomplished a good deal toward this end.

Child Welfare and the New Education

One of the problems nearest to the heart of the working women is that of child welfare and the new methods of education, which accounts for their active interest in this work. Special training courses for women attendants, instructors and organizers of nurseries exist not only in the principal cities, but in many small towns of Russia. To all these schools the working women delegates are being sent. The working women delegates are sent to nurseries, kindergartens, children's homes, etc., to help organize and improve these institutions. Under the guidance of the Communist women, a new atmosphere of child education along Communist lines is created. The old forms of benevolent institutions for the "poor orphans," such as existed under the bourgeois rule, have been entirely abolished. It is true that the lack of clothing, regular food supply, books, stationery, etc., serves as a great obstacle in transforming these institutions into model establishments. Nevertheless the Communist women, thanks to their energy, have succeeded in awakening the interest of the working women in the children's homes and nurseries; through the efforts and invaluable energy of Communist women, such as Comrades Nikolayeva, Lilina, Elisarova, Dashen and many others, this great but difficult work is developing rapidly.

Comrade Krupskaya (Ulianova-Lenin) and Menshinsky are the initiators of the system of uniform labor schools.

Protection of Motherhood

The Women's Department keeps also in close contact with the Department of Child and Motherhood Welfare. The function of this committee is to enforce all the decrees pertaining to the welfare of motherhood which have been passed in the Soviet Republic. Owing to various circumstances, especially to the hard economic conditions brought about by the war, these laws have not been enforced as widely as necessary. These committees, under the supervision of the Women's Department, carry on a propaganda to protect mothers. Thus the working women themselves, becoming acquainted with the principal laws of

safety in working conditions for pregnant and nursing mothers, assist in putting these laws into effect. Although since the revolution the principle of equal pay for equal work has been instituted, in reality the wages of most of the women are far lower than those of the men. As woman's skill in labor is not so highly developed as man's, women are therefore generally put into a lower wage category. Apparently little has been done to improve most unhealthy surroundings, which react harmfully upon the physical condition of the women. The Mothers' Welfare Committee must be on guard against all these evils. The committee enlists the cooperation of the working women in its task of putting into effect decrees pertaining to the safety of labor for women. Guided by the committee, the working women are on the lookout for pregnant working women; they improve sanitary conditions by installing wash stands, help organize public dining rooms in the workshops, etc.

In Ukraine, the women under the guidance of Comrade Moirova, are doing splendid work along these lines. They organize in all enterprises little units for the protection of motherhood. There the working women are to be found at the head of many institutions: nurseries, kindergartens, children's homes, homes for mothers, etc.

The introduction of nurseries, so far, extends chiefly to the working women in the towns, it has rarely penetrated into the villages. The latter have but a few summer nurseries, which are especially needed during the season of field work. Nevertheless, this problem will be solved successfully upon the material improvement of the general conditions in the country.

Abolition of Illiteracy

The working women have aided greatly in the campaign against illiteracy, having been called upon by the Women's Department of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party to help in this work. At present in a good many provinces women delegates are engaged in inspecting, organizing and instructing in the schools. A good number of them are studying the principles of education.

The educational problem was very broadly discussed at all the women's conferences during the past few years. To solve the problem more successfully, the proletarian women on their own account have taken census of the illiterate female population, as the women of Yekaterinburg have done

Women in the Law Courts

Women are also to be found in the courts of Russia in the capacity of jurors or judges. This has been especially popular among the oriental women of Russia. They have been living in domestic slavery for centuries and are still oppressed by the heavy religious yoke. Now having been proclaimed free citizens by the laws of Soviet Russia they are entering upon a new life. They have begun to take an active part in the social life, having chosen the law courts as the first support for their freedom. The women of Bashkiria and Turkestan are already performing judiciary functions.

Working Women in the Schools

The Women's Department, in their search for the most essential utilization of women's working power, selects a number of women who are detailed to different schools.

The special attention of the working women is called to the courses of study on the "Protection of Childhood and Motherhood." The head of the National Department for the Protection of Childhood and Motherhood, Comrade Lebedeva, has organized these courses very ably and has succeeded in raising the general standard of this work, as well as of the training for Red Nurses and attendants.

The working women are also directed by the Women's Department to different Party Schools in which they form 10 per cent of the total attendance. In 1920, through the Women's Department, 3,484 working and peasant women have been sent to party schools in 10 provinces.

At the Sverdlov University—the chief party school—a special section for the study of political work among women has been established.

Literary Propaganda among the Women

Besides these schools, meetings and other methods of oral propaganda, the Women's Department also conducts an extensive literary propaganda. Seventy-four weekly papers issue a special page each week devoted to the women question.

Besides this, the Central Women's Department issues a weekly bulletin in which are published all instructions issued by the section, programs for work with delegates, theses for agitation work and various information dealing with the working women's movement. The Central Women's Department also publishes a monthly, "Communist Women" with a circulation of 30,000 copies.

The special literary committee of the Central Women's Department supervises the issue of special literature, such as pamphlets, leaflets, etc., on questions dealing with the working women's movement. For the past half year over 400,000 copies of pamphlets dealing with problems concerning party work among the women have been issued by the Women's Department. The report of the First International Communist Women's Conference has also made its appearance recently.

Women and the Problems of Production

At the present time, when the Workers' Republic is faced with the problem of constructing a new economic system of production along Communist lines, there arises the necessity of having women share the responsibility for this work. The new form of the organization of labor is based on:

- 1) A precise registration and efficient distribution of all the labor forces of the Republic—women included.
- 2) Collective instead of individual housekeeping.
- 3) Reconstruction of the social standard of life on a new communist basis, so as to enable the women to contribute the whole amount of their labor to the production of common goods.

The appeal to both sexes for equal participation in the productive activity of the Labor State greatly alters the mutual relations of men and women. The dependence of woman upon her master and bread-giver, her husband, is rapidly vanishing. At present, the mighty Workers' Republic of Soviet Russia is the only bread-giver equally to men and women. "Those who work shall eat." The successful development of the new Commonwealth based on Communism helps the women to gain more and more of a foothold in all phases of work. Since masses of men have been called to arms, women have entered all branches of state and industrial work. According to the information issued by the National Council of Trade Unions, women form a majority in many industries.

WOMEN IN THE TRADE UNIONS

Unions	Membership	Percentage of Women
Food Workers	230,000	...
Public feeding workers	100,000	74.5
White goods workers	140,000	74.2
Tobacco workers	30,000	73.5
Artists	250,000	71.4
Hospital and dispensary workers	300,000	62.6
Textile workers	335,000	58.8
Domestic workers	...	53.2
Government employees	800,000	40.0

Glass and porcelain workers	35,000	39.8
Printers	60,000	39.2
Art workers	80,000	37.3
Stationary workers	22,000	37.1
Chemical workers	130,000	31.0
Agricultural workers	200,000	25.0
Workers on communal farms	178 000	24.8
Metal workers	500,000	24.7
Transport workers	100,000	23.3
Leather workers	150,000	21.6
Miners	275,000	18.0
Woodworkers	100,000	14.9
Water transport workers	200,000	14.5
Railroad workers	1,000,000	14.2

There are but few industries in which women are not represented. But although the women are predominant in many industries, their representation in factory administration committees is still very limited. For example, in the executive administrative bodies of the textile industry in 38 provinces there are about ten women members out of a total of 194, with the exception of Kostroma, where women are in the majority on the board of management of the Unions.

Results

Without the vast mass of proletarian women on the labor front no effective success can be achieved. Nor is the full emancipation of ten million workers easily attained unless it is on a Communist basis. It is not actually possible to form the machinery of the new commonwealth without the help of women.

The Great Change

The great change brought about by the October Revolution has shown the workers the true light. The strain which they are bearing in this period of civil war has strengthened the will of the workers of both sexes. They now follow the great slogan of Karl Marx. "The workers shall gain their freedom by their own efforts." The working women in the cities, as soon as they became conscious of their rights, readily linked up their chances for the future with those of Communism. But the awakening of the peasant women is coming much more slowly. Therefore it is the duty of the Party to find a way to arouse the class consciousness of the peasant women.

A great event is also taking place in Soviet Russia: the awakening of the Moslem women. In all the Eastern Republics of Soviet Russia, populated by Moslems, the Women's Department is conducting very vital work. A great effort is made to rally these women to the banners of the Soviet Republics and Communism. Large conferences of working women have been held all over Eastern Russia; preparations for the First All-Russian Congress are in progress. A conference of Eastern women Communists has recently taken place in Moscow. Communist women of Bashkiria, Kirgisia, Tataria, etc., dressed in their national costumes, but their faces covered by the veil prescribed by the Moslem religion, came to Moscow to their convention.

The Women's Department has also begun to work amongst the intellectual working women such as teachers, writers, medical and telephone workers.

The enormously difficult work done by the Women's Department may be reviewed with joy and gratitude. Through the efforts of this Department the women have been drawn to all kinds of constructive social and state work and have become fully conscious of their citizen rights. We find the working or peasant woman engaged at various responsible tasks.

She is at the head of a department, she acts as a commissar, she organizes public dining rooms, or directs the social care of children. She is represented in all phases of activity for the welfare of the State. She forms a part of the machinery of the new commonwealth. Her interest in the work is greatly inspired by her duties as an equal citizen with man. The class-consciousness of women has grown immensely in these three years of social revolution. Women's power of organization has expanded immensely, assuming a real mass character. It has become self-evident that without the cooperation of the proletarian women in the Workers' Republic, the solution of its many problems is impossible.

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THE AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT

22 November 1921

One of the Party's recurring problems was how to get its policies clearly explained to the population—and even to Party members. The evidence of widespread popular discontent in late 1920 and early 1921 and the need to explain NEP made this even more pressing. The solution was the Agitation and Propaganda Section of the Central Committee. "Agitprop" became one of the most ubiquitous features of the Soviet Union.

ON THE AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA SECTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

1. The Agitation and Propaganda Section of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) is organized as a part of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and is the agency with whose help the Central Committee organizes, unifies, and directs all verbal and printed agitation and propaganda work of the RKP(b).
2. To carry out the above-named tasks, the Agitation and Propaganda Section consists of four subsections: agitation, propaganda, press, and national minorities.

THE AGITATION SUBSECTION

3. The task of the Agitation Subsection is to:
 - a. provide overall direction of the political and production agitation work of local party bodies and party supervision over the agitation work of the appropriate soviet and trade union institutions;
 - b. study, on the basis of the experience of local party organizations, the methods, means, and forms of agitation, and to work out questions of agitation technique.
4. The Agitation Subsection consists of three branches: political agitation (political campaigns), production agitation, and agitation techniques.
5. The Political Agitation Branch works out and prepares agitational directives and instructions in the form of theses, slogans, and plans both for current, planned political work, and for crash political campaigns. Apart from regularly disseminating circularized instructions and incidental instructions, this branch works in closest co-operation with the Press Subsection in the sphere of printed agitation.
6. The Production Agitation Branch has the responsibility of organizing—through party committees and in liaison with the Cultural Department of the All-Russian Central Council

of Trade Unions and central committees of the trade unions—production agitation of both a regularly planned sort and of the sort that consists in seasonal and crash campaigns.

7. The Agitation Techniques Branch collects information on the methods, forms, and apparatuses of agitation, sums up accumulated experience, and elucidates new methods for bringing agitation closer to the broad masses.

THE PROPAGANDA SUBSECTION

8. The task of the Propaganda Subsection is:

a. to organize, unify, and direct all propaganda work within the RKP(b) by means of regular instructions to the guberniia committees;

b. to take account of and systematize party propaganda experience at the local level and to work out, on this basis, new forms and methods of propaganda;

c. to elaborate questions of methodology in party propaganda;

d. to exercise party control over the work of the Propaganda Department of Main Political Education Administration by means of coordinating with this body decisions on questions of principle in all areas of propaganda work; by reviewing programmes for all types of propaganda work, by reviewing study curriculums, the projects of the network of cultural and educational institutions, and by reviewing guides and study aids for special political subjects;

e. to participate in the work of the Accounts and Assignments Section of the Central Committee as it relates to reporting and assignment of the RKP(b)'s propaganda forces.

9. The Propaganda Subsection consists of three branches: intra-party propaganda, schools, and methodology.

10. The Intra-party Propaganda Branch prepares theses and the summaries of reports for party meetings on various topics relevant to the present moment; it works out the plan for current propaganda work in cells, circles, and sections of party organizations and draws up the corresponding theses and summaries; it takes account of, systematizes, and studies the experience of propaganda work at the local level and draws up letters of instruction to guberniia party committees on questions of propaganda work.

11. The School Section participates in the drawing up, review, and confirmation of the curriculum and programme of the Institute of Red Professors and of the courses for the study of marxism and oversees their fulfillment; it reviews the programmes of the socio-political cycle of the higher educational institutions, the higher technical schools, and the central educational institutions subordinate to the various people's commissariats, and presents its conclusions on these programmes; it works out, in conjunction with the Studies and Programme Department of the Main Political Education Administration, the programme of the soviet party schools and oversees the assignment of lecturers.

12. The Methods Branch oversees the methodological work of the Propaganda Department of the Main Political Education Administration and of other institutions of the People's Commissariat of Education in the club, library, and school areas.

THE PRESS SUBSECTION

13. It is the task of this subsection:

a. to exercise overall direction over the Russian republic provincial press and party supervision over the work of the Main Political Education Administration's Press Department;

b. to plan the current tasks of the press in the sphere of agitation and propaganda and to give direction to the work of the press in accordance with the overall political and economic tasks of the party;

c. to review and work out together with the Russian republic Main Political Education Administration the general state publishing plan for press organs;

d. to unify the publishing work of the Central Committee and to direct the publishing activities of local party organizations;

- e. to participate in the work of the Accounts and Assignments Section of the Central Committee relating to reporting and assignment for Communist journalists;
- f. to distribute literature for party committee libraries.
- 14. The Press Subsection consists of three branches: instruction, publishing, and distribution of literature.
- 15. The Instruction Branch gives direct instruction on editions intended for party members, jointly prepares with the Agitation Subsection the plan for regular, periodic press campaigns, and directs the work of the press in accordance with the general directives of the Central Committee.
- 16. The Publishing Branch unites all the publishing activities of the Central Committee and its sections, directs the work of local party organizations in the area of press activities, and establishes close ties with the State Publishing House, the Main State Paper Industry Administration, the printing section, and the editorial and publishing sections of the central institutions and organizations.
- 17. The Literature Distribution Branch is concerned with prompt and regular supplying of oblast, guberniia, and uезд party committee libraries with all the literature that appears on socio-political questions.
- 18. For the maintenance of close ties with the Press Section of the Russian republic Main Political Education Administration and for the purpose of giving direction to its work, there are to be regular meetings of the head of the Agitation and Propaganda Section, the head of the Press Subsection, and a responsible executive of the Russian republic Main Political Education Administration.
- 19. The Agitation and Propaganda Section of the Central Committee directs the instructors' journal *Zhurnal'st* (Journalist) and *Agit-Rost* (Main Political Education Administration Agitator), published by the Russian republic Main Political Education Administration, by appointing persons of its choice as editors of the press organs in questions.

THE NATIONAL MINORITIES SUBSECTION

- 20. It is the task of the National Minorities Subsection:
 - a. to unify and direct agitation and propaganda in the native language of the national minorities among those groups who are outside their autonomous oblast or republic or who have no such national territory within the Russian republic;
 - b. to work out and place before the Central Committee, questions of party construction resulting from the particular everyday and cultural conditions in which these national minorities live;
 - c. to investigate the most rational methods of party agitation and propaganda among the people of the national minorities, as well as to collect and work up the material necessary for this purpose;
 - d. to participate in the work of the Accounts and Assignments Section of the Central Committee as concerns reporting and assignments for national minorities staff;
 - e. to issue instructions to the guberniia national minorities subsections.
- 21. The National Minorities Subsection consists of the following departments: Jewish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Mari, Mordvinian, German, Polish, Finnish, Chuvash, and Estonian.
- 22. The Mari, Chuvash, Mordvinian, and Lithuanian departments are headed by secretaries.
- 23. The Jewish, Latvian, German, Polish, Finnish, and Estonia departments are headed by bureaus composed of a secretary and two members.
- 24. The secretaries or bureaus of the departments are appointed by the Central Committee from among the candidates recommended by a conference or meeting of staff workers of the local sections.
- 25. The Central Committee's National Minorities Subsection convenes regular meetings of the secretaries of the departments in order to coordinate the work of the departments and

to inform the departments about the measures being taken by the Central Committee's Agitation and Propaganda Section.

26. Meetings of staff workers at the local level and conferences of communists of the nationalities in question are convened only by resolution of the Central Committee.

McNeal/Gregor, pp. 144-148.



COMINTERN THESES ON THE UNITED FRONT

18 December 1921

The fading prospects for world revolution in the near future and the difficult economic situation in Russia led to a change of policy for the Comintern, the "united front" tactic. Although the first hints of it could be found at the Third Congress of the Comintern the previous summer, not until December was it formally and clearly enunciated. Moreover, it took the form of a directive from the Comintern's Executive Committee (ECCI), which was itself a sharp break with past practice and a sign of the growing central control of the Comintern. Such centrally ordered reversals became a feature of the Comintern in later years, but at this time it provoked opposition before being affirmed at the Fourth Congress in late 1922. The theses, while calling for cooperation with other socialists, also retained a high level of hostility toward them. Unity was seen as a temporary measure until complete Communist victory was attained. "Second, 2 1/2 and Amsterdam Internationals" refers to competing, non-Communist, socialist internationals.

THESES

ON THE UNITED FRONT OF THE PROLETARIAT AND ON RELATIONS TO THE WORKER ADHERING TO THE SECOND, 2 1/2 AND AMSTERDAM INTERNATIONALS AND TO THE WORKERS SUPPORTING THE ANARCHO-SYNDICALIST ORGANIZATIONS

1. At the present time the international labor movement is going through a unique period of transition which raises new, important tactical problems for the Communist International and its various sections.

This period is in the main characterized by the following phenomena. *The world economic crisis is growing worse; unemployment is increasing. In almost every country international capital has gone over to a systematic offensive against the workers, which manifests itself in open attempts of the capitalists to reduce wages and the entire standard of life of the workers. The bankruptcy of the Treaty of Versailles is becoming more and more apparent to the laboring masses. Washington has clearly shown the unavoidability of a new imperialist war or even of many such wars, if the international proletariat does not overthrow the bourgeois governments.*

2. Under the pressure of reality the revival of reformist illusions in the masses, which arose in connection with a number of other circumstances, is beginning to make way for another spirit. The "democratic" and reformist illusions of the working class which arose again after the end of the imperialistic butchery (on the one hand the "aristocracy of labor," on the other, the most backward and politically least experienced workers) are beginning to fade before they really attain full bloom. The proceedings and the conclusion of the

further "labors" of the Washington Conference will shake these illusions even more severely. If six months ago one could speak with a certain justice of a general swing to the right of the laboring masses in Europe and in America, there can to-day be no doubt of the *beginning* of a shift to the left.

3. Furthermore, under the pressure of the increasing attacks of capital, there has grown among the workers a spontaneous *striving for unity* which is literally not to be restrained and which goes hand in hand with a gradual increase of the confidence of the laboring masses in the Communists.

Ever-increasing numbers of workers are now beginning correctly to appreciate the courage of the Communist vanguard, which charged into battle for the interests of the working-class at a time when the whole immense mass of workers remained indifferent or were even hostile to Communism. Ever growing groups of workers are now convincing themselves that only the Communists have defended their economic and political interests under the most difficult circumstances and sometimes at the greatest of sacrifices. The respect for and the confidence in the uncompromising Communist vanguard of the working-class are again beginning to grow since even the more backward workers have realized and understood the uselessness of reformist hopes and that the only salvation from the marauding attacks of capitalism is the fight against capitalism.

4. The Communist Party can and should now reap the fruits of the battle it then carried on in the very unfavorable environment of the masses' indifference. But while the masses are being permeated by ever greater confidence in the uncompromising, courageous elements of the working-class, the Communists, they manifest, as whole, an unprecedented desire for unity. The strata of the workers with less political experience, now awakening to activity, are dreaming of the union of all workers' parties and even of all workers' organizations and hope to increase their power of resistance to capital in this manner. New masses of workers, which often took no active part in political struggles before, are now beginning to test the practical plans of reformists on the basis of their own experience. Together with these new masses other important masses of workers which belonged to the old Social Democratic parties are no longer satisfied with the campaign of the Social Democrats and Centrists against the Communist vanguard and are beginning to demand the coming to an understanding with the Communists.

But they have not yet lost their faith in the reformists and considerable masses of workers still support the parties of the Second and Amsterdam Internationals. These masses do not formulate their plans and desires clearly enough, but on the whole the new feeling in the masses can be traced back to the desire for the establishment of the united front and to the attempt to cause the parties and unions of the Second and Amsterdam Internationals to join with the Communists in the battle against the capitalist offensive. *Up to this point* this movement is a progressive one. In the present general situation of the working-class, any serious mass-action, even when it only is a fight for immediate demands, will unavoidably bring up for consideration general and fundamental questions of the revolution. The Communist vanguard can only win when new great masses of workers convince themselves by their own experiences of the illusoriness of reformism and of the inevitable fate of compromise.

5. In the initial period of the rise of a conscious and organized protest against the treason of the leaders of the Second International these latter had the entire apparatus of the organization of the workers in their hands. They utilized the principles of unity and of proletarian discipline in order to ruthlessly suppress the revolutionary proletarian protest and to place the entire power of the organization of the working-class at the service of national imperialism without opposition. Under these circumstances the revolutionary wing was compelled to obtain for itself at any price freedom of agitation and propaganda that is, freedom to bring home to the workers the historically unprecedented betrayal of the workers by their own parties, a betrayal which they are still committing.

6. After having assured for themselves complete freedom of *intellectual influence* on the proletarian masses, the Communist parties of all countries are now aiming to attain a more comprehensive and more complete unity of these masses for practical action. The Amsterdamers and the heroes of the Second International preach this unity but in practice sabotage it. After the failure of the attempt of the Amsterdam compromisers to suppress the voices of protest and of revolutionary appeal, they are now seeking the way out of the blind alley for which they are themselves to blame by the *introduction of splits*, of disorganization and of organized sabotage of the fight of the working masses. It is one of the most important tasks of the Communist Party to expose *in flagrante* these new forms of the old treason.

7. Profound inner processes, which have begun to develop in connection with the new economic situation of the working-class in Europe and America, compel the diplomats and leaders of the Second, 2 1/2 and Amsterdam International, however, to emphasize the question of unity on their part as well. Although the slogan of the united front really is the manifestation of the sincere desire of the board masses of the inexperienced workers, now awakening to a new, conscious life, the setting up of the unity slogan is for the bureaucrats and diplomats of the Second, 2 1/2 and Amsterdam Internationals a new attempt to deceive the workers and in a new way to lead them back to the old path of collaboration of the classes. The nearing danger of a new imperialist war (Washington), the increase of armaments, the new imperialist secret treaties concluded behind closed doors—all that does not cause the leaders of the Second, 2 1/2 and Amsterdam Internationals to sound the alarm and to support the international unity of the working-class in word as well in deed. On the contrary, the same dissensions and divisions inevitably arise in the Second and Amsterdam Internationals as appear in the camp of the international bourgeoisie. This phenomenon is inevitable because the solidarity of the reformist "Socialists" with the bourgeoisie of "their" own country is the cornerstone of reformism.

These are the general conditions under which the Communist International and its various sections must formulate their attitude to the slogan of the united Socialist front.

8. In view of this situation, the Executive of the Communist International is of the opinion that the slogans of the Third World Congress of the Communist movement as a whole demand *the support of the slogan of the united front of the working-class* by the Communist parties and by the Communist International as a whole and require that they take over the initiative in this question. In this connection the tactics of the Communist parties must be made to conform with the conditions in the various countries.

9. In *Germany* the Communist Party at its last National Conference gave its support to the slogan of the united front of the workers and declared it to be within the realm of possibility for the Communist Party to support a "united working-class government," which would in some degree be disposed to take up arms against the power of the capitalists. The Executive of the Communist International considers this decision as absolutely correct and is convinced that the K.P.D. can make its way into the great masses without giving up its independent political position. In Germany more than in any other country the masses will, with every day, be more and more convinced how right the Communist vanguard was when it refused to lay down its arms in the most difficult period and stubbornly emphasized the uselessness of the proposed employment of reformist remedies in a crisis which can only be gotten rid of by the proletarian revolution. By following this line of tactics, the Party will in time group around its banner all the revolutionary Anarchist and Syndicalist elements which today refuse to join in the mass-struggle.

10. In *France* the Communist Party has the majority of the politically organized workers in its ranks. As a result the question of the united front is of somewhat a different nature in France than in the other countries. But here as well it is necessary to make the entire responsibility for the split of the united battle front of the working-class fall on the shoulders of our enemies. The revolutionary section of the French Syndicalists is justifiably

carrying on the fight against the split of the trade unions, that is, the fight for the unity of the working-class in the economic struggle against the bourgeoisie. Unity is also necessary in view of the rise of the reactionary wave and imperialist policies, etc. The policy of the reformists and centrists led to the split in the party and today also threatens the unity of the trade union movement, by which it will only be demonstrated that Jouhaux as well as Longuet serves the cause of the bourgeoisie. The slogan of the unity of the proletariat in the economic as well as the political struggle against the bourgeoisie remains the best means of thwarting the plans for a split.

However much the reformist C.G.T., led by Jouhaux, Merrheim and Co, may betray the interests of the French working-class, the French Communists and the revolutionary elements of the French working-class must nevertheless before the beginning of every mass strike or any other revolutionary mass action propose to the reformists that they support these actions of the workers and must systematically expose the reformists when they refuse to support the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat. In this way we will most easily win the non-party working masses. Of course, this should under no circumstances cause the Communist Party to limit its independence, as for example, during the election campaigns in any way supporting the "Left Bloc," or the toleration of those vacillating Communists who still bewail the split from the Social Patriots.

11. In *England* the reformist Labour Party has refused admission to the Communist Party. Under the influence of the growth of the above-mentioned sentiments [for unity] among the workers, the London Labour Councils have recently supported for the acceptance of the Communist Party of Great Britain in the Labour Party.

Of course, England is in this connection an exception since, as a result of unique conditions, the Labour Party is in England a sort of general organization of the workers of the whole country. It is the duty of the English Communists to begin an energetic campaign for their entrance into the Labour Party. The recent treason of the trade union leaders during the coal strike and the systematic attack of the capitalists upon the wage of the workers have brought about a profound fermentation among the masses of the English proletariat, now becoming more and more revolutionary. The English Communists should, at any price, make the greatest efforts to obtain contact with the working masses by means of the slogan of the revolutionary united front against the capitalists.

12. In *Italy* the young Communist Party, which was most uncompromisingly opposed to the reformist Italian Socialist Party and the social-traitor Confederation of Labor, which recently completed their betrayal of the proletarian revolution, has nevertheless now begun to carry on its agitation under the slogan of the united front of the working class against the capitalist offensive. The Executive of the Communist International thoroughly approves this agitation of the Italian Communists and only demands its strengthening in the same direction. The Executive of the Communist International is convinced that the Italian Communist Party, with sufficient far-sightedness, can show the entire International a fine example of courageous Marxism, which ruthlessly exposes at every step the half-way measures and treason of the reformists and centrists who have wrapped themselves in the cloak of Communism, and can *at the same time* carry on a tireless, ever-widening campaign for the united front of the proletariat against the capitalists which will penetrate to the broadest masses of the workers.

In this connection the Party must of course do all in its power to draw the revolutionary Anarchist and Syndicalist elements into the common struggle.

13. In *Czecho-Slovakia*, where the Communist Party has the support of the majority of the politically organized workers, the task of the Communists is in several ways analogous to those of the French Communists. Securing their independence and breaking the last organic bands with the Centrists, the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia must, at the same time, popularize the slogan of the united front of the workers against the bourgeoisie in their country and thus finally expose before the less advanced workers the leaders

of the Social Democrats and the Centrists, who are really agents of capitalism. At the same time the Communists of Czecho-Slovakia must intensify their work in the conquest of the trade unions which are still in large degree in the hands of yellow leaders.

14. In *Sweden*, after the recent Parliamentary elections, a situation has arisen in which the small Communist fraction can play an important role. One of the most prominent leaders of the Second International, Mr. Branting, who at the same time is Premier of the Swedish bourgeoisie, is at the present in such a situation that in the formation of his Parliamentary majority the attitude of the small Communist fraction is of some importance. The Executive of the Communist International believes that under certain circumstances the Communist fraction of the Swedish Parliament should not refuse to support the Menshevik Branting ministry, as the German Communists have correctly done in several of the provincial governments of Germany (Thuringia, and Saxony). However, that does not at all mean that the Swedish Communists should in any way limit their independence or renounce the exposure of the nature of the Menshevik government. On the contrary, the more power the Mensheviks possess, the more will they commit treason against the working-class and the greater the efforts the Communists must make to expose the Mensheviks before the great masses of the workers.

15. In *America* the uniting of all the left elements in the trade union and political movement is beginning, which affords the Communists the opportunity of penetrating into the great masses of the American proletariat, while assuming the central position in this left organization. Building Communist organizations wherever there are a few Communists, the American Communists must at the same time stand at the head of this movement for the uniting of all revolutionary elements and must now with especial energy proclaim the slogan of the united front of the working-class, for example, for the relief of the unemployed. The chief indictment of the Gompers' trade unions should be the fact that they refuse to participate in the establishment of a united front of the workers against the capitalists for the relief of the unemployed.

16. In *Switzerland* our Party has been able to achieve several successes in the above mentioned manner. Thanks to the agitation of the Communists for the united front, they have been able to compel the trade union bureaucracy to convoke an extraordinary Congress which will take place in the near future, and in which our comrades will be able to expose the mendacity of reformism before all the workers of Switzerland and promote the work of uniting the revolutionary proletariat still further.

17. In a number of other countries the question takes on an altogether different view as a result of entirely new local conditions. After this sketch of the general line of action, the Executive of the Communist International is convinced that the various Communist parties will understand how to apply it in conformance with the conditions prevailing in each country.

18. The Executive of the Communist International considers as the main conditions, which are absolutely decisive for the Communist Parties of all countries, the absolute autonomy and complete independence of each Communist Party which makes an agreement with the parties of the Second and 2 1/2 Internationals, and its freedom to express its views and to criticize the opponents of Communism. While accepting the principles of *action*, the Communists must unconditionally retain the right and the possibility of expressing their opinion on the policies of all organizations of the working-class without exception, not only before and after the action, but also when necessary *during the action* as well. The surrender of these conditions is under no circumstances permissible. In supporting the slogan of the greatest possible unity of all workers' organizations in every *practical action against the capitalist front*, the Communists can in no case renounce the exposition of their views which alone are the logical expression of the defense of the interests of the working-class as a whole.

19. The Executive of the Communist International considers it useful to remind all brother parties of the experiences of the Russian Bolsheviks—the only party at present which has been able to win a victory over the bourgeoisie and seize power. During the decade and a half which elapsed between the birth of Bolshevism and its victory over the bourgeoisie (1903-1917) Bolshevism did not cease to carry on a tireless fight against reformism, or what is the same thing, Menshevism. But at the same time the Russian Bolsheviks often came to an agreement with the Mensheviks in the course of this decade and a half. The formal separation from the Mensheviks took place in Spring 1905. But under the influence of the stormy labor movement the Bolsheviks at the end of 1905 had already formed a common front with the Mensheviks. The formal split took place for a second time and finally in January 1912. From 1905 to 1912, split alternated with union and half union in 1906, 1907 and 1910. And these unions and half unions took place not only because of the changes of factional conflict, but also under the direct pressure of the great masses of workers who were awakening to active political life and actually demanded that they should be given the possibility of testing by their own experience whether the way of Menshevism really deviates from the path of the revolution. An especially strong desire for unity was to be observed among the Russian working-masses before the new revolutionary movement following the strikes on the *Lena*, just before the outbreak of the imperialist war. The leaders and diplomats of Russian Menshevism at that time attempted to utilize the desires of the workers for their ends about in the same way as the leaders of the Second, 2 1/2 and Amsterdam Internationals now are attempting to do. The Russian Bolsheviks did not reply to that desire of the workers for unity with a rejection of the united front. On the contrary, as a counterbalance to the diplomatic game of the Menshevik leaders, the Russian Bolsheviks proclaimed the slogan "Unity from Below," that is the unity of the working-masses in the actual struggle for the revolutionary demands of the workers against the capitalists. Practice has shown that this was the only correct answer. And as a result of these tactics, dependent on circumstances, and changing with time and place, a large number of the best Menshevik workers were won over to Communism.

20. In issuing the slogan of the united front of the proletariat and in concluding agreements between the various sections of the Communist International and the parties and unions of the Second and 2 1/2 Internationals, the Communist International cannot naturally refuse to contract such agreements on an international scale as well. The Executive of the Communist International made a proposal to the Amsterdam International in connection with relief for the Russian famine-stricken. It repeated this proposal for common action in connection with the White Terror in Spain and Yugoslavia and the persecutions of the workers in those countries. The Executive of the Communist International now makes a new proposal to the Amsterdam, Second and also 2 1/2 Internationals in connection with the first period of activity on the Washington Conference which has shown that the international working-class is menaced by a new imperialist butchery. Up to the present the leaders of the Second, 2 1/2 and Amsterdam Internationals have shown by their behavior that they drop their unity slogan when it comes to *practical action*. In all such cases it will be the duty of the Communist International as a whole and of its various sections in particular to point out to the masses of the workers the hypocrisy of the leaders of the Second, 2 1/2 and Amsterdam Internationals, who prefer unity with the bourgeoisie to unity with the revolutionary workers, who for example are a component part of the Washington imperialist conference by remaining in the International Labor Office of the League of Nations, instead of organizing the struggle against imperialist Washington. But a rejection of this or that practical proposal of the Communist International on the part of the leaders of the Second, 2 1/2 and Amsterdam Internationals will not cause us to give up the tactics here sketched out, which are deeply rooted in the masses and which we must systematically and unswervingly develop. When a proposal for a common battle front is rejected by our opponents it is necessary that the masses learn of it and in this way learn who

are the real destroyers of the united front of the working-class. When they agree with our proposals the action must gradually be made more thorough going and intensified as much as possible. In both cases it is necessary that the attention of the working-masses should be attracted by the negotiations of the Communists with the other organizations, for it is necessary to interest the broad masses in all the swings back and forth of the struggle for the united front of the proletariat.

21. In drawing up the detailed plan, the Executive of the Communist International warns all brother parties of the dangers which can arise in this connection. Not all Communist parties are sufficiently developed and strengthened and not all the parties have completely broken with Centrist and semi-Centrist ideology. It is possible that cases of excesses may rise—tendencies which will actually mean the dissolution of the Communist Parties and groups in the formless united bloc. In order to carry out the detailed tactics successfully for the cause of Communism, it is necessary that the Communist Party itself, which must put these tactics into execution, should be firmly united and that its leadership should be marked by ideal clarity.

22. Among the groups within the Communist International itself which are with more or less justice counted as right and even semi-Centrist, there are no doubt tendencies of two sorts. One element has really not broken with the ideology and the measures of the Second International, has not freed itself from respect for its former organization and unconsciously or half-consciously seeks the way to an ideal understanding with the Second International and, as a result, with bourgeois society. Other elements which are fighting against formal radicalism, against the errors of the so-called "Left" and others, desire to give the tactics of the young Communist Party more flexibility, more capacity for manoeuvring in order to enable it to penetrate the more quickly in the masses. The quick development of the Communist parties has sometimes forced these two tendencies in the same camp, in a certain degree into the same grouping. The employment of the above indicated methods, the mission of which is the anchoring of Communist agitation in the united mass action of the proletariat, most clearly exposes the really reformist tendencies within the Communist parties, and by the correct employment of these tactics will extraordinarily assist in the revolutionary consolidation of the Communist parties by educating the impatient or sectarian elements through experience as well as by cleansing of the Party of reformist ballast.

23. By the united front of the workers we understand the union of all workers who desire to fight against capitalism, in other words including the workers who still follow the *Anarchists and Syndicalists*. In other countries such workers can also be of assistance in the revolutionary struggle. The Communist International has from the first days of its existence maintained a friendly attitude to these proletarian elements, which gradually are overcoming their prejudices and coming over to Communism. The Communists must pay more attention to them than ever now, when the united front of the workers against the capitalists is becoming an actuality.

24. For the final decisions on future work in this field, the Executive of the Communist International has decided to convene a session of the Executive in the immediate future at which all parties are to send a double delegation.

25. The Executive of the Communist International will carefully follow each practical step in this field and requests all parties to report to it with all details every attempt and every success in the above direction.

International Press Correspondence, Vol. 2, No. 3 (10 January 1922), pp. 17-20.



REPORTS ON THE ECONOMY TO THE NINTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS

23-28 December 1921

The Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets devoted much of its attention to the dire economic condition of the country and the implications of the recently proclaimed New Economic Policy. This account summarizes the three reports dealing with industry, agriculture, and finance. It was prepared for the official Soviet publication in London. The report outlines the problems of the Soviet economy but attempts an optimistic outlook.

INDUSTRY

Report by P. A. Bogdanov (Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council)

The last few years have been characterised by the breakdown of Russian industry. The situation in 1920, however, was better than in 1919, and in 1921 better than in 1920; and we hope that in 1922 it will be improved still further. We base this hope not only on the slight improvement made in previous years but on much more important facts which will be made clear as we review the present state of the economic life of the country.

Fuel.—In the production of coal, the Donets basin, which is, of course, our principal coalfield, produced in 1920 4,500,000 tons, and in 1921 5,420,000 tons, to which must be added some 400,000 tons obtained from small leased mines. During 1921 this coalfield passed through a grave crisis. Owing to the extreme shortage of food in the early part of the year, the rise in output was followed in March and subsequent months by a sharp decline, the July production reaching only 150,000 tons. After July, however, the output went up again, and in October reached over 500,000 tons, whilst in November it was over 700,000 tons. Thus the last three months actually account for forty per cent of the year's production. Equally satisfactory are the figures showing the rate of consumption of coal at the pithead. In January this consumption amounted to sixty per cent of the output, in February to forty-eight per cent, and in November to only twenty-two per cent. The unmistakable revival of the Donets basin coal industry has been brought about largely by the concentration of production. The Government retained in exploitation, out of the total number of 1,100 pits, only 288, on which it concentrated all its energy and resources. The general improvement in the work of the district can be best seen in the increased productivity of hewers: thus, in October 11,500 hewers produced exactly the same quantity of coal as 17,500 obtained in March. The average output per hewer increased from thirteen tons in July to fifty-seven tons in November. Other coalfields have also increased their output, during the last three months accounting for nearly thirty-five per cent of their total production for the year.

On turning to oil we find a similar picture, though less clearly defined in its contrasts. The total output of oil in 1920 amounted to 3,980,000 tons; and in 1921 to 4,070,000 tons. In Baku the output declined from 2,920,000 tons in 1920 to 2,600,000 tons in 1921; but this was compensated by an increase in the Grozny output, the figures for which were for 1920 and 1921 respectively: 880,000 tons and 1,330,000 tons, the last figure being actually in excess of the pre-war average. There is no occasion to regard the position in Baku as particularly alarming. The output in December is reported as exceeding 250,000 tons, which is a marked improvement on the previous months, directly attributable to the import of materials from abroad, the application of the principles of the new economic policy, and the increased supply of foodstuffs to the workers. It must be noted that the above increase in the output is due to more intensified work, as is demonstrated by the fifty per cent increase during the last three months in the number of productive wells, and the more

extensive boring. In connection with the general revival of industry in Baku and the improvement of the conditions of life there is noticeable a considerable influx of workers to the oilfields.

Grozny received during the last three months only sixty-eight per cent of the food supplies it required, and this fact could not fail to influence production. But now that special supplies have been sent one may reasonably look for a further improvement in output.

During the years of the revolution wood has been our principal industrial fuel, and in 1921 it still played an important part in our general fuel balance. But this part is gradually growing smaller. On July 1, 1921, the prepared stock of wood and lignite amounted to above 69,000,000 tons, of which 61,000,000 tons (seventy per cent of the programme figure) have been actually supplied to the consumers. These figures show a slight falling off compared with the previous year. At the present moment, the most important question is the transport of stocks, as our railways still largely depend on wood fuel, while the stocks they have in hand are sufficient to last not more than a few weeks or, in some cases, even days. The rafting of wood down the rivers during the past year has been entirely satisfactory, 84.5 per cent of the wood rafted having been actually secured.

An interesting feature in the fuel balance of the country is the increased use of mineral fuel. Thus in 1920, wood accounted for forty-eight per cent of the total balance, in 1921 for thirty-eight per cent, and in 1922 the figure is expected to come down even to twenty-four per cent. Estimates for 1922, on the basis of recent output figures, show that the total fuel production will exceed the figures for 1921 by fifty per cent.

Metals.—The production of cast iron in 1921 amounted to 125,000 tons, which is equivalent to 2.9 per cent of the pre-war output. Compared, however, with the 105,000 tons for 1920, last year's figure shows some slight progress. The organisation of a metallurgical combine in the southern provinces has already led to an increased output of coal and coke, and also of cast iron. The programme of this combine for 1922 estimates the production of cast iron at 167,000 tons. Until recently this group of undertakings had only one blast furnace working; now they have two and during 1922 expect to have ten blast furnaces working. We must not expect, however, a rapid recovery of the metallurgical industry. Even in three years' time the output of cast iron, if the national programme is carried out, will reach only twenty-one per cent of the pre-war figure.

In the production of agricultural implements the value of the 190 output represents, on a gold basis, 2.8 million roubles as against 50,000,000 roubles in 1913. The programme for 1922 anticipates a production of implements equal in value to 8.5 million gold roubles.

The output of iron has dropped to an extremely low figure. In 1921 it amounted to only 217,000 tons as compared with 9,166,000 tons in 1913. One of the principal tasks of the moment is, therefore, the speedy restoration of the principal iron producing district in Russia—the Krivoy-Rog.

Among other mining industries mention should be made of the organisation of two trusts for the production of gold and platinum, and the very satisfactory increase in the production of salt, which rose from 600,000 tons in 1920 to 1,100,000 tons in 1921.

Textiles.—The condition of the textile industry, which now produces only 6.5 per cent of the prewar output, demands vigorous measures, including the concentration of production. The new economic policy has already brought about a certain improvement in the output of cotton factories, the production of which has risen from 8.15 per cent of their capacity to thirty per cent; the production of the flax factories has even risen to fifty-five per cent of pre-war. The programme for 1922 fixes the output of textiles at something between 25,000,000 and 28,000,000 yards of material of all sorts.

Labour.—An important feature of the present situation is the increased productivity of labour brought about by the new economic policy. Whereas at the end of 1920 absenteeism amongst the workers stood at as high a figure as twenty-two per cent (and in July and

August, 1921, at fifty-nine and forty-five per cent respectively), from September onwards the figures for absenteeism began sharply to decline.

At the same time the improvement in the supply of necessities to the workers has made it necessary to reduce the number of enterprises maintained by supplies from the State to the smallest possible proportions. Even as late as March last the number of workers supplied by the State totalled 1,770,000. At present this figure has had to be reduced to 1,050,000.

As regards the organisation of industry, the undertakings which by the decision of the Eighth Congress of Soviets were handed over to local authorities are to remain under the control of the Supreme Economic Council. The industrial enterprises, however, which were left in the administration of the central Government are to be grouped into Trusts, of which fifteen have already been formed. Our problem in organisation is how to establish normal relations between the Trusts and the local economic institutions: we hope to bring them into close contact with each other and thus make them parts of a single national economic organisation.

AGRICULTURE

Report by V. V. Ossinsky (People's Commissar for Agriculture)

Although there are unmistakable signs of improvement in the agricultural conditions of the country, it must be recognised that the decline as compared with pre-war years continues and is likely to continue for a long time unless heroic measures are taken to arrest it. Hence the urgent necessity of paying the greatest possible attention to the condition of agriculture.

In 1921 there was a certain improvement in the area sown. Thus, in the "consuming" provinces the spring sowings showed an increase of ten per cent. In some "producing" provinces the position remained unchanged, while in the Riazan province there was even an increase of eight per cent.

With the regard to the winter sowings of 1921, the data available show that the "consuming" provinces increased their sowings by twenty-six per cent, those "producing" provinces which were not affected by the drought by twenty-three per cent, those slightly affected by twenty-two per cent, and finally, the famine provinces decreased by twenty-five per cent, as against the figures for 1920. That the diminution in the famine provinces was so small in spite of the failure of crops, must be attributed to the heroic efforts of all concerned in the sowing campaign. Mention should also be made of the early ploughing of fallow land, which will have considerable effect in retaining the moisture for next season, and the ploughing of land for the spring sowing, about forty-three per cent of which has been already ploughed.

But important as these achievements are, they do not remove the danger which is still menacing the country.

The Volga provinces have been supplied with 417,000 tons of seed for the spring sowing. This means that in 1922 (unless substantial help from abroad can be secured) the area sown in those provinces will be only one-third of that sown in 1919, which was already below the normal. Assuming even that the yield will be above the average, it is clear that the Volga provinces will hardly be able to satisfy their own requirements, and a surplus for export will be out of the question. And as the provinces account for one-third of the total sown area of Russia (exclusive of the Ukraine and Turkestan) it is important to realise that nothing will be obtained from them either in food tax or as seed relief for other provinces that may require it.

The prospects of the crops next spring are, naturally, difficult to determine, but it must be recognised that the weather conditions of last year have left their marks; and that there is, therefore, the possibility of another failure of crops next summer, and this makes it essential that urgent measures should be taken to minimise its effects. But all measures

require money, and the annual budget grant of the Commissariat for Agriculture amounts only to some 27,000,000 gold roubles. To ensure the success of the land campaign, and to enable the Commissariat to obtain the essential materials and supplies, this grant must be greatly increased.

FINANCE

Budget Report by N. N. Krestinsky (People's Commissar for Finance)

Up to the present our economic policy has been based on the principle of nationalisation. We had requisitioning, labour service, and so on. Banks were done away with, and money itself was in the process of gradual abolition.

Now we stand on new ground. We have the food tax and the free market, and instead of trying to abolish money we are trying our best to strengthen our currency, to cure our money system of the ills with which it is afflicted. This object can be realised only by putting our paper currency on a gold basis. Two factors have been responsible for the depreciation of our money: first, the contraction of the goods market; and the second, unlimited issues of notes. The first of these factors, it would seem, is not losing its force. With the development of the free market new goods have come forward; goods of which some had been kept in hiding, and some have been produced by our State undertakings and our Kustar and agricultural industries. As a result we are able to observe a certain check in the depreciation of our rouble.

Our position with regard to the other factor—the emission of currency—is less favourable. Our issue of paper notes is not backed by gold; Kolchak stole a considerable quantity of our gold and what was left is rapidly being spent in foreign purchases.

What we have to do now is to cut, at all costs, our expenditure and increase our revenue.

We discussed these questions last summer. It was said that taxes would not help us; but this view has been proved to be erroneous. Here are the figures showing what we have already obtained in taxes. The tax on trade has yielded up to December 25 about four milliard roubles and the yield from this source is growing every month. The revenue of the Commissariat for Transport for private passengers and goods transport from July to December 10 amounted to 264 milliard roubles. The revenue of all the railways for December are expected to reach 120 milliard roubles. The transport estimate for 1922 calculates the receipts at 2.5 million gold roubles per month. The Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs has received up to December 1, 304 milliard roubles. Mention should also be made of local taxation. In Moscow, for instance, the trade tax brought in twenty-four milliard roubles, the leasing of trade premises eight milliard roubles, and the tramways thirty-one milliard roubles.

With regard to the 1922 budget, the estimate of revenue has been prepared on the basis of minimum receipts. It is made up as follows: The produce of the State industries will contribute a sum equivalent to about 900,000,000 gold roubles. The food tax will yield 400,000,000 gold roubles. Other articles of prime necessity in the hands of the Commissariat for Food will amount in value to about 25,000,000 gold roubles. Next, there will be the income from the State properties, especially from the sales of timber, totalling 70,000,000 gold roubles. The State taxes will contribute 75.5 million gold roubles; transport, posts, and telegraphs 99,000,000 gold roubles; sundry other sources will provide 66,000,000 gold roubles; these items will produce a total revenue of 1,648,000,000 gold roubles. The total expenditure for the period of the Budget (January 1 to September 30, 1922) is estimated at 1,878,000,000 gold roubles; so that the deficit, which must be met by note issues, amounts to 230,000,000, or only 12.3 per cent of the total. If we compare this with last year's estimate we find there 10,000,000 gold roubles from taxes; 189,000,000 gold roubles from the emission of paper currency; making a total of about 200,000,000 gold roubles; next the food contribution obtained in the first half of the year

by requisition, and in the second by food tax, yielded the value of 800,000,000 gold roubles (though this is probably an overstatement). Thus, the total income for the last twelve months was 1,900,000,000 gold roubles, or from 155,000,000 to 160,000,000 per month. It will be seen from the above that the estimate for the coming year promises a considerably bigger income, at the rate of 200,000,000 gold roubles per month. Nor will our position appear particularly unfavourable if we compare our Budget with the Budgets of such countries as Germany, Austria, and Poland. All these countries show enormous deficits, and are compelled to make them good by forced issues of paper money.

If we firmly adopt the plan of restricting in the most vigorous manner our issue of paper notes and adhere to the limits fixed in the Budget, if in the following year we reduce this sum still further, and if our State industries and agriculture continue to revive and improve as they have done during the last six months, then we shall have no grounds for pessimism with regard to the future of our finances.

Russian Information and Review, Vol. 1, No. 9 (1 February 1922), pp. 196-200.



3 THE YEAR 1922

CHICHERIN ACCEPTS THE INVITATION TO THE GENOA CONFERENCE

8 January 1922

The Soviet Union had been a pariah among the states of Europe. It was not invited to participate in the major postwar conferences and still was without formal recognition from any of the major powers. The invitation to the conference at Genoa, called to discuss the economic reconstruction of Eastern and Central Europe, was thus quickly seized on. The invitation itself grew out of a suggestion by the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, at an Allied Supreme Council meeting at Cannes; his statement is frequently called the "Cannes Resolution." Although mostly concerned with economic issues, two points of the invitation were particularly relevant to later relations between the Soviet Union and the Western states. Point one stated that "Nations can claim no right to dictate to each other regarding the Principles on which they are to regulate their system of ownership, internal economy and government..." while point five stated that "All nations should undertake to refrain from propaganda subversive of order and the established political system in other countries than their own." The conference met in April. See other documents on Genoa and the Rapallo treaty, to be found below, 10, 16, and 20 April.

*Telegram from G. Chicherin, People's Commissar
for Foreign Affairs to the Allied Supreme Council*

The Russian Government accepts with satisfaction the invitation to the European Conference to be convened in March next. The Russian delegation's election will be preceded by an extra-ordinary session of the All Russian Central Executive Committee, which will give

the delegation extensive authority. Even if Lenin, the President of the Council of People's Commissars, should be unable, owing to pressure of work, particularly in connection with the famine, to leave Russia, the composition of the delegation and the powers entrusted to it will make it equally as authoritative as if citizen Lenin himself took part in it. Thus there will be no obstacle on the part of Russia to the rapid course of work at the conference.

Chicherin

Soviet Union and Peace, pp. 81-82.



THE COUNCIL OF LABOR AND DEFENSE (STO)

15 January 1922

One of the more important but less well known institutions of the early Soviet government was the Council of Labor and Defense (Sovet Truda i Oborony). It originated as the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense, often called simply Council of Defense, set up in 1918 to coordinate military and economic issues and functioned as a sort of small war cabinet for the Council of People's Commissars. In 1920 it was renamed the Council of Labor and Defense and by the end of the year became the general coordinating body for economic planning and issues. It developed and issued many of the most important economic decrees and policies of these years. In 1921-1922 a Soviet journal published in London, Russian Information and Review, ran a series of articles about various Soviet government institutions under the general heading "How the Soviet Government Works." This article explaining the Council of Labor and Defense was the third in that series. The article includes portions of the government decree establishing the Council.

The Council of Labour and Defence

The main task of any civilised Government, apart from the preservation of its authority, the organisation of education, and the promotion of public health, lies in the assurance of peaceful economic progress for its citizens. For the Soviet Government in particular, which came into existence pledged to assist the complete transformation of the social order and the economic foundations existing in Russia before the October Revolution, these economic tasks were necessarily of primary importance from the first. And this circumstance was only the more emphasised by the utter anarchy in production prevalent in the capitalist regime of pre-revolutionary days, and by the complete bankruptcy and breakdown brought about by the death struggles of Tsarism between 1915 and 1917.

Building in this sphere, as in all others, entirely anew, without experience or any material or moral aid save its own resolution and the backing of the vast majority of the Russian workers, industrial and agricultural, the Soviet Government at the outset put before itself the bold and seemingly hopeless task of establishing a central economic authority which should unify and co-ordinate the work of the various People's Commissariats whose activity affected the economic interests of the community without in any way impeding their labours. It was felt that such a body should exist specifically for the purpose of drawing up and applying, through the various People's Commissariats, a general, all-Russian, economic plan of production, distribution, and commerce. Such a plan would provide for the requisite utilisation of raw materials; the necessary import of supplies from abroad; the

general progress of industry; the maintenance and improvement of the transport system; the most rational utilisation of labour power; the development of agriculture (not merely in the sense of ensuring an adequate supply of food to the population through State or other channels, but with the object of bringing it up-to-date and ultimately of directing it on to large-scale Communist lines); the disposal abroad of surplus products and raw materials in such a manner as to produce the maximum benefit for the whole of the community; the regulation of State currency and banking; and so on.

For this purpose there was organised in 1918 the Supreme Economic Council (*Vysshyy Soviet Narodnovo Khoziaistva*), at first as a People's Commissariat, built up in the ordinary way and headed by a Chairman and Board selected by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee from amongst its members. Its first task was to take over and administer the nationalised industries as they one by one passed, from June, 1918, onwards, into the hands of the State. In this it worked as the central unit of a network of local economic councils, each built up out of a section of the local Soviet Executive Committee with a number of additions from trade union and technical bodies. But very clear and unmistakable indications were given that the future functions of the S.E.C. were to be far wider than those involved in regulating industry: at first by agreement with the other "economic Commissariats," and ultimately by absorbing them, it was to develop into that organ of universal co-ordination and national housekeeping which has already been described.

Circumstances, however, decided otherwise. The civil war which began in the spring of 1918, passing in the summer into a war of national defence against foreign aggression and invasion, for three years obliged the Soviet Government to consider the work of each Commissariat in the light, not of its harmony with the best economic interests of the people as a whole, but of its adaptability to military requirements and the needs of a besieged fortress—as Soviet Russia felt herself to be from 1918 to 1920. Certain Commissariats (Food, Transport) developed into powerful organisations with a nation-wide scope and a sense of independence; others (Labour, Agriculture, Foreign Trade) had their vitality destroyed or their activities seriously limited from the very beginning by the conditions of war-time. The Supreme Economic Council itself found its hands more than full with the problem of adapting industry for war-time purposes and (when peace returned with the autumn of 1920) of reviving those branches which had perforce to be allowed to fall into decline or decay. After three years of concentration on purely industrial affairs, it was no longer capable of assuming the all-embracing role assigned to it by the original planners of its existence. It had become to all intents and purposes the People's Commissariat for Industry.

A new organ was necessary, and such a one was at hand. In April, 1920, the Council of Defence (an inter-departmental "War Cabinet" set up within the Council of People's Commissars in November, 1918, for the express purpose of winning the war, like its counterparts in Western Europe) had been re-organised on a wider basis as the Council of Labour and Defence (*Soviet Truda i Oborony*), "with the object," in the words of the decree, "of the closest possible unification of all forces on the labour front." It was hoped that warfare was at an end and that peaceful work was once more possible. More especially, the military formations previously at the disposal of the Council of Defence could now, it was anticipated, be utilised in a more rational manner, in the form of "labour armies," by the same Council with a wider personnel, and thus the painful stage of demobilisation and industrial re-absorption might to a large extent be avoided.

Once again sanguine hopes were thwarted, and the Polish attack, together with Wrangel's renewed activity in the south, effectively postponed all thought of peaceful revival for nearly twelve months. More than this, it was quite clear by the end of this new and (so far) conclusive chapter in the Soviet Republic's military life that the general exhaustion was then too marked to permit of the measures planned earlier in the year.

Demobilisation was therefore decided upon and carried out. The Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which met in December, 1920, to consider the new situation of Soviet Russia, was placed in a position to utilise the Council of Labour and Defence for a purpose of vaster and more far-reaching import than the direction of labour armies—namely, to carry out the work of general economic unification outlined earlier in this article.

In the decree of the All-Russian Congress, the work of the Council of Labour and Defence was defined as follows:

The Council of Labour and Defence co-ordinates and develops the activity of all departments of State in the interests of the defence of the country and of economic reconstruction.

To carry out the task imposed upon it, the C.L.D. publishes its decisions, regulations, and instructions, and takes all the measures necessary to ensure their accurate and rapid execution; in particular, it determines the single economic plan of the R.S.F.S.R., submits it for ratification by the A.R.C.E.C., directs the work of the economic People's Commissariats in accordance with this plan, supervises its application, and decides in cases of necessity on any modifications of its provisions.

The constitution of the C.L.D. which, in practice, meeting weekly, works as a Committee of the Council of People's Commissars, and publishes minutes of its proceedings in its official daily organ *Economic Life* (*Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*), is laid down by the same decree. The chairman of the Council of People's Commissars is chairman of the C.L.D.; its permanent members are the People's Commissars for War, the Supreme Economic Council, Labour, Transport, Agriculture, Food, and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, together with a representative of the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions. The director of the Central Statistical Department attends the sessions in a consultative capacity, and the People's Commissar for Finance with a decisive vote when financial questions are being discussed.

It is of great importance to note that, while the decisions of the C.L.D. are binding on all institutions, central and local, and may be altered or set aside only by the A.R.C.E.C. or the Council of People's Commissars, the C.L.D. has set up no apparatus of its own to carry out these decisions. They are communicated in the requisite form to the commissariats concerned, and their execution is the work exclusively of the latter: thus unnecessary bureaucracy has been avoided. On the other hand, it has a definite and extremely energetic apparatus for assisting it in arriving at its conclusions. At the centre, in the capital, it has subordinated to it a series of thirteen or fourteen great inter-departmental commissions, which work up the material and collect the data from the appropriate People's Commissariat, each in its own delimited sphere of work, but together covering all the more pressing economic problems. The chief of these is the State Economic Planning Commission (*Gosplan*), which draws up the economic programme for the year in all its encyclopaedic variety on the basis of the reports of the People's Commissariats, and submits it to the C.L.D. for discussion and approval. Others, scarcely less prominent, but actually more specialised, are the State Electrification Commission (*Goelro*), the Committee for Improving the Lot of the Working Class, the Committee for Utilisation (which until the most recent period controlled the distribution of all the raw and partly worked-up materials of production), the Committee for Investigating the Agricultural Conditions of the South-Eastern Region (set up since the beginning of the famine on the Volga), and so on.

Further, the C.L.D. has at its disposal, since October, 1921, a constant and regular stream of reports from a network of local organs of similar type, set up in large numbers following a special decree of the A.R.C.E.C. of June 30, 1921. Regional "economic conferences" (*ekonomicheskoye soveshchanie*)—this was the name given to the new bodies partly to distinguish them from the old "economic councils," which are now purely industrial bodies, and partly to emphasise their super-departmental character—may be set up in

any of the recently marked out economic regions or groups of provinces by special decision of the C.L.D. Provincial, county, and area (a term which includes both rural areas and the towns) economic conferences are composed of the chairmen or directors of the following departments of the appropriate local Soviet Executive Committee: economic council, land, food, labour, workers' and peasants' inspection, municipal affairs, statistical (with a consultative voice), and the chairman of the council of trade unions for the given territory. The chairman of the local executive committee is chairman of the conference. In rural districts (sub-divisions of counties, which are smaller than areas) the conference is constituted by the chairman of the executive committees, the directors of the land and municipal affairs department, the chairman of the local co-operative society, and a representative of the workers' and peasants' inspection. In all these lower bodies, technical experts and representatives of other institutions are invited for consultative purposes on special questions. Finally, the lowest units of all are the village "agricultural committees" (*selkom*), set up by the Eighth All-Russian Congress for the express purpose of raising the level of agriculture, and, in the case of large factories which express a desire in this sense, factory economic conferences composed of the chairman or vice-chairman of the board of management, the chairman of the workers' committee, the chairman of the local valuing committee (set up in connection with the introduction of free trading under the new economic policy), and a representative of the local "group for assisting the workers' and peasants' inspection."

All these local organs, from the provincial economic conference to the factory or village bodies, act as sub-committees, meeting weekly or fortnightly, of the Soviet Executive Committee for the given territory or of the Soviet of the given town or village and are directly and entirely responsible to these bodies, forming no apparatus of their own. They thus bear exactly the same relations to these general organs of State authority as the C.L.D. itself bears to the Council of the People's Commissars, and their tasks are defined by the decree of June, 1921, in a similar way:

"to unify and develop the activity of all local economic organs, to co-ordinate their work, and to ensure that they meet the problems dictated, not only by local interests, but also by those of the State as a whole."

In other words, in addition to providing the "economic plan" for strictly local requirements, each grade of this gigantic economic machine is charged with supervising the execution, in the territory for which it is responsible, of that section of the general State plan which affects the territory, in all its details.

It is therefore natural that each of these economic conferences should be required to render regular quarterly reports—on lines worked out and laid down by instructions from the C.L.D. itself, to cover all sides of local economic and social life—to the economic conference immediately above it; that is, village committees to the rural district bodies, and so on. The reports of the principal bodies are printed in a fixed number of copies, and sent, in addition to the recognised central economic bodies, to the principal libraries, universities, academies, institutes of economic research, etc., in the Republic. Other reports (rural district, village, and small town) are handed in manuscript form to the appropriate superior economic conference, and are abstracted for the central authorities by the provincial statistical departments.

In conclusion, we may refer to the figures available to illustrate the work of the Council of Labour and Defence, which show that in six months (November 1, 1920 to April 30, 1921) it examined 991 questions, twenty per cent of which were raised by the Supreme Economic Council, thirteen per cent, by the Commissariat for Food, and twelve per cent by the War Department, while in the first four months of 1921 seventy-three sub-commissions for special current questions (apart from the principal permanent groups mentioned earlier) were set up. No statistics are yet available of the work of the lower organs: but for

the last three months *Economic Life* has been steadily printing abstracts of the reports of the provincial economic conferences now coming in. These reports on the whole, in spite of many obvious defects born for the most part of inexperience, show that the general principles indicated by the C.L.D. have been correctly grasped by the local Soviet workers and economic bodies, and that an earnest and systematic effort is being made to introduce an element of co-ordination and forethought into local economic activity. There is thus slowly but surely being built up a more and more solid guarantee that the new economic policy in all its ramifications will be intelligently applied, and the foundations of the new social order firmly and unshakably laid.

Russian Information and Review, Vol. 1, No. 8 (15 January 1922).



LENIN ON CINEMA—THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THE ARTS

17 January 1922

The possibilities of cinema as a propaganda, agitation, and educational tool in a country of widespread illiteracy intrigued the Soviet leaders. Their fascination with new technology in general probably contributed as well. Lenin dictated this note to the Commissariat of Education, which was responsible for the cinema, with a request that it draw up a program of action based on his directives. In February, Lunacharsky had a conversation with Lenin in which, by the former's recollection, Lenin made his oft quoted statement "that of all the arts the most important for us is the cinema."

V. I. Lenin

Directives on the Film Business

The People's Commissariat for Education should organise the supervision of all film showings and systematise this business. All films shown in the R.S.F.S.R. should be registered and numbered at the Commissariat for Education. A definite proportion should be fixed for every film-showing programme:

a) entertainment films, specially for advertisement or income (of course, without obscenity and counter-revolution) and

b) under the heading "From the life of peoples of all countries"—pictures with a special propaganda message, such as: Britain's colonial policy in India, the work of the League of Nations, the starving Berliners, etc., etc. Besides films, photographs of propaganda interest should be shown with appropriate subtitles. The privately owned cinemas should be made to yield a sufficient return to the state in the form of rent, the owners to be allowed to increase the number of films and present new ones subject to censorship by the Commissariat for Education and provided the proper proportion is maintained between entertainment films and propaganda films coming under the heading of films "From the life of peoples of all countries," in order that film-makers should have an incentive for producing new pictures. They should be allowed wide initiative within these limits. Pictures of a propaganda and educational nature should be checked by old Marxists and writers, to avoid a repetition of the many sad instances when propaganda with us defeated its own purpose. Special attention should be given to organising film showings in the villages and in the East, where they are novelties and where our propaganda, therefore, will be all the more effective.

Lenin, Vol. 42, pp. 388-389.

REORGANIZATION OF THE SECRET POLICE:
ABOLITION OF THE CHEKA AND FORMATION OF THE GPU
8 February 1922

In 1922 the All-Russian Commission, or Cheka, was abolished and replaced by the State Political Administration, or GPU, which was placed under the People's Commissariat for Justice. This was in part a result of concern among some Bolsheviks that the excesses of the Cheka had to be curbed and also a signal that with the end of the Civil War, the worst of the Red terror was ended. The restrictions on the power of the police proved to be more on paper than in reality, however. During this period, the GPU was primarily concerned with reasonably well-defined "enemies" such as former activists in other political parties. It was to be reorganized into the OGPU on 15 November 1923 and its role changed dramatically toward the later 1920s. This decree is sometimes dated 6 February.

ON THE ABOLITION OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN EXTRAORDINARY
COMMISSION AND ON THE REGULATIONS FOR
CONDUCTING SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND ARRESTS

In accordance with the resolution of the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the reorganization of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Counter-Revolution, Speculation, and Official Offences, and on the local organs is of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, the VTsIK decrees:

1. That the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission and its local organs shall be abolished.

2. That the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs shall, together with the other tasks indicated in paragraph 1 of the acts concerning the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, execute throughout the entire territory of the RSFSR the following tasks:

- (a) Suppression of open counter-revolutionary outbreaks, including banditry;
- (b) Taking measures to prevent and combat espionage;
- (c) Guarding rail and water transport;
- (d) Political policing of the borders of the RSFSR;
- (e) Combating contraband and crossing of the borders of the republic without proper permission;
- (f) Executing special orders of the Presidium of the VTsIK or of the Sovnarkom for protecting the revolutionary order.

3. For the fulfilment of these tasks there is to be formed in connection with the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs a State Political Administration (GPU), under the personal chairmanship of the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs or of his deputy, who is to be appointed by the Sovnarkom, and in the local places there are to be political sections; in the autonomous republics and regions the political sections are to be connected with the central executive committee and in the provinces with the executive committees thereof.

4. The political sections connected with the central executive committees of the autonomous republics and regions remain directly subordinate to the central GPU attached to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, on the same principles as the other unified people's commissariats and administrations of the autonomous republics and regions.

5. The political sections of the provincial executive committees shall act in accordance with a special act referring thereto, approved by the Presidium of the VTsIK.

Note: Special sections and transport sections forming part of the GPU and the political sections conduct the struggle against crimes in the army and on the railroads according to special regulations concerning them, approved by the Presidium of the VTsIK.

6. At the direct disposal of the GPU there are special army detachments, the size of which shall be determined by the decisions of the Council of Labor and Defence, under the orders of a special staff of the troops of the GPU of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, this staff being part of the GPU.

7. Owing to the necessity of adopting measures for stopping the activities of those who take part in counter-revolutionary attempts, in banditism, espionage, thefts on the railways and waterways, contraband, and crossing the frontiers without permission, the GPU, the political sections, as well as their representatives in the districts, have the right to undertake searches, seizures and arrests as follows:

(a) In the case of persons caught in the act of committing a crime, the arrests, searches, or seizures by agents of the GPU or of the political sections may be effected without a special decision of the GPU, or of the political sections, or a special order containing the approval of the chairman of the GPU, within 48 hours from the time such procedure was resorted to; in all the other cases the arrest, as well as the searches and seizures, are admissible only upon special decision of the OGPU or the political sections, over the signature of their representatives, according to special orders which are issued in the manner stipulated by the instructions elaborated by the GPU, and confirmed by the People's Commissariat for Justice.

(b) Not later than two weeks after the arrest the indictment shall be submitted to the prisoner.

(c) Not later than two months after the day of the arrest the GPU must either free the arrested person or ask the Presidium of the VTsIK for permission to continue the detention of the arrested person, provided this is warranted by special circumstances, for a period determined by the presidium of the VTsIK, or it shall refer the matter to the courts.

8. All general criminal cases concerning speculation, offences committed in connection with official duties, and other offences which, before the publication of this decree, were in the hands of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission and its organs, shall be transmitted within two weeks to the respective revolutionary tribunals or people's courts, and in the future all cases concerning crimes directed against the soviet structure or representing violations of the laws of the RSFSR shall be exclusively judged by the courts, either by the revolutionary tribunals or by the people's courts, according to the case.

9. The People's Commissariat for Justice shall supervise the execution of articles 7 and 8.

10. The acts concerning the powers of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs shall be complemented in accordance with this decree.

Signed: President of the VTsIK: M. Kalinin.

Secretary of the VTsIK: A. Enukidze.

Batsell, pp. 606-609.



LENIN ON NEP, ITS ROLE AND FUTURE

27 March 1922

The Eleventh Party Congress was the last attended by Lenin, whose work had already been affected by his health. However, he gave the report of the Central Committee. Although

several topics are touched on, such as the Genoa Conference, most of it is devoted to a discussion of the New Economic Policy, including the question of when it might be abandoned, an issue which was already being raised by some of the militants. The report is Lenin's last major statement on NEP and is important for understanding the development of Lenin's thinking on it. The continuation or termination of NEP and Lenin's ideas about that became an important issue in the political-economic struggle of the 1920s and again in the reassessment of the Soviet economic system which began under Gorbachev in the late 1980s. See also Lenin's comments of 27-28 May 1921, above.

V. I. Lenin

POLITICAL REPORT

OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P. (B.)

(*Applause.*) Comrades, permit me to start the political report of the Central Committee from the end and not from the beginning of the year. The political question most discussed today is Genoa. But since a great deal has already been said on the subject in our press, and since I have already said what is most essential to it in my speech on March 6, which has been published, I would ask you to permit me to refrain from going into details unless you particularly wish me to do so.

On the whole you know everything about Genoa, because much has been written about it in the newspapers—in my opinion too much, to the detriment of the real, practical and urgent requirements of our work of construction in general, and of our economic development in particular. In Europe, in all bourgeois countries, of course, they like to occupy people's minds, or stuff their heads, with all sorts of trash about Genoa. On this occasion (I would say not only on this occasion) we are copying them, and copying them far too much.

I must say that in the Central Committee we have taken very great pains to appoint a delegation of our best diplomats (we now have a fair number of Soviet diplomats, which was not the case in the early period of the Soviet Republic). The Central Committee has drawn up sufficiently detailed instructions for our diplomats at the Genoa Conference; we spent a long time discussing these instructions and considered and reconsidered them several times. It goes without saying that the question here is, I shall not say of war, because that term is likely to be misunderstood, but at all events one of rivalry. In the bourgeois camp there is a very strong trend, much stronger than any other, that wants to wreck the Genoa Conference. There are trends which greatly favour the Genoa Conference and want it to meet at all costs. The latter have now gained the upper hand. Lastly, in all bourgeois countries there are trends which might be called pacifist trends, among which should be included the entire Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals. It is this section of the bourgeoisie which is advocating a number of pacifist proposals and is trying to concoct something in the nature of a pacifist policy. As Communists we have definite views about this pacifism which it would be superfluous to expound here. Needless to say, we are going to Genoa not as Communists, but as merchants. We must trade, and they must trade. We want the trade to benefit us; they want it to benefit them. The course of the issue will be determined, if only to a small degree, by the skill of our diplomats.

Insofar as we are going to Genoa as merchants it is obviously by no means a matter of indifference to us whether we shall deal with those people from the bourgeois camp who are inclined to settle the problem by war, or with those who are inclined towards pacifism, even the worst kind of pacifism, which from the Communist viewpoint will not stand the slightest criticism. It would be a bad merchant, indeed, if he were unable to appreciate this distinction, and, by shaping his tactic accordingly, achieve practical aims.

We are going to Genoa for the practical purpose of expanding trade and of creating the most favourable conditions for its successful development on the widest scale. But we

cannot guarantee the success of the Genoa Conference. It would be ridiculous and absurd to give any guarantees on that score. I must say, however, that, weighing up the present possibilities of Genoa in the most sober and cautious manner, I think that it will not be an exaggeration to say that we shall achieve our objective.

Through Genoa, if the other parties in the negotiations are sufficiently shrewd and not too stubborn; bypassing Genoa if they take it into their heads to be stubborn. But we shall achieve our goal!

The fact of the matter is that the most urgent, pressing and practical interests that have been sharply revealed in all the capitalist countries during the past few years call for the development, regulation and expansion of trade with Russia. Since such interests exist, we may argue, we may quarrel, we may disagree on specific combinations—it is highly probable that we shall have to disagree—this fundamental economic necessity will, nevertheless, after all is said and done, make a way for itself. I think we can rest assured of that. I cannot vouch for the date; I cannot vouch for success; but at this gathering we can say with a fair amount of certainty that regular trade relations between the Soviet Republic and all the capitalist countries in the world are certain to continue developing. When I come to it in another part of my report I shall mention the hitches that may possibly occur; but I think that this is all that need be said on the question of Genoa.

Needless to say, the comrades who desire to study the question in greater detail and who are not content with the list of delegates published in the newspapers may set up a commission, or a section, and acquaint themselves with all the material of the Central Committee, and all the correspondence and instructions. Of course, the details we have outlined are provisional, for no one up to now knows exactly who will sit round the table at Genoa, and what terms, or preliminary terms or provisions will be announced. It would be highly inexpedient, and I think practically impossible, to discuss all this here. I repeat, this Congress, through the medium of a section, or a commission, has every opportunity to collect all the documents on this question—both the published documents and those in the possession of the Central Committee.

I shall not say anymore, for I am sure that it is not here that our greatest difficulties lie. This is not the question on which the attention of the whole Party should be focussed. The European bourgeois press is artificially and deliberately inflating and exaggerating the importance of this Conference in order to deceive the masses of the working people (as nine-tenths of the bourgeois press in all these free democratic countries and republics always does). We have succumbed to the influence of this press to some extent. As usual, our press still yields to the old bourgeois habits; it refuses to adopt new, socialist methods, and we have made a greater fuss about this subject than it deserves. In fact, for Communists, especially for those who have lived through such stern years as we have lived through since 1917, and witnessed the formidable political combinations that have appeared in that period, Genoa does not present any great difficulties. I cannot recall any disagreement or controversy on this question either in the Central Committee or in the ranks of the Party. This is natural, for there is nothing controversial here from the point of view of Communists, even bearing in mind the various shades of opinion among them. I repeat: we are going to Genoa as merchants for the purpose of securing the most favourable terms for promoting the trade which has started, which is being carried on, and which, even if someone succeeded in forcibly interrupting it for a time, would inevitably continue to develop after the interruption.

Hence, confining myself to these brief remarks about Genoa, I shall now proceed to deal with the issues which, in my opinion, have been the major political questions of the past year and which will be such in the ensuing year. It seems to me that the political report of the Central Committee should not merely deal with the events of the year under review, but also point out (that, at any rate, is what I usually do) the main, fundamental

political lessons of the events of that year, so that we may learn something for the ensuing year and be in a position to correctly determine our policy for that year.

The New Economic Policy is, of course, the major question. This has been the dominant question throughout the year under review. If we have any important, serious and irrevocable gain to record for this year (and I am not so very sure that we have), it is that we have learnt something from the launching of this New Economic Policy. If we have learnt even a little, then, during the past year, we have learnt a great deal in this field. And the test of whether we have really learnt anything, and to what extent, will probably be made by subsequent events of a kind which we ourselves can do little to determine, as for example the impending financial crisis. It seems to me that in connection with the New Economic Policy, the most important things to keep in mind as a basis for all our arguments, as a means of testing our experience during the past year, and of learning practical lessons for the ensuing year are contained in the following three points.

First, the New Economic Policy is important for us primarily as a means of testing whether we are really establishing a link with the peasant economy. In the preceding period of development of our revolution, when all our attention and all our efforts were concentrated mainly on, or almost entirely absorbed by, the task of repelling invasion, we could not devote the necessary attention to this link; we had other things to think about. To some extent we could and had to ignore this bond when we were confronted by the absolutely urgent and overshadowing task of warding off the danger of being immediately crushed by the gigantic forces of world imperialism.

The turn towards the New Economic Policy was decided on at the last Congress with exceptional unanimity, with even greater unanimity than other questions have been decided by our Party (which, it must be admitted, is generally distinguished for its unanimity). This unanimity showed that the need for a new approach to socialist economy had fully matured. People who differed on many questions, and who assessed the situation from different angles, unanimously and very quickly and unhesitantly agreed that we lacked a real approach to socialist economy, to the task of building its foundation; that the only means of finding this approach was the New Economic Policy. Owing to the course taken by the development of war events, by the development of political events, by the development of capitalism in the old, civilised West, and owing also to the social and political conditions that developed in the colonies, we were the first to make a breach in the old bourgeois world at a time when our country was economically, if not the most backward, at any rate one of the most backward countries in the world. The vast majority of the peasants in our country are engaged in small individual farming. The items of our programme of building a Communist society, that we could apply immediately, were to some extent outside the sphere of activity of the broad mass of the peasantry, upon whom we imposed very heavy obligations, which we justified on the grounds that war permitted no wavering in this matter. Taken as a whole, this was accepted as justification by the peasantry, notwithstanding the mistakes we could not avoid. On the whole, the mass of the peasantry realised and understood that the enormous burdens imposed upon them were necessary in order to save the workers' and peasants' rule from the landowners and prevent it from being strangled by capitalist invasion, which threatened to wrest away all the gains of the revolution. But there was no link between the peasant economy and the economy that was being built up in the nationalised, socialised factories and on state farms.

We saw this clearly at the last Party Congress. We saw it so clearly that there was no hesitation whatever in the Party on the question as to whether the New Economic Policy was inevitable or not.

It is amusing to read what is said about our decision in the numerous publications of the various Russian parties abroad. There are only trifling differences in the opinions they express. Living with memories of the past, they still continue to reiterate that to this day

the Left Communists are opposed to the New Economic Policy. In 1921 they remembered what had occurred in 1918 and what our Left Communists themselves have forgotten; and they go on chewing this over and over again, assuring the world that these Bolsheviks are a sly and false lot, and that they are concealing from Europe that they have disagreements in their ranks. Reading this, one says to oneself, "Let them go on fooling themselves." If this is what they imagine is going on in this country, we can judge the degree of intelligence of these allegedly highly educated old fogies who have fled abroad. We know that there have been no disagreements in our ranks, and the reason for this is that the practical necessity of a different approach to the task of building the foundation of socialist economy was clear to all.

There was no link between the peasant economy and the new economy we tried to create. Does it exist now? Not yet. We are only approaching it. The whole significance of the New Economic Policy—which our press still often searches for everywhere except where it should search—the whole purpose of this policy is to find a way of establishing a link between the new economy, which we are creating with such enormous effort, and the peasant economy. That is what stands to our credit; without it we would not be Communist revolutionaries.

We began to develop the new economy in an entirely new way, brushing aside everything old. Had we not begun to develop it we would have been utterly defeated in the very first months, in the very first years. But the fact that we began to develop this new economy with such splendid audacity does not mean that we must necessarily continue in the same way. Why should we? There is no reason.

From the very beginning we said that we had to undertake an entirely new task, and that unless we received speedy assistance from our comrades, the workers in the capitalistically more developed countries, we should encounter incredible difficulties and certainly make a number of mistakes. The main thing is to be able dispassionately to examine where such mistakes have been made and to start again from the beginning. If we begin from the beginning, not twice, but many times, it will show that we are not bound by prejudice, and that we are approaching our task, which is the greatest the world has ever seen, with a sober outlook.

Today, as far as the New Economic Policy is concerned the main thing is to assimilate the experience of the past year correctly. That must be done, and we want to do it. And if we want to do it, come what may (and we do want to do it, and shall do it!), we must know that the problem of the New Economic Policy, the fundamental, decisive and overriding problem, is to establish a link between the new economy that we have begun to create (very badly, very clumsily, but have nevertheless begun to create, on the basis of an entirely new, socialist economy, of a new system of production and distribution) and the peasant economy, by which millions and millions of peasants obtain their livelihood.

This link has been lacking, and we must create it before anything else. Everything else must be subordinated to this. We have still to ascertain the extent to which the New Economic Policy has succeeded in creating this link without destroying what we have begun so clumsily to build.

We are developing our economy together with the peasantry. We shall have to alter it many times and organise it in such a way that it will provide a link between our socialist work on large-scale industry and agriculture and the work every peasant is doing as best he can, struggling out of poverty, without philosophising (for how can philosophising help him to extricate himself from his position and save him from the very real danger of a painful death from starvation?).

We must reveal this link so that we may see it clearly, so that all the people may see it, and so that the whole mass of the peasantry may see that there is a connection between their present severe, incredibly ruined, incredibly impoverished and painful existence and

the work which is being done for the sake of remote socialist ideals. We must bring about a situation where the ordinary rank-and-file working man realises that he has obtained some improvement, and that he has obtained it not in the way a few peasants obtained improvements under the rule of landowners and capitalists, when every improvement (undoubtedly there were improvements and very big ones) was accompanied by insult, derision and humiliation for the muzhik, by violence against the masses, which not a single peasant has forgotten, and which will not be forgotten in Russia for decades. Our aim is to restore the link, to prove to the peasant by deeds that we are beginning with what is intelligible, familiar and immediately accessible to him, in spite of his poverty, and not with something remote and fantastic from the peasant's point of view. We must prove that we can help him and that in this period, when the small peasant is in a state of appalling ruin, impoverishment and starvation, the Communists are really helping him. Either we prove that, or he will send us to the devil. That is absolutely inevitable.

Such is the significance of the New Economic Policy; it is the basis of our entire policy; it is the major lesson taught by the whole of the past year's experience in applying the New Economic Policy, and, so to speak, our main political rule for the coming year. The peasant is allowing us credit, and, of course, after what he has lived through, he cannot do otherwise. Taken in the mass, the peasants go on saying: "Well, if you are not able to do it yet, we shall wait; perhaps you will learn." But this credit cannot go on for ever.

This we must know; and having obtained credit we must hurry. We must know that the time is approaching when this peasant country will no longer give us credit, when it will demand cash, to use a commercial term. It will say: "You have postponed payment for so many months, so many years. But by this time, dear rulers, you must have learnt the most sound and reliable method of helping us free ourselves from poverty, want, starvation and ruin. You can do it, you have proved it." This is the test that we shall inevitably have to face; and, in the last analysis, this test will decide everything: the fate of NEP and the fate of Communist rule in Russia.

Shall we accomplish our immediate task or not? Is this NEP fit for anything or not? If the retreat turns out to be correct tactics, we must link up with the peasant masses while we are in retreat, and subsequently march forward with them a hundred times more slowly, but firmly and unswervingly, in a way that will always make it apparent to them that we are really marching forward. Then our cause will be absolutely invincible, and no power on earth can vanquish us. We did not accomplish this in the first year. We must say this frankly. And I am profoundly convinced (and our New Economic Policy enables us to draw this conclusion quite definitely and firmly) that if we appreciate the enormous danger harboured by NEP and concentrate all our forces on its weak points, we shall solve this problem.

Link up with the peasant masses, with the rank-and-file working peasants, and begin to move forward immeasurably, infinitely more slowly than we expected, but in such a way that the entire mass will actually move forward with us. If we do that we shall in time progress much more quickly than we even dream of today. This, in my opinion, is the first fundamental political lesson of the New Economic Policy.

The second, more specific lesson is the test through competition between state and capitalist enterprises. We are now forming mixed companies—I shall have something to say about these later on—which, like our state trade and our New Economic Policy as a whole, mean that we Communists are resorting to commercial, capitalist methods. These mixed companies are also important because through them practical competition is created between capitalist methods and our methods. Consider it practically. Up to now we have been writing a programme and making promises. In its time this was absolutely necessary. It is impossible to launch on a world revolution without a programme and without promises. If the whiteguards, including the Mensheviks, jeer at us for this, it only shows that

the Mensheviks and the socialists of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals have no idea, in general, of the way a revolution develops. We could proceed in no other way.

Now, however, the position is that we must put our work to a serious test, and not the sort of test that is made by control institutions set up by the Communists themselves, even though these control institutions are magnificent, even though they are almost the ideal control institutions in the Soviet system and the Party; such a test may be mockery from the point of view of the actual requirements of the peasant economy, but it is certainly no mockery from the standpoint of our construction. We are now setting up these control institutions but I am referring not to this test but to the test from the point of view of the entire economy.

The capitalist was able to supply things. He did it inefficiently, charged exorbitant prices, insulted and robbed us. The ordinary workers and peasants, who do not argue about Communism because they do not know what it is, are well aware of this.

"But the capitalists were, after all, able to supply things—are you? You are not able to do it." That is what we heard last spring; though not always clearly audible, it was the undertone of the whole of last spring's crisis. "As people you are splendid, but you cannot cope with the economic task you have undertaken." This is the simple and withering criticism which the peasantry—and through the peasantry, some sections of workers—levelled at the Communist Party last year. That is why in the NEP question, this old point acquires such significance.

We need a real test. The capitalists are operating alongside us. They are operating like robbers; they make profit; but they know how to do things. But you—you are trying to do it in a new way: you make no profit, your principles are Communist, your ideals are splendid; they are written out so beautifully that you seem to be saints, that you should go to heaven while you are still alive. But can you get things done? We need a test, a real test, not the kind the Central Control Commission makes when it censures somebody and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee imposes some penalty. Yes, we want a real test from the viewpoint of the national economy.

We Communists have received numerous deferments, and more credit has been allowed us than any other government has ever been given. Of course, we Communists helped to get rid of the capitalists and landowners. The peasants appreciate this and have given us an extension of time, longer credit, but only for a certain period. After that comes the test: can you run the economy as well as the others? The old capitalist can; you cannot.

That is the first lesson, the first main part of the political report of the Central Committee. We cannot run the economy. This has been proved in the past year. I would like very much to quote the example of several Gos-trests (if I may express myself in the beautiful Russia language that Turgenev praised so highly) to show how we run the economy.

Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, and largely owing to ill health, I have been unable to elaborate this part of my report and so I must confine myself to expressing my conviction, which is based on my observations of what is going on. During the past year we showed quite clearly that we cannot run the economy. That is the fundamental lesson. Either we prove the opposite in the coming year, or Soviet power will not be able to exist. And the greatest danger is that not everybody realises this. If all of us Communists, the responsible officials, clearly realise that we lack the ability to run the economy, that we must learn from the very beginning, then we shall win—that, in my opinion, is the fundamental conclusion that should be drawn. But many of us do not appreciate this and believe that if there are people who do think that way, it can only be the ignorant, who have not studied Communism; perhaps they will some day learn and understand. No, excuse me, the point is not that the peasant or the non-Party worker has not studied Communism, but that the time has passed when the job was to draft a programme and call upon the people to

carry out this great programme. That time has passed. Today you must prove that you can give practical economic assistance to the workers and to the peasants under the present difficult conditions, and thus demonstrate to them that you have stood the test of competition.

The mixed companies that we have begun to form, in which private capitalists, Russian and foreign, and Communists participate, provide one of the means by which we can learn to organise competition properly and show that we are no less able to establish a link with the peasant economy than the capitalists; that we can meet its requirements; that we can help the peasant make progress even at his present level, in spite of his backwardness; for it is impossible to change him in a brief span of time.

That is the sort of competition confronting us as an absolutely urgent task. It is the pivot of the New Economic Policy and, in my opinion, the quintessence of the Party's policy. We are faced with any number of purely political problems and difficulties. You know what they are: Genoa, the danger of intervention. The difficulties are enormous but they are nothing compared with this economic difficulty. We know how things are done in the political field; we have gained considerable experience; we have learned a lot about bourgeois diplomacy. It is the sort of thing the Mensheviks taught us for fifteen years, and we got something useful out of it. This is not new.

But here is something we must do now in the economic field. We must win the competition against the ordinary shop assistant, the ordinary capitalist, the merchant, who will go to the peasant without arguing about Communism. Just imagine, he will not begin to argue about Communism, but will argue in this way—if you want to obtain something, or carry on trade properly, or if you want to build, I will do the building at a high price; the Communists will, perhaps, build at a higher price, perhaps even ten times higher. It is this kind of agitation that is now the crux of the matter; herein lies the root of economics.

I repeat, thanks to our correct policy, the people allowed us a deferment of payment and credit, and this, to put it in terms of NEP, is a promissory note. But this promissory note is undated, and you cannot learn from the wording when it will be presented for redemption. Therein lies the danger; this is the specific feature that distinguishes these political promissory notes from ordinary, commercial promissory notes. We must concentrate all our attention on this, and not rest content with the fact that there are responsible and good Communists in all the state trusts and mixed companies. That is of no use, because these Communists do not know how to run the economy and, in that respect, are inferior to the ordinary capitalist salesmen, who have received their training in big factories and big firms. But we refuse to admit this; in this field Communist conceit—*komchvanstvo* [*comconceit*—Ed], to use the great Russian language again—still persists. The whole point is that the responsible Communists, even the best of them, who are unquestionably honest and loyal, who in the old days suffered penal servitude and did not fear death, do not know how to trade, because they are not businessmen, they have not learnt to trade, do not want to learn and do not understand that they must start learning from the beginning. Communists, revolutionaries who have accomplished the greatest revolution in the world on whom the eyes of, if not forty pyramids then, at all events, forty European countries are turned in the hope of emancipation from capitalism, must learn from ordinary salesmen. But these ordinary salesmen have had ten years' warehouse experience and know the business, whereas the responsible Communists and devoted revolutionaries do not know the business, and do not even realise that they do not know it.

And so, comrades, if we do away with at least this elementary ignorance we shall achieve a tremendous victory. We must leave this Congress with the conviction that we are ignorant of this business and with the resolve to start learning it from the bottom. After all, we have not ceased to be revolutionaries (although many say, and not altogether without

foundation, that we have become bureaucrats) and can understand this simple thing, that in a new and unusually difficult undertaking we must be prepared to start from the beginning over and over again. If after starting you find yourselves at a dead end, start again, and go on doing it ten times if necessary, until you attain your object. Do not put on airs, do not be conceited because you are a Communist while there is some non-Party salesman, perhaps a whiteguard—and very likely he is a whiteguard—who can do things which economically must be done at all costs, but which you cannot do. If you, responsible Communists, who have hundreds of ranks and titles and wear Communist and Soviet Orders, realise this, you will attain your object, because this is something that can be learned.

We have some successes, even if only very tiny ones, to record for the past year, but they are insignificant. The main thing is that there is no realisation nor widespread conviction among all Communists that at the present time the responsible and most devoted Russian Communist is less able to perform these functions than any salesman of the old school. I repeat, we must start learning from the very beginning. If we realise this, we shall pass our test; and the test is a serious one which the impending financial crisis will set—the test set by the Russian and international market to which we are subordinated, with which we are connected, and from which we cannot isolate ourselves. The test is a crucial one, for here we may be beaten economically and politically.

That is how the question stands and it cannot be otherwise, for the competition will be very severe, and it will be decisive. We had many outlets and loopholes that enabled us to escape from our political and economic difficulties. We can proudly say that up to now we have been able to utilise these outlets and loopholes in various combinations corresponding to the varying circumstances. But now we have no other outlets. Permit me to say this to you without exaggeration, because in this respect it is really “the last and decisive battle,” not against international capitalism—against that we shall yet have many “last and decisive battles”—but against Russian capitalism, against the capitalism that is growing out of the small-peasant economy, the capitalism that is fostered by the latter. Here we shall have a fight on our hands in the immediate future, and the date of it cannot be fixed exactly. Here the “last and decisive battle” is impending; here there are no political or any other flanking movements that we can undertake, because this is a test in competition with private capital. Either we pass this test in competition with private capital, or we fail completely. To help us pass it we have political power and a host of economic and other resources; we have everything you want except ability. We lack ability. And if we learn this simple lesson from the experience of last year and take it as our guiding line for the whole of 1922, we shall conquer this difficulty, too, in spite of the fact that it is much greater than the previous difficulty, for it rests upon ourselves. It is not like some external enemy. The difficulty is that we ourselves refuse to admit the unpleasant truth forced upon us; we refuse to undertake the unpleasant duty that the situation demands of us, namely, to start learning from the beginning. That, in my opinion, is the second lesson that we must learn from the New Economic Policy.

The third, supplementary lesson is on the question of state capitalism. It is a pity Comrade Bukharin is not present at the Congress. I should have liked to argue with him a little, but that had better be postponed to the next Congress. On the question of state capitalism, I think that generally our press and our Party make the mistake of dropping into intellectualism, into liberalism; we philosophise about how state capitalism is to be interpreted, and look into old books. But in those old books you will not find what we are discussing; they deal with the state capitalism that exists under capitalism. Not a single book has been written about state capitalism under Communism. It did not occur even to Marx to write a word on this subject; and he died without leaving a single precise statement or definite instruction on it. That is why we must overcome the difficulty entirely by ourselves. And if we make a general mental survey of our press and see what has been written about state

capitalism, as I tried to do when I was preparing this report, we shall be convinced that it is missing the target, that it is looking in an entirely wrong direction.

The state capitalism discussed in all books on economics is that which exists under the capitalist system, where the state brings under its direct control certain capitalist enterprises. But ours is a proletarian state; it rests on the proletariat; it gives the proletariat all political privileges; and through the medium of the proletariat it attracts to itself the lower ranks of the peasantry (you remember that we began this work through the Poor Peasants' Committees). That is why very many people are misled by the term state capitalism. To avoid this we must remember the fundamental thing that state capitalism in the form we have here is not dealt with in any theory, or in any books, for the simple reason that all the usual concepts connected with this term are associated with bourgeois rule in capitalist society. Our society is one which has left the rails of capitalism, but has not yet got on to new rails. The state in this society is not ruled by the bourgeoisie, but by the proletariat. We refuse to understand that when we say "state" we mean ourselves, the proletariat, the vanguard of the working class. State capitalism is capitalism which we shall be able to restrain, and the limits of which we shall be able to fix. This state capitalism is connected with the state, and the state is the workers, the advanced section of the workers, the vanguard. We are the state.

State capitalism is capitalism that we must confine within certain bounds; but we have not yet learned to confine it within those bounds. That is the whole point. And it rests with us to determine what this state capitalism is to be. We have sufficient, quite sufficient political power; we also have sufficient economic resources at our command, but the vanguard of the working class which has been brought to the forefront to directly supervise, to determine the boundaries, to demarcate, to subordinate and not be subordinated itself, lacks sufficient ability for it. All that is needed here is ability, and that is what we do not have.

Never before in history has there been a situation in which the proletariat, the revolutionary vanguard, possessed sufficient political power and had state capitalism existing alongside it. The whole question turns on our understanding that this is the capitalism that we can and must permit, that we can and must confine within certain bounds; for this capitalism is essential for the broad masses of the peasantry and for private capital, which must trade in such a way as to satisfy the needs of the peasantry. We must organise things in such a way as to make possible the customary operation of capitalist economy and capitalist exchange, because this is essential for the people. Without it, existence is impossible. All the rest is not an absolutely vital matter to this camp. They can resign themselves to all that. You Communists, you workers, you, the politically enlightened section of the proletariat, which undertook to administer the state, must be able to arrange it so that the state, which you have taken into your hands, shall function the way you want it to. Well, we have lived through a year, the state is in our hands; but has it operated the New Economic Policy in the way we wanted in this past year? No. But we refuse to admit that it did not operate in the way we wanted. How did it operate? The machine refused to obey the hand that guided it. It was like a car that was going not in the direction the driver desired, but in the direction someone else desired; as if it were being driven by some mysterious, lawless hand, God knows whose, perhaps of a profiteer, or of a private capitalist, or of both. Be that as it may, the car is not going quite in the direction the man at the wheel imagines, and often it goes in an altogether different direction. This is the main thing that must be remembered in regard to state capitalism. In this main field we must start learning from the very beginning, and only when we have thoroughly understood and appreciated this can we be sure that we shall learn.

Now I come to the question of halting the retreat, a question I dealt with in my speech at the Congress of Metal-workers. Since then I have not heard any objection, either in the

Party press, or in private letters from comrades, or in the Central Committee. The Central Committee approved my plan, which was, that in the report of the Central Committee to the present Congress strong emphasis should be laid on calling a halt to this retreat and that the Congress should give binding instructions on behalf of the whole Party accordingly. For a year we have been retreating. On behalf of the Party we must now call a halt. The purpose pursued by the retreat has been achieved. This period is drawing, or has drawn, to a close. We now have a different objective, that of regrouping our forces. We have reached a new line; on the whole, we have conducted the retreat in fairly good order. True, not a few voices were heard from various sides which tried to convert this retreat into a stampede. Some—for example, several members of the group which bore the name of Workers' Opposition (I don't think they had any right to that name)—argued that we were not retreating properly in some sector or other. Owing to their excessive zeal they found themselves at the wrong door, and now they realise it. At that time they did not see that their activities did not help us to correct our movement, but merely had the effect of spreading panic and hindering our effort to beat a disciplined retreat.

Retreat is a difficult matter, especially for revolutionaries who are accustomed to advance; especially when they have been accustomed to advance with enormous success for several years; especially if they are surrounded by revolutionaries in other countries who are longing for the time when they can launch an offensive. Seeing that we were retreating, several of them burst into tears in a disgraceful and childish manner, as was the case at the last extended Plenary Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. Moved by the best Communist sentiments and Communist aspirations, several of the comrades burst into tears because—oh horror!—the good Russian Communists were retreating. Perhaps it is now difficult for me to understand this West-European mentality, although I lived for quite a number of years in those marvellous democratic countries as an exile. Perhaps from their point of view this is such a difficult matter to understand that it is enough to make one weep. We, at any rate, have no time for sentiment. It was clear to us that because we had advanced so successfully for many years and had achieved so many extraordinary victories (and all this in a country that was in an appalling state of ruin and lacked the material resources!), to consolidate that advance, since we had gained so much, it was absolutely essential for us to retreat. We could not hold all the positions we had captured in the first onslaught. On the other hand, it was because we had captured so much in the first onslaught, on the crest of the wave of enthusiasm displayed by the workers and peasants, that we had room enough to retreat a long distance, and can retreat still further now, without losing our main and fundamental positions. On the whole, the retreat was fairly orderly, although certain panic-stricken voices, among them that of the Workers' Opposition (this was the tremendous harm it did!), caused losses in our ranks, caused a relaxation of discipline, and disturbed the proper order of retreat. The most dangerous thing during a retreat is panic. When a whole army (I speak in the figurative sense) is in retreat, it cannot have the same morale as when it is advancing. At every step you find a certain mood of depression. We even had poets who wrote that people were cold and starving in Moscow, that "everything before was bright and beautiful, but now trade and profiteering abound." We have had quite a number of poetic effusions of this sort.

Of course, retreat breeds all this. That is where the serious danger lies; it is terribly difficult to retreat after a great victorious advance, for the relations are entirely different. During a victorious advance, even if discipline is relaxed, everybody presses forward on his own accord. During a retreat, however, discipline must be more conscious and is a hundred times more necessary, because, when the entire army is in retreat, it does not know or see where it should halt. It sees only retreat; under such circumstances a few panic-stricken voices are, at times, enough to cause a stampede. The danger here is enormous. When a real army is in retreat, machine-guns are kept ready, and when an orderly retreat degenerates into a disorderly one, the command to fire is given, and quite rightly, too.

If, during an incredibly difficult retreat, when everything depends on preserving proper order, anyone spreads panic—even from the best of motives—the slightest breach of discipline must be punished severely, sternly, ruthlessly; and this applies not only to certain of our internal Party affairs, but also, and to a greater extent, to such gentry as the Mensheviks, and to all the gentry of the Two-and-a-Half International.

The other day I read an article by Comrade Rakosi in No. 20 of *The Communist International* on a new book by Otto Bauer, from whom at one time we all learned, but who, like Kautsky, became a miserable petty bourgeois after the war. Bauer now writes: "There, they are now retreating to capitalism! We have always said that it was a bourgeois revolution."

And the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, all of whom preach this sort of thing, are astonished when we declare that we shall shoot people for such things. They are amazed; but surely it is clear. When an army is in retreat a hundred times more discipline is required than when it is advancing, because during an advance everybody presses forward. If everybody started rushing back now, it would spell immediate and inevitable disaster.

The most important thing at such a moment is to retreat in good order, to fix the precise limits of the retreat, and not to give way to panic. And when a Menshevik says, "You are now retreating; I have been advocating retreat all the time, I agree with you, I am your man, let us retreat together," we say in reply, "For the public manifestations of Menshevism our revolutionary courts must pass the death sentence, otherwise they are not our courts, but God knows what."

They cannot understand this and exclaim: "What dictatorial manners these people have!" They still think we are persecuting the Mensheviks because they fought us in Geneva. But had we done that we should have been unable to hold power even for two months. Indeed, the sermons which Otto Bauer, the leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries preach express their true nature—"The revolution has gone too far. What you are saying now we have been saying all the time, permit us to say it again." But we say in reply: "Permit us to put you before a firing squad for saying that. Either you refrain from expressing your views, or, if you insist on expressing your political views publicly in the present circumstances, when our position is far more difficult than it was when the whiteguards were directly attacking us, then you will have only yourselves to blame if we treat you as the worst and most pernicious whiteguard elements." We must never forget this.

When I speak about halting the retreat I do not mean that we have learned to trade. On the contrary, I am of the opposite opinion; and if my speech were to create that impression it would show that I had been misunderstood and that I am unable to express my thoughts properly.

The point, however, is that we must put a stop to the nervousness and fuss that have arisen with the introduction of NEP—the desire to do everything in a new way and to adapt everything. We now have a number of mixed companies. True, we have only very few. There are nine companies formed in conjunction with foreign capitalists and sanctioned by the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. The Sokolnikov Commission has sanctioned six and the Northern Timber Trust has sanctioned two. Thus we now have seventeen companies with an aggregate capital amounting to many millions, sanctioned by several government departments (of course, there is plenty of confusion with all these departments, so that some slip here is also possible). At any rate, we have formed companies jointly with Russian and foreign capitalists. There are only a few of them. But this small but practical start shows that the Communists have been judged by what they do. They have not been judged by such high institutions as the Central Control Commission and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. The Central Control Commission is a splendid institution, of course, and we shall now give it more power. For all that, the judgment these institutions pass on

Communists is not—just imagine—recognised on the international market. (*Laughter.*) But now that ordinary Russian and foreign capitalists are joining the Communists in forming mixed companies, we say, "We can do things after all; bad as it is, meagre as it is, we have got something for a start." True, it is not very much. Just think of it: a year has passed since we declared that we would devote all our energy (and it is said that we have a great deal of energy) to this matter, and in this year we have managed to form only seventeen companies.

This shows how devilishly clumsy and inept we are; how much Oblomovism still remains, for which we shall inevitably get a good thrashing. For all that, I repeat, a start, a reconnaissance has been made. The capitalists would not agree to have dealings with us if the elementary conditions for their operations did not exist. Even if only a very small section of them has agreed to this, it shows that we have scored a partial victory.

Of course, they will cheat us in these companies, cheat us so that it will take several years before matters are straightened out. but that does not matter. I do not say that is a victory; it is a reconnaissance, which shows that we have an arena, we have a terrain, and can now stop the retreat.

The reconnaissance has revealed that we have concluded an insignificant number of agreements with capitalists; but we have concluded them for all that. We must learn from that and continue our operations. In this sense we must put a stop to nervousness, screaming and fuss. We received notes and telephone messages, one after another asking, "Now that we have NEP, may we be reorganised too?" Everybody is bustling, and we get utter confusion; nobody is doing any practical work; everybody is continuously arguing about how to adapt oneself to NEP, but no practical results are forthcoming.

The merchants are laughing at us Communists, and in all probability are saying, "Formerly there were Persuaders-in-Chief, now we have Talkers-in-Chief." That the capitalists gloated over the fact that we started late, that we were not sharp enough—of that there need not be the slightest doubt. In this sense, I say, these instructions must be endorsed in the name of the Congress.

The retreat is at an end. The principal methods of operation, of how we are to work with the capitalists, are outlined. We have examples, even if an insignificant number.

Stop philosophising and arguing about NEP. Let the poets write verses, that is what they are poets for. But you economists, you stop arguing about NEP and get more companies formed; check up on how many Communists we have who can organise successful competition with the capitalists.

The retreat has come to an end; it is now a matter of regrouping our forces. These are the instructions that the Congress must pass so as to put an end to fuss and bustle. Calm down, do not philosophise; if you do, it will be counted as a black mark against you. Show by your practical efforts that you can work no less efficiently than the capitalists. The capitalists create an economic link with the peasants in order to amass wealth; you must create a link with peasant economy in order to strengthen the economic power of our proletarian state. You have the advantage over the capitalists in that political power is in your hands; you have a number of economic weapons at your command; the only trouble is that you cannot make proper use of them. Look at things more soberly. Cast off the tinsel, the festive Communist garments, learn a simple thing simply, and we shall beat the private capitalist. We possess political power; we possess a host of economic weapons. If we beat capitalism and create a link with peasant farming we shall become an absolutely invincible power. Then the building of socialism will not be the task of that drop in the ocean, called the Communist Party, but the task of the entire mass of the working people. Then the rank-and-file peasants will see that we are helping them and they will follow our lead. Consequently, even if the pace is a hundred times slower, it will be a million times more certain and more sure.

It is in this sense that we must speak of halting the retreat; and the proper thing to do is, in one way or another, to make this slogan a Congress decision.

In this connection, I should like to deal with the question: what is the Bolsheviks' New Economic Policy—evolution or tactics? This question has been raised by the *Smena Vekh* people, who, as you know, are a trend which has arisen among Russian emigres; it is a socio-political trend led by some of the most prominent Constitutional-Democrats, several Ministers of the former Kolchak government, people who have come to the conclusion that the Soviet government is building up the Russian state and therefore should be supported. They argue as follows: "What sort of state is the Soviet government building? The Communists say they are building a Communist state and assure us that the new policy is a matter of tactics: the Bolsheviks are making use of the private capitalists in a difficult situation, but later they will get the upper hand. The Bolsheviks can say what they like; as a matter of fact it is not tactics but evolution, internal regeneration; they will arrive at the ordinary bourgeois state, and we must support them. History proceeds in devious ways."

Some of them pretend to be Communists, but there are others who are more straightforward, one of these is Ustryalov. I think he was a Minister in Kolchak's government. He does not agree with his colleagues and says: "You can think what you like about Communism, but I maintain that it is not a matter of tactics, but of evolution." I think that by being straightforward like this, Ustryalov is rendering us a great service. We, and I particularly because of my position, hear a lot of sentimental Communist lies, "Communist fibbing," every day, and sometimes we get sick to death of them. But now instead of these "Communist fibs" I get a copy of *Smena Vekh*, which says quite plainly: "Things are by no means what you imagine them to be. As a matter of fact, you are slipping into the ordinary bourgeois morass with Communist flags inscribed with catchwords stuck all over the place." This is very useful. It is not a repetition of what we are constantly hearing around us, but the plain class truth uttered by the class enemy. It is very useful to read this sort of thing; and it was written not because the Communist state allows you to write some things and not others, but because it really is the class truth, bluntly and frankly uttered by the class enemy. "I am in favour of supporting the Soviet government," say Ustryalov, although he was a Constitutional-Democrat, a bourgeois, and supported intervention. "I am in favour of supporting Soviet power because it has taken the road that will lead it to the ordinary bourgeois state."

This is very useful, and I think that we must keep it in mind. It is much better for us if the *Smena Vekh* people write in that strain than if some of them pretend to be almost Communists, so that from a distance one cannot tell whether they believe in God or in the Communist revolution. We must say frankly that such candid enemies are useful. We must say frankly that the things Ustryalov speaks about are possible. History knows all sorts of metamorphoses. Relying on firmness of convictions, loyalty, and other splendid moral qualities is anything but a serious attitude in politics. A few people may be endowed with splendid moral qualities, but historical issues are decided by vast masses, which, if the few do not suit them, may at times treat them none too politely.

There have been many cases of this kind, that is why we must welcome this frank utterance of the *Smena Vekh* people. The enemy is speaking the class truth and is pointing to the danger that confronts us, and which the enemy is striving to make inevitable. *Smena Vekh* adherents express the sentiments of thousands and tens of thousands of bourgeois, or of Soviet employees whose function it is to operate our New Economic Policy. This is the real and main danger. And that is why attention must be concentrated mainly on the question: "Who will win?" I have spoken about competition. No direct onslaught is being made on us now; nobody is clutching us by the throat. True, we have yet to see what will happen tomorrow; but today we are not being subjected to armed attack. Nevertheless, the fight against capitalist society has become a hundred times more fierce and perilous, because we are not always able to tell enemies from friends.

When I spoke about Communist competition, what I had in mind were not Communist sympathies but the development of economic forms and social systems. This is not competition but, if not the last, then nearly the last, desperate, furious, life-and death struggle between capitalism and Communism.

And here we must squarely put the question. Wherein lies our strength and what do we lack? We have quite enough political power. I hardly think there is anyone here who will assert that on such-and-such a practical question, in such-and-such a business institution, the Communists, the Communist Party, lack sufficient power. There are people who think only of this, but these people are hopelessly looking backward and cannot understand that one must look ahead. The main economic power is in our hands. All the vital large enterprises, the railways, etc., are in our hands. The number of leased enterprises, although considerable in places, is on the whole insignificant; altogether it is infinitesimal compared with the rest. The economic power in the hands of the proletarian state of Russia is quite adequate to ensure the transition to Communism. What then is lacking? Obviously, what is lacking is culture among the functions. If we take Moscow with its 4,700 Communists in responsible positions, and if we take that huge bureaucratic machine, that gigantic heap, we must ask: who is directing whom? I doubt very much whether it can truthfully be said that the Communists are directing that heap. To tell the truth, they are not directing, they are being directed. Something analogous happened here to what we were told in our history lessons when we were children: sometimes one nation conquers another, the nation that conquers is the conqueror and the nation that is vanquished is the conquered nation. This is simple and intelligible to all. But what happens to the culture of these nations? Here things are not so simple. If the conquering nation is more cultured than the vanquished nation, the former imposes its culture upon the latter; but if the opposite is the case, the vanquished nation imposes its culture upon the conqueror. Has not something like this happened in the capital of the R.S.F.S.R.? Have the 4,700 Communists (nearly a whole army division, and all of them the very best) come under the influence of an alien culture? True, there may be the impression that the vanquished have a high level of culture. But that is not the case at all. Their culture is miserable, insignificant, but it is still at a higher level than ours. Miserable and low as it is, it is higher than that of our responsible Communist administrators, for the latter lack administrative ability. Communists who are put at the head of departments—and sometimes artful saboteurs deliberately put them in these positions in order to use them as a shield—are often fooled. This is a very unpleasant admission to make, or, at any rate, not a very pleasant one; but I think we must admit it, for at present this is the salient problem. I think that this is the political lesson of the past year, and it is around this that the struggle will rage in 1922.

Will the responsible Communists of the R.S.F.S.R. and of the Russian Communist Party realise that they cannot administer; that they only imagine they are directing, but are, actually, being directed? If they realise this they will learn, of course; for this business can be learnt. But one must study hard to learn it, and our people are not doing this. They scatter orders and decrees right and left, but the result is quite different from what they want.

The competition and rivalry that we have placed on the order of the day by proclaiming NEP is a serious business. It appears to be going on in all government offices, but as a matter of fact it is one more form of the struggle between two irreconcilably hostile classes. It is another form of the struggle that has not yet been brought to a head, and culturally it has not yet been resolved even in the central government departments in Moscow. Very often the bourgeois officials know the business better than our best Communists, who are invested with authority and have every opportunity, but who cannot make the slightest use of their rights and authority.

I should like to quote a passage from a pamphlet by Alexander Todorsky. It was published in Vesyegonsk (there is an uyezd town of that name in Tver Gubernia) on the first anniversary of the Soviet revolution in Russia, on November 7, 1918, a long, long time ago. Evidently this Vesyegonsk comrade is a member of the Party—I read the pamphlet a long time ago and cannot say for certain. He describes how he set to work to equip two Soviet factories, and for this purpose enlisted the services of two bourgeois. He did this in the way these things were done at that time—threatened to imprison them and to confiscate all their property. They were enlisted for the task of restoring the factories. We know how the services of the bourgeoisie were enlisted in 1918 (*laughter*); so there is no need for me to go into details. The methods we are now using to enlist the bourgeoisie are different. But here is the conclusion he arrived at. "This is only half the job. It is not enough to defeat the bourgeoisie, to overpower them; they must be compelled to work for us."

Now these are remarkable words. They are remarkable for they show that even in the town of Vesyegonsk, even in 1918, there were people who had a correct understanding of the relationship between the victorious proletariat and the vanquished bourgeoisie.

When we rap the exploiters' knuckles, render them innocuous, overpower them, it is only half the job. In Moscow, however, ninety out of a hundred responsible officials imagine that all we have to do is to overpower, render innocuous and rap knuckles. What I have said about the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and whiteguards is very often interpreted solely as rendering innocuous, rapping knuckles (and, perhaps, not only the knuckles, but some other place) and overpowering. But that is only half the job. It was only half the job even in 1918, when this was written by the Vesyegonsk comrade; now it is even less than one-fourth. We must make these hands work for us, and not have responsible Communists at the head of departments, enjoying rank and title, but actually swimming with the stream together with the bourgeoisie. That is the whole point.

The idea of building Communist society exclusively with the hands of the Communists is childish, absolutely childish. We Communists are but a drop in the ocean, a drop in the ocean of the people. We shall be able to lead the people along the road we have chosen only if we correctly determine it not only from the standpoint of its direction in world history. From that point of view we have determined the road quite correctly, and this is corroborated by the situation in every country. We must also determine it correctly for our own native land, for our country. But the direction in world history is not the only factor. Other factors are whether there will be intervention or not, and whether we shall be able to supply the peasants with goods in exchange for their grain. The peasants will say: "You are splendid fellows, you defended our country. That is why we obeyed you. But if you cannot run the show, get out!" Yes, that is what the peasants will say.

We Communists shall be able to direct our economy if we succeed in utilising the hands of the bourgeoisie in building up this economy of ours and in the meantime learn from these bourgeoisie and guide them along the road we want them to travel. But when a Communist imagines that he knows everything, when he says: "I am a responsible Communist, I have beaten enemies far more formidable than any salesman. We have fought at the front and have beaten far more formidable enemies"—it is this prevailing mood that is doing us great harm.

Rendering the exploiters innocuous, rapping them over the knuckles, clipping their wings is the least important part of the job. That must be done, and our State Political Administration and our courts must do it more vigorously than they have up to now. They must remember that they are proletarian courts surrounded by enemies the world over. This is not difficult, and in the main we have learned to do it. Here a certain amount of pressure must be exercised, but that is easy.

To win the second part of the victory, i.e., to build Communism with the hands of non-Communists, to acquire the practical ability to do what is economically necessary, we must establish a link with peasant farming, we must satisfy the peasant, so that he will say: "Hard, bitter and painful as starvation is, I see a government that is an unusual one, is no ordinary one, but is doing something practically useful, something tangible." We must see to it that the numerous elements with whom we are co-operating, and who far exceed us in number, work in such a way as to enable us to supervise them: we must learn to understand this work, and direct their hands so that they do something useful for Communism. This is the key point of the present situation; for although individual Communists have understood and realised that it is necessary to enlist the non-Party people for this work, the rank-and-file of our Party have not. Many circulars have been written, much has been said about this, but has anything been accomplished during the past year? Nothing. Not five Party committees out of a hundred can show practical results. This shows how much we lag behind the requirements of the present time: how much we are still living in the traditions 1918 and 1919. Those were great years, a great historical task was then accomplished. But if we only look back on those years and do not see the task that now confronts us, we shall be doomed, certainly and absolutely. And the whole point is that we refuse to admit it.

I should now like to give two practical examples to illustrate how we administer. I have said already that it would be more correct to take one of the state trusts as an example, but I must ask you to excuse me for not being able to apply this proper method, for to do so it would have been necessary to study the concrete material concerning at least one state trust. Unfortunately, I have been unable to do that, and so I will take two small examples. One example is the accusation of bureaucracy levelled at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade by the Moscow Consumers' Co-operative Society. The other example I will take from the Donets Basin.

The first example is not quite relevant—I am unable to find a better—but it will serve to illustrate my main point. As you know from the newspapers, I have been unable to deal with affairs directly during these past few months. I have not been attending the Council of People's Commissars, or the Central Committee. During the short and rare visits I made to Moscow I was struck by the desperate and terrible complaints levelled at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade. I have never doubted for a moment that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade functions badly and that it is tied up with red tape. But when the complaints became particularly bitter I tried to investigate the matter, to take a concrete example and for once get to the bottom of it, to ascertain the cause, to ascertain why the machine was not working properly.

The M.C.C.S. wanted to purchase a quantity of canned goods. A French citizen appeared and offered some. I do not know whether he did it in the interests of the international policy and with the knowledge of the leadership of the Entente countries, or with the approval of Poincare and the other enemies of the Soviet government (I think our historians will investigate and make this clear after the Genoa Conference), but the fact is that the French bourgeoisie took not only a theoretical, but also a practical interest in this business, as a French bourgeois turned up in Moscow with an offer of canned goods. Moscow is starving; in the summer the situation will be worse; no meat has been delivered, and knowing the merits of our People's Commissariat of Railways, probably none will be delivered.

An offer is made to sell canned meat for Soviet currency (whether the meat is entirely bad or not will be established by a future investigation). What could be simpler? But if the matter is approached in the Soviet way, it turns out to be not so simple after all. I was unable to go into the matter personally, but I ordered an investigation and I have before me the report which shows how this celebrated case developed. It started with the decision

adopted on February 11 by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on the report of Comrade Kamenev concerning the desirability of purchasing food abroad. Of course, how could a Russian citizen decide such a question without the consent of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party! Think of it! How could 4,700 responsible officials (and this is only according to the census) decide a matter like purchasing food abroad without the consent of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee? This would be something supernatural, of course. Evidently, Comrade Kamenev understands our policy and the realities of our position perfectly well, and therefore, he did not place too much reliance on the numerous responsible officials. He started by taking the bull by the horns—if not the bull, at all events the Political Bureau—and without any difficulty (I did not hear that there was any discussion over the matter) obtained a resolution stating: "To call the attention of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade to the desirability of importing food from abroad; the import duties...", etc. The attention of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade was drawn to this. Things started moving. This was on February 11. I remember that I had occasion to be in Moscow at the very end of February, or about that time, and what did I find? The complaints, the despairing complaints of the Moscow comrades. "What's the matter?" I ask. "There is no way we can buy these provisions." "Why?" "Because of the red tape of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade." I had not been taking part in affairs for a long time and I did not know that the Political Bureau had adopted a decision on the matter. I merely ordered the Executive Secretary of our Council to investigate, procure the relevant documents and show them to me. The matter was settled when Krasin arrived. Kamenev discussed the matter with him, the transaction was arranged, and the canned meat was purchased. All's well that ends well.

I have not the least doubt that Kamenev and Krasin can come to an understanding and correctly determine the political line desired by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. If the Political line on commercial matters were decided by Kamenev and Krasin, ours would be the best Soviet Republic in the world. But Kamenev, a member of the Political Bureau, and Krasin—the latter is busy with diplomatic affairs connected with Genoa, affairs which have entailed an enormous, an excessive amount of labour—cannot be dragged into every transaction, dragged into the business of buying canned goods from a French citizen. That is not the way to work. This is not new, not economic, and not a policy, but sheer mockery. Now I have the report of the investigation into this matter. In fact, I have two reports: one, the report of the investigation made by Gorbunov, the Executive Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars, and his assistant, Miroshnikov; and the other, the report of the investigation made by the State Political Administration. I do not know why the latter interested itself in the matter, and I am not quite sure whether it was proper for it to do so; but I will not go into that now, because I am afraid this might entail another investigation. The important thing is that material on the matter has been collected and I now have it before me.

On arriving in Moscow at the end of February I heard bitter complaints, "We cannot buy the canned goods," although in Libau there was a ship with a cargo of canned goods, and the owners were prepared to take Soviet currency for real canned goods! (*Laughter.*) If these canned goods are not entirely bad (and I now emphasise the "if", because I am not sure that I shall not call for another investigation, the results of which, however, we shall have to report at the next Congress), if, I say, these goods are not entirely bad and they have been purchased, I ask: why could not this matter have been settled without Kamenev and Krasin? For the report I have before me I gather that one responsible Communist sent another responsible Communist to the devil. I also gather from this report that one responsible Communist said to another responsible Communist. "From now on I shall not talk to you except in the presence of a lawyer." Reading this report I recalled the time when I was

in exile in Siberia, twenty-five years ago, and had occasion to act in the capacity of a lawyer. I was not a certified lawyer, because, being summarily exiled, I was not allowed to practise; but as there was no other lawyer in the region, people came and confided their troubles to me. But sometimes I had the greatest difficulty in understanding what the trouble was. A woman would come and, of course, start telling me a long story about her relatives, and it was incredibly difficult to get from her what she really wanted. I said to her. "Bring me a copy." She went on with her endless and pointless story. When I repeated, "Bring me a copy", she left, complaining: "He won't hear what I have to say unless I bring a copy." In our colony we had a hearty laugh over this copy. I was able, however, to make some progress. People came to me, brought copies of the necessary documents, and I was able to gather what their trouble was, what they complained of, what ailed them. This was twenty-five years ago, in Siberia, in a place many hundreds of versts from the nearest railway station.

But why was it necessary, three years after the revolution, in the capital of the Soviet Republic, to have two investigations, the intervention of Kamenev and Krasin and the instructions of the Political Bureau to purchase canned goods? What was lacking? Political power? No. The money was forthcoming, so they had economic as well as political power. All the necessary institutions were available. What was lacking, then? Culture. Ninety-nine out of every hundred officials of the M.C.C.S.—against whom I have no complaint to make whatever, and whom I regard as excellent Communists—and of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade lack culture. They were unable to approach the matter in a cultured manner.

When I first heard of the matter I sent the following written proposal to the Central Committee: "All the officials concerned of the Moscow government departments—except the members of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, who, as you know, enjoy immunity—should be put in the worst prison in Moscow for six hours, and those of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade for thirty-six hours." And then it turned out that no one could say who the culprits were (*laughter*), and from what I have told you it is evident that the culprits will never be discovered. It is simply the usual inability of the Russian intellectuals to get things done—inefficiency and slovenliness. First they rush at a job, do a little bit, and then think about it, and when nothing comes of it, they run to complain to Kamenev and want the matter to be brought before the Political Bureau. Of course, all difficult state problems should be brought before the Political Bureau—I shall have to say something about that later on—but one should think first and then act. If you want to bring up a case, submit the appropriate documents. First send a telegram, and in Moscow we also have telephones; send a telephone message to the competent department and a copy to Tsyurupa saying: "I regard the transaction as urgent and will take proceedings against anyone guilty of red tape." One must think of this elementary culture, one must approach things in a thoughtful manner. If the business is not settled in the course of a few minutes, by telephone, collect the documents and say: "If you start any of your red tape I shall have you clapped in gaol." But not a moment's thought is given to the matter, there is no preparation, the usual bustle, several commissions, everybody is tired out, exhausted, run down, and things begin to move only when Kamenev is put in touch with Krasin. All this is typical of what goes on not only in the capital, Moscow, but also in the other capitals, in the capitals of all independent republics and regions. And the same thing, even a hundred times worse, constantly goes on in the provincial towns.

In our struggle we must remember that Communists must be able to reason. They may be perfectly familiar with the revolutionary struggle and with the state of the revolutionary movement all over the world; but if we are to extricate ourselves from desperate poverty and want we need culture, integrity and an ability to reason. Many lack these qualities. It would be unfair to say that the responsible Communists do not fulfil their functions

conscientiously. The overwhelming majority of them, ninety-nine out of a hundred, are not only conscientious—they proved their devotion to the revolution under the most difficult conditions before the fall of tsarism and after the revolution; they were ready to lay down their lives. Therefore, it would be radically wrong to attribute the trouble to lack of conscientiousness. We need a cultured approach to the simplest affairs of state. We must all understand that this is a matter of state, a business matter; and if obstacles arise we must be able to overcome them and take proceedings against those who are guilty of red tape. We have proletarian courts in Moscow; they must bring to account the persons who are to blame for the failure to effect the purchase of several tens of thousands of poods of canned food. I think the proletarian courts will be able to punish the guilty; but in order to punish, the culprits must be found. I assure you that in this case no culprits will be found. I want you all to look into this business: no one is guilty; all we see is a lot of fuss and bustle and nonsense. Nobody has the ability to approach the business properly; nobody understands that affairs of state must not be tackled in this way. And all the whiteguards and saboteurs take advantage of this. At one time we waged a fierce struggle against the saboteurs; that struggle confronts us even now. There are saboteurs today, of course, and they must be fought. But can we fight them when the position is as I have just described it? This is worse than any sabotage. The saboteur could wish for nothing better than that two Communists should argue over the question of when to appeal to the Political Bureau for instructions on principles in buying food; and of course he would soon slip in between them and egg them on. If any intelligent saboteur were to stand behind these Communists, or behind each of them in turn, and encourage them, that would be the end. The matter would be doomed for ever. Who is to blame? Nobody, because two responsible Communists, devoted revolutionaries, are arguing over last year's snow; are arguing over the question of when to appeal to the Political Bureau for instructions on principles in buying food.

That is how the matter stands and that is the difficulty that confronts us. Any salesman trained in a large capitalist enterprise knows how to settle a matter like that; but ninety-nine responsible Communists out of a hundred do not. And they refuse to understand that they do not know how and that they must learn the ABC of this business. Unless we realise this, unless we sit down in the preparatory class again, we shall never be able to solve the economic problem that now lies at the basis of our entire policy.

The other example I wanted to give you is that of the Donets Basin. You know that this is the centre, the real basis of our entire economy. It will be utterly impossible to restore large-scale industry in Russia, to really build socialism—for it can only be built on the basis of large-scale industry—unless we restore the Donets Basin and bring it up to the proper level. The Central Committee is closely watching developments there.

As regards this region there was no unjustified, ridiculous or absurd raising of minor questions in the Political Bureau; real, absolutely urgent business was discussed.

The Central Committee ought to see to it that in such real centres, bases and foundations of our entire economy, work is carried on in a real business-like manner. At the head of the Central Coal Industry Board we had not only undoubtedly devoted, but really educated and very capable people. I should not be wrong even if I said talented people. That is why the Central Committee has concentrated its attention on it. The Ukraine is an independent republic. That is quite all right. But in Party matters it sometimes—what is the politest way of saying it?—takes a roundabout course, and we shall have to get at them. For the people in charge there are sly, and their Central Committee I shall not say deceives us, but somehow edges away from us. To obtain a general view of the whole business, we discussed it in the Central Committee here and discovered that friction and disagreement exist. There is a Commission for the Utilisation of Small Mines there and, of course, severe friction between it and the Central Coal Industry Board. Still we, the Central Committee have a certain amount of experience and we unanimously decided not to remove the

leading people, but if there was any friction it was to be reported to us, down to the smallest detail. For since we have not only devoted but capable people in the region, we must back them up, and enable them to complete their training, assuming that they have not done so. In the end, a Party Congress was held in the Ukraine—I do not know what happened there; all sorts of things happened. I asked for information from the Ukrainian comrades, and I asked Comrade Orjonikidze particularly—and the Central Committee did the same—to go down there and ascertain what had happened. Evidently, there was some intrigue and an awful mess, which the Commission on Party History would not be able to clear up in ten years should it undertake to do so. But the upshot of it all was that contrary to the unanimous instructions of the Central Committee, this group was superseded by another group. What was the matter? In the main, notwithstanding all its good qualities, a section of the group made a mistake. They were overzealous in their methods of administration. There we have to deal with workers. Very often the word “workers” is taken to mean the factory proletariat. But it does not mean that at all. During the war people who were by no means proletarians went into the factories; they went into the factories to dodge the war. Are the social and economic conditions in our country today such as to induce real proletarians to go into the factories? No. It would be true according to Marx; but Marx did not write about Russia; he wrote about capitalism as a whole, beginning with the fifteenth century. It held true over a period of six hundred years, but it is not true for present-day Russia. Very often those who go into the factories are not proletarians; they are casual elements of every description.

The task is to learn to organise the work properly, not to lag behind, to remove friction in time, not to separate administration from politics. For our administration and our politics rest on the ability of the entire vanguard to maintain contact with the entire mass of the proletariat and with the entire mass of the peasantry. If anybody forgets these cogs and becomes wholly absorbed in administration, the result will be a disastrous one. The mistake the Donets Basin officials made is insignificant compared with other mistakes of ours, but this example is a typical one. The Central Committee unanimously ordered: “Allow this group to remain; bring all conflicts, even minor ones, before the Central Committee, for the Donets Basin is not an ordinary district, but a vital one, without which socialist construction would simply remain a pious wish.” But all our political power, all the authority of the Central Committee proved of no avail.

This time there was a mistake in administration, of course; in addition, a host of other mistakes were made.

This instance shows that it is not a matter of possessing political power, but of administrative ability, the ability to put the right man in the right place, the ability to avoid petty conflicts, so that state economic work may be carried on without interruption. This is what we lack; this is the root of the mistake.

I think that in discussing our revolution and weighing up its prospects, we must carefully single out the problems which the revolution has solved completely and which have irrevocably gone down in history as an epoch-making departure from capitalism. Our revolution has such solutions to its credit. Let the Mensheviks and Otto Bauer of the Two-and-a-Half International shout: “Theirs is a bourgeois revolution.” We say that our task was to consummate the bourgeois revolution. As a certain whiteguard newspaper expressed it: dung had accumulated in our state institutions for four hundred years; but we cleaned it all out in four years. This dung of medievalism has not been cleared out either in our country, or even in advanced, enlightened Germany. Yet they reproach us for doing what stands very much to our credit. The fact that we have consummated the revolution is an achievement that can never be expunged from our record.

War is now in the air. The trade unions, for example, the reformist trade unions, are passing resolutions against war and are threatening to call strikes in opposition to war.

Recently, if I am not mistaken, I read a report in the newspapers to the effect that a certain very good Communist delivered an anti-war speech in the French Chamber of Deputies in the course of which he stated that the workers would prefer to rise in revolt rather than go to war. This question cannot be formulated in the way we formulated it in 1912, when the Basle Manifesto was issued. The Russian Revolution alone has shown how it is possible to emerge from war, and what effort this entails. It showed what emerging from a reactionary war by revolutionary methods means. Reactionary imperialist wars are inevitable in all parts of the world; and in solving problems of this sort mankind cannot and will not forget that tens of millions were slaughtered then, and will be slaughtered again if war breaks out. We are living in the twentieth century, and the only nation that emerged from a reactionary war by revolutionary methods not for the benefit of a particular government, but by overthrowing it, was the Russian nation, and it was the Russian Revolution that extricated it. What has been won by the Russian Revolution is irrevocable. No power on earth can erase that; nor can any power on earth erase the fact that the Soviet state has been created. This is a historic victory. For hundreds of years states have been built according to the bourgeois model, and for the first time a non-bourgeois form of state has been discovered. Our machinery of government may be faulty, but it is said that the first steam engine that was invented was also faulty. No one even knows whether it worked or not, but that is not the important point; the important point is that it was invented. Even assuming that the first steam engine was of no use, the fact is that we now have steam engines. Even if our machinery of government is very faulty, the fact remains that it has been created; the greatest invention in history has been made; a proletarian type of state has been created. Therefore, let all Europe, let thousands of bourgeois newspapers broadcast news about the horrors and poverty that prevail in our country, about suffering being the sole lot of the working people in our country; the workers all over the world are still drawn towards the Soviet state. These are the great and irrevocable gains that we have achieved. But for us, members of the Communist Party, this meant only opening the door. We are now confronted with the task of laying the foundations of socialist economy. Has this been done? No, it has not. We still lack the socialist foundation. Those Communists who imagine that we have it are greatly mistaken. The whole point is to distinguish firmly, clearly and dispassionately what constitutes the historic service rendered by the Russian Revolution from what we do very badly, from what has not yet been created, and what we shall have to redo many times yet.

Political events are always very confused and complicated. They can be compared with a chain. To hold the whole chain you must grasp the main link. Not a link chosen at random. What was the central event in 1917? Withdrawal from the war. The entire nation demanded this, and it overshadowed everything. Revolutionary Russia accomplished this withdrawal from the war. It cost tremendous effort; but the major demand of the people was satisfied, and that brought us victory for many years. The people realised, the peasants saw, every soldier returning from the front understood perfectly well that the Soviet government was a more democratic government, one that stood closer to the working people. No matter how many outrageous and absurd things we may have done in other spheres, the fact that we realised what the main task was proved that everything was right.

What was the key feature of 1919 and 1920? Military resistance. The all-powerful Entente was marching against us, was at our throats. No propaganda was required there. Every non-Party peasant understood what was going on. The landowners were coming back. The Communists knew how to fight them. That is why, taken in the mass, the peasants followed the lead of the Communists; that is why we were victorious.

In 1921, the key feature was an orderly retreat. This required stern discipline. The Workers' Opposition said: "You are underrating the workers; the workers should display greater initiative." But initiative had to be displayed then by retreating in good order and

by maintaining strict discipline. Anyone who introduced an undertone of panic or insubordination would have doomed the revolution to defeat; for there is nothing more difficult than retreating with people who have been accustomed to victory, who are imbued with revolutionary views and ideals, and who, in their hearts, regard every retreat as a disgraceful matter. The greater danger was the violation of good order, and the greatest task was to maintain good order.

And what is the key feature now? The key feature now—and I would like to sum up my report with this—is not that we have changed our line of policy. An incredible lot of nonsense is being talked about this in connection with NEP. It is all hot air, pernicious twaddle. In connection with NEP some people are beginning to fuss around, proposing to reorganise our government departments and to form new ones. All this is pernicious twaddle. In the present situation the key feature is people, the proper choice of people. A revolutionary who is accustomed to struggle against petty reformists and uplift educators finds it hard to understand this. Soberly weighed up, the political conclusion to be drawn from the present situation is that we have advanced so far that we cannot hold all the positions; and we need not hold them all. Internationally our position has improved vastly these last few years. The Soviet type of state is our achievement; it is a step forward in human progress; and the information the Communist International receives from every country every day corroborates this. Nobody has the slightest doubt about that. From the point of view of practical work, however, the position is that unless the Communists render the masses of the peasants practical assistance they will lose their support. Passing laws, passing better decrees, etc., is not now the main object of our attention. There was a time when the passing of decrees was a form of propaganda. People used to laugh at us and say that the Bolsheviks do not realise that their decrees are not being carried out; the entire whiteguard press was full of jeers on that score. But at that period this passing of decrees was quite justified. We Bolsheviks had just taken power, and we said to the peasant, to the worker: "Here is a decree; this is how we would like to have the state administered. Try it!" From the very outset we gave the ordinary workers and peasants an idea of our policy in the form of decrees. The result was the enormous confidence we enjoyed and now enjoy among the masses of the people. This was an essential period at the beginning of the revolution; without it we should not have risen on the crest of the revolutionary wave; we should have wallowed in its trough. Without it we should not have won the confidence of all the workers and peasants who wanted to build their lives on new lines. But this period has passed, and we refuse to understand this. Now the peasants and workers will laugh at us if we order this or that government department to be formed or reorganised. The ordinary workers and peasants will display no interest in this now, and they will be right, because this is not the central task today. This is not the sort of thing with which we Communists should now go to the people. Although we who are engaged in government departments are always overwhelmed with so many petty affairs, this is not the link that we must grasp, this is not the key feature. The key feature is that we have not got the right men in the right places; that responsible Communists who acquitted themselves magnificently during the revolution have been given commercial and industrial functions about which they know nothing; and they prevent us from seeing the truth, for rogues and rascals hide magnificently behind their backs. The trouble is that we have no such thing as practical control of how things have been done. This is a prosaic job, a small job; these are petty affairs. But after the greatest political change in history, bearing in mind that for a time we shall have to live in the midst of the capitalist system, the key feature now is not politics in the narrow sense of the word (what we read in the newspapers is just political fireworks; there is nothing socialist in it at all), the key feature is not resolutions, not departments and not reorganisation. As long as these things are necessary we shall do them, but don't go to the people with them. Choose the proper men and introduce practical control. That is what the people will appreciate.

In the sea of people we are after all but a drop in the ocean, and we can administer only when we express correctly what the people are conscious of. Unless we do this the Communist Party will not lead the proletariat, the proletariat will not lead the masses, and the whole machine will collapse. The chief thing the people, all the working people, want today is nothing but help in their desperate hunger and need; they want to be shown that the improvement needed by the peasants is really taking place in the form they are accustomed to. The peasant knows and is accustomed to the market and trade. We were unable to introduce direct Communist distribution. We lacked the factories and their equipment for this. That being the case, we must provide the peasants with what they need through the medium of trade, and provide it as well as the capitalist did, otherwise the people will not tolerate such an administration. This is the key to the situation; and unless something unexpected arises, this, given three conditions, should be the central feature of our activities in 1922.

The first condition is that there shall be no intervention. We are doing all we can in the diplomatic field to avoid it; nevertheless, it may occur any day. We must really be on the alert, and we must agree to make certain big sacrifices for the sake of the Red Army, within definite limits, of course. We are confronted by the entire bourgeois world, which is only seeking a way in which to strangle us. Our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are nothing more nor less than the agents of this bourgeoisie. Such is their political status.

The second condition is that the financial crisis shall not be too severe. The crisis is approaching. You will hear about that when we discuss financial policy. If it is too severe and rigorous we shall have to revise many things again and concentrate all efforts on one thing. If it is not too severe it may even be useful; it will give the Communists in all the state trusts a good shaking; only we must not forget to do it. The financial crisis will shake up government departments and industrial enterprises, and those that are not equal to their task will be the first to burst; only we must take care that all the blame for this is not thrown on the specialists while the responsible Communists are praised for being very good fellows who have fought at the fronts and have always worked well. Thus, if the financial crisis is not too severe we can derive some benefit from it and comb the ranks of the responsible Communists engaged in the business departments, not in the way the Central Control Commission and the Central Verification Commission comb them, but very thoroughly.

The third condition is that we shall make no political mistakes in this period. Of course, if we do make political mistakes all our work of economic construction will be disrupted and we shall land ourselves in controversies about how to rectify them and what direction to pursue. But if we make no sad mistakes, the key feature in the near future will be not decrees and politics in the narrow sense of the word, not departments and their organisation—the responsible Communists and the Soviet institutions will deal with these things whenever necessary—the main thing in all our activities will be choosing the right people and making sure that decisions are carried out. If, in this respect, we learn something practical, if we do something practically useful, we shall again overcome all difficulties.

In conclusion I must mention the practical side of the question of our Soviet institutions, the higher government bodies and the Party's relation to them. The relations between the Party and the Soviet government bodies are not what they ought to be. On this point we are quite unanimous. I have given one example of how minor matters are dragged before the Political Bureau. It is extremely difficult to get out of this by formal means, for there is only one governing party in our country; and a member of the Party cannot be prohibited from lodging complaints. That is why everything that comes up on the Council of People's Commissars is dragged before the Political Bureau. I, too, am greatly to blame for this, for to a large extent contact between the Council of People's Commissars and the Political Bureau was maintained through me. When I was obliged to retire from work it

was found that the two wheels were not working in unison and Kamenev had to bear a treble load to maintain this contact. Inasmuch as it is barely probable that I shall return to work in the near future, all hope devolves on the fact that there are two other deputies—Comrade Tsyurupa, who has been cleansed by the Germans, and Comrade Rykov, whom they have splendidly cleansed. It seems that even Wilhelm, the German Emperor, has stood us in good stead—I never expected it. He had a surgeon, who happened to be the doctor treating comrade Rykov, and he removed his worst part, keeping it in Germany, and left the best part intact, sending that part of Comrade Rykov thoroughly cleansed to us. If that method continues to be used it will be a really good thing.

Joking aside, a word or two about the main instructions. On this point there is complete unanimity on the Central Committee, and I hope that the Congress will pay the closest attention to it and endorse the instructions that the Political Bureau and the Central Committee be relieved of minor matters, and that more should be shifted to the responsible officials. The People's Commissars must be responsible for their work and should not bring these matters up first on the Council of People's Commissars and then on the Political Bureau. Formally, we cannot abolish the right to lodge complaints with the Central Committee, for our Party is the only governing party in the country. But we must put a stop to the habit of bringing every petty matter before the Central Committee; we must raise the prestige of the Council of People's Commissars. The Commissars and not the Deputy Commissars must mainly attend the meetings of the Council. The functions of the Council must be changed in the direction in which I have not succeeded in changing them during the past year, that is, it must pay much more attention to executive control. We shall have two more deputies—Rykov and Tsyurupa. When Rykov was in the Extraordinary Authorised Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence for the Supply of the Red Army and Navy he tightened things up and the work went well. Tsyurupa organised one of the most efficient People's Commissariats. If together they make the maximum effort to improve the People's Commissariats in the sense of efficiency and responsibility, we shall make some, even if a little, progress here. We have eighteen People's Commissariats of which not less than fifteen are of no use at all—efficient People's Commissars cannot be found everywhere, and I certainly hope that people give this more of their attention. Comrade Rykov must be a member of the Central Committee Bureau and of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee because there must be a tie-up between these two bodies, for without this tie-up the main wheels sometimes spin in the air.

In this connection, we must see to it that the number of commissions of the Council of People's Commissars and of the Council of Labour and Defence is reduced. These bodies must know and settle their own affairs and not split up into an infinite number of commissions. A few days ago the commissions were overhauled. It was found that there were one hundred and twenty of them. How many were necessary? Sixteen. And this is not the first cut. Instead of accepting responsibility for their work, preparing a decision for the Council of People's Commissars and knowing that they bear responsibility for this decision, there is a tendency to take shelter behind commissions. The devil himself would lose his way in this maze of commissions. Nobody knows what is going on, who is responsible; everything is mixed up, and finally a decision is passed for which everybody is held responsible.

In this connection, reference must be made to the need for extending and developing the autonomy and activities of the regional economic conferences. The administrative division of Russia has now been drawn up on scientific lines; the economic and climatic conditions, the way of life, the conditions of obtaining fuel, of local industry, etc., have all been taken into account. On the basis of this division, district and regional economic conferences have been instituted. Changes may be made here and there, of course, but the prestige of these economic conferences must be enhanced.

Then we must see to it that the All-Russia Central Executive Committee works more energetically, meets in session more regularly, and for longer periods. The sessions of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee should discuss bills which sometimes are hastily brought before the Council of People's Commissars when there is no need to do so. It would be better to postpone such bills and give the local workers an opportunity to study them carefully. Stricter demands should be made upon those who draft the bills. This is not done.

If the sessions of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee last longer, they can split up into sections and subcommissions, and thus will be able to verify the work more strictly and strive to achieve what in my opinion is the key, the quintessence of the present political situation: to concentrate attention on choosing the right people and on verifying how decisions are carried out.

It must be admitted, and we must not be afraid to admit, that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the responsible Communists are not in the jobs they are now fit for; that they are unable to perform their duties, and that they must sit down to learn. If this is admitted, and since we have the opportunity to learn—judging by the general international situation we shall have time to do so—we must do it, come what may. (*Stormy applause.*)

Lenin, Vol. 33, pp. 263-309.



APPOINTMENT OF STALIN AS GENERAL SECRETARY

3 April 1922

One of the most important events of both Soviet and modern world history took place with hardly a notice—the appointment of Joseph Stalin as General Secretary of the Communist Party. This new office was created as part of the effort to improve internal party management. Stalin, ever the party's man for handling day-to-day affairs, was appointed to it. It was this office that Stalin used to build his power base, as did his successors. It became the most important office in the Soviet Union. The person holding the title of General Secretary, later for a time called First Secretary, was universally recognized as the leader of the Soviet Union. The announcement took the form of a small notice in the upper left corner of Pravda. TsK stands for Central Committee and RKP for Russian Communist Party.

For the Information of Organizations and Members of the RKP

The Central Committee elected by the XI congress of the RKP has confirmed a secretariat of the TsK RKP consisting of: C[omrade] Stalin (general secretary), C[omrade] Molotov and C[omrade] Kuibyshev.

The secretariat of the TsK has established the following schedule of reception hours at the TsK, daily from 12:00 to 3:00 p.m.: Monday—Molotov and Kuibyshev, Tuesday—Stalin and Molotov, Wednesday—Kuibyshev and Molotov, Thursday—Kuibyshev, Friday—Stalin and Molotov, Saturday—Stalin and Kuibyshev.

Address TsK: Vozdvizhenka, 5

Secretary of the TsK RKP, Stalin.

Pravda, 4 April 1922.

CHICHERIN'S STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION
AT THE OPENING OF THE GENOA CONFERENCE
10 April 1922

At the opening meeting of the Genoa Conference David Lloyd George spoke first, stressing the importance of resolving the problem of the Russian debts as a means of moving toward the economic reconstruction of Europe and lasting peace. Chicherin, as head of the Soviet delegation at its first international conference, responded. He held out the prospect of fruitful economic collaboration but rejected payment of the debts of the old regime and other claims against Russia. He went on to propose a series of international conferences, general arms limitations, and other measures, including a redistribution of gold reserves and turning the League of Nations into a League of Peoples. His response was so far from agreement with the Allied countries that fruitful outcome of the Conference seemed unlikely, although efforts persisted.

Speech by G.Chicherin at First Plenary Sitting of Genoa Conference.

The Russian Delegation, representing the Government which has always sustained the cause of peace, receive with a particular satisfaction the declarations of the preceding speakers proclaiming the great necessity of peace. They specially associate themselves with the declaration of the Italian Prime Minister when he says that there is here neither conqueror nor conquered, and with that of the Prime Minister of Great Britain assuring us that we are all here on a footing of equality.

The Russian Delegation desires to declare before everything else that they have come here in the interests of peace and the general reconstruction of the economic life of Europe, ruined by prolonged war and by the after-war policy.

Whilst themselves preserving the point of view of Communist principles, the Russian delegation recognises that in the present period of history, which permits the parallel existence of the ancient social order and of the new order now being born, economic collaboration between the States representing the two systems of property is imperatively necessary for the general economic reconstruction.

The Russian Government in consequence attributes great importance to the first point of the Cannes Resolutions, which deals with reciprocal recognition of different systems of property and different political and economic forms actually existing in the different countries. The Russian Delegation has come here not with the intention of making propaganda for their own theoretical views, but in order to engage in practical relations with the other Governments. The industrial and commercial interests of all countries on the basis of reciprocity, equality and universal economic reconstruction is, in present conditions, so immense and colossal that it can only be solved if all countries, both European and non-European, have the sincere desire to co-ordinate their efforts, and are convinced of the necessity of consenting to temporary sacrifices. The economic reconstruction of Russia, the largest state in Europe, with its incalculable natural riches, is an indispensable condition of universal economic reconstruction. Russia, on her side, declares herself fully disposed to contribute to the solution of the problem placed before the Conference by all the means in her power, and these means are not insignificant. In view of the economic need of the world, and of the development of universal political forces, the Russian Government is ready to open its frontier consciously and voluntarily for the creation of international traffic routes. It is ready to deliver to cultivation millions of acres of the most fertile land in the world. It is ready to grant forest concessions, mining concessions for coal and minerals of an infinite richness, particularly in Siberia, and concessions of all kinds throughout the

territory of the Federated Socialist Soviet Republics of Russia. It proposes, between the industry of the west on the one hand and the agriculture and industry of Siberia on the other, collaboration of such a nature as to enlarge the basis of Europe in industry so far as concerns raw materials, grain and fuel, in proportions far surpassing the pre-war level. A detailed draft of a plan of general economic reconstruction can, if necessary, be presented by the Russian Delegation in the course of the Conference. The perfect possibility of its present realisation from the financial and economic point of view results from the fact that the whole of the capital, which every year ought to be invested in this work in order to guarantee the future of European production, would only constitute a small fraction of the annual expenses of the countries of Europe and of America in respect of their armies and their fleets. In making these proposals the Russian Delegation comes back to the ideas of the Cannes Resolutions, which they adopt in principle, while reserving the right to present on their own part supplementary articles and amendments to the existing articles. However, the work of the economic reconstruction of Russia will be rendered absolutely vain (and with it the work of putting an end to European economic chaos) and will be directed on a false and fatal course if the nations which are economically more powerful, instead of creating the necessary conditions for the economic rebirth of Russia and of facilitating her progress in the future, crush her under the weight of demands which are beyond her strength—the survivals of a past which to her is odious.

We must also remark that the recent measures of the Russian Government in the domain of internal legislation, measures conforming to the new policy of Russia in economic matters, have anticipated the desiderata contained in the Cannes Resolutions, so far as concerns the legal guarantees necessary for economic collaboration between Soviet Russia and States based upon private property. However, all efforts towards the reconstruction of the economic position of the world are in vain so long as there remains suspended over Europe and the world the menace of new wars, perhaps still more devastating than those of the past years. In this respect also Russia is disposed to contribute to the consolidation of peace to the extent which is possible and within the limits of the social and economic order existing in the majority of countries. The Delegation intends to propose, in the course of the conference, the general limitation of armaments, and to support all proposals tending to lighten the weight of militarism, on condition that this limitation is applied to the armies of all countries, and that the rules of war are completed by the absolute prohibition of its most barbarous forms, such as asphyxiating gas and aerial warfare, as well as the use of means of terrorising peaceful populations. It follows that Russia is equally ready herself to realise the limitation of armaments, on condition of a full and complete reciprocity, and on condition that she is furnished with the necessary guarantees against any sort of attack upon or interference with her internal affairs. We greet with satisfaction this first European Conference, and especially the proposal of the British Prime Minister that similar conferences shall take place periodically in future, but the Russian Delegation desires to emphasise the importance of enlarging these conferences and securing the participation in them of all the peoples of the world. In our view, the establishment of universal peace should be accomplished by a Universal Congress, the basis of which would be the equality of all peoples and the recognition of the right of each of them to determine its own destiny. We also feel that the method of representation at these conferences needs to be modified. We regard it as absolutely indispensable that the workers' organisations should be officially represented at these congresses. The decisions of these conferences must in no case be applied by force or by the exercise of pressure on minorities, but on the contrary by the free-will of all taking part in them.

The Russian Government is even willing to adopt as its point of departure the old agreements with the Powers which regulate international relations, subject to some necessary modifications, and to take part in the revision of the constitution of the League of Nations

so as to transform it into a real League of Peoples without any domination of some nations by others, and without the existing division between victors and vanquished. The universal Congress of which I speak would have to appoint technical commissions to outline and elaborate a programme for the economic reconstruction of the world. This programme cannot possibly be enforced by violence; it must be such as to appeal to all those taking part in it. International railway, river and maritime routes must be mapped out, and the internationalisation of these routes must be attained by progressive stages. Technical international commissions would be able to lend their assistance to the different countries for the regulation of international rivers, for the utilisation of international ports, and for the technical improvement of the great world routes. The infinite wealth of Central Siberia would in this way be thrown open for the use of the whole world, and would produce among other benefits an increase in the prosperity of all peoples, if the peoples are all sincere in their desire for economic co-operation. If they seek in this way, by a common effort, to bring the world economic crisis to an end, if they are willing to make sacrifices, it will not prove difficult to find means of stabilising the exchanges.

One of these means might be the redistribution of the existing gold reserves among all the countries, in the same proportion as before the war, but by means of long term loans, without prejudice to the interests of the countries which are at present in possession of this gold. This redistribution should be combined with a rational redistribution of the products of industry and commercial activity, and with a distribution of fuel (naphtha, coal, etc.) according to a settled plan.

I have merely outlined the basic principles of the proposals which the Russian Delegation might put forward if they are granted an opportunity. I desire to repeat once more that, as Communists, we do not entertain any special illusion as to the responsibility for the existing state of affairs. However, we are nevertheless ready to contribute, in the interests of Russia and of all Europe, in the interests of tens of millions of men who are suffering beyond the limits of human endurance owing to the present economic chaos—we are willing to contribute our aid to every effort calculated to improve the economic situation of the world and to remove the threat of a second war. We are prepared to support all proposals of a progressive nature brought forward, with this object, by other countries.

Soviet Union and Peace, pp. 82-86, with minor modifications.



TREATY OF RAPALLO

16 April 1922

During the Genoa Conference the Soviet and German delegation went to the nearby town of Rapallo and reached a separate agreement on economic and other issues. The announcement came as a surprise to the other major powers. It established full diplomatic relations, which for the Soviets was a major breakthrough, for Germany was the first major power, even if temporarily weakened, to recognize the Soviet state. Moreover, both sides renounced all economic claims against the other arising out of the war, debt repudiation, or nationalization of property so long as neither recognized the claims of a third power in this area. This effectively scuttled prospects for the Allies obtaining Soviet concessions in this area. Moreover, it marked the beginning of a decade long close relationship between the two countries. There were rumors of a secret military convention as well—see below, 29 April.

TREATY OF RAPALLO

The German Government, represented by Reichsminister Dr. Walther Rathenau, and the Government of the RSFSR, represented by People's Commissar Chicherin, have agreed on the following provisions:

Clause 1.—The two Governments agree that all questions resulting from the state of war between Germany and Russia shall be settled in the following manner:

(a) Both Governments mutually renounce repayment for their war expenses and for damages arising out of the war, that is to say, damages caused to them and their nationals in the zone of war operations by military measures, including all requisitions effected in a hostile country. They renounce in the same way repayment for civil damages inflicted on civilians, that is to say, damages caused to the nationals of the two countries by exceptional war legislation or by violent measures taken by any authority of the State of either side.

(b) All legal relations concerning questions of public or private law resulting from the state of war, including the question of the treatment of merchant ships which fell into the hands of the one side or the other during the war, shall be settled on the basis of reciprocity.

(c) Germany and Russia mutually renounce repayment of expenses incurred for prisoners of war. The German Government also renounces repayment of expenses for soldiers of the Red Army interned in Germany. The Russian Government, for its part, renounces repayment of the sums Germany has derived from the sale of Russian Army material brought into Germany by these interned troops.

Clause 2.—Germany renounces all claims resulting from the enforcement of the laws and measures of the Soviet Republic as it has affected German nationals or their private rights or the rights of the German State itself, as well as claims resulting from measures taken by the Soviet Republic or its authorities in any other way against subjects of the German State or their private rights, provided that the Soviet Republic shall not satisfy similar claims made by any third State.

Clause 3.—Consular and diplomatic relations between Germany and the Federal Soviet Republic shall be resumed immediately. The admission of consuls to both countries shall be arranged by special agreement.

Clause 4.—Both Governments agree, further, that the rights of the nationals of either of the two parties on the other's territory as well as the regulation of commercial relations shall be based on the most-favoured-nation principle. This principle does not include rights and facilities granted by the Soviet Government to another Soviet State or to any State that formerly formed part of the Russian Empire.

Clause 5.—The two Governments undertake to give each other mutual assistance for the alleviation of their economic difficulties in the most benevolent spirit. In the event of a general settlement of this question on an international basis, they undertake to have a preliminary exchange of views. The German Government declares itself ready to facilitate, as far as possible, the conclusion and the execution of economic contracts between private enterprises in the two countries.

Clause 6.—Clause 1, paragraph (b), and clause 4 of this agreement will come into force after the ratification of this document. The other clauses will come into force immediately.

Done in duplicate at Rapallo, April 16, 1922.

Chicherin
Rathenau

Russian Information and Review, Vol. 1, No. 16 (15 May 1922), p. 370.



SOVIET DELEGATION AT GENOA
MEMORANDUM ON DEBTS AND ECONOMIC ISSUES
20 April 1922

Prior to the Genoa Conference the Allied governments had a commission of experts meeting in London draft a financial memorandum to use as a working document. After the plenary session on 10 April, this became the basis of both formal work by commissions and informal talks among delegations. On 22 April the Soviets presented their own memorandum in response, spelling out the very different perspective of the Soviet leaders on international economic—and other—affairs. Noteworthy is the Soviet discussion of the reparations claim they would make against the Allied governments for the costs arising from their intervention in the Russian Civil War. The annexes referred to are documents from 1917-1919 demonstrating Allied intervention in Russia, not included here.

MEMORANDUM OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION
The Resolutions of Cannes

When, by the decision of the Supreme Council dated January 10, Russia was invited to participate in the Conference of Genoa, she was informed of the resolutions adopted by the Supreme Council at Cannes, the 6th of January preceding, but without the invitation being conditioned upon the acceptance of these resolutions or upon any other demands whatever. Nevertheless the Russian Delegation, believing that an exact and consistent interpretation of the Resolutions of Cannes might furnish a basis for mutual understanding and for the settlement of questions in dispute between the Republic of Russia and the Western countries, declared at the first plenary session of the Conference that she accepted in principle the stipulations of the Resolutions of Cannes while at the same time reserving the right to offer amendments to it and to propose new articles. The Delegation was of the opinion that grounds for agreement on the question in dispute might be found in the three fundamental theses of Cannes:

1. Respect of the absolute sovereignty of each nation in the establishment of a regime of property and an economic and administrative system for its own people;
2. Legislative, judiciary and administrative guarantee of the personal and property rights of foreigners desiring to go into any country in order to engage in economic activities;
3. Recognition on the part of all the governments of the principle of reciprocity in the execution of their engagements and compensation for injuries suffered by foreign citizens—as was stated in the note prepared for the press by the ministers and the experts of Cannes, the official character of which was emphasized by the Prime Minister of Great Britain in his speech in Parliament on the 3rd of April.

The Memorandum of the Experts and the Resolutions of Cannes

Now, the Memorandum drawn up at London between the 20th and 28th of March, 1922 by the Allied experts, which was not presented to the Russian Delegation until the Conference itself, clearly deviates in its most essential propositions from the theses of Cannes and contradicts in its practical demands the principles enunciated in its own preamble. While affirming that the Russian question has been examined from the point of view of "justice" and of the necessity of the "economic reconstruction" of Russia, without the "exploitation of the Russian people," the Memorandum nevertheless presents practical demands equivalent not only to the exploitation but even to the complete enslavement of the working population of Russia to foreign capital. At the same time it ignores the essential question of the means necessary to obtain the aforesaid economic reconstruction of the

country. This silence is all the more incomprehensible in that without the revival of the productive forces of Russia, one cannot imagine an economic renaissance of Europe from the profound industrial crisis it is now experiencing and which has led to the shrinkage of the export market, the scarcity of food and of raw materials, and the steadily growing number of unemployed, which has not fallen below nine million for Europe and America during these last years. England, Italy, France and Germany produced from 1916 to 1920, 25 million tons of wheat a year less than before the war. And the prolonged loss of 8 million tons which they used to import annually from Russia has condemned them to a very serious food crisis and deprived their industry of every possibility of further development. American wheat is already too expensive for Europe. The lack of markets and the absence of purchasers capable of paying means that at the present time industry operates at less than 50 per cent of its productive capacity. Such is the situation which led to the Resolutions of Cannes as well as to the Conference of Genoa. Meanwhile, although the center of the problem is most obviously the reconstruction of Russia and of Western Europe, and not the reestablishment of the rights and the revenues of the little groups of creditors of Russia, it is upon this latter question that the Memorandum of London centers its attention.

The Conditions of Future Work

According to the general principles set forth in the preamble of the Memorandum of London, the representatives of the governments of Europe assembled at the Conference should give particular attention to the measures which are needed to revive the productive forces of Russia, not to the means of satisfying the demands of its creditors, as the Memorandum does.

Valid as they may be in general, the demands of isolated citizens of this or that country ought to be secondary to the enormous problems presented by the economic reconstruction of a Europe which is disorganized by the war, the peace policy and the universal economic crisis, and to the amelioration of the conditions of existence of the working masses. The sole means of obtaining a rapid rebirth of the economic power of Russia is an immediate and energetic aid in the form of long-term credits both in money and goods offered to the Russian people by European capital, and not the plundering of its resources and the retarding of its economic development for the profit of a group of foreign capitalists.

Assuming the necessity of reestablishing the economic prosperity of Russia by all available means, the government of the Republic, since the adoption of its new economic orientation, has reformed the civil legislation and the judiciary procedure in a manner which offers to foreign capital sufficient guarantees while protecting its interests and conforming to its laws.

The demands for guarantees of the rights of foreigners which are presented in paragraph 8 and following of the London Memorandum are evidently based upon an insufficient knowledge of the new legislation of Russia. During these last months the Russian Government has already adopted the following judicial measures:

1. Freedom of internal trade.
2. Legal guarantees of the freedom of industrial initiative and of private capital in the enterprises entrusted by the State to private exploitation.
3. Freedom for everyone to commit himself to the forms of industrial and commercial activity not expressly prohibited.
4. Guarantee of the persons of all citizens and particularly of foreigners against all illegal requisitions, confiscations, arrests and so forth.
5. Special guarantees ensuring to foreign concessionaires their contracts of concession.
6. A civil code and civil courts, involving the services of lawyers.

The workers' organizations of the Soviet Republic have decided to give their attention above all to the protection of labor and the regularization of the relations between workers and employers by means of collective contracts. They have renounced all interference in the management of the industries.

The Russian Delegation, attaching primary importance to placing foreign capital in the most favorable conditions, is prepared to take into consideration all the demands which may be submitted to it for the development and consolidation of the guarantees mentioned above. The Delegation does not doubt that it will be easy to arrive at a practical agreement in all that concerns the work of foreigners in Russia and the protection of their persons and their property. But it must call attention to the fact that the legislative and administrative measures of the Government can produce their full effect in protecting the interests of foreign capital, within as well as outside of Russia, only when the government has recognized *de jure* and its rights and competence not subject to question. If the foreign businessmen, who understand better than their governments how important and indispensable it is for them to penetrate Russia, refrain from it at present, it is not because the Tsarist debts have not been paid, but because the formal rights of the Soviet Government are still in doubt in the eyes of foreign governments and hence it is possible for new conflicts to arise which would endanger the capital invested in Russia.

The Delegation considers it necessary to note that the authors of the London Memorandum, indicating in Part 2 the guarantees they find indispensable to the operation of foreign capital in Russia, deviate radically from paragraph 1 of the Resolutions of Cannes. They seek to impose upon Russia an internal legislation repugnant to its regime and tending, under the pretext of creating "advantageous conditions of labor" for foreign capital, to introduce a system of capitulations involving an impairment of the sovereignty of Russia. The most convincing examples are (1) paragraph 24 of the Memorandum, which tends to establish a judiciary extra-territoriality for the benefit of foreigners; and (2) the organization of the commission of the Russian debt which is presented in annex 1 of the Memorandum, and which if it should be realized would undoubtedly develop into an organ of foreign control over the whole economic life of the Republic, following the example of the Reparations Commission established by the Treaty of Versailles for Germany.

The Soviet Power and Its Contracts

The Delegation declares that the power of the Soviets, derived from the great Russian Revolution, has always fulfilled and intends always to fulfil the contracts which it makes and that the legal guarantees which it offers are no less solid than those of any other sovereign state. During these two last years, although the Soviet Government has concluded a number of foreign contracts for important advances in gold, there is not a single case in which it has transgressed or failed to execute the engagements undertaken by it. The Delegation declares in a manner absolutely categorical that all the statements to the contrary which appear from time to time in the press are pure inventions.

If the power of the Soviets has refused to recognize the contracts of preceding governments or to satisfy the demands of persons who have suffered from its measures of internal politics, such as the nationalization of industries, the municipalization of buildings, the requisition or confiscation of private property, it is not because it is "incapable" or "unwilling" to honor its contracts, but on the contrary, for reasons of principle or on the grounds of political necessity.

The Revolution of 1917, which destroyed from top to bottom the old political, social and economic state of affairs in order to put in its place a totally different organization of society and transfer power into the hands of new social classes, interrupted the continuity of civil contracts. These contracts were an integral part of the economic regime of the disappearing society and fell into forfeit along with that society itself. This Revolution was an immense cataclysm such as the world has known only at exceptional moments in its history, and its character of *force majeure* will not be questioned by any objective statesman.

Moreover one can apply to revolutionary Russia more than to any other country subjected to social perturbations, the opinion of many authorities on international law who deny to the governments of countries whose nationals have suffered from such perturbations the right to claim compensation for damages suffered, and still more that of employing violence for the satisfaction of these claims. (Annex 1).

In rejecting resolutely all responsibility for damages caused to foreign property by the economic crisis resulting from the war and its consequences or by the abandonment of these properties by their owners emigrating to foreign countries, as well as the responsibility for injuries suffered by foreign property in the course of the Allied intervention in Russia and the civil war promoted by the Allied governments, the Russian Delegation must call the attention of the Conference to the fact that even the measures systematically applied by the Soviet power, such as the nationalization of the means of production and the requisition of goods belonging to foreigners, do not render it legally obligated to compensate the losses suffered. The Allied Governments, (and under their pressure the neutral governments also), were from the beginning hostile to the Soviet Revolution and refused to enter into official relations with the new government, even before it had adopted the first measures of nationalization.

They did not attempt for a single moment to obtain any accord whatever with the power of the Soviets for the protection of the rights of their citizens, and the friendly liquidation of their property rights in Russia. However, when certain representatives of foreign governments did enter into contact with the Soviet power for the defence of the interests of their nationals, in every case without exception the Russian Government took all possible measures to stop the requisition and repair the damages caused.

Such was the case with certain foreign factories whose owners or directors negotiated with the government and for this reason avoided nationalization and are still functioning today as private properties. Instead of defending the interests of their nationals in the social cataclysm which Russia was passing through, the foreign governments, belligerent and neutral alike, recalled from Russia not only their diplomatic and consular representatives but even those private persons who would respond to the invitation. Foreign properties were abandoned to chance, a fact which, considering the exceptional importance of many of these properties for the economic life of Russia, endangered the entire industry of the country.

Foreign Intervention

Far from contenting themselves with this rupture of relations with Soviet Russia, the Powers of the Entente undertook a military intervention and a legal blockade, openly supporting the local uprisings fomented by their own agents (the revolt of the Czecho-Slovaks, the Cossacks of the Don and of Kuban, the White Guards of Siberia, the Yaroslav uprising and so forth), and coming to the aid of Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich, Wrangel and others, by the sending of Allied forces into Northern Russia, the Black Sea and the Caucasus. Documentary data proves that even in the first months of its existence, the Soviet Government did not experience any difficulty in triumphing over the local revolts of elements discontented with the new regime, and that only where these elements were organized by the Allied Governments and received active aid from them in money, munitions, military supplies, and bodies of instructors, did these little sporadic revolts give birth to veritable fronts of civil war, with their retinue of savage violations, destructions of whole villages, pogroms of Jews, and other atrocities. The opinion of military experts is categorical on this point: without the intervention of foreign powers, the different local revolts which took place in Russia would never have assumed the character of atrocious civil war, which they did assume as consequence of it. The blame and the responsibility of the Allied Governments for the organization and maintenance of the civil war in Russia and for the colossal losses which the people and the State of Russia have suffered, are not subject to the least doubt. (Annex 2). Part of this responsibility falls equally upon the neutral countries, which by offering their hospitality to counter-revolutionary elements in order for them to

organize plots against Russia on their territory, enroll troops for the civil war, purchase and transport arms, and so forth, took part also in the boycott and blockade.

Driven by foreign intervention and the blockade to the necessity of a desperate defence, the Soviet power was constrained to accelerate the nationalization of industry and commerce and also to apply to the holders of foreign property in Russia the same measures of liquidation, confiscation, or nationalization without indemnity which were taken, according to international custom among belligerents, by the Allies themselves. It is necessary to say, however, that the Soviet Government has never applied measures abridging the personal and property rights of foreigners for the simple reason that the state of defence against intervention gave it the right to do so.

These measures were applied only to the extent demanded by security and the public welfare, by the plan of nationalization of industry and commerce rendered inevitable by the new legal and economic regime, and by the urgent necessity of re-organized production and distribution in a State isolated and cut off from the entire world by the blockade. The Soviet Government in so doing used only the undeniable right of every state to impose public charges upon its nationals and foreign citizens, as well as to dispose of their goods when the highest interest of the State demands it.

The intervention and the blockade of the Allied powers and the civil war nourished by them during more than three years have caused losses to Russia far surpassing the claims which foreigners injured by the revolution can claim. Without mentioning the gold, the stocks and merchandise sequestered in foreign countries or carried out of Russia, the Russian State demands that it be compensated for the destructions caused by the war; for the railroads, the bridges, the rolling stock, the equipment of ports, the buildings of all sorts destroyed, and the ships sunk, as well as for the shops, the factories, the mines, the private goods of its nationals, and the farms and houses burned and ravaged. It demands, moreover, the restitution of its maritime and merchant fleet seized by the Allied Powers or the White Armies under their protection.

Apart from these claims concerning the damages caused directly to the wealth of the nation and of its private citizens, there is still to be compensated a long list of damages inflicted upon the nationalized industry or private property as a result of military operations in territories occupied by the foreign or White armies, and finally the support of several hundreds of thousands of invalids of the civil war and of the families of its victims.

The losses suffered by the Russian State and people unquestionably have better claims to compensation than the former owners of property in Russia or of Russian bonds, especially since the latter belong to peoples victorious in the world war who have benefitted from immense contributions paid by the vanquished, while their demands are addressed to a country entirely ruined by the war and the foreign intervention and struggling desperately for its right to existence within the only forms of organization possible to it.

It is truly strange to hear demands for indemnities advanced by citizens of states which have made war without success against Russia and by representatives of governments who throughout the war have applied the right of confiscation to the nationals of the opposing party abiding in their territory, and who in the Treaty of Versailles have raised this right to the height of a principle even for the time of peace, imposing upon the entire population of a vanquished state the material responsibility for damages caused to its victors by the military acts of its governments.

The Soviet Power Is Disposed to a Mutual Indemnification of Damages

Nevertheless the Government of the Russian Republic, desiring to find a propitious ground for an agreement and for the reestablishment of business relations with foreign capital, is ready to admit the right of foreign citizens to compensation for the losses which they have suffered, on the condition, however, of the complete reciprocity demanded by the note to the press of the 11th of January, before cited, which spoke of the "recognition by all countries of their public debts and of the indemnification of losses and damages

caused by the action of their governments." The Soviet Government counterpoises the losses suffered by Russia from the ravages of Allied troops and White Guards supported by them to the losses of foreign citizens due to acts of the Soviet power and agrees to discuss them both, and to compensate the latter if the balance is not in its favor.

The "War Debts" of the Russian Government

It is regrettable that the Allied experts, abandoning the principles of justice and of reconstruction without exploitation, which their Memorandum proclaims, have refused to adhere to this point of view and propose to meet the claims of Russia for the destruction which she has suffered by establishing a very special category of Allied claims; viz. the war debts of the Russian Government. (Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Memorandum).

This desire to eliminate the legitimate claims of the Russian people for incontestable damages which the military intervention of foreign governments has caused them, by opposing what they have agreed to call the "war debts"—otherwise to be described as a category of inter-Allied engagements, the complete annulment of which has been put upon the order of the day by the Allies themselves—appears, to say the least, strange to the Russian Delegation. It is obliged to reject in the most categorical fashion every invitation to pay these debts as an inadmissible attempt to charge ruined Russia with a considerable portion of the expenses of the war of the Allied Powers. What they call the war-debts of Russia represent in reality the war material manufactured by the Allied factories and sent to the Russian front in order to assure the success of the Allied armies. The Russian people have sacrificed to the common cause of the Allies more lives than all the others put together. They have endured immense material losses and the loss of vast territories of primary importance for the development of their country as a result of the war. At the very moment when the other Allies have obtained, by the peace treaties, enormous increases of territory and great contributions, they wish to make the Russian people pay the expenses of an operation which has been so lucrative for others. The Russian Delegation invites all the members of the Conference to appreciate the inconsistency and the unreasonableness of such a demand.

The Desire for the Re-establishment of Private Property in Russia

The Russian Delegation should finally point out that, in spite of Section 1 of the Resolutions of Cannes which acknowledges each nation's right to establish the system of property and economy which it chooses, the Memorandum of the experts raises at many points the question of the restitution of the nationalized industries to their ex-proprietors, in other words the re-establishment, open or veiled, of the private ownership of industrial enterprises in opposition to the system of State ownership established in Russia. The Soviet Government, desiring the most rapid possible re-establishment of industry and its maximum productivity, will itself try, in leasing mines, factories and other enterprises, to give preference to the ex-proprietors, who possess experience and knowledge of the country. But it will not permit anyone to impose as a condition the restitution of these industries as a private property title or even their obligatory leasing to their ex-proprietors, because that would involve an impairment of the sovereignty of the Republic and of its liberty to dispose of its productive forces according to the needs and the best interests of the Russian people. It is superfluous to add that the return of private property, with the re-establishment of former possessions within the bounds of the big industries, such as naptha, coal and electricity, would present a serious obstacle to the revival of the productive forces of Russia and the rapid reconstruction of its national economy.

The Obligations of Russia According to the Memorandum of London and the National Income

The memorandum does not indicate the possible amount of the debts of Russia arising from all her former obligations and private claims, but according to the calculations made by the foreign economic press, the sum of the debts for all categories enumerated in the

Memorandum clearly amounts to 18 1/2 billion of gold roubles. Deducting the debts of war, we have for the pre-war debts and the private claims, with interests due up to December 1st, 1921, a total of about 11 billion. Supposing for a moment that the Soviet Government should consent to pay these debts in full within the time fixed, the first payment with the interest and the amortization of 1.25 per cent of the capital would demand a sum of about 1.2 billion. The Imperial Government in imposing upon the population the maximum of effort and relying besides on production and foreign commerce in the period before the war, with its excess of exports over imports, was in a condition, in the last five years preceding the war, to pay on the average 366 million, or about 400 million roubles a year of interest and amortization. In order to be able to pay the sum indicated of 1.2 billion a year, Russia would have not only to attain the rate of production which prevailed before the war of 1914 but surpass it three times. As the national income of Russia per annum before the war was 100 roubles per person and is at present about 30 roubles—that is to say, it has diminished more than two thirds—the Memorandum seems to suppose that in the space of five years our national income will increase by nine times. One can see to what degree this supposition is unrealistic by the example of England, France, Germany and Russia, whose national income per person increased on the average by 60% between 1894 and 1913, or by 3% on the average per year. The Russian Delegation agrees that under the Soviet regime the productive forces of Russia will develop much more quickly than in the capitalist states of the West or under the former Tsarist regime in Russia. It is ready to admit that this income will increase twice as fast. But the Delegation, flattering as that might be to the Soviet power, nevertheless considers unfounded the supposition that the increase of annual income between 1922 and 1927 might go sixty times as fast as before the war. The Russian economy is profoundly disorganized. According to the most optimistic estimates the net annual national income has fallen from 12 billion before the war, to 4 billion. If our national income increases twice as fast as before the war and doubles in 16 years, it will take 25 years for Russia to regain her pre-war level.

Now, as the country will be compelled before all promptly to pay the interests and the amortizations of the new loans which will aid her recovery, and as these payments will have to begin long before the date indicated, Russia will not have, for as long a time as we can foresee, any resources with which to honor her other engagements. This conclusion can be confirmed by any impartial and scientifically conscientious commission of experts which may have the opportunity to study our economic situation.

The following data will show how monstrous are the payments demanded of us: the Tsarist Government expended each year before the war, on account of its debt, a sum of 3 3/10 per cent of all the annual national income and approximately 13 per cent of its budget. The Memorandum of the experts believes that it will be possible to exact from Russia in 5 years the annual payment of a sum which is equal to 20 per cent of its national income, supposedly increased by 30 per cent, and about 80 per cent of its present budget. These payments are to be made, it should be noted, for the profit of countries whose national income per head of the inhabitants is 7 or 8 times that of Russia.

The Payment of Former Obligations and the Re-establishment of Russia

If the Soviet Government engaged to pay, upon the national income of a ruined country, even a part only of the sums arising from the obligations enumerated in the London Memorandum, it would not only lead to a systematic non-satisfaction of needs and a chronic pauperization of the population, but it would also fatally clog the process of economic revival. Russia would find herself incapable of regaining with the least possible delay her role of the chief purveyor of wheat and raw materials for Europe, of becoming again an immense market for western industry, and by re-establishing her economic situation becoming one of the principal elements in the economic re-establishment of the whole

world. If the obtaining of new credits destined for the economic reconstruction of Russia is subordinated to the payment of former obligations, and if all the positive results of the new loans and the economic revival resulting from them are devoted to the payment of old debts, these new credits will lose all sense for the Russian people and Russia will be obliged to continue by its own means and without hoping for the help of foreign capital, the work of its economic rebirth, which has already commenced and is naturally progressing very slowly. Moreover it is not only the Russian people but all the peoples of Europe and America, and even the overwhelming majority of the industrial and commercial classes of all countries, whose primary interest lies not in indemnifying a small number of former creditors of Russia, but in renewing economic relations with Russia and putting their capital to work there under conditions guaranteeing sufficient advantages and at the same time favoring the economic development of the country.

*Necessity for the General Liquidation of
Financial Engagements of the War Period*

As a result of the war all the states of Europe find themselves in a state of complete economic impotence. All the interest bearing titles in the hands of the possessing classes, dating from before the war or during the war (deeds, stocks, bonds, and so forth), no longer correspond in any way to the volume of the real national income, just as the obligations of the State no longer correspond to the amounts in the budget. Hence the necessity, more and more clearly felt, of putting all these titles and obligations into relation with production and the national income. This necessity finds its expression both in the bankruptcy several States are moving towards little by little, being obliged to renounce the payment of their war debts, and in the numerous failures of banks and of private firms. It finds expression also in the constant fall in value of notes and papers of every kind.

While the Governments refuse payment or exempt themselves from it in practice, while industries and private banks declare bankruptcy, while the working masses pay with an enormous lowering of their level of existence for the disturbances of the war, according to the Memorandum of the experts one single category of individuals is going to be indemnified—the creditors of Russia. They alone are going to cash the full value of their titles, as if the Russian Revolution had guaranteed them against all the risks and all the damages endured throughout the entire world by the masses of the people and by the capitalist groups.

In consequence of what precedes, the Russian Delegation proposes in the matter of debts and mutual obligations, the solution of which has been set forth above and which is in full accord with the real economic situation resulting from the World War and from the subsequent disturbances, as well as with the absolute necessities of the economic reconstruction of the entire world.

The Delegation of Russia once more and with particular energy draws the attention of the public opinion of all the States to the fact that the Soviet Government throughout these pourparlers, in seeking an agreement, desires to defend the interests of the future of Russia and the economic progress of all Europe, whereas that agreement is in danger of being rendered impossible or postponed by the narrow and egotistical demands of a little group of former creditors of Russia who exercise, unfortunately, too much influence upon the policies of the governments.

Soviet Russia, Vol. 5, No. 11 (1 June 1922), pp. 298-301, with modifications.



THE QUESTION OF A MILITARY CONVENTION
ALONG WITH THE TREATY OF RAPALLO
29 April 1922

One of the recurring rumors surrounding the Treaty of Rapallo—see above, 16 April—was that there was a secret military convention. Apparently there was no military appendix to the treaty, but the signing of the treaty facilitated transforming ongoing Soviet and German military talks into actual agreements on mutual assistance which were signed soon thereafter, and some may have been signed earlier. Therefore, the letter to the French Foreign Minister was technically accurate but in spirit misleading, as was a similar one the next day to the Polish government. Both countries were very upset at the military implications of Rapallo.

LETTER FROM CHICHERIN TO THE
FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE TREATY OF RAPALLO

29 April 1922

In French press comment and in the statements of French Government leaders, the treaty between Germany and Russia worked out in the course of many months in Berlin and signed at Rapallo is regarded as an act directed against French interests. The assumption has frequently been made that secret clauses of a military and political character, concealing aggressive intentions on Russia's part towards France or its allies, are attached to the treaty of Rapallo.

The Russian delegation declare in the most categorical terms that the treaty of Rapallo does not contain a single secret clause, military or political, nor any such kind of clause whatever, and that the Russian Government is not a party to any act the operation of which is directed against the interests of France or of any other nation.

The treaty of Rapallo has no other object than the settlement of questions which have accumulated between two States which were at war with one another and which feel the mutual necessity of re-establishing peaceful relations, in their own interests and in the interests of mankind.

Far from being directed against France or any other Power, the above-mentioned treaty is, from the Russian Government's point of view, only the beginning of a series of particular special treaties designed, in the opinion of the Russian delegation, to supplement the principal treaty which the Powers meeting at Genoa are anxious to conclude. These treaties should serve as the basis for pacification and stability throughout the world. As far as France in particular is concerned, the Russian Government observes that there are many points of contact between the interests of these two countries, which would facilitate the conclusion of a treaty on all questions at issue between them.

In this respect, Russia's policy remains unchanged, notwithstanding the hostility which France thought it necessary to show in regard to Russia in the last four years. The Russian Government cannot conceal from the French Government that its hostile policy towards Russia has aroused a lively feeling of indignation against France in Russian public opinion, and that, were it not for this policy, there would be no obstacle to the resumption of more friendly relations between Russia and France and its allies.

The Russian Government is convinced that a change in this situation is as necessary as it would be advantageous to the interests of France, Russia, the nations of western Europe, and the economic reconstruction of the entire world.

Be assured that this letter is dictated solely by the sincere desire to dispel all misunderstandings which might interfere with the progress of the Genoa Conference.

Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, Vol. 1, pp. 304-305.

THE NEW AGRARIAN LAND LAW—AN EXPLANATION

12 May 1922

One of the key issues of NEP for the peasants—and some other groups—was land tenure. Here a representative of the Commissariat of Agriculture, P. A. Mesiatsev, explains to the Central Executive Committee the nature and reasons behind the draft of the new land law. He was especially emphatic that the new law, whatever references it contained to "labor tenure" and use of the land, did not provide for a return to private ownership of property. After discussion, the basic principles were approved and a new law was promulgated ten days later—see 22 May below.

REPORT BY P. A. MESIATSEV, OF THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSARIAT FOR AGRICULTURE

When, last year, the new economic policy was established and various enterprises began to be leased, letters began to pour in to the various land departments from former large, and even small, owners of landed property, demanding in some cases the return of their estates, in others asking whether they could obtain the latter on lease. We pointed out to them quite definitely that under no circumstances whatever could there be any return to private property in land. The ownership and administration of the land by the proletarian and peasant State, is the fundamental fact underlying the proposed land laws. You will, therefore, not find in the project the word "ownership" but only the word "use" of the land.

While, therefore, private ownership is not sanctioned in any shape or form, we have endeavoured to create definite rights for the actual users of the land. Originally, after the abolition of private property in land, the law establishing its socialisation was interpreted in the sense that the land was considered to be for use by the whole people and the property of all the people. Later, when the landed class had been expropriated and the working population had taken possession of the land, when, moreover, the Soviet power had extended its influence more and more over the whole of Russia, it became necessary to introduce a definite organising basis. Therefore, in the law of 1919, we introduced the concept that the land as a whole belonged to the State, but that he who worked the land had a fixed right to use it. Up to the autumn of last year, however, ideas on this subject were vague, and what was permitted in one district was forbidden in another. We must now regularise the practice so that the whole population may know definitely what are its rights with regard to the use of the land. At present there are three forms of land tenure: (1) land worked directly by the State in Soviet farms; (2) land belonging to towns—communal land; (3) land belonging to the peasants—the last class constitutes ninety-six per cent of the total—and it is for this class that we need to establish stable conditions of land tenure.

In the draft decree before the conference those who use the land can only be deprived of it under definite circumstances, namely: (1) when the household ceases altogether to work the particular portion of land allotted to it; (2) when the land user is convicted by a court of justice of certain crimes; (3) when a particular portion of land is required by the Government for certain State needs, such as the construction of a railway, and so on. Further, if without sufficient excuse the holder fails to cultivate the land or leases the land contrary to law, he can be deprived of the land for a period not exceeding one rotation of crops, and that only by judgment of a court. Land which is thus set free is at the disposal of the local land group or society. To avoid continual repartitions and disputes and yet to allow full freedom to individuals and groups of peasants to exploit the land in whatever way they desire, the law provides that during the general redistribution of land any household or group of households may leave the commune; the individual peasant or group may choose any form of working the land allotted to them they may prefer. All forms of land

tenure—whether group, artel, commune, or single holdings—will have equal rights, privileges, and duties. There is to be no favouritism of one special form by the State, and every redistribution of the land is to be carried out in such a way as to protect the interests both of the society of commune remaining and of those who decide to leave it.

The reason we need this great variety of forms of land tenure is that, agriculturally, Russia varies greatly from district to district. Thus, while in the centre of Russia the communal form is the most prevalent and individual holdings seem unable to survive—even in former times, when, for instance, according to the Stolypin policy they were given State aid—in the west, on the other hand, individual farms have flourished even during the revolution. Even when it was prohibited it happened often that a group of peasants combined, received land as a collective group, and then separated again into individual farms. In the south-east—in the Volga provinces—individual farms have almost disappeared. The State must, and has, given up any effort at administrative interference with the form in which the peasant works the land—it should only exert a certain economic and guiding influence.

All types of collective associations can choose their own forms of agriculture, but those collectives which were formed by State aid on the large landed estates cannot be allowed to break up at will—they are, therefore, excepted from this provision. If such a collective desires to break up, the State will take over the whole concern. But all other collectives formed on peasant lands have the right to break up at will.

With regard to the leasing of land, the provisions for leasing apply only to land worked by peasants and their families who, owing to poverty or to a shortage of labour power, are temporarily unable to work the land themselves. Anyone may take such land on lease providing the total quantity of land in the hands of any one household is no more than that household can ordinarily work without hired labour.

You may ask why are we trying to arrest the growth of the big farms in the villages at the present time. Our answer to this is that the present is a very exceptional time—when the population is moving towards rather than away from the country—and we must aim at securing to the workers who are forced to return to the country the means of living on the land without being exploited. We are against the small farm system in principle, but at the present transition time we are bound to support it as large scale farming would now only lead to the growth of the kulaks (large farmers) and the exploitation of the hired workers. When industry and trade again develop, this question will arise anew and will receive a fresh solution.

The conditions under which it is permissible to work the land with hired labour are indicated in the decree, and other questions regarding the tenure and use of the land which are not specifically dealt with in the draft are referred to in a supplementary code of Land Laws. It is, however, very important for us to hear the views and criticisms of the delegates from the countryside before the project is shaped into its final form and confirmed.

In conclusion, I venture to hope that we have succeeded in this law in carrying out and reconciling our two fundamental aims—on the one hand to produce such stable conditions of land tenure as would tend to increase the productivity of our agriculture, on the other hand, to protect the interests of the proletarian and semi-proletarian sections of the countryside and to avoid any rupture between the workers and the peasantry. I hope that the session, whilst incorporating various improvements, will yet accept the main proposals of the draft, which we propose should be submitted for further examination to a special committee. Its preliminary publication has already had a considerable effect on our agriculture and I think that its final confirmation by such an authoritative body as the All-Russian Central Executive Committee will have a still greater effect.

Russian Information and Review, Vol. 1, No. 18 (15 June 1922), pp. 416-418.



KURSKY EXPLAINS THE NEW LAW ON PROPERTY

13 May 1922

One of the major retreats of the NEP program was in the realm of property rights. The concessions to private economic activity required both more clearly defined and more extensive property rights than had existed since the Bolshevik Revolution. The Commissar of Justice, D. I. Kursky, explained the new law to the Central Executive Committee, which shortly thereafter approved it—see 22 May, below.

REPORT BY KURSKY, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR JUSTICE

The draft decree on the rights of property, now put before the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, is intended to embody the fundamental principles underlying the proposed Code of Civil Laws, which is at present awaiting completion. The acceptance or amendment of this draft decree by the committee will guide the framers of the Code of Civil Laws as to what the basic principles of the code should be.

The draft decree which the Commissariat for Justice now puts before you aims at defining the relationships between the workers, peasants, and bourgeoisie which arise from the new economic policy. If we turn to the past year we shall find that all these rights of property which are specifically defined and formulated in the decree had already been established at various periods during the last twelve months. At the same time we made it quite clear what were the fundamental positions in the realm of property, beyond which we were not prepared to retreat.

The proposed Civil Code will recognise only one right to the ownership of land, and that is the right of the State. This is a basic principle in our jurisprudence.

As far as concerns buildings and structures, the right to private ownership of these was not abolished by the decree on socialization. No reference, however, was made to the question of the sites of structures, and it is now necessary to legalise the transfer of the leases of sites, when the structures built upon them are leased or transferred. The Council of People's Commissars has established the maximum period of lease at thirty-six years.

As to movable property, no definite law on this question has hitherto existed, but the actual extent of private right to movable property was always subject to the practice of requisition and confiscation. It was the decree of January, 1921, which first defined the classes of property to which confiscation was in future to be limited, and the situation was made still more clear by the decree of November 17, 1921, abolishing the general power of requisition and confiscation, which could henceforward only be exercised in exceptional circumstances. These two decrees, in conjunction with that of May, 1921, which put a stop to any further extension of nationalisation, clearly implied the right to private ownership of movable property and the means of production.

It is now proposed to give definite legal sanction to this right in paragraph 8 of the present draft decree; and, as a logical inference, the right of mortgaging or otherwise pledging such property is also recognised.

The protection of inventions, patent rights, and authors' rights is established in general terms by the draft decree, the exact details being left for subsequent elaboration. Previous decrees did grant the author the right to sole possession of his work during his lifetime, but it was assumed that both inventions and literary and artistic productions were a national possession which the State might at any time expropriate.

A most important clause in the draft decree is the one concerned with inheritance. The operation of previous decrees on inheritance was limited by the fact that the amount of property possessed by any individual in the country had been limited, amounting practically only to articles of a domestic nature or forming part of a domestic industry. With the

death of the head of the family, no movement of property would naturally occur, and the decree on nationalisation was concerned solely with protecting the interests of those who were immediately dependent on that industry or property. The present draft decree concedes in general terms the right to the inheritance of property (under testaments as well as in the event of intestacy). It also proposes that the right should be limited; and suggests the imposition of a graduated tax on all property inheritance.

There follows in the draft decree an important section laying down the basic principle for that section of the Code of Civil Laws which is to deal with obligations arising out of contracts. It establishes the right to conclude any agreement not forbidden by law, such as contracts relating to hire, purchase, sale, loans, guarantees, insurance, articles of association, bills of exchange, tenders, etc., which contracts become binding in law and enforceable through the courts. Any clause in a contract purporting to prevent reference to a court of law invalidates that contract.

The circumstances under which contracts become *ipso facto* invalid are enumerated, such as contracts entered into by minors, or with the purpose of opposing or defeating the law, or for conferring rights to commodities withdrawn from circulation, or calculated to injure the interests of the State. Appeal may be made to a court of law by any of the parties to a contract for its complete or partial annulment on the grounds that the contract was entered into under the influence of fraud, threats, or violence, or under a misapprehension as to the essential nature of the contract. A further clause provides that if a party to the contract has taken advantage of the dire need of the other party for the purposes of usurious exploitation, the contract at the request of the latter party may be entirely or partially annulled by a court of law.

Many of the subjects referred to in this section have already been embodied in decrees, such as, for instance, the one on bills of exchange. Others have already been worked up into special sections of the proposed Code of Civil Laws. Others will require more elaborate treatment in accordance with the development of the economic life of the country.

The final clauses state that the laws of property and obligation refer to legal entities, as well as to private individuals; among these are specifically included foreign legal entities registered in Russia. It is also laid down that all civil disputes of any nature whatever may be brought before the courts of law.

Discussion

The draft decree when submitted to discussion by the session met with considerable criticism. Opposition was not raised to the fundamental principles underlying the draft. The opinion was generally expressed, however, that the draft was in the nature of a declaration, and could only be passed as an indication of the basic principle on which the proposed Code of Civil Laws should be elaborated. To pass it as a decree would at once give its provisions, which had been cast in very general terms, the force of law. Critics pointed out that many of the terms used in the decree required precise definition; in other instances the project was too specific, as in fixing the maximum period of leases at thirty-six years.

On these grounds the session felt reluctant to go into a detailed examination of the project, and the proposal was made, and accepted by the People's Commissar for Justice, that the project should be passed in principle and then be submitted to a commission for further consideration and elaboration, the result of the commission's work to be submitted to the next session of the A.R.C.E.C.

This proposal was unanimously adopted, and the commission was at once elected.

Russian Information and Review, Vol. 1, No. 18 (15 June 1922), pp. 421-422.



KURSKY ON SOVIET LAW AND THE NEW CRIMINAL CODE

14-15 May 1922

The drafting of new legal codes, civil and criminal, was part of the process of consolidating the political and judicial system after the end of the Civil War and as part of NEP. Here D. I. Kursky, the People's Commissar of Justice, explains to the All-Russian Central Executive committee (A.R.C.E.C.) the principles underlying the new criminal code. The account includes a discussion which followed his presentation.

REPORT BY KURSKY, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR JUSTICE

The draft code of Criminal Law now laid before you embodies the four years' experience of the people's courts and the tribunals, and co-ordinates the series of decrees that have from time to time been issued on various points of criminal law. It has been carefully examined by the Commissariat for Justice and a special commission of the Council of People's Commissars, and it may be said to crystallise the conceptions of justice which have developed since the Revolution.

The code first of all defines the nature of the phenomenon which it has been designed to combat—namely, crime. Crime is described as a manifestation dangerous to the Soviet social order. The code, in setting out to combat crime, is not imbued with those ideas of vengeance and intimidation upon which the bourgeois criminal codes are based. To us the criminal is a human being, who is dangerous under present circumstances, and whom one must either isolate or strive to reform, but never make the object of vengeance. That is the basic principle in our laws.

Secondly, the code is concerned with punishments for offences. Three methods are possible. One is to state what specific punishment should be meted out for each and every offence, as was the case in Tsarist criminal law. The second method is not to specify the punishment at all, but to leave it to the social consciousness of the judges. This was the practice followed in the beginning of the Revolution, a necessary practice then, but one that must be abandoned now that we are engaged on a clear and definite formulation of the criminal law in Russia. The third method is to state the maximum and minimum limits of punishment for each offence, within which the courts may act according to their discretion.

This last is the method adopted in our projected criminal code. The principle adopted was to divide and classify all crimes into two fundamental groups. The first group included all crimes which were directly aimed at the Soviet order; the second group covered crimes which were survivals of the old order and had no political significance. Having adopted this principle, it is evident that crimes of the first order demand stern repressive measures; those of the second order do not require to be dealt with so severely. Consequently, for crimes of the first group we propose minimum punishments, less than which must not be given, and for crimes of the second group maximum punishments, which the courts must not exceed.

Methods of punishment are a serious question. Here, too, the principles adopted indicate the class character of the code, which provides that if the offence is directed to the re-establishment of the power of the bourgeoisie it shall be punished in a more severe manner than if it is committed solely for personal interests. Paragraph 25 indicates the principles upon which courts should be guided in selecting the methods of punishment, and here scope is given for the exercise of the Socialist conceptions of justice by the courts.

A feature of our code in the matter of punishments is the utilisation of a method which has grown up in Soviet legal practice, namely, compulsory labour without deprivation of liberty; upon this principle a range of punishments has been established.

The code further preserves that maximum period of deprivation of liberty which has already been established by an earlier decree, *i.e.*, five years. So lenient a maximum is foreign to the criminal laws of any other country, and is perhaps a bold step on our part. It is true that the extreme penalty [death-ed.] must, for the present, be retained; but its application is strictly limited. Paragraph 33 of the code lays down that, until abolished by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the extreme penalty shall be applicable in those cases which come under the jurisdiction of the military sections of the tribunals, or are brought before courts martial.

The final section of the code deals with minor offences against public welfare, which at present, by a decree of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs, are dealt with by the appropriate administrative department of the provincial executive committees. The code proposes to deal with these offences by an injunction of the people's courts.

I propose that the projected code be adopted in principle and handed to a special commission for final formulation.

Discussion

In the discussion which followed the draft code was subjected to considerable criticism. Part of the criticism, represented by *RIAZANOV* and *MARATOV*, was directed against the code in principle, urging that its introduction was untimely and was based on the false assumption that the period of active revolutionary struggle was over and that a period of settled legality could be begun. *LARIN*, while not objecting to the code in principle, represented the section which believed that the class character of the code was not sufficiently marked, and that it was too lenient towards non-proletarian elements in society.

The remaining criticism centred round specific points, and concerned mainly the questions of the maximum sentence, the death penalty, and paragraph ten of the code, which provided that in cases of crimes which are not specifically dealt with in the code and for which no punishment is indicated, the courts should be guided by sections in the code which dealt with crimes of a similar nature.

As regards the five years maximum, it was urged that such a sentence was insufficient for offences of grave political character, especially in view of the amnesties which the Soviet Government from time to time declared, and of the fact that in every province a Commission was to be permanently established with powers to reduce sentences, which would certainly be exercised. In reply to criticisms on the application of the death penalty, *KURSKY* pointed out that the code made it clear that it could only be applied by military courts. In reply to the criticism of paragraph ten, he stated that the code had been drawn up at what was phenomenal speed, and provision had to be made for offences which had been overlooked in the code.

Further criticism dealt with the proposal to remove minor offences against social welfare from the jurisdiction of the administrative departments concerned, on the grounds that the people's courts would be over-burdened with trivial matters; and to the position of the autonomous republics, with distinct manners, customs, and religions, in relation to a code applicable to the Federation.

Finally, the draft code was adopted in principle, and submitted to a Commission with instructions to examine criticisms and objections, collect further material and report the results of its labours to the next session of the A.R.C.E.C.

Russian Information and Review, Vol. 1, No. 18 (15 June 1922), pp. 422-423.



NEP—THE LAW ON LAND TENURE AND USE

22 May 1922

The initial decree on the agrarian tax in kind inaugurated the NEP, but many other pieces of legislation were involved in developing it. An important decree was issued a year later that not only spelled out the types of landholding which were allowed but even allowed individual peasants to hire labor, a provision which many Communists felt to be a particularly serious departure from Marxism.

LAW ON LABOR-BASED LAND USE

In order to create a sound, stable and adaptable labor-based system of land use, necessary for the restoration and development of agriculture, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, on the basis of the resolution on the land question (paragraph 6) of the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets, for changing and supplementing existing legislation, resolves to approve the following basic law on labor-based land tenure.

Division I

On Procedures for Labor Land Tenure

1. From the time of promulgation of the present decree, every land community has the right to maintain the existing form of land tenure or, upon the decision of the majority of its full-rights members (those who have reached 18 years of age, without distinction as to sex), to select any type of land tenure.

2. The type of land tenure in the agricultural community can be: (a) communal (with equalized re-allotment of land between households); (b) divisional (with the right of the household to land of immutable size in the form of overlapping plots, scattered strips, or individual farm plots, (c) associated (with common rights of land usage with members of the land community, forming an agricultural commune, artel, or association with joint exploitation of the land, and (d) mixed (with different methods of land utilization on various household lands).

3. The right of free selection of types of land-tenure extends not only to the collective farms, organized on peasants' allotted and purchased lands, but also to the lands of former owners, if they were distributed among the population in toil usage on the basis of the decisions of land offices or soviet congresses. Members of such collectives, leaving the collectives with land, are obliged to return, in proportion to the land they are withdrawing from the collective, their share of the governmental pecuniary or material loan received by the collective.

Note: The terms and procedures for discontinuing collective farms organized on lands which were not distributed by the time of the conversion of the collectives to labor use among the population (state farms, city settlements and other state property allocated by various establishments, organizations and enterprises) will be formed according to special regulations.

4. At the time of re-allotting and apportioning in the community, any number of households, as well as separate households, have the right to leave the land community, without its consent, and demand an apportionment of land, due them after the apportionment is carried out, in one place. Any form of land-tenure can be established on these allotted lands.

5. In cases when a full re-allotting does not take place, leaving the land without the consent of the land community is permitted if this is demanded by 1/5 or more of the remaining households and more than 50 households in land communities having more than 250 households. Apportionments are permitted by any number of households and at any time on vacant and naturally isolated plots if such apportionments are not offered in the general re-allotment of land.

6. At every apportioning the land community first of all establishes the allotment unit (according to consumers, working power, or mixed) and the amount of land to be allotted from the community and then calculates the amount of land due each allotment unit. In addition, the allotment unit must be one and the same for all appendages of landed property (arable land, meadow, etc.) and must be the same for those leaving the land community with land as well as for those who remain in it.

Note. The use of house-and-garden plots and buildings will be determined by special legislation.

7. All land allotments should be carried out with the observance of the greatest mutual convenience of land-tenure for those remaining in the land community as well as those who are leaving the land community.

8. After the land community has passed from one type of land-tenure to another, with the execution of the allotting in conformity with the present decree, further allotments calling for general re-allotment of land are permitted only with the permission of the land community and with the observance of the conditions indicated in the decree of 30 April 1920 of the Council of People's Commissars regarding the re-distribution of land (Collection of Laws, 1920, no. 35, page 170).

9. The Provincial Executive Committee has the right, upon the suggestion of the Provincial Land Organization and with the approval of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, to issue compulsory decrees regarding the establishment of allotment units throughout the province or its separate regions, applicable to local conditions and systems of the households. Prior to the promulgation of the decrees, the allotment unit for the allotment of lands is set by the land community itself upon the decision of the majority of its full-rights members. These cases the subsequent promulgation of the compulsory decrees by the provincial executive committee concerning tax assessments will not necessitate the redistribution of land ahead of schedule.

Note: Prior to their incorporation in the Peoples' Commissariat of Agriculture of the Federation, the Peoples' Commissariats of Agriculture of the autonomous republics and the regional agricultural departments of the autonomous regions are to adopt the resolutions on the basis of the current articles.

10. During the redistribution of the land there must not be any cut-offs, transfers or divisions separated from public lands, as per the decree of the Council of Peoples' Commissars 27 May 1920 (S.U. 120, No. 52, Art. 226).

11. The following order is established for all changes in systems of land-tenure, carried out on the basis of the present decree, and equalizing allotment of land from the community or of a general re-allotment:

- a) all questions are considered first of all by the general meeting of all the members of the given land community;
- b) in the absence of disputes or grievances, the decision of the general meeting comes into force after it is registered with the district land board, which is obliged to examine such matters within a month from the date of their receipt;
- c) in cases where disputes arise, the dissatisfied party has the right to appeal the decision of the land community in accordance with the regulations established for the examination of disputes over land; only after complete examination and settlement of the dispute can the appropriate registration take place;
- d) in cases provided for in Article 5 dealing with households leaving the land community, the registration is examined and put into effect in conformity with sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of the present article.

Division II

Rights of the Toiling-User of the Land

12. None of the toiling tenants can be deprived of land except in cases directly provided for by law, and the sizes, boundaries, and sites of their plots can be changed only under

agrarian laws on re-distribution, and by land re-allotment in those communities where a communal form of land tenure exists.

13. Right to the land, granted to a toiling tenant, ceases in cases: (a) of voluntary renunciation of land by all the members of the household; (b) of complete cessation of independent farming by the household; (c) of escheatment of the household; (d) of definite migration of the household to another place with discontinuance of independent farming at the old place; (e) of deprivation of the right to land by the courts for offenses indicated by law; (f) of land taken in a manner prescribed for by governmental or public purposes (road construction, mining of valuable deposits, and the like).

14. In case individual members of the household leave for military service, are called by mobilization, or are elected to a soviet or public office, the portion of land due them will be preserved by the community for the full length of service of its departed members. If a member leaves for outside work, the portion of land due the departed member is preserved by the household to which he belongs for a period of 2 crop rotations, reckoned from the time of departure, and upon return to the household after the expiration of that period, he is provided with land from the land reserve if such a reserve is available. In the absence of such a reserve, the land shall be allotted to him on an equal basis with other members of the community at the next land redistribution.

15. If the land of the toil-tenant is taken over for government for public purposes (Article 13), in a manner prescribed by law, then in place of the land taken over the toil-tenant is allotted land in another place, with compensation for losses suffered by the tenant.

16. If the tenant without a valid reason leaves the land without economic exploitation, or leases it in violation of the law (Division III), then he can be temporarily, for a period of not more than one year, deprived of the right of using that land by the regulations established for the examination of disputed land affairs.

17. Upon the cessation of land tenure, the free portions of land go to the local land reserve and, in the first instance, are earmarked for the satisfaction of the land needs of a household deprived of land use.

18. The purchase, sale or conditional sale, bequest and also mortgaging of land is forbidden, and agreements completed in violation of the prohibitions are held invalid; persons guilty of their completion will be deprived of land found in their use in addition to punishment under criminal order.

Division III

About Toil of Land (Temporary Violations of the Land Use Law)

19. Toiling households, temporarily weakened, owing to natural calamities (bad harvest, fire, cattle plague, etc.), a shortage or dearth of man-power (death, temporary absence for seasonal labor, military mobilization, election for soviet or public service, etc.) are permitted to lease all or part of the land in exchange for payment in money, products, or other forms of remuneration and with the observance of conditions indicated in the following articles.

20. A lease is permitted for a period not exceeding the time for conducting one crop rotation on the leased plot, and in the absence of normal crop rotation, for a period of not more than 3 years.

21. In exceptional cases the limitation of the lease can be lengthened with the permission of the Volost Executive Committee, but not for a period beyond two crop rotations, and in the absence of normal crop rotations, for a period of not more than six years. If, at the expiration of this period, the lessee is not in a position to conduct independent farming on the leased land, then the land goes into the local reserve fund to meet the needs of other members of the given commune.

22. Only toil-leasing (Article 19) is permitted: no one can receive under a lease more land than can be cultivated for certain by the labor-strength of the lessee's household.

23. The lease enters into force after it is registered with the local Volost Executive Committee if the land leased is more than 3/4 of all the lessee's land, and with the local village Soviet if the land leased is below that quantity.

24. The lease can be concluded in written as well as oral forms. The oral contracts must be presented by the party in the presence of an authorized member of the volost executive committee or village soviet (art. 23) and recorded in a special book of contracts.

25. The lease becomes void if the lessee's household completely discontinues independent farming due to the migration of the household or changes its occupations.

26. After concluding the lease, the tenant pledges to carry on farming on the leased land as an efficient and prudent farmer and has no right to sublet the land to other persons. In addition, the tenant pays the levies, taxes, and duties due on the leased land during the course of the lease.

27. The lease can be terminated prematurely in the event of violation of the conditions of the lease or non-fulfillment of those conditions as stated in Art. 26 or if he fails to fulfill the conditions of the rental agreement. Rights and obligations arising out of the contract annulment are to be considered in settling any land disputes.

28. Upon the termination of the lease, the leased land with all improvements carried out by the tenant returns to the lessee. Any improvements unused by the tenant are subject to mutual accounting under the terms of the lease or by a supplementary contract or understanding.

Division IV

About Auxiliary Hired Labor in Toiling-Land-Tenure Households

29. Auxiliary hired labor in toiling agricultural households is permitted in those cases when the household cannot fulfill its necessary agricultural tasks in good time due to the condition of its own laboring force or inventory. However, the hired labor must be used only while the farm continues to use its own workers in the farm-laboring operation—i.e. under the conditions that all available able-bodied members of the farm work along with the hired laborer.

30. In localities where there is a shortage of arable land, the use of hired labor is completely permitted for temporarily weakened households only for the time of their shortage of power; for other households, hired labor is permitted only for individual seasons when the condition of the households laboring force does not allow the household to cope with its separate tasks (haymaking, harvesting, etc.). In the localities where large areas of land are found, and also on farms organized in new places, in the process of settling down or migrating, hired labor is permitted on a scale necessary for rapid cultivation and maximum utilization of the household area.

31. Hired labor conforms with the conditions specified in laws and regulations regarding the protection and standardization of labor.

Division V

About Strengthening Toil-Tenure

32. For the rapid construction and stabilization of toil-tenure, volost, village, and other agricultural organizations must make available for toil land tenure all lands now found in their actual possession and legally allotted to them by land organs or by soviet congresses (volost, district, or provincial) for the purpose of distributing the land for toil use.

Note: In the event that it is impossible to establish exactly the boundaries and size of the actual land used, the settlement of the disputed section will be distributed between the corresponding villages and other associations commensurate with the number of mouths to feed and the land provided.

33. For the same purpose, further equalization of land between separate volosts and villages is absolutely forbidden.

Note: At the time of the publication of the approval of the present draft decree on land use or the presentation of it to the land committees for approval, land use work will cease to ensure the earliest implementation of the decree.

34. The land organs will carry an obligatory agrarian-exploitation tasks only in the following cases: (a) organizing land funds for the distribution and re-distribution of free and excess land and (b) elimination of significant inter-volost or inter-village overlapping of agricultural lands. In all similar cases, agricultural work must be completed by the interested parties and in accordance with it compulsory land use ceases.

35. In regions where there are no confusing land relations between villages and other associations, in order to implement state-ordered land use (land regulation), land organs will only provide the particular laws legalizing existing land use with the establishment of the size and boundaries and issuing the appropriate documents to the people.

Division VI Final Decisions

36. The People's Commissariat of Agriculture has the right to issue instructions and decrees for guidance and application of the present law.

37. The present law applies to the R.S.F.S.R. and to republics united with her by treaty. Modifications of it, called for by particular local conditions, are effected through the Federal Committee on Land Affairs attached to the Presidium of The All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

Meisel and Kozera, pp. 133-138; *Sobranie zakononii i rasporiazhevii*, No. 36, Article 426 (1922), 576-580.



NEP—THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY 22 May 1922

The encouragement of economic recovery included also allowing private enterprise in trade and industry. Essential to this was assuring the right to private property although the decree carefully stipulated that this did not mean that former property owners could reclaim previously expropriated property. This decree represented a further retreat from the socialist policies of the first years of the Bolshevik government. See also Kursky's explanation of the law, 13 May 1922, above.

DECREE OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE NINTH ALL-RUSSIAN CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, ON THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, AS RECOGNIZED BY THE R.S.F.S.R., PROTECTED BY ITS LAWS AND MAINTAINED BY ITS COURTS

With the object of establishing exact relations between State organs and associations or private persons participating in the development of the productive forces of the country, and the relations of private persons and combinations between each other, and with the purpose of fixing the consequent legal guarantees necessary for the maintenance of the property rights of citizens of the R.S.F.S.R. and foreigners, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee resolves:

I. To permit all citizens, whose rights are not limited by law established, upon the territory of the R.S.F.S.R. and her Allies and the Soviet Republics united with her by treaty, the right of organizing industrial and commercial undertakings and of pursuing trades and professions permitted by the laws of the R.S.F.S.R., provided that all regulations regarding industry and trade and the protection of labour are observed.

II. To permit all citizens, whose rights are not limited by law established, the following rights of property which shall be defended by the courts of law:

A. Property

(1) The right to the possession of buildings in town or country not nationalized by the local Soviets together with the right of transferring such buildings with the lease of the site on which the transferred buildings stand.

Note. The right of transferring leases does not apply to cultivated lands in country districts.

(2) The right, by agreement with the local authorities concerned with the disposal of land, of building upon urban and country sites for a period fixed by law, but not exceeding forty-nine years, with the right to the possession of the buildings during this period as mentioned in the previous clause.

(3) The right to the possession of movable property connected with factories, workshops, commercial and industrial undertakings, private ownership of which is permissible, tools and the means of production, the products of agriculture and industry, commodities not withdrawn from circulation by special legislation, financial capital, articles of domestic utility and articles of personal use.

Note. The requisition of property mentioned in Clauses 1, 2, and 3 of the present decree against payment for the alienated property at average market prices within a period of one month, and confiscation without compensation, are permissible only in special circumstances established by law.

(4) The right to mortgage or pledge property mentioned in Clauses 1, 2, and 3 of the present decree.

(5) The right to inventions, copyright, trademarks, and industrial models and drawings within the limits established by special legislation.

(6) The right of inheritance, by testament or law, by husbands or wives or direct offspring, to the limit of 10,000 gold rubles in total value.

Note. Exception to this clause are permissible only in circumstances established by special legislation.

B. Contracts

(7) The right to conclude all manner of contracts, including those relating to the leasing of property, purchase and sale, barter, lease, loans, tender, power of attorney, insurance, partnership (simple, complete, in trust, and limited liability), bills of exchange and all kinds of banking and credit operations, which agreements shall receive the force of law and shall be maintainable in a court of law in accordance with the following conditions:

(a) All agreements not forbidden by law concluded between (1) State organs and persons, (2) legally qualified citizens, and (3) legal entities, to the limits defined in their constitutions, shall be considered obligatory upon the parties to the contract, and shall give them the right to the legal defense of claims arising therefrom.

Note. A clause inserted in a contract forbidding either of the parties to resort to the courts of law shall render that contract invalid.

(b) Contracts shall be invalid which: (1) are concluded by persons not legally qualified; (2) are contrary to the law, or whose object is to defeat the law; (3) are from the transfer of rights to commodities withdrawn from circulation; (4) are concluded without due observance of the forms laid down by law; or (5) are clearly prejudicial to the State.

(c) The courts may consider contracts fully or partially invalid at the request of one of the parties, in the following circumstances: (1) if one of the parties entered into the contract under the influence of fraud, threats, or violence, or as a result of collusion; (2) if one of the parties entered into the contract under a misapprehension of a fundamental nature.

Where one of the parties takes advantage of the dire necessity of the other party for the purpose of usurious exploitation, the court may at the request of the aggrieved party or the appropriate authorities, either declare the contract invalid or annul it for the future.

III. The rights of property and obligations mentioned in Sections 1 to 7 apply also to all bodies recognized as legal entities, as, for example, producing and co-operative organizations, partnerships, registered companies, State institutions and undertakings, and their combinations to the limit laid down in their constitutions or in corresponding regulations.

Note 1. Foreign limited liability companies, partnerships, etc., may enjoy the rights of legal entities in the R.S.F.S.R. only with the permission of the appropriate organs of the Council of People's Commissars.

Note 2. Foreign legal entities which have not received permission to conduct activities in the R.S.F.S.R. may enjoy legal defense of claims arising outside the frontiers of the R.S.F.S.R. against persons residing within the frontiers only where such right is mutual.

IV. Disputes as to the rights of citizenship shall be settled by the courts of law.

V. The present decree is not retroactive, and does not confer the right on former owners of property which had been expropriated in accordance with revolutionary law before the promulgation of the present decree to claim the return of such property.

VI. The A.R.C.E.C. requests the Presidium of the A.R.C.E.C. and the Council of People's Commissars to draw up the necessary detailed laws arising out of the present decree and to submit to the next ordinary session of the A.R.C.E.C. a draft Code of the Civil Laws of the R.S.F.S.R.

Russian Information and Review, Vol. 1, No. 20 (15 July 1922) pp. 478-479, with modifications.



TRIAL OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES

27 May 1922

The NEP era, despite the relaxation of economic controls, saw a general tightening of political controls. This began inside the Communist Party with the actions of the Tenth Party Congress in 1921. It also included suppression of opposition outside the party. A key step in this and in the history of political trials in the USSR was the trial of the Socialist Revolutionary Party leaders in 1922. Stretching out over several months, the trial provoked controversy not only within Soviet Russia but among socialists internationally. For the Bolsheviks, the purpose probably was to break what little organized opposition remained in the country, to destroy the SR's remaining influence among the masses, and to emphasize the inadmissibility of independent activity. Both sides treated it more as a political confrontation than a judicial process. Given here is a portion of the indictment, which totalled 117 pages, against the "first group" of defendants, which included the most important ones.

INDICTMENT

The following persons are charged before the Supreme Tribunal of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for offences set out in the historical and special sections of the indictment, namely:

(1) GOTZ, Abram Rafaielovich, DONSKOY, Dmitri Dmitrievich, GERSTEIN, Lev Yakovlevich, LIKHATCH, Michail Alexandrovich, IVANOV, Nikolai Nikolaivich,

RATNER-ELKIND, Evgenia Moiseevna, RAKOV, Dmitri Fedorovich, FEDOROVICH, Florian Florianovich, VEDENYAPIN, Michail Alexandrovich, GENDELMAN-GRABOVSKY, Michail Yakovlevich, MOROZOV, Sergei Vladimirovich, ARTEMIEV, Nikolai Ivanovich, RATNER, Grigori Moiseevich, TIMOFEEV, Efgeni Michailovich.

GOTZ, DONSKOY, VEDENYAPIN, and GENDELMAN, being elected to the Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionary Party at the Third Congress of the party in June, 1917, and re-elected to the same Central Committee at the Fourth Congress in December, 1917; and DONSKOY, GERSTEIN, LIKHATCH, IVANOV N., RATNER-ELKIND, RAKOV, FEDOROVICH, TIMOFEEV, being elected to the Central Committee in December, 1917; and ARTEMIEV, MOROZOV, and RATNER, Grigori, to the Moscow Bureau of the Central Committee during the first half of 1918, and up to the day of arrest, and subsequently to the Tenth Council of the party in August, 1921, being directors of the activities and responsible leaders of the said party,

So directed the activities of the party as to utilise its resources and energies for the overthrow of the power of the Workers' and Peasants' Soviets won by the proletarian revolution, and of the Workers' and Peasants' Government founded upon the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R., inasmuch as:—

(1) They made preparations for and organised armed uprisings against the Soviet Power in Petrograd and Moscow, formed special military organisations and bands, entering for this purpose into relationships and contact with other counter-revolutionary organisations, accepting from them financial aid and jointly organising technical bodies for the purpose of armed insurrection in the form of military staffs, officer corps, etc. and supporting with all the resources at their disposal uprisings and insurrections wherever they occurred.

(2) In the name of the party they entered into relationships with the representatives of international capitalism in the person of the official representatives of the capitalist Governments of the Entente at the time when the latter were at war with the R.S.F.S.R., helping them in the seizure of the territory of the Soviet Republic, supplying them with information as to the internal situation of the country, and accepting from them military, financial, and technical aid.

(3) With the same purpose they entered into relationships with armed White Guard forces fighting against the Soviet Republic, namely, with Generals Krasnov, Alexeiev, and Denikin, and with the bourgeois-nationalist counter-revolutionary centres on the borders of the R.S.F.S.R., styling themselves the Governments of the Ukraine, the Kuban, and the Don, aiding and reinforcing with all their resources such counter-revolutionary centres as sprang up, especially in Samara, in the north, in Ufa, and in Omsk, under the name of the "Government of Members of the Constituent Assembly," and the armed struggle conducted by the latter against the Soviet Government by means of high treason, espionage, etc.

(4) They organised and directed the activities of military groups specially formed for carrying out terrorist acts against the executants of the Soviet Power, the blowing up of railways and the armed robbery of Soviet institutions and persons, and utilised the funds so obtained for the purposes of carrying on their counter-revolutionary work.

Inasmuch as,

(a) GOTZ, member of the Central Committee of the S.R.P., personally carried on agitation within the army after the October Revolution, appearing at meetings in Tsarskoe, Mogilev, and Pakov with an appeal for opposition against the authorities, prepared and participated in the organisation of the Junker uprising in Petrograd on October 29, signed proclamations for the uprising of the Junkers in armed struggle against the Soviet Power, attended the meetings of the Military Commission and the sittings of the bureau of the Military Commission as well as the joint sittings of the Military Commission and the Military Section of the Union for Regeneration, whose purpose was to overthrow the Soviet Government; attended the sittings of the military staff of the Union for Regeneration,

together with the representatives of the other counter-revolutionary organisations forming part of the Union for Regeneration, for the purpose of jointly organising the armed overthrow of the Soviet Power; became for the same purpose a member of the Committee for the Salvation of the Fatherland and the Revolution, received money for the counter-revolutionary work of the Military Commission from the Military Section of the Union for Regeneration; and, above all,

Being in February, 1918, a responsible member of the Central Committee of the S.R.P. in Petrograd, upon the suggestion of Lydia Konopleva to organise an attempt upon the life of Lenin, not only gave his own personal consent to this, but also promised her to obtain the official sanction of the Central Committee for the above-mentioned act, in execution of which before the members of the Central Committee of the S.R.P. left Petrograd for Moscow he transmitted to Konopleva the sanction of the Central Committee for the organisation of the attempt upon Comrade Lenin, and then after the departure of the Central Committee of the S.R.P. for Moscow sent the second and final sanction of the Central Committee for the execution of the terrorist act by Boris Rabinovich, member of the S.R.P.

Through this same Rabinovich at the same period he conducted negotiations with Estrin, member of the Petrograd Provincial Committee, for the organisation of an attempt to blow up a train upon which the Council of People's Commissars were proceeding to Moscow in March, 1918, and in order to test Estrin proposed that he should shoot Trotsky when the latter appeared at the meeting in the Alexandrinsk Theatre in Petrograd; in April, 1918, in conversation with Semenov, he gave the latter sanction in the name of the Central Committee to carry out terrorist acts against responsible Soviet workers, and himself indicated Zinoviev and Volodarsky as persons against whom the first terrorist acts should be organised, and personally conspired with the Socialist Revolutionary Zeime, to the end that the latter should discover the places of residence of Zinoviev and Volodarsky, and indicated Zeime to Semenov as the person from whom he should obtain the necessary addresses, and later, in July, 1918, being informed of the state of the preparations for the attempt upon Comrade Volodarsky, and having himself conducted the attempt inasmuch as he fixed the time for its execution, after the completion of the murder issued instructions for the immediate return of the members of the Central Military Section from Petrograd to Moscow, in order to conceal the murder of Volodarsky and the participants in the murder, and towards the end of June and in the beginning of July, 1918, again gave sanction on behalf of the Central Committee for the attempts upon Lenin and Trotsky; and finally, in the name of the Central Committee of the S.R.P., gave the sanction for the execution of acts of robbery against Soviet institutions and private persons.

(b) DONSKOY, Dmitri Dmitrievich, member of the Central Committee of the S.R.P., directed the Military Commission after the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly, represented the Central Committee of the Party, in 1918, in the Council of the Military Commission consisting of representatives of the sections, participated on behalf of the Central Committee at the conference of the Military Commission in connection with the disarmament of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, on which account he entered into relationship with the counter-revolutionary organisation of Filonenko, and gave sanction in the name of the Central Committee for the establishment of relationships with the counter-revolutionary organisation of Ivanov, and with the German General Staff of Ludendorf, for which purpose he commissioned the Socialist Revolutionary Postnikov.

Later in Moscow he conducted military work, assisted at the report of the representatives from the Ufa Committee, and participated in relationships established by the S.R.P. with other emissaries and couriers, including the conference with the representative of General Alexeiev, staff officer Gaevsky, also receiving the report of Khrenovsky on his visit to General Alexeiev, and the report of Ratner on his survey of the Ukraine, and conducted similar counter-revolutionary military work in Saratov, and, moreover,

In April, 1918, when he was applied to by Semenov, gave his consent to terrorist acts against responsible members of the Soviet Government and put Semenov in connection with the member of the Central Committee of the S.R.P., Gotz, for the purpose of receiving from the latter official sanction for carrying out the above-mentioned acts, and in June, 1918, again confirmed to Semenov in Saratov the sanction of the Central Committee for terrorist acts, and gave his consent to the proposal for the organisation of attempts upon Lenin and Trotsky; in July, 1918, being then in Moscow, as a responsible member of the Central Committee, being acquainted with and conducting the activities of the Central Military Group, just previous to the attempt upon Lenin, he held communication with the perpetrator of the act, Kaplan, as to the preparation for the attempt; he conveyed the sanction of the Central Committee to Semenov for the carrying out of attempts upon Lenin, Trotsky, Volodarsky, Zinoviev, and Uritsky;

And in addition gave official sanction to Semenov for acts of robbery upon Soviet institutions and private persons, and not only himself expressed his readiness to take part in the acts of robbery, but actually did so take part, namely:

(1) In February, 1918, he conducted negotiations with employees of the co-operative store at the corner of Panteleimonovsky and Mokhovaya, in Petrograd, for the organisation of a robbery for which purpose he put Semenov into communication with the said employees;

(2) He put Semenov into communication with a certain S.R. employed in the Commissariat for Food in Petrograd with the purpose of organising through him the robbery of an employee of the Commissariat by sending the latter with a certain sum of money, and subsequently after the robbery proposed that Semenov should hand over the money robbed to the treasurer of the Central Committee, Evgenia Ratner;

(3) He informed Semenov of an S.R. employed in the Flax Co-operative Society, through whom to carry out a robbery upon that institution;

(4) He gave Semenov money for purchasing special implements for melting the lock of the fire-proof safe in the Moscow Provincial Food Committee;

(5) He had knowledge of the robbery of money from the Ninth Postal and Telegraphic Division of Moscow, and gave instructions that the money robbed should be placed at the disposal of the Central Military Group;

(6) And in addition, when in Moscow, in July, 1918, as a responsible member of the Central Committee, organised through Agapov, a special band of dynamiters headed by Davidov, the object of which was to organise the blowing up of trains and railway bridges. Moreover, he, firstly, received a report from Davidov as to the progress of this work and gave the latter instructions, for which purpose he three times went to the meeting place of the dynamiters in the village of Tomilkno and, secondly, was acquainted with and arranged the connection between the group and the agent of the French Mission, Henri Vertamond, for the purpose of receiving financial aid and explosive material.

[The indictment continues with similar specific charges against the others named in the opening section.—Ed.]

Russian Information and Review, Vol. 1, No. 20 (15 July 1922), pp. 476-477.



GLAVLIT—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENSORSHIP OFFICE

6 June 1922

Censorship of the press was established immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution but establishment of a fully developed, comprehensive, censorship system and agency came only

with the creation of Glavlit (Main Administration for Literature and Publishing), which played a major role in Soviet life thereafter. Especially important was the requirement of "preliminary examination of everything intended for the press," i.e., approval prior to publication. Included also is the first part of the "Instruction" from Glavlit to its local organs. The latter parts, not included, deal primarily with the structure of local departments and the distribution of work.

STATUTES OF THE MAIN ADMINISTRATION FOR LITERATURE AND PUBLISHING (GLAVLIT)

1. For the purpose of the unification of all forms of censorship for printed matter there is established the Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing under the People's Commissariat of Education, with local organs under the Provincial Departments of Public Instruction.

2. Upon the Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing and its local organs is made incumbent:

- a) The preliminary examination of all matter intended for publication or dissemination, both in manuscript and in print, of periodical and non-periodical publications, photographs, drawings, maps, and similar matter;
- b) The issuance of permits for the right to publish various printed matter as well as organs of the periodical and non-periodical press;
- c) The compilation of lists of printed matter prohibited from sale and distribution;
- d) The promulgation of rules, orders and instructions concerning affairs of the press, to be binding upon all organs of the press, publishing concerns, typographies, libraries and book stores.

3. The Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing and its organs prohibit the publication and distribution of matter:

- a) Containing agitation against the Soviet Power;
- b) Disclosing the military secrets of the Republic;
- c) Exciting public opinion through the communication of false reports;
- d) Exciting nationalistic and religious fanaticism;
- e) Of a pornographic nature.

4. The publications of the Communist International, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, the Provincial Committees of the Russian Communist Party and, in general, the entire press of the Communist Party, as well as the publications of the State Publishing Department and of the Main Politico-Educational Committee, the "Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee" and the scientific works of the Academy of Sciences are exempt from the censorship. With regard to these publications it is made incumbent upon the Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing and its organs to adopt measures for the full safeguarding of the interests of the military censorship. As for special departmental publications they are to be exempted from the censorship only by agreement between the Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing and the respective People's Commissariat.

5. All publications issued in the Republic, excluding those listed in Article 4, must carry the stamp of Glavlit or its local organs.

6. At the head of the Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing stands a manager appointed by the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Education, and two assistants appointed by the same collegium by agreement with the Revolutionary War Council of the Republic and the State Political Department, to be subject to the authority of the manager as well as of the respective organ.

7. The local organs of the Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing in the larger centers, such as Petrograd, Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov, etc. (as determined by

the Main Administration), are organized the same as the Main Administration. In all other Provincial capitals there are censors to be appointed by the Provincial Departments of Public Instruction and confirmed in office by the Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing.

8. Apart from cases where certain localities are placed in a state of martial law, where the organs of the censorship in the different localities are transferred, from considerations of military necessity, by agreement between the Revolutionary War Council of the Republic and the Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing, to the jurisdiction of the War Department, or else the latter may appoint to those organs a special censor.

9. The surveillance of performances and theatrical presentation is made incumbent upon the managers of the Provincial Departments of Public Instruction.

10. The organs of the State Political Department, "G.P.U.," are charged with combating the dissemination of matter prohibited by the Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing and by its organs; the surveillance of typographies, customs and frontier stations; combating surreptitious publications and their distribution; combating the importation from abroad, for distribution in the territory of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, of literature which it is forbidden to circulate; supervising the sale of Russian and foreign literature; and the confiscation of books prohibited by the Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing and its organs, according to the lists mentioned in Section "c" of Paragraph 2.

NOTE: The lists issued by the Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing are obligatory for the strict and unfailing guidance of the organs of the State Political Department. Concerning publications not included in the above mentioned lists, the State Political Department in each separate case raises the question of permission or prohibition of their circulation before the Main Administrations for Affairs of Literature and Publishing.

11. Managers of typographies and factory administrations are bound, at the risk of legal responsibility, to watch strictly that matter printed in their typographies be provided with the stamp of the Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing, or of its organs, except matter enumerated in Paragraph 4.

12. Owners and managers of typographies are obliged to submit to the organs of the censorship five copies each of every kind of printed matter immediately following the printing.

(Signed) For the President of the Council of People's Commissars,

INSTRUCTION

From the Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing
(Glavlit) to Its Local Organs.

1. Rights and Functions of the GLAVLIT and Its Local Organs.

1. The Glavlit and its local organs carry out all forms of the censorship (military, political, ideological, etc.)

2. All organs of the press, except those exempted from the censorship under the decree, are obliged to submit to the Glavlit and its local organs for preliminary examination everything intended for the press.

3. Glavlit undertakes the preliminary examination of all matter intended for publication or distribution, both in manuscript and in print, periodical and non-periodical publications, photographs, drawings, and similar matter (Russian as well as that imported from abroad).

4. It handles the issuance of permits for the right to publish various works, as well as the organs of the periodical and non-periodical press, and the right to organize new publishing concerns.

5. It compiles lists of printed matter prohibited from sale and distribution (Russian literature as well as foreign).

6. It issues rules, orders and instructions regarding affairs of the press, which are binding upon all the organs of the press: publishing concerns, typographies, libraries and book stores.

7. The censorship of printed matter consists in:

- a) Preventing the printing of information not to be made public (See enumeration—Glavlit statute, paragraph 3);
- b) Preventing the printing of articles which are of a character manifestly hostile to the Communist Party and the Soviet authority;
- c) Preventing all kinds of publications which carry an ideology that is hostile to us in fundamental questions (social, religious, economic, the nationalities problem, the domain of art, etc.);
- d) Preventing the publication of the yellow press, pornography, false publicity, etc.;
- e) Expunging from articles their sharpest points (facts, figures, characterizations) which compromise the Soviet authority and the Communist Party.

8. Glavlit has the right to stop publications, reduce their circulation, and shut down publishing concerns in cases of obviously criminal activity, bringing the responsible heads to court or turning over their cases to the local organs of the State Political Department.

NOTE: In the event that there should be need of closing any publishing concern, the local organ of the Glavlit is to inquire about it at headquarters. Only when the necessity for closing should be extremely urgent may it on its own authority stop the publishing concern, reporting to headquarters for its approval.

9. The Political Control Department of the State Political Department renders to the Glavlit technical assistance in the surveillance of the description of the press, typographies, book trade, and the import and export of printed matter from abroad and beyond the frontiers of the Republic, according to the decree....

Letters from Russian Prisons, pp. 307-310, with minor modifications.



DECLARATION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF ARTISTS OF REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA (AKhRR) June 1922

The futurists, suprematists, constructivists, and other avant garde schools of art were challenged by others which stressed realism and the everyday lives of workers, peasants, soldiers, and the Revolution presented in a way readily accessible to the masses. Out of this came the Association of Artists of Revolutionary Russia (AKhRR) in 1922. Their realistic style, heroic representation of the Revolution, and didactic manner attracted both party support and a popular following. They increasingly became the dominant influence in art as the 1920s wore on, precursors of Socialist Realism. This declaration was in the catalogue of their exhibition of June-July 1922, "Exhibition of Studies, Sketches, Drawing from the Life and Customs of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army."

DECLARATION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF ARTISTS OF REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA
The Great October Revolution, in liberating the creative forces of the people, has aroused the consciousness of the masses and the artists—the spokesmen of the people's spiritual life.

Our civic duty before mankind is to set down, artistically and documentarily, the revolutionary impulse of this great moment of history.

We will depict the present day: the life of the Red Army, the workers, the peasants, the revolutionaries, and the heroes of labor.

We will provide a true picture of events and not abstract concoctions discrediting our Revolution in the face of the international proletariat.

The old art groups existing before the Revolution have lost their meaning, the boundaries between them have been erased in regard to both ideology and form—and they continue to exist merely as circles of people linked together by personal connections but devoid of any ideological basis or content.

It is this content in art that we consider a sign of truth in a work of art, and the desire to express this content induces us, the artists of Revolutionary Russia, to join forces; the tasks before us are strictly defined.

The day of revolution, the moment of revolution, is the day of heroism; the moment of heroism—and now we must reveal our artistic experiences in the monumental forms of the style of heroic realism.

By acknowledging continuity in art and by basing ourselves on the contemporary world view, we create this style of heroic realism and lay the foundation of the universal building of future art, the art of a classless society.

Bowlit, pp. 266-267.



INSTRUCTIONS FOR REGISTERING ASSOCIATIONS AND SOCIETIES

10 August 1922

A special characteristic feature of the Soviet state was the attempt to control the establishment, as well as actions, of all organizations of whatever kind. These instructions outline the process of obtaining approval, required by decrees passed earlier in 1922.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REGISTRATION OF SOCIETIES, UNIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Pursuant to the ruling of the Praesidium of the All Russian Central Executive Committee, June 12, 1922, and to the ruling of the All Russian Central Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars, August 3, 1922, no society, union or association, with the exception of trade unions affiliated with the All Russian Central Federation of Trade Unions (WZSPS) may initiate its activities without previous registration with the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and with its local departments.

1. Persons or groups desiring to establish a society, union or association upon approval of its constitution by the proper department must submit to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs or to its local department as may be required (a) Minutes of the organizational meeting of the society, union or association, in triplicate. (b) Constitution of the society, in triplicate, (c) Copy of the application for permit to organize as submitted to the proper department and copy of the constitution as approved by the proper department, in triplicate, (d) data showing the location of the executive offices of the organization, the area

covered in its activities, the places where it proposes to have branches and authorized affiliations, in triplicate, (e) List of charter members with the following data concerning them, in triplicate: surname, given name and father's given name, residence and address, social status, general service record since 1914, party affiliations, economic status, (f) Registration fee of R100 [one hundred rubles].

NOTE 1: Subsequent reports must be submitted listing the membership of the Executive Committee, and the changes thereof, in accordance with the outline given under item "e," section 1.

NOTE 2: All literature already published by societies, unions and associations is subject to the general rules in force for the censorship of printed publications.

2. All societies, unions and associations already actually in existence at the time of issuance of these instructions must submit to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (a) Constitution of the Society, list of charter members, and members of the current Executive Committee, following the outline given under Par, "e," Sec. 1., copy of the application for permit to organize as submitted to the proper department, and copy of the constitution as approved by the proper department, in triplicate, (b) data showing the location of the executive offices of the organization, the area covered in its activities, list of its branches, their location, and list of authorized affiliations and their addresses, in triplicate.

3. The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and its departments in the localities where the unions, societies and associations function issue a certificate of registration which must be preserved in the records of the unions, societies and associations.

4. Societies, unions or associations not registered within two weeks after the date of publication of these instructions are declared disbanded.

Chairman of VTsIK M. Kalinin

Letters From Russian Prisons, p. 314.



THE NEW PEASANT WOMAN: MARY THE BOLSHEVIST

15 September 1922

There are many theoretical writings about women from this period and many others which proclaimed their new role in state and society. See, for example, the various writings by Alexandra Kollontai in this volume and in volume one, and that by Bukharin on 31 July 1920 above, as well as writings in volume three. More graphic, however, while still serving a didactic purpose, were articles such as "Mary the Bolshevik." It appeared in Moskovskii Ponedel'nik sometime in 1922, probably summer. It traces, in a humorous style but with serious purpose, Mary's transition from traditional peasant wife to "Bolshevik" public activist. The fate of such women was not always so easy as in this story, however, for often they ended up being beaten or even killed by angry menfolk, especially in the Moslem areas. The series of stars which separate the sections of the narrative were in the original. The three stars are section markers in the original and do not represent omissions.

Mary the Bolshevik

We had one such. Tall, broad-chested, with black eye-brows that rose like arches. Her husband was no bigger than a thimble. Kozonok was the name we gave him. You felt you

could hide him all under a hat, so insignificant he looked. But when he got cross with his wife—goodness gracious—he was a terror. He banged the table like the smith with his hammer, and shouted:

"I'll murder you—squeeze your soul out of you."

But Mary was artful. She would pretend to be frightened, and would speak respectfully.

"Prokofy Mitrich! Whatever has made you so cross?"

"I'll knock your head off," he would threaten.

And she, still more sweetly:

"I have just made some porridge. Won't you have some?"

She would fill the dish to the brim, put some butter on, and would stand bowing and entreating him in the wedding-like fashion:

"Do help yourself, Prokofy Mitrich. I have offended you greatly—forgive me."

And Prokofy Mitrich would be pleased that a woman should try to humour him. He would toss his head, feeling himself a mighty hero.

"Don't want it."

Mary waited on him like a servant, brought water, looked for his pouch. At night she would put his head on her arm, stroke his hair, and purr sweet words into his ear like a cat.

Before, she did not show her temper very much, bearing her domestic worries secretly in her heart. But when the Bolsheviks came with their freedom and started their twaddle about women being equal to men, Mary opened her eyes, so to speak. Whenever there was speech-making she flew to the meeting. You would have thought she had lost all shame. Once she came up to an orator and, with wide-open eyes, said:

"Come to our place, Comrade orator, and have tea with us."

Kozonok was simply dumbfounded. His eyes went dim. His nostrils swelled like bubbles. "Ah, he's going to do for her right here," we thought. But somehow he pulled himself together and walking awkwardly toward her, said curtly:

"Home you go! Quick!"

Not her. Just to spite him, I suppose, she got on to the orator's box and turned to us with a speech.

"Fellow peasants!"

We simply burst with laughter. And even Kozonok could no longer control himself.

"Comrade orator, shove that devil of a woman down, will you?"

At home he went for her for all he was worth.

"I'll squeeze your soul out."

But Mary only kept teasing him.

"Who is it making so much noise here, Prokofy Mitrich? Is it you? It does sound terrible, but I'm not a bit afraid."

"I'll chop off the bottom of your skirt if you keep gadding about to meetings."

"It's too hard for your hatchet, dear."

Kozonok's blood was boiling. He looked for something to strike her with.

"You just touch me," flung Mary at him in a threatening voice. "You see those pots? I'll smash them all over your scrubby head."

From this it began. Kozonok tries to show his power, Mary hers. Kozonok sleeps in the bed, Mary on the stove. Kozonok goes to her, she goes from him.

Then Mary refused to have any more children. She had two and they both died. Kozonok wanted a third one, but Mary would not even hear of it. "I'm tired of this game," she said.

"What game?"

"That same one. Did you ever bear a child?"

"I'm not a woman, am I?"

"Nor and I a cow to calve every year. I will bear one when I fancy it."

This drove Kozonok mad.

"I'll knock your head off if you speak like this."

But Mary only laughed! "I won't have children," she said.

The poor fellow was no longer himself. No more jokes or high jinks with him as before. He would go to the stove and lie there like a widower. What could he do? Give her a good thrashing? But she would leave him at once. Worse still, she would drag him into the court, and the Bolsheviks were sure to find him guilty—it was their fashion to make a fuss over women. Or perhaps let her do as she liked? But this would only be bringing shame on himself, as everybody would be saying, "The man has no character, he is a coward." Twice he went to a fortune teller—but this also had no effect.

Meanwhile, Mary began to bring home books and newspapers from the club. She would spread a whole sheet on the table, and would sit like a school mistress, silently moving her lips. Kozonok, of course, only looked on and said nothing. Better that she read at home than gadded about outside, he thought. Only now and again he would just say mockingly:

"Holding the paper upside down, eh? A reader, heaven forbid."

Books and newspaper—they draw one like a bog. They change one, make one a different person. As a matter of fact, Mary was getting somewhat off her head. She began to poke her nose into men's business. When there was a meeting to decide some public matter, she was always there. This annoyed the men. "Mary, go to your kitchen," they would say to her.

But she took no notice. Only looked round as if it did not concern her at all. Then she got it into her head to start a "Fem-branch"—a fancy name—goodness only knows what it really means. It did give us a shock, however, when we saw first one woman and then another, then a third, go and join Mary in that blessed branch of hers. Soon an adult school opened in Kozonok's house. Women gathered there together and rattled on and on for hours. The commissar from the village council himself began to pay visits to their meetings—all about self-education and such trash—you know. He was one of our own men. In the old days we called him Vaska. But after he went over to the Bolsheviks he became Vasily Ivanich. Kozonok was now afraid to open his mouth. He would scarcely say a word, as from all sides there came upon him: "You there, you'd better hold your tongue."

The commissar, of course, was always hand in glove with the women. That was his programme.

"You must not scold a woman now, Prokofy Mitrich," he would say to Kozonok, "it's revolution." But Kozonok only smiled like a fool. In his heart he would have torn all that revolution to pieces. But he was afraid to say that—it might have led him into trouble.

Mary's pranks, however, were getting worse and worse. One day she said: "I'm going to join the Communist Party."

"You must be ashamed of yourself," answered Kozonok, trying to bring her to her senses. "Haven't you got any conscience left? You'll be punished by God if you behave like this."

But Mary only sniggered.

"God? What God? where did you find him?"

She became quite like a madwoman.

* * *

It was a time when the village had to elect a new council. Women swarmed to the meeting as if it was a fair.

"Mary! Mary Grishagina!" they shouted.

Just to tease them, one of us men said without thinking:

"Come along, Mary. Do us the honour."

We took it just as a joke. but it turned out very serious. Women started pecking the men, like daws—a whole flock of them—widows, soldiers' wives, and what not. And our men

are not over anxious to take up official jobs, particularly in these days. So we just let them have it their way.

"Mary? Well, let it be Mary. Let her burn her fingers, too."

When the votes cast for Mary were counted, they were two hundred and fifteen! The commissar, Vasily Ivanich, even made a speech congratulating her on her success.

And as to Mary, she stood solemn like, with her face just flushed and eyes grown still bigger.

"I'll do my duty, comrades," she said. "Don't condemn me if I do anything wrong. Rather come and help me."

Kozonok was much upset over all this. He was at a loss as to how to take it—whether it was a slight on him or an honour.

"How am I to speak to her?" he thought when he came home. "She is a Government official now."

To us men it also seemed rather queer. It looked like some game. A woman—and then all of a sudden she sits on the village council, decides our business.

We began to use strong language among ourselves.

"Fools, that is the word for us. How could we put a woman to a post like this?"

Then old Nazarov said this straight into Mary's face:

"I tell you, Mary, you went into the wrong gate."

She only shook her head.

"I did not choose it myself—people bid me go there."

* * *

When we came to the meeting of the council just to have a look at Mary, we could scarcely recognise her. She set a table. Put an inkstand on it, two pencils—a blue and a red one. Near by the secretary was scribbling something. And Mary, the devil-woman, even changed her voice and ran through the papers as if she had been doing that all her life.

"This refers to the food question, Comrade Eremeyev, doesn't it?"

That's how she spoke, and she would sign her name like a minister.

"Have you got our lists ready? Make haste, please."

We simply could not believe our eyes. Mary! Who would have thought that of her! And she never, even once, blushed. And everybody was a "comrade" to her. Once old Klimov came, and she used the same word to him. "What do you want, comrade?" she asked.

But the old man could not stick this word—it hurt him more than if you trod on his corn. So he turned on her:

"You may be a councillor, but I'm no comrade to you."

A month later she began to wear a man's shirt and stuck a star to her cap.

Kozonok suffered all this as long as he could, but at last his patience gave out—he asked for a divorce.

"I can't stand it any longer," he said to Mary. "Relieve me of this life."

Mary only waved her hand.

"With pleasure. I have been ready for this a long time."

* * *

So she went on with her job for about five months. By this time we began to be tired of her. Whatever the Bolsheviks did she always backed them, and then other women caught from her these new ideas. Here one sniffed, there another. Two left their husbands altogether.

And then one day Mary got into a cart, and off she went. Where she went—I can't say. People say she was seen in another village, talking at meetings, and gadding about among

the women. Who knows? Perhaps it wasn't she, but another like her. There are lots of her kind nowadays.

Russian Information and Review, Vol. 1, No. 24 (15 September 1922), pp. 571-572.



FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY

16 October 1922

Regulation and control of foreign trade was a major concern of the Bolsheviks who had nationalized foreign trade on 22 April 1918. Later the practice of establishing trade delegations abroad was developed. This decree of the Central Executive Committee regularized and laid down more clearly than previously the state monopoly of foreign trade. Supplemental decrees in April 1923 developed this further as well as the rules for permits for foreign firms operating within Russia.

ON FOREIGN TRADE

In order to regulate the foreign trade of the R.S.F.S.R. and to facilitate the trading operations of the most important State and economic enterprises and organisations, and to meet their needs and requirements in the way of business connections with foreign countries, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, in extension of paragraph 3 (A) and paragraphs 3 and 4 (B) of the decree on Foreign Trade, No. 24, 1922, Section 26, decrees:

1. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade conducts its activities abroad through the trade delegations of the R.S.F.S.R., which form an essential constituent part of the plenipotentiary missions of the R.S.F.S.R. in each separate country. All commercial enterprises working there, as also separate representatives of the People's Commissariats, departments, and institutions who go abroad for the purpose of carrying on trade operations, act under the immediate direction and control of the trade delegation in the given country.

2. State, central, and local economic enterprises included in a special list are empowered, on condition they observe strictly the principle of the monopoly of foreign trade, to carry on trading operations abroad through the medium of their own special representatives. A list of such enterprises is drawn up by the People's Commissariats, regional economic conferences, and provincial economic conferences, and is ratified by the Council of Labour and Defence.

3. The central and local economic enterprises or their representatives indicated in paragraph 2 must inform the Commissariat for Foreign Trade or the particular trade delegation of every trade operation they propose to carry out. The Commissariat for Foreign Trade or the particular trade delegation is authorised, on its own responsibility, to give a reasoned prohibition of any such operation.

4. Liability in connection with foreign transactions is borne by the State only when contracts are concluded and signed by the Commissariat for Foreign Trade, or by trade delegations of the R.S.F.S.R. in particular countries, as also by institutions and individuals specially authorised for each separate transactions by a decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars, the Council of Labour and Defence, or the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

5. Liability for other foreign transactions, concluded in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present decree, rests solely with those State, central, or local economic enterprises which have signed these contracts. The liability of these enterprises is limited by the amount of property at their disposal. The State, People's Commissariats, and separate departments to which the economic enterprise in question may be subordinate bear no joint or secondary liability whatever in connection with such transactions.

Note. In agreements concluded in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of the present decree a clause must be inserted whereby the agent of the economic enterprise undertakes to refer any claims arising out of the transaction exclusively to the enterprise he represents, and under no circumstances to the State, People's Commissariats, or to particular departments to which the State, central, or local enterprise may be subordinate.

6. The directors of State, central, and local economic enterprises, and their representatives abroad, are punishable for any violation of the present decree (particularly as regards the note to paragraph 5) in accordance with paragraph 110 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

7. The Council of People's Commissars will issue instructions for the application of paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the present decree.

Note. The present decree is not applicable to the Centrosoyus, which carries on its operations within the limits of the rights and privileges granted to it by previous decisions of the Government.

Russian Information and Review, Vol. 2, No. 37 (23 June 1923), p. 585.



THE CODE OF LABOR LAWS

30 October 1922

The establishment of an orderly political, legal, and economic system after 1921 included a new labor law code. This code would provide the basis, with amendments, for labor legislation in the Soviet Union until a new code was written in 1970. The code retained the emphasis on protection of labor—safety, wages, hours, social insurance, holidays, limits on child labor and some other types of work, etc.—that had characterized Bolshevik labor legislation since 1917. However, it also reflected the extent to which the trade unions and factory committees had been stripped of their role in industrial management and brought under government control. It also was characterized by both the abandonment of compulsory labor in favor of contract and the need under NEP for private economic activity, although much of it was oriented toward regulating—and limiting—private enterprise. The general spirit allowed private economic activity in so far as it fulfilled a public good rather than in its own right. The provisions reflecting private economic activity—a minor part—were of course later repealed or modified. The code was approved by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on 30 October and became operative on 15 November 1922.

CODE OF LABOUR LAWS

I. GENERAL

1. The Code of Labour Laws shall apply to all persons working for hire, including domestic workers, and shall be binding upon all enterprises and institutions (State, not

excluding military institutions, public, and private—including those employing workers in their homes) and upon all persons employing paid hired labour.

NOTE: The Council of People's Commissars is instructed to issue a special decree establishing the limits within which the present Code is not applicable to home workers.

2. The limits of the application of the present code in regard to compulsory labour (Art. 11) shall be established by the Council of People's Commissars, the Council of Labour and Defence and, upon their authority, by the People's Commissariat for Labour.

3. The Council of People's Commissars shall have the right of extending the provisions of the present code or any part of it, to certain categories of soldiers not engaged upon active military service.

4. All labour contracts or agreements imposing conditions of labour worse than those established by the present code shall be invalid.

II. THE METHOD OF OFFERING AND HIRING LABOUR

5. Citizens of the R.S.F.S.R. shall offer their voluntary labour services through the organs of the People's Commissariat for Labour, with the exception of the cases provided for by Article 9.

6. Persons seeking employment shall register themselves as unemployed at the local department of the People's Commissariat for Labour.

7. The hiring of all labour power without exception by enterprises, institutions, estates (State, public, and private) as well as by individual employers shall be done through the intermediary of the appropriate department of the People's Commissariat for Labour in the following manner:

(a) The request for labour shall be forwarded by the management of the enterprise, institution, or individual employer to the appropriate department of the People's Commissariat for Labour.

(b) Should the department have on its registers persons possessing the qualifications enumerated in the demand, they shall be sent to fill the post according to procedure to be established by the People's Commissariat for Labour in agreement with the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions.

(c) The employer must inform the department of the People's Commissariat for Labour, according to procedure to be established by the latter, whether the person sent has been hired or rejected.

8. The employer shall be held responsible: (a) for the correctness of the information given by him as to the conditions of the proposed work; (b) for the non-fulfillment of the terms of hire undertaken by himself, and (c) for the illegal rejection of persons sent to fill the offered posts.

9. Workers may be offered employment otherwise than through the intermediary of the departments of the People's Commissariat for Labour, but with compulsory subsequent registration with the latter, in the following circumstances: (a) where political reliability, or special qualifications connected with the personality of the candidate, is demanded, and (b) where the required labour power cannot be supplied by the departments of the People's Commissariat for Labour within a period of three days after demand.

10. The management of State, public, and private institutions and enterprises must inform the departments of the People's Commissariat for Labour, in a manner and at intervals to be established by the latter, of the periodical changes in their staffs.

III. COMPULSORY LABOUR

11. In exceptional circumstances (natural calamities, or an insufficiency of labour power for the fulfillment of work of primary State importance) all citizens of the R.S.F.S.R., with the exception of those enumerated in Articles 12 to 14, may be called upon to perform

compulsory labour service by a special decree of the Council of People's Commissars, or by bodies empowered by it for this purpose.

12. In no case shall the following persons be liable to be called upon for compulsory labour service: (a) persons under eighteen years of age; (b) men above forty-five years of age; (c) women above forty years of age.

13. The following shall be exempt from compulsory labour service: (a) persons temporarily incapacitated by reason of illness or injury for a period necessary for their recovery; (b) pregnant women, for a period of eight weeks before and eight weeks after confinement; (c) women breast-feeding children; (d) military and labour invalids; and (e) mothers of children under eight years of age who are not being cared for by other persons.

14. Supplementary exemptions and privileges in connection with the various forms of compulsory labour on account of health, family reasons, the nature of the work, or social conditions may be made by the Council of People's Commissars, the Council of Labour and Defence, and the People's Commissariat for Labour.

IV. COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS

15. A collective agreement is a contract concluded by a trade union (Articles 152 and 153) as the representative of the employees on the one hand and by the employer on the other, which lays down the conditions of labour and of hire for individual enterprises, institutions, or groups thereof (Article 17), and defines the contents of the subsequent personal (labour) agreements of hire (Articles 27 and 28).

16. The provisions of a collective agreement shall apply to all persons employed in the given enterprise or institution, independently of whether they are members of the trade union concluding the agreement or not.

NOTE. A collective agreement shall not apply to members of the administrative staff who possess the right of hiring and discharging labour.

17. Collective agreements may be general, *i.e.*, be applicable all over the Republic to a whole branch of industry or of national economy, or they may be local. Where general collective agreements exist, local collective agreements may be made only in circumstances and in a manner specially provided for in the general agreement.

18. The limit of time for which collective agreements may be concluded shall be fixed by the People's Commissariat for Labour in conjunction with the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions.

19. Provisions of collective agreements which lay down conditions of labour worse than those established by the present code or by other existing labour legislation or statutes shall be invalid.

20. Trade Unions shall not be held materially responsible for collective agreements.

21. Collective agreements must be drawn up in writing and must be registered with the Commissariat for Labour, which has the right of vetoing such parts of the agreement as establish worse conditions than those fixed by existing legislation (Art. 19). The method of registering collective agreements shall be established by the People's Commissariat for Labour.

NOTE. The veto by departments of the People's Commissariat for Labour of certain clauses of a collective agreement shall not hinder the registration of the remainder of the agreement, if both parties declare their consent.

22. A registered collective agreement shall come into force on the day it is signed by both parties, or after an interval provided for in the agreement itself.

23. In the event of the reorganisation of an institution or enterprise, or its transfer to other hands, a registered collective agreement shall remain in force until the expiry of its term.

NOTE. In such circumstances either side may declare its desire to revise the collective contract, of which it must give the other side one fortnight's notice; the contract, however, remains in force until a new agreement is arrived at.

24. The renewal of an agreement for a further term, even though on the former conditions, and all alterations and additions introduced into an agreement by mutual consent, must be registered in the usual manner (Art. 21).

25. Disputes arising between employer and employee out of an agreement which has for any reason not been registered shall be decided, not on the basis of such agreement, but according to existing legislation.

26. The bodies primarily responsible for supervising the execution of collective agreements shall be the Assessment and Disputes Commissions (Art. 172).

V. LABOUR AGREEMENTS

27. A labour agreement is a contract between two or more persons, of which one side (the employee) offers his labour power to the other side (the employer) for payment. Labour agreements shall be concluded whether collective agreements exist or not.

28. The conditions of a labour agreement shall be determined by mutual agreement. Labour agreements shall be invalid which establish worse conditions for the employee than those provided for by labour legislation, the collective agreement, and the internal regulations drawn up for the given enterprise or institution (Articles 4, 15, 19, and 52 and 55), or which establish conditions tending to limit the political and civil rights of the employee.

29. The conclusion of the labour agreement must be accompanied by the issue of wage books to all employees (except members of the management) in all undertakings and institutions independent of their number. The issue of wage books is not obligatory where the labour agreement is for a period of less than one week.

NOTE 1. Where a labour agreement is concluded with an artel, wage books must be issued to each member of the artel, in addition to the book issued to the artel generally.

NOTE 2. The method of issue, and the contents of the wage books, shall be defined by special legislation.

30. Labour agreements may be concluded with single individuals or with groups of individuals (artels, etc.).

31. Minors possess equal rights with adults in the matter of labour agreements. Parents and guardians, as well as institutions, and persons responsible for supervising the observance of the laws for the protection of labour, shall have the right of demanding the annulment of the agreement before the contracted date where its continuance would menace the health of the minor, or otherwise affect him detrimentally.

32. Where by a labour agreement work is being performed not on behalf of the person directly signing the agreement, but for the undertaking or enterprise for whom he works, or where the enterprise in which the work is being done is a section or department of another enterprise, responsibility for the labour agreement shall lie upon the enterprise, institution, or person for whom the work is being performed.

Where a labour agreement is signed by a contractor for the performance of work he has contracted for, responsibility shall lie with the contractor.

NOTE. Disputes between enterprises, institutions, or persons and contractors shall be settled in the ordinary course of law.

33. Where a labour agreement is concluded with an artel the employer shall assume for each member of the artel performing work provided for by the agreement the same responsibilities and privileges as though agreements had been signed with each individual.

34. Labour agreements may be concluded: (a) for a definite period of not more than one year; (b) for an indefinite period, or (c) for a period necessary for the performance of a definite piece of work.

35. An employee may not without the consent of the employer transfer the work demanded of him to another person. An artel may, if not otherwise provided for in the labour agreement, itself distribute the work among its members, or replace one member by another.

36. An employer may not ask an employee to perform work different in character from that for which he has been hired, or work which is accompanied by obvious danger to life, or which does not fulfil the provisions of the labour laws.

If there is temporarily no work to be done for which the person has been hired, the employer may transfer him to other work corresponding with his qualifications. Should the employee refuse such work he may be discharged, provided he is paid the allowance in lieu of notice (Article 89).

In exceptional circumstances, where it is necessary to avert a catastrophe, an employee may be asked to perform other work than that for which he is qualified.

In the above circumstances wages must not be reduced and moreover, if the temporary work is of a higher paid nature than that for which the employee has been taken on, then payment shall be made at the higher rate (Article 64).

37. The transfer of an employee from one enterprise to another or from one locality to another, even though the latter is in conjunction with the transfer of the whole enterprise, may not take place without the consent of the employee; where this is not given the labour agreement may be annulled by either side, but in either case the employee must be paid the allowance in lieu of notice (Article 89).

38. Where the work to be done is of a prolonged character, a manual worker before being permanently employed may be given a period of probation of not more than six days, and a clerical or administrative worker a period of not more than two weeks (in the case of an unqualified and less responsible worker) or of not more than one month (for responsible workers).

39. As the result of the period of probation the employee may be either permanently employed or discharged, in which latter case he shall be paid for the period of probation at the established rate for the grade of work he performed.

40. The appropriate organ of the People's Commissariat for Labour must be informed immediately by the employer (Article 7) whether as a result of probation the employee has been taken on or not. During the period of trial the worker is regarded as unemployed, and his place in rotation on the register of the department of the Commissariat for Labour is retained.

41. If an employer or manager of an undertaking has taken the identity papers of the employee, he must return them to him at the first demand.

42. An employer must give an employee, at the latter's request, a certificate stating how long and upon what work the employee was engaged with him. The inclusion of secret or agreed signs in the certificate is forbidden.

The exchange of secret communications between employers, designed to establish the conditions upon which workers shall be hired, is forbidden.

43. The imposition of monetary fines upon the employee by the employer or the management is forbidden, except in circumstances provided for by special legislation or by the regulations for internal management.

44. A labour agreement shall terminate: (a) by the mutual agreement of the parties; (b) at the expiry of its term; (c) at the conclusion of the stipulated work, or (d) by declaration of either party in the manner provided for in Articles 46 and 47. The transfer of the institution or enterprise from one department or owner to another shall not terminate a labour agreement.

45. If on the expiry of the term of an agreement the working relations between the parties continue, and neither side demands their cessation, the agreement shall be regarded as remaining in force on the former conditions for an indefinite term.

46. An employee may at any time demand the annulment of an agreement concluded for an indefinite period, but he must give the employer notice at least one day in advance if he is paid weekly, and at least seven days in advance if he is paid fortnightly or monthly.

47. An agreement concluded for an indefinite period may be annulled, and an agreement for a definite term may be annulled before the expiry of its term on the demand of the employer, in addition to the cases provided for in Articles 36 and 37, only in the following circumstances:

- (a) Where the enterprise or institution is partially or completely shut down, or where work is reduced.
- (b) Where from economic causes work ceases for a period of more than one month.
- (c) Where the employee subsequently proves himself unfit for his post.
- (d) Where, without sufficient cause, the employee systematically fails to fulfil the duties demanded of him by the agreement or by the rules for internal management.
- (e) Where the employee has committed a crime directly connected with his work and sentence has been carried into effect, or where the employee is kept under arrest for a period of more than two months.
- (f) Where the employee, without sufficient cause, fails to put in an appearance for more than three days in succession, or for more than six days in one month.
- (g) Where as the result of temporary incapacitation the employee fails to return to work after the lapse of two months, or, in the case of a woman giving birth to a child, two months after the period of four months provided for in Article 42.

NOTE 1. The annulment of an agreement in the circumstances provided for in Clauses (c) and (d) may not take place except by the decision of the Disputes Commission.

NOTE 2. The annulment of an agreement with an employee who is a member of the Works' Committee, or a similar body, shall be effected as provided for in Article 160 of the present code.

NOTE 3. When an agreement is annulled in the circumstances provided for in clauses (a), (b), and (c), the employer must give the employee two weeks' notice of discharge, and compensation must be paid in the ordinary way (Article 88).

48. An agreement concluded for a definite term may be annulled by the employee before the expiry of that term in the following circumstances:

- (a) If he is not paid the stipulated wages at the stipulated time.
- (b) If the employer fails to fulfil the obligations assumed by the agreement or imposed upon him by the labour laws.
- (c) If the employer, the management, or members of their families behave in an offensive manner towards him.
- (d) If the sanitary conditions of work change for the worse.
- (e) In any other circumstances specially provided for by law.

NOTE. On the protest of the employer, the authenticity of the circumstances provided for in clauses (a), (b), and (c) shall be established by the Disputes Commission, or, where such does not exist, by the procedure provided for settling disputes.

49. Any labour agreement may also be annulled at the demand of the Trade Union. Should the employer not consent to the demand of the Trade Union the matter shall be settled by the ordinary procedure for deciding disputes.

VI. REGULATIONS FOR INTERNAL MANAGEMENT

50. Regulations for internal management for the purpose of fixing the conditions of labour shall be drawn up in all enterprises and institutions employing not less than five persons. These regulations are binding upon all employees only if they have been drawn up in the manner provided (Articles 52-55) and brought to the notice of the employees.

51. The regulations for internal management shall contain a clear and definite and, if possible, exhaustive statement of the general and special obligations of the employees and management, and the extent to which they shall be held answerable for non-fulfilment.

52. The regulations for internal management must contain nothing contrary to the laws of labour, nor to the collective agreement in force in the given enterprise or institution.

53. Typical regulations for internal management will be issued by the Commissariat for Labour, in conjunction with the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions and the Supreme Economic Council.

NOTE. Until regulations for internal management have been drawn up in any enterprise or institution, and been duly approved (Article 54), the typical regulations issued in accordance with Article 53 shall be binding upon that enterprise or institution.

54. The regulations for internal management of any State, public, and private institution or enterprise shall be drawn up in joint consultation between the management and the local sections of the appropriate Trade Unions, and must be approved by the Labour Inspector. The decision of the latter may be protested against at the local Department of Labour, the decision of which shall be final.

55. The regulations for internal management for a whole branch of industry or of the national economic organisation, for central institutions or enterprises, for groups of enterprises united amongst themselves, or for enterprises or institutions of special State importance, may be drawn up directly at the centre by the Executive Committee of the Trade Union concerned and the management, and shall be confirmed by the People's Commissariat for Labour. Supplementary regulations for the several institutions or enterprises forming part of the group may be added in accordance with Articles 53 and 54 of the present Code.

VII. STANDARDS OF OUTPUT

56. Standards of output shall be drawn up jointly between the management of an enterprise or institution and the Trade Union, or the appropriate organ of the Trade Union (Articles 151 and 156).

57. An employee failing, owing to his own fault, to reach the standards of output under normal conditions of labour shall receive wages in accordance with the amount of work performed, but in no case less than two-thirds of his wages scale. Should he fail systematically to reach the standard of output, he may be discharged in accordance with Article 47 and note thereto.

NOTE 1. For the purpose of this paragraph normal conditions of labour shall be regarded as:

- (a) Machines, lathes, benches, etc., must be in a fit working state;
- (b) Materials and tools must be provided at the proper times;
- (c) Materials and tools must be of the required quality;
- (d) Proper hygienic and sanitary arrangements (lighting, heating etc.) must be provided at the place of work.

NOTE 2. For minors not working a full day, but engaged upon time work, the standards of output shall be the adult standards of output reduced in accordance with the length of their working day.

VIII. PAYMENT FOR LABOUR

58. The amount an employee shall receive in return for his labour shall be fixed by collective agreements and labour agreements.

59. The amount of payment shall not be less than the compulsory minimum fixed by the State at the given period for the given category of labour.

60. The amount of payment shall in the agreements be calculated either on a time basis in accordance with the normal working day (Article 94 *et seq.*) or a basis of piecework. Payment for overtime shall be specially fixed by the agreement, but must not be less than one and a-half times the normal payment for the first two hours, and double for subsequent hours and for work performed upon rest days and holidays (Article 109 *et seq.*).

61. Minors shall be paid for a reduced working day as for a full day, in accordance with their labour category. The People's Commissariat for Labour shall be empowered to establish the scales of payment and the method of calculation for minors in accordance with the nature of, and the conditions prevailing in, the branch of industry concerned.

62. If an employee is performing work involving several grades of skill, he shall be paid according to the highest paid grade of skill (Article 36).

63. When an employee performs work requiring special knowledge or training, he shall be paid on the scale fixed for such work, even if he does not possess a diploma or certificate of training in the given work.

64. If an employee is transferred to lower paid work, he shall be paid at his former scale for a fortnight after transfer.

65. If the work is of a permanent character, payment must be made periodically, but not less often than once a fortnight.

Payment for temporary or casual work lasting less than one fortnight shall be made immediately upon the conclusion of the work.

66. Payment for labour shall be made in currency and, if so provided for in the labour or collective agreement, in kind (housing, food, articles of general consumption). The conditions of payment in kind and the methods of calculating such payments shall be defined in the agreement.

67. Payment for labour shall be made in working time and at the place of work.

68. If an employee fails to fulfil the work required of him from reasons not depending upon himself, he shall be paid in accordance with his average daily wage.

NOTE. The People's Commissariat for Labour shall fix the method of calculating an average wage.

69. Workers about to take their ordinary holiday shall be paid in advance an average wage for the period of holiday.

70. Job work or piece work shall be paid in accordance with a scale obtained by dividing the daily wage appropriate to that category of labour by the standard of output (Article 56). Other methods of paying for piece work may be fixed by the agreement.

71. The collective or the labour agreement shall determine how payment shall be made for time spent in preparation for performing job work.

72. Where a special piece of work is given to be performed at job rates, the employee shall receive advances at the usual times of payment, before the end of the piece of work (Article 65), equivalent to the wages scale of his labour category.

73. Where the ordinary wages scale is not earned on job work payment shall be made for the actual work performed, but not less than two-thirds of the employee's wages scale (Article 57).

74. Where an employee, for reasons not depending upon himself, leaves a job unfinished, he shall be paid for the work performed, less advances (Article 72), at a valuation made by the local Disputes (Valuation and Disputes) Commission, and where such does not exist, and agreement cannot be reached, by the ordinary procedure for settling disputes.

75. Minors working on piece rates shall be paid the same as adults employed on the same work, plus payment for two hours according to their wages scale.

76. When time rates are altered, corresponding alterations shall be made in the assessment of piece work.

NOTE. Employees who have commenced work before the changes in the piecework valuations shall be paid at a rate to be fixed by the Disputes Commission or, where such does not exist, by the appropriate Trade Union, or, if agreement is not reached, by the ordinary method of settling disputes.

IX. GUARANTEES AND COMPENSATION

77. Workers and employees shall be paid an average wage (Article 68) for absence in order to exercise their electoral rights, where such is permitted in working time by the appropriate State organ.

78. Workers and employees called upon to attend a court of law either as witnesses, experts, or magistrates shall receive an average wage during the period they are fulfilling the duties imposed upon them by the legal authorities.

79. Workers and employees elected as representatives to congresses, conferences, and executive meetings of State, Trade Union, and Co-operative (uniform consumers' Co-operatives) bodies shall be paid an average wage for the period of working time spent in the execution of these duties.

80. Workers and employees leaving work on being called up for service in the Red Army shall be paid for two weeks at the average wage.

81. Employees absenting themselves from their ordinary work on their employer's business shall have their posts kept for them, and shall be paid the average wage, with a daily allowance of not less than 1/24th of their monthly wages; in addition, they shall be compensated for expenses involved, in a manner and to an extent to be fixed by the People's Commissariat for Labour.

82. When an employee at the order of the management of an institution or enterprise is transferred from one locality to another, involving a change of residence (Article 37), he shall be compensated for all expenses connected with removal, and shall be paid a daily allowance for each day spent on removal, with six days extra, at a rate not less than 1/24th of his monthly wages; in addition, he shall be paid a single allowance equivalent to his monthly wage at his former employment, and, if the members of his family remove with him, a further single allowance equivalent to one quarter of his monthly wage for each member of the family.

83. An employee occasioning damage to appliances, goods, or materials, either through carelessness or through non-observance of the regulations for internal management may, at the decision of the Disputes Commission, have his wages reduced by a sum equivalent to the damage done, but not more than one-third of his monthly wages.

84. The employer shall guarantee to place at the disposal of the employee, free of charge, all tools and appliances necessary for the performance of his work.

85. Where an employee uses his own tools in the service of the undertaking, the employer must pay a sum in compensation for wear and tear which shall be fixed by the collective agreement or, where this is not done, by the People's Commissariat for Labour.

86. In enterprises where the conditions of labour occasion an undue wear and tear of clothing and footwear, the employer shall be obliged to supply his employees with clothing and footwear free of charge, according to the grading of employment and requirements specially fixed by the People's Commissariat for Labour. Where in the opinion of the local Department of Labour the supply of such articles is impossible, the employer must pay a sum in lieu equivalent to their actual cost.

87. Workers remaining in enterprises and institutions where work has been suspended for a period up to one month shall receive wages in accordance with their wages scale.

NOTE. Where work is suspended for a period of not more than three days, payment shall be made for the idle period on the basis of average wage (Article 68).

88. Where a fixed-term or indefinite-term labour agreement is annulled, in circumstances provided for in clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Article 47, the employer shall pay the employee a leaving allowance equivalent to a fortnight's wages, or give him a fortnight's notice of discharge.

89. Where a labour agreement is annulled in circumstances provided for in Articles 36 (Section 2), 37, 48, and 80, the employee shall be paid a leaving allowance equivalent to a fortnight's wages.

90. Where a labour agreement is annulled in circumstances provided for in clauses (d), (e), (f), and (g), Article 47, and in Article 49, or at the employee's own desire in accordance with Article 46, no leaving allowance is payable.

91. Where, with the sanction of the Disputes Commission or, if such does not exist, of the appropriate Trade Union, an enterprise or institution does not give the ordinary leave (Article 114) or, in the circumstances provided for, the supplementary leave (Article 116), the worker or employee shall be given monetary compensation equivalent to his average wage at the time of payment.

92. Employees temporarily incapacitated shall retain their posts at their place of employment for a period of not less than two months if the incapacity is due to illness, or for four months if the incapacity is due to child-bearing (Articles 47 and 132).

93. Should the employer become insolvent, all payments to employees arising out of collective and labour agreements shall receive preference over all other liabilities of the employer.

X. HOURS OF LABOUR

94. The normal working day both on productive work and on work auxiliary to production must not exceed eight hours.

NOTE. The People's Commissariat for Labour, in agreement with the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions, may designate certain categories of responsible political, Trade Union, and Soviet workers whose working hours shall not be subject to the provisions of this Article.

95. The working day may not exceed six hours: (a) for persons between the ages of sixteen and eighteen; (b) for persons engaged upon mental and clerical work, with the exception of work directly connected with production, and (c) for persons engaged upon underground work, to be specified in a list of trades to be drawn up by the People's Commissariat for Labour.

Persons engaged upon exceptionally heavy labour, or upon work detrimental to health, shall have their working day reduced to an extent to be fixed by the People's Commissariat for Labour.

96. The working day fixed by Articles 94 and 95 shall be reduced by one hour for night work.

For work performed on shifts or in unbroken attendances at night time the hours shall be the same as in day time, but payment for hours worked at night time shall be correspondingly increased, viz., by 1/7th (Article 94) and 1/5th (Article 95), respectively.

Workers on piece rates shall receive for each hour of night work, in addition to their piece work earnings, 1/7th or 1/5th (in accordance with Articles 94 and 95 respectively) of the hourly wage appropriate to their category of labour.

NOTE. Night work shall be regarded as work performed between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.

97. Home workers, agricultural workers, workers employed on repair or breakdown work, and similar workers engaged upon permanent employment and paid monthly, may have their working hours divided into periods of any length, with the proviso that the number of breaks in their work shall not exceed two per day, and that the number of hours worked per month shall not exceed the normal monthly number of working hours (Article 94).

98. Employees shall be granted time off for rest and meals during the ordinary working hours. Rest times and meal times shall not be regarded as working time.

NOTE. In circumstances where work cannot be interrupted the employee must be given an opportunity to take food during working hours, and the regulations for internal management shall state where the meals are to be taken. A list for such cases shall be drawn up by the People's Commissariat for Labour.

99. The employee may spend the break period in any manner he desires, and he may leave his place of employment during such a break.

NOTE. Exemptions from the provisions of Article 99 in enterprises of a special character will be permitted only by the consent of the appropriate Trade Union and the sanction of organs of the People's Commissariat for Labour.

100. Where work is performed at regular intervals, breaks shall occur not later than four hours after the commencement of work, and shall last not less than one half-hour and not more than two hours. The length of the breaks within these limits shall be established by the regulations for internal management.

NOTE. Special breaks for mothers nursing infants are provided for in Article 134.

101. The hours at which work shall begin and end, and at which breaks shall be allowed, shall be fixed by the regulations for internal management.

102. Where work is done in shifts, each shift shall work the normal working hours. The times at which shifts shall be changed shall be fixed by the regulations for internal management, provision being made that the normal progress of work is not thereby hindered.

103. As a general rule, work in excess of the normal day (overtime) is forbidden.

104. Overtime shall be permitted in the following exceptional circumstances:

(a) for the performance of work essential to the defence of the Republic, or to avoid social calamities;

(b) in order to remove accidental and unforeseen hindrances to the correct functioning of the socially necessary labour of water supply, lighting, sanitation, transport, and postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communications;

(c) for the conclusion of a piece of work already begun which has been interrupted by accidental or unforeseen technical hindrances preventing its conclusion in normal working hours, if the cessation of such work would occasion damage to materials or machinery;

(d) for the performance of repair or breakdown work on machinery or equipment, if the damage done occasions the enforced idleness of a considerable number of workers.

NOTE. Overtime permitted by the provisions of this paragraph may be performed only by their decision of the local Disputes Commission, and, where such does not exist, by agreement with the appropriate Trade Union and the sanction of the Inspector of Labour. In cases of urgency the Inspector of Labour may be informed subsequent to the performance of overtime.

105. Persons under eighteen years of age are absolutely forbidden to perform overtime.

106. The total amount of overtime which any employee may perform in one year must not exceed 120 hours, and the amount of overtime performed by him in two days in succession must not exceed four hours.

NOTE. In certain industries where work is of a seasonal nature, the amount of overtime may be increased by the People's Commissariat for Labour in agreement with the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions above the limits fixed in the present article.

107. Overtime may not be performed to make up for lost time by lateness.

108. The amount of overtime worked must be noted each time in the employee's wages book and in a special overtime book, the entry stating the times of commencement and conclusion of overtime and the amount of overtime pay received by the employee.

XI. HOLIDAYS AND REST DAYS

109. Every employee shall be entitled to a weekly uninterrupted rest period of not less than forty-two hours. The days set aside for the weekly rest shall be established by the local Departments of Labour in agreements with the Trades Councils, and may be either Sundays or any other day in the week, as best accords with the nationality and religion of the workers of the given locality.

110. Workers in enterprises and institutions who, owing to the nature of their work, cannot avail themselves of the generally established weekly rest day, shall be allowed a day off on some other day of the week. This provision applies also to enterprises where the work must be of an uninterrupted nature. In such enterprises special substitute rest days for the generally established rest day shall be fixed for each shift for workers.

111. The performance of work is forbidden upon the following holidays:

(a) January 1: New Year's Day.

(b) January 22: The anniversary of January 9, 1905 (Bloody Sunday).

(c) March 12: The anniversary of the overthrow of the autocracy.

(d) March 18: The anniversary of the Paris Commune.

(e) May 1: International Labour Day.

(f) November 7: The anniversary of the Proletarian Revolution.

112. The Departments of Labour, in agreement with the Provincial Councils of Trade Unions, shall fix in addition to the holidays established in Article 111, special holidays, not exceeding ten per year, in accordance with the demands of local conditions, the composition of the population, the national holidays, etc.

NOTE. The People's Commissariat for Labour, in agreement with the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions, shall draw up a list of enterprises and institutions where, owing to its nature, the work must be continued uninterruptedly on all or any of the rest days and holidays mentioned in the foregoing articles.

113. On the eve of rest days and holidays (Articles 109-111) hours of work shall not exceed six, but shall be paid for as a full day. In piecework additional payment shall be made for the hours not worked in accordance with this Article at the rate appropriate to the category of labour.

NOTE. Workers receiving a monthly wage shall not have their wages reduced for rest days and holidays.

114. All persons employed on hire, and who have worked for an uninterrupted period of not less than 5 1/2 months, are entitled to a holiday once a year, of not less than one fortnight. For persons under eighteen years of age the ordinary annual holiday shall be not less than one month.

NOTE. The continuous period of employment which according to this Article entitles the employee to ordinary leave shall not be regarded as interrupted by the transfer of the worker concerned, at the orders of the management, from one enterprise or institution to another, or by the voluntary transfer of the employee without interruption of work from one State institution or enterprise to another.

115. Persons working in specially unhealthy or dangerous employment shall be entitled, in addition to the ordinary leave provided for in Article 114, to supplementary leave of not less than one fortnight.

A list of industries and trades in which supplementary leave shall be awarded shall be drawn up by the People's Commissariat for Labour.

116. It shall be forbidden to withhold or to give monetary compensation (Article 91) in lieu of the supplementary leave provided for in Article 115, or the ordinary leave of minors (Article 114) except in circumstances specially defined in instructions of the People's Commissariat for Labour.

117. Leave may be taken at any period of the year provided it does not interfere with the normal progress of work.

118. The times, method and order of leave shall be established by the Disputes Commission or, where such does not exist, by agreement between the management of the enterprise or institution and the representatives of the workers (Article 156).

In case of disagreement, the question shall be settled according to the ordinary method of dealing with disputes.

119. Sickness and maternity leave shall not interfere with the ordinary and supplementary leave provided for in Articles 114 and 115.

120. If, through no fault of the employee, he does not receive his ordinary leave in one year and does not receive compensation in lieu (Article 91), his leave in the following year shall be extended to make up for the period not received. It shall be forbidden to combine periods of leave in this manner for more than two years.

XII. APPRENTICESHIP

121. By apprentices are meant persons attending apprenticeship schools, training brigades or workshops, or undergoing individual tuition in the processes of production under the supervision of qualified workers.

122. The period of apprenticeship shall be established for each trade by the People's Commissariat for Labour in agreement with the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions and the People's Commissariat for Education, but shall not exceed four years for the highest skilled labour.

123. The number of apprentices established by collective agreement or otherwise must not be less than the numbers fixed by the People's Commissariat for Labour in agreement with the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions and the central economic bodies for the given branch of industry.

124. Apprentices shall not be called upon to perform any work not connected with their special training.

125. Every enterprise shall be obliged to take the necessary measures to provide for the adequate apprenticeship of minors in accordance with instructions to be issued jointly by the People's Commissariat for Labour, the People's Commissariat for Education, and the Supreme Economic Council and, where circumstances demand, the economic department concerned.

126. Apprentices who have concluded their period of apprenticeship in any branch of trade shall be submitted to a test. They may undergo the test if desired before the conclusion of their term of apprenticeship.

127. The People's Commissariat for Labour may issue compulsory regulations regarding the rules and methods of apprenticeship.

128. The organs of the People's Commissariat for Labour shall be responsible for establishing correct methods of apprenticeship and seeing that they are correctly carried out.

XIII. WOMEN AND MINORS

129. The employment of women and persons under the age of eighteen on exceptionally heavy or unhealthy work, or on work underground, is forbidden.

A list of trades considered too heavy or unhealthy and also the limits of weights to be carried, separately for women and minors, shall be drawn up by the People's Commissariat for Labour in agreement with the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions.

130. Women and persons under eighteen years of age are forbidden to perform night work.

NOTE. The People's Commissariat for Labour, in agreement with the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions, may sanction the employment of adult women on night work in certain branches of industry where circumstances of special urgency demand it.

131. The employment of pregnant or breast-feeding women upon night work or overtime is forbidden unconditionally.

132. Women engaged upon physical labour shall be released from employment for a period of eight weeks before and eight weeks after confinement, and women employed upon clerical and mental work for a period of six weeks before and six weeks after confinement (Article 181).

NOTE. The People's Commissariat for Labour shall draw up a list of clerical and mental employments where, on account of special circumstances, the period of maternity leave shall be fixed at eight weeks before and eight weeks after confinement.

133. Women from the first month of their pregnancy shall not be sent to perform duties away from their place of permanent employment without their consent.

134. Nursing mothers shall be allowed, in addition to the ordinary break periods (Article 100), supplementary breaks for the purpose of nursing their infants. The exact period of these breaks shall be established by the regulations for internal management, but the breaks for nursing purposes shall not take place less often than every three and a half hours and shall last not less than one half-hour.

Nursing breaks shall be regarded as working time.

135. The employment of persons under sixteen years of age is forbidden.

NOTE. In exceptional circumstances the Inspectors of Labour may, in accordance with special instructions to be issued by the People's Commissariat for Labour in agreement with the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions, sanction the employment of persons not less than fourteen years of age.

136. Persons under sixteen years of age already engaged upon employment, or who shall be employed in accordance with Article 135, shall work a four-hour day.

137. The minimum number of juvenile workers to be employed in any given branch of industry shall be fixed by special instructions to be issued by the People's Commissariat for Labour in agreement with the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions.

XIV. THE PROTECTION OF LABOUR

138. No enterprise may be started or restarted or transferred to another building without the sanction of the Labour Inspectorate and the industrial and technical sanitary authorities.

139. Every enterprise and institution shall take adequate measures to avert or minimise dangerous conditions of labour, to prevent accidents, and to maintain the place of work in a proper sanitary and hygienic condition, in accordance with the general and the special regulations for each branch of industry issued by the People's Commissariat for Labour.

140. Machines, beltings, lathes, etc. shall be brought to a standstill during the break periods except in circumstances where this is impossible owing to technical reasons or where they serve for the purposes of ventilation, water supply, illumination, etc.

141. Where work is of a dangerous nature or must be performed in abnormal temperatures or in damp places or where it involves dirtying the body and also where provisions of social hygiene demand, the workers must be provided at the expense of the undertaking with special clothing and protective appliances (goggles, masks, respirators, soap, etc.) in accordance with, and to an extent to be established by lists drawn up by, the People's Commissariat for Labour.

142. In trades liable to the danger of industrial poisoning the workers shall be supplied with fatty foods or other neutralising agencies in accordance with a list and, to an extent, to be established by the People's Commissariat for Labour. These articles shall be supplied at the cost of the undertaking.

NOTE. Where special clothing, protective appliances, or anti-toxic articles (Articles 141 and 142) are not issued by the undertaking, but are acquired by the workers themselves, the latter must be repaid the actual cost of such articles.

143. The People's Commissariat for Labour and its local departments may in the case of specially dangerous occupation demand a compulsory preliminary medical examination of all hired workers or special groups of workers (women and minors), and subsequent periodical re-examinations.

144. The People's Commissariat for Labour may in agreement with the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions forbid the performance of night work in enterprises where its performance is not essential, and where it is specially detrimental to the health of the workers.

145. Enterprises, institutions, and estates shall be obliged to display in a conspicuous place all existing rules and regulations for the protection of workers and keep all books appropriate to these regulations as shall be demanded by the People's Commissariat for Labour.

146. The responsibility for supervising the execution by all institutions, enterprises, estates, and private persons without exception, of all the provisions of the present Code, decrees, instructions, regulations, and collective agreements in so far as they apply to the conditions of labour and the protection of the life and health of the workers, shall lie with the Inspectorate of Labour, the Technical Inspectorate, and the Sanitary Inspectorate, controlled by the People's Commissariat for Labour.

147. Labour Inspectors shall be elected for a fixed period by the Councils of Trade Unions with the confirmation of the People's Commissariat for Labour.

148. To fulfil the objects indicated in Art. 146 the Labour Inspection authorities shall perform the following duties:

(a) They shall visit at any time of the night or day the enterprises, institutions, and estates in their district, and all places where work is performed as well as all institutions connected with them provided for the workers (house, hospitals, creches, baths, etc.).

(b) They shall demand from the owner or manager of the undertaking, institution, or estate any explanation required and all essential books, documents, and information.

(c) They shall give their opinions concerning the starting of enterprises or any part of them.

(d) They shall give instructions, which shall be binding upon State, public, or private institutions, enterprises, estates, or persons, for the discontinuance of any infringement of the regulations for the protection of labour or any defect in their observance notes by them.

(e) They shall see that all infringements of the present Code or of decrees, instructions, regulations, and other acts of the Soviet authorities, directed towards the protection of the life and health of the workers, are brought up before the courts of law or dealt with by administrative jurisdiction.

149. In addition to the measures indicated in the foregoing clauses, the Labour Inspection organs may take any extraordinary steps to eliminate conditions directly threatening the lives and the health of the workers, although such measures were not provided for by special laws, instructions, regulations, or dispositions of the People's Commissariat for Labour and its local organs.

150. The Sanitary and Technical Inspectorates of the People's Commissariat for Labour shall be responsible for supervising the correct application and execution of the instructions, rules, and compulsory regulations concerning workshop hygiene and sanitation and technical safety precautions.

XV. TRADE (INDUSTRIAL) UNIONS AND THEIR ORGANS IN ENTERPRISES, INSTITUTIONS, AND ESTATES

151. Trade (Industrial) Unions uniting citizens working for hire in State, public and private enterprises, institutions, and estates shall be entitled to represent hired workers before various bodies as a party to collective agreements, and also to represent them in all matters affecting their labour and general conditions.

152. Trade (Industrial) Unions organised in accordance with principles laid down by their congresses are not obliged to register with the State bodies set up for the registration

of societies and unions, but shall register in their own inter-union organisations in a manner to be defined by the All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions.

153. All other societies which are not registered with inter-union bodies in accordance with Article 152 are forbidden to use the name Trade (Industrial) Union, or to exercise the rights of the latter.

154. Trade (Industrial) Unions shall have the right of (a) acquiring and possessing property and (b) concluding all kinds of agreements, transactions, etc., in accordance with existing legislation.

NOTE. All rights enjoyed by Trade (Industrial) Unions shall also be enjoyed by their inter-union combinations.

155. In accordance with Article 16 of the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. all State organs are obliged to give every possible assistance to Trade (Industrial) Unions and their combinations as e.g., supplying them with furnished accommodation for their labour halls and trade union halls, offering them special privileges in the use of postal, telegraphic, telephonic, railway, and water communications, etc.

156. The basic organ of the Trade Union in an enterprise, institution, or estate shall be the workers' committee (factory or workshop, pit, local, etc.), or the delegate empowered by the union acting in place of a committee.

NOTE 1. The method of electing a committee by the workers of an enterprise, institution, or estate shall be defined by the Trade (Industrial) Union concerned.

NOTE 2. In naval and military departments workers' committees shall be organised and shall function in accordance with special regulations to be issued by the People's Commissariat for Labour in agreement with the Revolutionary Military Council and the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions.

157. No other committee in an enterprise, institution, or estate besides that provided for in Article 156 of the present Code and approved by the Trade (Industrial) Union concerned shall exercise the rights conferred by Articles 158-160.

158. The functions of the committee (Article 156) shall be:

(a) To represent and defend the interests of the workers combined by it before the management of the enterprise, institution, or estate in all questions affecting their labour and general conditions.

(b) To act as their representative on Government and public bodies.

(c) To supervise the correct execution by the management of the enterprise, institution, or estate of the legal provisions for the protection of labour, social insurance, the payment of wages, sanitation, and technical safety precautions, and also to co-operate on the State bodies concerned with labour protection.

(d) To adopt measures for the improvement of the cultural and material conditions of the workers.

(e) To assist the normal progress of production in State enterprises and to participate, through the appropriate Trade (Industrial) Union, in the regulation and organisation of the economic life of the country.

159. The management shall be informed of the election of a committee and when it begins its functions. The number of members of the committee who shall be released from their ordinary employment to perform the work of the committee shall be as follows:—

Number of workers in the enterprise, institution, or estate.

Number of persons to be released full time.

Up to 300	1
From 300-1,000	2
From 1,000-5,000	3
Over 5,000	5

Members of a committee shall be released from employment by the management acting upon a resolution of the committee.

160. Members of a committee released from their permanent employment to perform the work of the committee shall retain the wages appropriate to their labour qualifications, but not less than their appropriate wages scale. Such released members of the committee shall be guaranteed, on the conclusion of their committee functions, continuance of employment in the enterprise, institution, or estate concerned on the basis of the hiring agreement in force at the time of election and of any alterations effected in the agreement during their membership of the committee.

Members of a committee may be discharged, after the general regulations concerning the cessation or annulment of labour agreements (Articles 44 and 47) have been observed, only with the consent of the Trade (Industrial) Union concerned.

161. The management of an enterprise, institution, or estate shall put no hindrance in the way of the activities of the committees and the bodies (general and delegate meetings) electing them.

(a) General and delegate meetings, as a rule, shall be held out of working time; they may be held in working time when the meeting is to elect delegates to State bodies (Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, and social insurance bodies), or to Trade Union Congresses; in other extra-ordinary circumstances the consent of the management must be obtained. This rule applies to departmental meetings.

(b) Meetings of the committee shall also, as a general rule, be held out of working hours, and only in exceptional circumstances and with the consent of the management may all the workers of the committee be released from their employment in order to hold a meeting.

(c) The management must inform the committee within three days of the employment of new workers and must give it three days' notice of proposed discharges.

162. The cost of maintaining the workers' committee shall be supplied by the management of the enterprise, institution, or estate on an estimate to be fixed by the Trade Union concerned, but not exceeding two per cent of the total wages of the employees in the given enterprise, institution, or estate.

163. The sums referred to in Article 162 shall be expended by the committee in a manner which shall be established by the Trade Union concerned and must not be used for any other purpose except that for which they have been directly assigned.

164. Trade (Industrial) Unions shall be entitled to demand the regular and punctual payment of the sums for the maintenance of the committee by the management of the enterprise, institution, or estate, and also to exercise control over the committee's receipts and expenditures.

165. The management of the enterprise, institution, or estate shall be obliged to provide the committee free of charge with necessary accommodation, furniture, heating, and lighting for the use both of the committee itself and of general and delegate meetings of the workers united by the committee, and free entrance and exit to and from these quarters to perform the work of the committee shall be allowed.

166. Members of Trade Union Executive Committees and their mandated representatives and members of the workers' committees (Articles 151 and 156) shall have free access to any workshop, gang, department, laboratory, etc., in the enterprise, institution, or estate.

167. Breaches of the regulations of Section XV of the present Code entitled, "Trade (Industrial) Unions and their Organs in Enterprises, Institutions, and on Estates" are punishable under Article 134 of the Code of Criminal Laws of the R.S.F.S.R.

XVI. ORGANS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND ADJUDICATION ON INFRINGEMENTS OF THE LABOUR CODE

168. Infringements of the Labour Code and disputes connected with the hiring of labour shall be settled either by the legally enforceable judgment of the People's Courts in special session or by conciliation or arbitration by the Assessment and Disputes Commissions, Conciliation Boards, and Arbitration Courts composed of equal representatives of the disputing parties. All the above institutions shall function on the basis of a special statute to be drawn up for each of them.

169. All infringements of the Code of Labour Laws or other labour legislation, or of collective agreements, in so far as they are liable to criminal prosecution, shall be dealt with by special sessions of the People's Courts. These sessions shall be composed of a chairman—the People's Judge—and two assessors, one representing the People's Commissariat for Labour and the other representing the Trade Union organisations.

All individual and group disputes between employers and employees, if not referred to a Conciliation Board, may be dealt with at sessions of the People's Courts as defined above.

170. The following causes may be dealt with by Conciliation Boards or Arbitration Courts: (a) all disputes arising out of the conclusion, execution, interpretation, or amendment of collective agreements or wages agreements; (b) all disputes arising out of labour agreements, if both parties give their consent to such procedure, with the exception of disputes provided for in the first part of Article 169.

171. Causes shall be submitted to the Conciliation Boards only with the consent of both parties. Causes connected with the execution of collective agreements shall only come before the Conciliation Boards after they have been examined by an Assessment and Disputes Commission and failed to receive settlement. The decisions of Conciliation Boards are binding only if they receive the consent of the parties.

Causes shall be referred to the Arbitration Courts only by mutual consent of the parties, whether they have been examined by a Conciliation Board or not. In the case of disputes in State institutions or enterprises, the organs of the People's Commissariat for Labour, at the request of the Trade Unions, shall set up Arbitration Courts, the recognition of which by the State institutions or enterprises is compulsory. In the case of very grave disputes which menace the safety of the State, the Arbitration Court may be appointed by decree of the supreme State authorities (the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars, and the Council of Labour and Defence).

172. The Assessment and Disputes Commissions shall deal only with disputes arising out of the application of collective and labour agreements, and other questions specially defined in the present Code. Decisions in the Assessment and Disputes Commissions shall be arrived at by agreement of the parties and where this cannot be obtained the matter shall be referred to a higher instance.

NOTE. Questions connected with the very existence of a collective agreement or arising out of demands for the abrogation of certain parts of an agreement or for the inclusion of new or supplementary clauses to an agreement, shall not lie within the competence of the Assessment and Disputes Commissions.

173. No appeal shall be allowed against the decisions of Assessment and Disputes Commissions and agreements of the Conciliation Boards which shall have the force of a contract or of decisions of the Arbitration Courts.

174. Agreements reached in the Conciliation Boards shall be carried into effect by the parties themselves. Decisions of the Arbitration Courts, where the employers refuse to execute them voluntarily, shall be referred through the organs of the People's Commissariat for Labour to a People's Court. The latter shall make a compulsory order within twenty-four hours for the execution of the decision.

Decisions of an Arbitration Court in so far as they concern the workers shall be carried into effect by the Trade Union.

XVII. SOCIAL INSURANCE

175. Social insurance shall cover all persons working for hire, whether engaged in State, public, co-operative, concessionary, leased, mixed, or private enterprises, institutions, or estates, or with private persons, and whatever the nature and duration of their work and the methods of payment.

176. Social insurance shall include: (a) medical assistance; (b) allowances during temporary incapacitation (*e.g.*, from sickness, accident, quarantine, pregnancy, childbirth, or the nursing of sick members of the family); (c) supplementary allowances (*e.g.*, for infant feeding, sick nursing, or burial); (d) unemployment allowances; (e) disablement allowances; (f) allowances to working class families on the death or untraceable disappearance of the breadwinner.

177. For the purpose of social insurance, insurance contributions shall be paid in percentage proportion to wages. The scale of contributions, depending upon the degree of unhealthiness or dangerousness of the enterprise, shall be established by special decisions of the Council of People's Commissars.

NOTE. Insurance funds shall be strictly reserved for the insurance of the workers and may not be diverted to any other purpose.

178. Insurance contributions are payable by the enterprises, institutions, estates, or persons employing hired labour and are not recoverable from the insured person or to be deducted from wages.

179. All insured persons in the event of temporary incapacitation from whatever cause (Art. 176 (b)) shall be paid allowances equivalent to the wages rates of their labour category in the given enterprise or institution at the time the allowances are paid, and in any case not less than the actual wages of the insured person at the time of incapacitation.

180. Allowances for temporary incapacitation shall be payable from the day of incapacitation to the day incapacitation is removed or until permanent disablement has been certified.

181. Allowances for pregnancy and childbirth shall be payable for the whole period of release from employment, as provided for in Article 132 and note to Article 132 of the present Code.

182. The central organs for social insurance, if funds should prove inadequate, shall be entitled temporarily to reduce the scales of allowances for temporary incapacitation (Article 179) but to not less than two-thirds of the wages rates applicable to the labour category of the insured person.

183. In addition to the allowances provided for in Article 181, insured persons or their wives, in the event of childbirth, shall be paid a single supplementary allowance for the layette of the new-born infant equivalent to the average monthly wage of the locality and a further allowance for child feeding equivalent to one-quarter of the average wage of the locality, which latter allowance shall be payable monthly for a period of nine months from the birth of the child.

184. The allowance for the burial of insured persons and the non-able-bodied members of their families living on their support shall be equivalent to the average cost of a civil funeral but not more than the average monthly wage of the locality.

185. The unemployed allowance shall be fixed by the appropriate organs at not less than one-sixth of the average wage of the locality and rising with the labour category of the unemployed person and his experience in his trade as a hired worker at the time of loss of employment.

NOTE. The unemployment allowance to minors shall vary with their labour category independently of their trade experience.

186. The period for which unemployment allowance shall be payable, according to the labour category and the experience in his trade of the unemployed person, shall be fixed by the appropriate organs; but the minimum period shall be not less than six months.

187. The right to insurance allowances for permanent disablement shall be extended to all persons who have worked for hire and who have lost their labour power by reason of accident, disease, or senility.

The Council of People's Commissars shall fix the period of employment which shall confer the right to old age allowances.

188. The scales and methods of payment of disablement pensions shall be drawn up by the appropriate organs, in accordance with the nature and degree of disablement and the financial position of the disabled person.

189. In the event of the death of, or satisfactory proof of the untraceable disappearance of, a person working for hire, the following members of his family who are inadequately provided for and who were dependent upon the support of the insured person, shall be entitled to insurance benefit: (a) children, brothers, and sisters, until they have reached the age of sixteen; (b) non-able-bodied parents or husband or wife; (c) any of the above enumerated members of the family who are able-bodied but who are charged with the care of children under eight years of age.

190. The scales and forms of allowance payable to members of the families of insured persons who have died or untraceably disappeared shall be fixed by the appropriate organs according to the age and financial position of the persons to whom the insurance is payable.

191. The non-payment by enterprises, institutions, estates, and individuals of the insurance contributions due from them (Article 178) shall in no case deprive the persons employed by them for hire of the right to receive the allowances provided for in Articles 176 *et seq.* of the present Code.

Russian Information and Review, Vol. 20, Nos. 20-26 (17 February-7 April 1923), pp. 312-313, 328-329, 344-345, 369-371, 376-377, 393-934, 408-410.



CELEBRATING THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE REVOLUTION — I

7 November 1922

The anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution quickly became a major holiday of the Soviet state. After the pressures of Civil War passed, more elaborate and carefully planned celebrations were staged. The nature of celebrations varied at first but a basic pattern quickly emerged which included large columns of workers and others converging on the city center from the outlying districts and the parade through Red Square. Displaying the military forces of the Soviet state was a central part of the latter. This document and the one which follows are newspaper reports of the 1922 celebration in Moscow. This document surveys the events in the major districts of Moscow. The next document briefly describes the ceremonies in Red Square, including the presence of foreign dignitaries—which also became a fixture. The Red Square ceremonies included a lengthy speech by Trotsky, the report of which took up most of the newspaper article. It is not included here. Trotsky's prominent role is the more ironic in that these accounts were later reprinted in the USSR and then abroad with all references to Trotsky omitted, not only his speech but also those references which appeared in the accounts of the Bauman and Khamovniki districts in the first document. The same issue of Pravda from which these are taken included various other articles on the celebrations. The newspaper account moves back and forth between present and past tenses; that has been

preserved here because it gives some of the sense of urgency and excitement of the holiday.

ON THE STREETS OF MOSCOW

In the Rogozhsko-Simonovsky District

The district is alive from early morning. Groups of workers arrive at the gathering points from all directions. Taganka Square is decorated with flags. In the middle is a decorative structure on which are portrayed workers, peasants and redarmymen in the glow of the revolution. At the entrance to the street leading to the district soviet is a decorative gate with slogans.

The district soviet and the district party committee, with a portrait of Comrade Safronov, march at the head of the long column of demonstrators. [They carry] a banner inscribed "The hour of the worldwide October is near." After them come orderly ranks of workers and working women from the factories and shops, trade union organizations, and students. The metalworkers of the Guzhon, Dinamo, and Dongauer factories, the railroad workers, and the workers of the artillery depot, all pass by with their own banners.

From decorated trucks filled with children comes a ceaseless "hurrah." The demonstrators stretch in an endless line.

In the Khamovniki District

The meeting point of the district—the soviet building—is decorated with portraits of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, and with greenery and posters. About 11:00 a.m. men and women workers gather. Workers of the Goznak factory arrived with their own band. Workers of the Kauchuk (Rubber) factory came with a model of a dirigible inscribed: "For the Red Air Force—Red Rubber." From all sides come the sounds of revolutionary songs. The voices of Komsomol youth stand out notably.

At 1:00 p.m. the notes of the "Internationale" ring out, and then a funeral march as a truck starts toward Red Square with a portrait of the district hero, Comrade Shlemin, a worker of the Briansk Railroad Line who was shot by military cadets while transferring arms from the Khamovniki barracks during the revolutionary days. At 1:15 the procession moves toward Red Square.

In the Bauman District

Those wishing to participate in the procession were so numerous that it was necessary to divide them into columns according to factory areas. Ten columns were formed: the Bauman, Blagushinskaia, Cherkizovskaia, Vvedenskaia, Pokrovskaia, Iauzskaia, Basmannaia, Kurskii Station, and Pokrovskii Boulevard. Toward 12:00 noon all gathering points were completely filled with workers and youths.

At the building of the Bauman district soviet the procession stretched for about a mile and a quarter. Along Nemetskaia Street stretched an endless column of demonstrators. Workers of the Fourth State Mill erected a windmill with turning arms atop an automobile. Full sized portraits of comrades Lenin and Trotsky were painted on the wall of the Spartacus Club building. From everywhere comes harmonious singing. From decorated trucks children fill the air with cries of "hurrah." Children lining the route on the pavement pick up the cry. A large group of women wearing all red shawls on their heads stand out.

The procession began at 12:00. The Bauman area column led off, being the largest. At the head was the full district party committee, with its own banner and band. This column alone had no fewer than 50,000 people. At the crossroads new columns merged with the first, forming an endless ribbon.

In Krasnopresnia District

From early morning groups of workers gather on Georgievskiaia Square, at the building of the Krasnopresnia district party committee. With each minute the crowd grows larger

and larger. At the head [of the procession is carried] a memorial plaque with the inscription: "Eternal memory to the Fighters for the October Revolution," and after it the banners of the district committee, of the Komsomol, and innumerable placards with slogans.

The procession toward Red Square begins with the sounds of a band. A long chain of workers from the Trekhgornaia Plant, the Miussky Tram Park, the Alexandrov Railway, the Dukat Factory and others stretch away. On one float a large model steam locomotive—the emblem of the railroaders—emerges from behind red banners, while at the corner of Strastnaia Square stand two decorated steamships on wheels, with the inscriptions: "Long live the captain of the ship of world revolution, Comrade Lenin," and "Sailors of all countries, follow the example of Marti and Badina."

All of Tverskaia Street has been transformed into a workers camp, completely covered by the red paint and green garlands which decorate the buildings. There is a ceaseless hum of voices and music. Faces are happy and festive. In the sky a line of airplanes appear. "Long live the Red Air Force," rings out the loud collective greeting.

In Zamoskvoreche District

Assembly on Serpukhovskaia Square began during the early morning. From every quarter, along every factory street adjoining the square, stretch demonstrators with flags and placards. Exemplary order. Each enterprise calmly waits at the assigned place. At the head of the demonstration goes the district soviet and district party committee. Behind them a group of sailors with a model of a large dreadnought of the "Marat" class with the name "Comintern." After the dreadnought follows a minelayer of the "Novik" class. Then after the naval vessels there is a large column of "Knights" [*Bogatyr*] with caricatures of Poincaré, Lloyd George and others.

Workers of the formerly Mikhelson (now Vladimir Ilich) Factory came to the demonstrations with a large peat machine. The factory has produced about 40 of these machines, which are working at Kashirka and other places. Each factory, each enterprise of Zamoskvoreche appeared at the demonstration with an original emblem of its own production.

The mood of the demonstrators is excited, festive. "There never was anything like this before," say the district leaders in one voice. "Both party and nonparty people all came out for today's demonstration, as one." There are few "gawkers" in the districts, almost every-one joining the processions.

Pravda, No. 253 (9 November 1922).



CELEBRATING THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE REVOLUTION — II 7 November 1922

See the headnote to the preceding document.

ON RED SQUARE

Red flags were strung attractively on Red Square, along the Kremlin walls, in front of the communal graves [to heroes of the revolution] and on both sides of the rostrums. Near the platform for Comintern guests towers a white monolith about fourteen feet (four and a quarter meters) in height, depicting a worker at an anvil with a hammer in one hand and

hat in the other, with which he greets the approaching demonstration. This is the work of the sculptor Lekht, which was brilliantly executed under very unfavorable conditions of freezing temperature. In order to continue making the statue it was necessary to work under a tarpaulin to heat up the atmosphere and freezing water.

Behind the rostrum, along the entire of the square by the communal graves, stretches a line of specially painted pictures on revolutionary themes, in huge frames.

By 9:00 a.m. military units are already drawn up for parade. About 11:00 the square is filled with these units, which gleam with beautiful uniforms and superb ranks.

Soon the delegates of the Comintern, the members of the Central Committee and Moscow Committee of the Russian Communist Party, the members of the Moscow Soviet, the People's Commissars, the diplomatic corps, and last, the director of the parade, Comrade Trotsky, appear on the square. To the powerful notes of the "Internationale" there begins a display of military maneuvers.

At the end of the maneuvers Comrade Trotsky mounts the podium and delivers the following speech.... [There follows a long account of Trotsky's speech, stressing the strength and unity of the Soviet state]. Comrade Trotsky's speech is met by shouts of "hurrah" which are taken up by the military units and the endless columns of demonstrators and reverberate across the square.

Pravda, No. 253 (9 November 1922).



SOVIET COURTS AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS

11 November 1922

As part of the general consolidation and organization of political, governmental and legal institutions and procedures after the Civil War, the Soviet state undertook to create an orderly and unified judicial system, replacing the various institutions created during the years of war. See also the new law codes and commentaries thereon elsewhere in this volume. Although established for the Russian Republic, this, like other institutions and laws, was extended to cover the USSR as it came into being, with only minor modifications.

JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE R.S.F.S.R.

PART I.

I. GENERAL

1. In order to safeguard the gains of the proletarian revolution, and to protect the interests of the State and the rights of the labouring masses and their organisations, the following unified system of judicial institutions is hereby established for the whole territory of the R.S.F.S.R.

- (a) People's courts, consisting of a permanent People's judge.
- (b) People's courts, consisting of the permanent People's judge and two assessors.
- (c) Provincial courts.
- (d) The Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R. and its subordinate courts.

2. For the trial of cases of special importance, either because of their complicated nature, or necessity of special knowledge and skill for their examination, and also for cases

of a dangerous nature involving grave peril to the military strength of the Republic or its economic prosperity, the following special courts are hereby temporarily established in addition to the courts specified in Article I.:

- (a) Military tribunals, for dealing with offences involving peril to the military strength of the Red Army.
- (b) Military transport tribunals for dealing with particularly grave offences involving peril to the transport system.
- (c) Four special Labour sessions of the People's courts for dealing with cases of violation of the Labour Code.
- (d) Land commissions, for dealing with disputes in connection with land.
- (e) Central and local arbitration commissions attached to the Council of Labour and Defence and to the provincial economic councils, for dealing with disputes which may arise between various State institutions concerning property rights.

The method of appointing these courts, and their system of work are explained in Part IV., Section XII. of this decree.

3. Each People's judge, acting either alone or jointly with two assessors, shall have a specific rural district or town ward assigned to him. In these areas he shall be fully responsible for his actions before the court, or to the higher judicial instances of the R.S.F.S.R. in the manner provided below.

4. The competence of the provincial courts shall extend over the whole territory of the province or region in which they are set up, and in addition to the cases under its jurisdiction, it shall supervise all other courts in the same province or region, except the sessions of the Supreme Court on circuit and the military and military transport tribunals.

5. The Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R. shall have within its competence: supervision of all the law courts of the R.S.F.S.R. without exception, appeals against decisions of the provincial courts, supervision of all cases dealt with by any of the courts of the Republic, and examination of cases of special State importance, in the capacity of a court of first instance, in accordance with a special law placing such cases within its competence.

6. The task of the State procurators shall be to supervise the due observance of the law, keep under direct observation preliminary investigations and taking of evidence, and to act as prosecutors at the courts on behalf of the state.

7. The preliminary investigations of criminal offences, within the area assigned to them, or coming within the competence of the various courts to which they are attached, shall be conducted by people's examining magistrates, under the supervision of the procurators and the provincial courts.

8. In order to provide legal advice for the labouring masses in civil disputes, and to provide defence in the criminal sessions of the provincial courts, a panel of advocates shall be established.

9. Judicial agents shall be appointed to carry out the decisions of the provincial and People's courts. Notaries shall be appointed to execute all the documents necessitated by the provisions of the law.

10. The limits of competence, jurisdiction, and responsibility of all the above-named courts and officials are defined in the corresponding sections and chapters of the present decree.

II. METHODS OF ELECTION AND RECALL OF PEOPLE'S JUDGES.

DISTRICTS ASSIGNED TO THE PEOPLE'S COURTS

11. A People's judge may be any citizen of either sex, who has not been convicted by a court of law and who possesses the following qualifications:

- (a) He is qualified to vote and be elected to the Soviets.
- (b) He has not less than two years' experience of responsible political work in the workers' or peasants' public, industrial or party organisations, or not less than three

years' experience of practical work in a Soviet judicial institution, in a post not lower than that of examining magistrate.

NOTE—Individuals who have been dismissed from public organisations for serious offences cannot become judges.

12. People's judges are elected by the provincial executive committees on the recommendation of either the provincial court or the People's Commissar for Justice, for each ward or area of the province, according to the number of People's Courts.

13. The People's judges are elected for a period of one year, and are eligible for re-election. The dismissal of a judge before the completion of his term, or his transference to another district of the same province, can only be carried out by the decision of the provincial executive committee which elected him, on the recommendation of the People's Commissar for Justice, or on its own initiative. In the latter case, however, a detailed report must at once be sent to the People's Commissar for Justice, stating the reasons for the dismissal. The recalling of a People's judge can take place only after a trial or in conformity with Articles 69-84 of the present decree.

14. The number of People's Courts in the province and their area of jurisdiction shall be fixed by the provincial court and confirmed by the provincial executive committee and the People's Commissariat for Justice. In case of disagreement with the proposed division into districts, the latter is authorised to demand the fixing of a certain minimum number of courts for the province.

III. PEOPLE'S ASSESSORS AND THE METHODS OF CALLING THEM TO FULFIL JUDICIAL DUTIES

15. Any worker citizen of the R.S.F.S.R., of either sex, who is qualified to vote and to be elected to the local Soviets, may be a People's Assessor.

16. A person who has either been convicted by a court of law or expelled from a social or industrial organisation for disgraceful acts or behaviour cannot be a People's Assessor.

17. A People's Assessor may participate in a judicial session for not more than six days in the year; during that period he will attend all sessions of the court.

NOTE—Exceptions to this paragraph are to be found in the Criminal Procedure Code.

18. Lists of People's Assessors for each district served by a People's Court are drawn up on the basis that three persons will be required per week—two members and one deputy; that is, 156 persons per year, with an addition of a reserve of twenty-five per cent as substitutes for absentees, giving another thirty-nine, or in round numbers a total of 200 persons per year for each district served by a People's Court.

19. Lists of People's Assessors are drawn up once a year by December 1. One month beforehand a special committee in each county (uyezd) or ward will distribute the total number of Assessors (according to the number of districts served by a People's Court) amongst all the industrial undertakings, rural districts, and military units of the county or ward.

20. The chairman of this selecting committee shall be a member of the local county executive committee, and the members shall be the assistant provincial procurator and one people's judge of the county. People's Assessors shall be selected on the following basis: fifty per cent from the workers, thirty-five per cent from the villages and rural districts (volosts), and fifteen per cent from local military units. The lists when drawn up are sent to the People's Judges concerned and to the workshop committees, the local military commissars, and rural district executive committees.

21. On receiving notification, the workshop committees and others enumerated above proceed with the election of candidates, taking into consideration the standard of their political development. The lists of candidates are placarded in the factories, rural district committees, workers' clubs, etc. For a week after the lists are posted any worker may

challenge any candidate by stating to the institutions concerned in drawing up the lists the reasons for his objection. After the challenges have been considered, the lists shall be despatched to the People's Judge.

22. Citizens struck off the lists may appeal within one week against the decision to the body superior to the institution drawing up the list—the trade union, county executive committee, or to the political department of a higher army unit, etc. These bodies shall consider the appeal within one week.

23. On receiving the lists, the People's Judge shall send a copy for confirmation to the chairman of the county selection committee. Without waiting for final approval of the lists, he will summon the People's Assessors in alphabetical order to fulfil their duties.

24. On receiving copies of their lists from all the People's Judges in the county, the selection committee will draw up a complete list of People's Assessors, from which it may remove those who for some reason or other do not possess the necessary qualifications. From the approved People's Assessors a special list is drawn up of those who are to take part in the sessions of the Provincial Court on circuit.

25. Those struck off the lists of People's Assessors by the county selection committee may appeal to the local executive committee, whose decision is final.

26. The People's Judges shall explain their rights and duties to the People's Assessors, on their arrival in court, and shall secure from each of them a signed acknowledgement of such explanation and a solemn promise to judge according to the dictates of his conscience.

27. During the period in which they are employed in the Court, the People's Assessors receive full pay from their employers, including remuneration for the time spent in travelling to and from the court. Persons engaged in agriculture or in home industries receive a daily allowance, at the minimum rate of pay for the district, from the county executive committee out of local funds, on a signed order from the People's Judge.

28. In case of illness or other justifiable excuse for non-attendance, the People's Assessor's turn is postponed to a later date, his name being placed at the end of the list; when this takes place he shall be informed by the Judge.

IV. PLACE OF SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S COURTS; THE OFFICERS ATTACHED TO THE COURTS; REPORTS TO BE RENDERED BY THE PEOPLE'S JUDGE

29. The place of session of the People's Court shall be made widely known. The clerical staff of the People's Court shall be determined by the People's Commissariat for Justice. The cost of maintaining the office is borne by the provincial executive committees which make the necessary grants, through the provincial courts, according to the estimates submitted to them.

30. A secretary is attached to each People's Court; he must be recommended for this post by a judge and approved by the provincial court. Any person who has been convicted by a court of law or expelled from a social organisation for disgraceful sets or behaviour cannot occupy the post of secretary to a People's Court.

31. The provincial court shall supervise the work of the People's Judges, including the technical management of the courts. Judges are under the disciplinary control of this court. The forms, dates, and procedure for the rendering of material, financial, or any other reports by the People's Judges shall be determined by instructions from the People's Commissariat for Justice and by the orders and regulations issued by the Provincial Courts.

V. PEOPLE'S EXAMINING MAGISTRATES

32. People's examining magistrates are attached to:

- (a) wards or districts specially allotted to them.
- (b) criminal departments of the provincial courts.
- (c) the Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R.

(d) the Procurator's department of the People's Commissariat for Justice for urgent investigations of the most important cases.

33. Examining magistrates attached to wards or districts are styled "People's Examining Magistrates;" those attached to the provincial courts "Senior Examining Magistrates;" and those attached to the Supreme Court and the Procurator's Department of the People's Commissariat for Justice, "Examining Magistrates for Extraordinary Cases."

34. No person may be an examining magistrate who:

(a) has been convicted by a court of law or expelled from a social organisation for disgraceful acts or conduct.

(b) has had less than two years' experience in a Soviet judicial institution, in a position not lower than that of secretary to a People's Judge, or has not passed the necessary examinations at the provincial court.

(c) is disqualified from voting at elections to the local Soviets.

(d) has been guilty of a disloyal attitude to the Soviet authorities, or was a member of an anti-Soviet organisation during the Civil War.

35. The allotting of wards to examining magistrates, and their appointment, takes place by decision of the provincial court and must be approved by the provincial executive committee and the People's Commissariat for Justice. The dismissal of a People's examining magistrate is carried out by decision of a Court, on its own initiative, or after representations from the provincial executive committee or the People's Commissariat for Justice.

36. Senior examining magistrates and extra-ordinary examining magistrates are appointed, transferred, and dismissed by decision of the departments to which they are attached. These magistrates are competent to deal with cases arising throughout the whole area controlled by the department to which they are attached.

37. A secretary and messenger are attached to each People's examining magistrate. The cost of maintaining the examining magistrates and their staff is borne by the provincial executive committees, which make the necessary grants out of local funds through the provincial courts, according to estimates submitted as for the maintenance of the People's Court. The other examining magistrates are maintained from the State Treasury.

38. In their mutual relations with the courts, procurators, examining institutions, and other authorities, the examining magistrates shall be guided by the appropriate paragraphs of the Code of Criminal Procedure and by the instructions and directions of the People's Commissariat for Justice and the provincial courts.

VI. THE PROVINCIAL COURT

39. The provincial court acts:

(a) As the central judicial authority of the province, directly controlling the work of the People's Courts subordinate to it.

(b) As a court of appeal, for the hearing of appeals and protests lodged with it against the decisions of the People's Courts subordinate to it, as well as private complaints against decisions of these courts.

(c) As a court of first instance, for cases placed by the law within the jurisdiction of provincial courts.

40. The provincial court consists of a chairman and two vice-chairmen, one for the civil and one for the criminal section of the court, twelve permanent members of the provincial court, and provincial People's Assessors, summoned to take part in the sessions of the provincial court in the manner laid down below, with the necessary number of secretaries and other officials required for the work of the provincial court and the offices attached to it.

41. The chairman and the vice-chairmen of the provincial court, in addition to possessing the qualifications required for People's Judges, must also have had not less than three

years' experience of practical judicial work in the capacity of a People's Judge, or as a member of a Revolutionary Tribunal. The qualifications required for members of a provincial court are not less than two years' experience in the above-mentioned posts.

NOTE—Exceptions to this rule can be allowed only with the authorisation of the People's Commissariat for Justice.

42. The chairman, vice-chairmen, and members of the provincial court are elected by the provincial executive committee for a period of one year, and this appointment must be confirmed by the People's Commissariat for Justice, which may also recommend its own candidates for the posts of chairman, vice-chairmen, and members of the provincial court. Persons holding these posts are eligible for re-election at the end of their term of office. The chairman or vice-chairmen of the provincial court cannot be dismissed or replaced, before the completion of their term of office, by the provincial executive committee without the sanction of the People's Commissariat for Justice, except in cases of dismissal following conviction by a court of law or as a disciplinary measure of the Supreme Court. The same rules apply to the members of the provincial court.

43. In the case of candidates for the post of chairman or vice-chairman of the provincial court not being approved by the People's Commissariat for Justice, if the provincial executive committee has no other candidates possessing the qualifications required by law, the posts may be filled by the People's Commissariat for Justice in the usual way.

44. People's Assessors, to act in judicial sessions of the provincial court, are recruited from a special list of citizens who must have not less than two years' experience of work in social or industrial organisations. Lists of such persons are prepared on the recommendation of the provincial court by a special committee consisting of a chairman, who is a member of the provincial executive committee and appointed by the latter, two members of the provincial court appointed by the chairman, the provincial procurator, and three members of the provincial trade union council elected by that body. The lists are subject to approval by the provincial executive committee, which can refuse to accept particular individuals, such refusals not being subject to any further appeal.

45. Not less than 200 provincial People's Assessors are elected, including a minimum of twenty-five People's Judges, to act chiefly in sessions of the civil section of the People's Court. The qualifications required under paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 24, 25, 27, and 28 of this decree relating to People's Assessors attached to the People's Courts apply also in the case of assessors of the provincial courts.

46. Only individuals possessing the qualifications necessary for obtaining a post not lower than that of a People's Examining Magistrate can be secretary to any section of the provincial court.

One of the secretaries is appointed as Senior Secretary to the provincial court.

47. The other offices attached to the provincial court, and their officials, carry out their duties in accordance with special regulations.

VII. FUNCTIONS OF THE PROVINCIAL COURT

48. The chairman and two vice-chairmen are entirely responsible for the regular and efficient functioning of the provincial court, and for the precise and accurate fulfilment of existing legislative enactments and regulations, both in the provincial court and in offices and courts subordinate to it.

49. In accordance with the foregoing, the following matters fall within the competence of the chairman:

(a) Appointment of the members of the provincial court, and distribution of their duties between the sections of the court; submission for approval by the provincial executive committee of People's Judges and People's Examining Magistrates; and supervision of the punctual preparation, in accordance with the requirements of the law, of lists

of People's Assessors; supervision of the regular payment of the People's Judges and People's Examining Magistrates, and obtaining financial statements from them; preparation and submission of reports of the provincial court and People's Courts to the provincial executive committee and the People's Commissariat for Justice; supervision of the work of the office and of the preparation of financial, material, and other reports on the provincial court, and of all communications on the affairs of the court with the People's Commissariat for Justice and other departments; supervision of the work of the notaries and of the panel of advocates.

(b) The summoning of plenary sessions of the provincial court, and presiding over these, and the preliminary examination of all material lodged for decision by the plenary session of the provincial court on all questions within the competence of the latter, including preparation of material relating to the control and responsibility of the People's Examining Magistrates, People's Judges, members of the panel of advocates and other officials; the imposing of disciplinary penalties on People's Judges, People's Examining Magistrates, and other officials, within the limits of the chairman's authority.

50. A plenary session of a provincial court consists of all the members of the said court then present in court, in any case not less than half of the total members, and with the obligatory participation of the provincial procurator or his assistant. The functions of a plenary session are:

(a) The examination of all questions in connection with the areas of jurisdiction and the number of districts assigned to People's Courts; the transfer of People's Judges within the area controlled by the provincial court; the assignment and determination of the areas of jurisdiction and number of People's Examining Magistrates; the appointment and transfer of the latter; the examination of reports from People's Judges on statements submitted by members of the provincial court nominated by the chairman; appointment of control commissions to prepare reports on the work of the People's Judges and People's Examining Magistrates, and the consideration of such reports; and the elaboration of instructions and regulations within the competence of the provincial court.

(b) Examination of all questions which may arise in connection with disciplinary measures to be taken against People's Judges, and People's Examining Magistrates and other officials subordinate to the provincial court, including members of the latter; the adoption of resolutions for the provisional suspension from their duties of People's Judges and People's Examining Magistrates, pending a decision on their cases; the election of a disciplinary board of the provincial court.

(c) Examination of separate questions, submitted by the chairman of the provincial court or by the judicial or appeal sessions of the provincial court, or by the provincial procurator, in connection with points of law which are either obscure or not established in sufficient detail. Such examination, however, shall be made only on concrete cases or judgments, and the opinion of the court must be communicated to the Supreme Court.

51. If the presiding chairman agrees with the decision of the plenary session, except in cases provided in paragraph 50 (c), it immediately comes into force; where such agreement is not reached, all the material is to be forwarded for decision by the People's Commissariat for Justice, by the Supreme Court, or by the provisional executive committee, according to its nature. A protest by the procurator against the decision of the plenary session of the provincial court does not prevent the carrying into effect of such a decision by the provincial court.

52. The criminal section of the provincial court consists of seven permanent members, including as chief of the section a vice-chairman of the provincial court, and is divided into a criminal section and a section of criminal appeal. The judicial sessions of the appeal section require the presence of three permanent members of the provincial court and two

provincial People's Assessors, summoned to participate in the session by the administrative session of the criminal section from a list filed in the provincial court. The appointment and assignment of members of the criminal section of the provincial court to participate in the respective appeal and judicial sessions of the section, as well as the appointment of chairmen for the sessions of the criminal section in circuit, are carried out by the chief of the section—the vice-chairman—by agreement with the chairman of the provincial court. The chairman of the provincial court may at his discretion preside in any case under examination by the appeal sessions of the criminal section of the provincial court.

53. The civil section of the provincial court also consists of seven, including the chief of the section—one of the vice-chairmen—and is divided into two subsections; one for civil cases, and the other for civil appeals. The latter consists of three permanent members of the provincial court, including the chief of the civil section—the vice-chairman of the provincial court—and the former is composed of one permanent member as chairman and two People's Assessors, preference being given to those inscribed on the list who hold the office of People's Judge (paragraph 45). The appointment and assignment of members of the civil section of the provincial court to participate in appeal and judicial sessions of the section and of the chairman in circuit session are carried out by a decision of the chief of the section in agreement with the chairman of the provincial court. The summoning of People's Assessors is carried out by an administrative session of the section, consisting, however, exclusively of permanent members of the provincial court. The chairman of the provincial court may, at his discretion, preside in any case before the appeal sessions of the civil section of the provincial court.

NOTE—In accordance with the number of cases, the chairman of the provincial court, acting with the two vice-chairmen, may review the assignment of members of the provincial court to the various sections, or may appoint special sessions from members of the court, for the hearing of certain cases not falling within the special competence of any section; or may apply to the People's Commissariat for Justice for authority to increase the number of members of the provincial court to meet the needs of the province.

54. The disciplinary board of the provincial court consists of three members, including the chairman or one of the vice-chairmen, appointed by a plenary session of the provincial court.

VIII. THE SUPREME COURT OF THE R.S.F.S.R.

55. The Supreme Court (Par. 5) functions through:

- (a) The Presidium.
- (b) The Plenary Session.
- (c) Criminal and Civil Appeal Divisions.
- (d) Judicial, Military, and Military-transport Divisions.
- (e) The Disciplinary Board.

56. The chairman and members of the Supreme Court are appointed by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The chairman of the Supreme Court, the vice-chairman, and the chairmen of the Judicial, Military, and Military-transport Divisions are appointed by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee directly; other members of the Supreme Court, on the nomination of the People's Commissar for Justice. Members of the Military and Military-transport Divisions are appointed by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the nomination of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the People's Commissariat for Transport, after a report on the nominations from the People's Commissariat for Justice.

57. The chairman and members of the Supreme Court can only be recalled or suspended by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

NOTE—Other responsible individuals attached to the Supreme Court and its Divisions, such as procurators, secretaries of Divisions, and examining magistrates for extra-ordinary cases, are appointed and dismissed in accordance with special rules and regulations.

58. By a special decision of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, regional departments of the Supreme Court may be opened in autonomous Republics or separate administrative regions. The members of these departments are appointed either by the Central Executive Committee of the Republic concerned, or by special regulations confirmed by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee; the appointment of the chairman and vice-chairman of these departments, however, requires confirmation by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

IX. COMPETENCE OF THE PRESIDIUM AND THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE SUPREME COURT

59. The Presidium of the Supreme Court consists of the chairman of the Supreme Court, the vice-chairman, the chairmen of the Appeal Divisions, and of the Judicial, Military, and Military-transport Divisions. The following matters fall within the competence of the Presidium.

(1.) Supervision of administrative matters connected with the Supreme Court, and of offices and officials attached to it:

- (a) Distribution of duties among the members of the Supreme Court;
- (b) Examination and confirmation of reports of the separate Divisions, and preparation of reports of the Supreme Court.

(2.) Supervision of the local courts:

(a) Appointment of special commissions to report on provincial and other courts of a similar status, when this is recommended by the Procurator of the Republic, and consideration of the reports made by these commissions;

(b) Institution of disciplinary proceedings against members of the Supreme Court, chairmen and vice-chairmen of provincial and other courts of similar status. These proceedings arise either as a result of the inspection of the courts or from information laid before the Presidium by the Procurator of the Republic. The Presidium will impose disciplinary penalties in such cases within the limits of its authority;

(c) Summoning of plenary sessions of the Supreme Court.

NOTE—The Assistant Procurator of the Republic (Procurator of the Supreme Court) must be present at all sessions of the Presidium for consultative purposes.

60. A plenary session of the Supreme Court is composed of all members of the Court present at the time, the quorum being half of the total number of members. The session is presided over by the chairman or the vice-chairman and either the Procurator of the Republic or his senior assistant must be present. The functions of the session are:

(1.) The authoritative interpretation of the law in all questions of judicial procedure which may be put forward by the various Divisions or by judicial sessions of any Division. Such questions may also be raised by the Presidium of the Supreme Court, the Procurator of the Republic, or his assistant attached to the Supreme Court.

(2.) To examine, rescind, or modify sentences of the Judicial or Appeal Divisions of the Supreme Court or of any other court of the Republic, on the recommendation of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Procurator of the Republic, or the Presidium of the Supreme Court. Such examinations may also be undertaken where either the chairman of a session in any Division, or the procurator attached to it, protests against the sentence of a court.

(3.) Election of disciplinary board of the Supreme Court.

(4.) Examination of all other questions, specially referred to the plenary sessions of the Supreme Court.

X. THE APPEAL DIVISIONS AND JUDICIAL DIVISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT

61. The Appeal Divisions act under the direct supervision and guidance of the chairman of the Supreme Court. His immediate assistants for the criminal section are the chairmen of the Civil and Criminal Divisions. The chairman may, at his discretion, preside in any case under examination by the Appeal Divisions.

62. A session of the Appeal Division consists of three members, one presiding chairman and two of the eight permanent members of Appeal Divisions (four for each Division). Two assistant procurators of the Supreme Court are attached to the Criminal and Civil Appeal Divisions.

63. The vice-chairman of the Supreme Court controls the entire Judicial Division for all cases which come before the Supreme Court as a court of first instance, and has as his immediate assistants the chairman of the Judicial Division and the chairmen of the Military and Military-transport Divisions.

64. The Judicial Division consists of the chairman of the Division and four members. A judicial session consists of three members, including the chairman. The vice-chairman of the Supreme Court may also preside over the Division.

Two assistant procurators of the Supreme Court are attached to the Judicial Division.

65. The Military and Military-transport Divisions consist each of a chairman, vice-chairman, and four members. A session of each Division consists of three members, including the chairman and two members summoned to take part in the session in accordance with procedure established by the chairman.

Two assistant procurators of the Supreme Court are attached to the Military and Military-transport Divisions, one for each Division.

66. A single examining section, which consists of the examining magistrates for important cases, serves the Judicial Divisions of the Supreme Court; a single register must also be kept of all cases for investigation, under the supervision of the Procurator of the Supreme Court, and of the vice-chairman in charge of the judicial section of the Supreme Court.

67. The procedure for confirmation and appointment of the local military and military-transport judicial authorities subordinate to the Military and Military-transport Divisions is laid down in Part XII., which also provides for the reports to be submitted by them and the manner in which they are controlled.

68. The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court consists of three members of the Supreme Court, including a member of the Presidium who acts as chairman. These members are elected at the plenary session of the Supreme Court.

XI. DISCIPLINARY CONTROL OF JUDICIAL WORKERS

69. The Procurator of the Republic may institute disciplinary proceedings against all persons, without exception, employed in judicial institutions of the R.S.F.S.R.

70. The chairman of the Supreme Court, and the assistant procurator of the Republic attached to the Supreme Court, may institute disciplinary proceedings against all judicial employees, working in institutions which are controlled by the said court, *i.e.*, chairmen and members of Divisions of the Supreme Court, chairmen and vice-chairmen of provincial courts and other courts of a similar status, provincial procurators and their assistants and other officials attached to the provincial courts.

71. Chairmen of provincial courts and provincial procurators may institute disciplinary proceedings against all those employed in institutions which are controlled by the provincial court.

72. The chairmen and procurators of the Military and Military-transport divisions of the Supreme Court may institute disciplinary proceedings against all those employed in institutions subordinate to them.

73. Disciplinary proceedings may be based on:

(a) Offences, conduct, or acts by judicial workers, whether in the course of fulfilling judicial duties or otherwise, when such acts, although not punishable under criminal law, are nevertheless incompatible with the dignity and status of judicial workers.

(b) The annulment by the Supreme Court of a number of sentences and decisions passed by the judicial workers in question on the ground that such decisions are contrary to the general spirit of the laws of the R.S.F.S.R., and to the interests of the labouring masses.

74. The following disciplinary measures may be taken:—

(a) Censure.

(b) Reprimand.

(c) Transfer and removal to a lower post.

(d) Dismissal and prohibition of employment in judicial institutions for a fixed term.

75. Disciplinary proceedings may be instituted not later than one year from the time of the offence.

76. Disciplinary proceedings instituted as the result of a complaint by a private individual cannot be suspended at the plaintiff's request.

77. Prior to the examination of a case by the Disciplinary Board the latter must obtain necessary information, and obtain an explanatory statement from the accused; the Board may entrust the carrying out of the investigations to a member of the Board or of the provincial court, or People's Court according to the nature of the case.

78. The date when the case is to be considered must be communicated by the Disciplinary Board to the accused, who may attend the session to give a personal explanation.

79. If it is considered necessary, the Disciplinary Board may require the attendance of the accused at the trial. In such cases attendance of the accused is obligatory.

80. The Disciplinary Board is not bound by any formalities and may, at its discretion, determine the manner in which the case is examined, subject only to the right of the accused to make a final reply in cases where the Board allows the procurator to sum up the case.

81. Members of the Board may be challenged in the usual manner.

82. Decisions taken by the Disciplinary Board rank as judgments; records of sessions of the Board are made in the same manner as reports of court sessions; the members present at the sessions must be noted.

83. Decisions of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court are not subject to appeal.

84. Should the Disciplinary Board consider, in the course of investigation, that the offence should be the subject of criminal proceedings, the investigation must be closed and the case transferred to the jurisdiction of the appropriate authority.

XII. JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TRIAL OF CASES BELONGING TO SPECIAL CATEGORIES

85. Military and Military-transport judicial institutions of the R.S.F.S.R. and of all allied and autonomous Republics function under the general control and supervision of the People's Commissariat for Justice and the Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R. The organisation and immediate supervision of the work of Military and Military-transport judicial institutions is carried out by the Military and Military-transport Divisions of the Supreme Court.

86. The following Military judicial institutions are established:

(a) Military tribunals of a military region or front attached to revolutionary military councils of military regions or fronts.

(b) Corps military tribunals, attached to Army Corps.

(c) Divisional departments of regional tribunals, attached to Army Divisions.

In time of war or areas of military operations there may also be established military tribunals of armies or of fortified areas, and departments of the corps' military tribunals attached to the army divisions involved in the operations.

The number of military tribunals during both war and peace is determined from time to time by decisions of the Presidium of the Supreme Court on recommendations made by the Military Division of the Supreme Court.

87. Transport tribunals are established in Moscow, Petrograd, Kharkov, Rostov-on-Don, Omsk, Tashkent, and Smolensk.

Existing transport tribunals may be abolished, or new ones established, by decisions taken from time to time by the Presidium of the Supreme Court on recommendations put forward by the Military-transport Division of the said court.

88. The military tribunal of a region or front consists of a chairman, vice-chairman, and four members, nominated by the Military Division from the list of candidates selected by the Revolutionary Military Tribunal of the region or front and sanctioned by the Military Division jointly with the Revolutionary Military Court of the Republic.

The corps' military tribunal consists of a chairman and four members, appointed by the Military Division of the Supreme Court, from the list of candidates selected by the Revolutionary Military Council of the region or front.

The divisional military tribunal consists of a chairman, vice-chairman, and four members, appointed by the military tribunal of the region or front.

89. Transport tribunals consist of a chairman, vice-chairman, and four members, selected by the departments of the People's Commissariat for Transport in the district, and appointed by the Military Transport Division of the Supreme Court jointly with the People's Commissariat for Transport.

NOTE—In accordance with the number of cases, the number of members in particular transport tribunals may be increased to seven by a decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Court.

90. The Military and Military-transport Divisions of the Supreme Court may at any time replace or transfer the chairmen and members of military and transport tribunals, but such action must be notified to the appropriate Revolutionary Military Councils or the People's Commissariat for Transport.

91. In disciplinary proceedings, the military tribunals attached to regions, corps, or armies and the district transport tribunals are subordinate to the disciplinary board of the Supreme Court; military tribunals attached to army divisions are subordinate to the disciplinary boards of regional or corps' military tribunals.

92. Labour sessions of the People's Courts must be established at each provincial court; they consist of one permanent People's Judge and two permanent members, one elected by the local provincial trade union council, and the other by the local provincial Department of Labour. They function in the same manner and are subject to the same regulations as the People's Courts.

93. Appeals against sentences of the labour sessions are lodged in the usual way with the provincial court, which controls and supervises the work of the said sessions. (Para. 4.) The qualifications required for holding the post of a People's Judge, presiding over labour sessions, and the procedure governing his appointment and replacement are the same as those applying to other People's Judges of the province.

94. The Land Arbitration Commissions which were formed for the settlement of land and property disputes between State institutions (Decrees of May 24 and September 21, 1922) work in conformity with the published regulations relating to them, and as regards control are subordinate to the People's Commissariat for Justice and institutions controlled

by it locally, to the plenary sessions of the provincial courts, and the procurators, and centrally to the Supreme Court and Procurator of the Republic (Pars. 4, 5, and Note 2 to Par. 60).

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THE CIVIL CODE

11 November 1922

The problems of administering the new state, compounded by the tasks of economic recovery, led to the issuance of several fundamental law codes, mostly in 1922 and most of which are given in this volume. One was a new Civil Code which, with many amendments, remained in effect throughout Soviet history. The new code took effect 1 January 1923 for the R.S.F.S.R. and provided the basis for the codes of other republics of the Soviet Union. Many of the clauses such as number five which provides for the right to "organize industrial and commercial enterprises"—a feature of the New Economic Policy era only—were modified in later years. Even though the Code provided for private economic activity, carefully restricted and in time mostly phased out, the tone was set by the first article: rights are exercised only in conformity with specified social and economic purposes, which the state and Communist Party determined. The code is a huge and detailed document, even in its original form, and so only the first sections from the "General Part" are presented here. The full document, with commentaries and amendments until 1947, is in Vladimir Gsovski, Soviet Civil Law, Vol. 2 (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1949), pp. 3-235, from which this is taken.

CIVIL CODE "General Part"

I. Basic Provisions

1. The law protects private rights except as they are exercised in contradiction to their social and economic purpose.

2. Disputes concerning private rights shall be decided in a judicial proceeding. Waiver of the right to invoke the court is void.

Note: Disputes concerning property arising between governmental agencies shall be settled according to the procedure established by special provisions of law.

3. Relations arising from land tenure, for the employment of labor, and domestic relations are regulated by separate codes.

II. Holders of Rights (Persons)

4. For the purpose of the development of the productive forces of the country, the R.S.F.S.R. has granted legal capacity (the capacity of having private rights and obligations) to all citizens who are not restricted in their rights by sentence of the court.

Sex, race, nationality, religion, origin, have no bearing upon the scope of legal capacity.

5. In accordance with the foregoing, every citizen of the R.S.F.S.R. and other republics of the Soviet Union [being formed at this time - Ed.] has the right to move about freely and to take residence within the territory of the R.S.F.S.R., to choose any occupation and profession not forbidden by law, to acquire and alienate property within the limitations established by law, to conclude legal transactions and to incur obligations, to organize industrial and commercial enterprises, subject to all regulations governing industrial and commercial activities and protecting employed labor.

6. No one may be deprived of private rights or limited in rights except in cases and in proceedings established by law....

13. Legal entities are such associations of persons and such organizations or institutions as may, in their own name, acquire rights in property, assume obligations, and sue and be sued in court.

14. A legal entity must have a charter (bylaws) duly approved and, in specified cases, registered by agencies authorized by law....

17. All persons in the R.S.F.S.R., legal entities and human beings, shall participate in foreign trade only through the medium of the government as represented by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Independent appearances in the foreign market shall not be permitted except under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

18. The existence of a legal entity may be terminated by the proper organ of government authority, if the legal entity deviates from the purpose defined by the charter or contract or if the activities of the organs of the legal entity (general meeting or management) deviate in a direction contrary to the interests of the State....

III. Objects of Rights (Property)

20. Property withdrawn from civil commerce may be the object of private rights only within the limits expressly stated by law.

21. The land shall be the domain of the State and shall not be subject to private commerce. Land tenure shall be permitted only in the form of the mere right of use.

Note: In consequence of the abolition of private ownership of land, the division of property into movable and immovable is abolished....

Gsovski, Vol. 2, pp. 16-21.



GOOD AND BAD FACTORY MANAGERS

November-December 1922

Pravda announced a competition for essays on good and bad factory managers, to run from 21 October 1922 to 1 January 1923, with the essays to be published in Pravda. One hundred thirty-two factory managers were described, some more than once. A committee selected the best and worst managers from the essays. In naming the winners Pravda noted that almost all the best managers had been rank and file workers before the revolution! Of those given here, Ukhanov won first prize and Tamanov a consolation prize in the best manager category. Fershtudt did not "win" first prize among the bad managers but he did lose his job two days after the essay was printed. The prizes themselves were an interesting commentary on the economic conditions of the time: first prize was a winter coat, a woolen

suit or costume, a pair of boots, a watch, a cap, six sets of underlinen, books and a year's subscription to Pravda; the runners-up got the same type of clothing gifts, only less.

PRAVDA ESSAY COMPETITION

A Good Manager—K. V. Ukhonov, Manager of the "Dynamo" (Electrical Machine Construction) Factory.

During the first three years of the revolution the Dynamo Factory was only at work intermittently. In those days the workers knew Ukhonov only as an earnest, energetic Bolshevik, who had been foremost in the early days of the 1917 Revolution in demanding "all power to the Soviets," and who had always been ready to shoulder any responsibility in times of difficulty and danger.

In the autumn of 1920, with the whole-hearted sympathy and support of the workers, he was placed at the head of the factory.

His first care was to rid the works of all unreliable elements, and to utilise to the utmost the special skill of every worker. But many were the difficulties with which he had to contend. With the willing help of his workers, however, and by the constant exercise of tact, sympathy, and right judgment in helping to tide them over difficult times, Ukhonov succeeded in setting the wheels of the factory going merrily once more.

By the exercise of great energy and vigilance he succeeded in laying in a sufficient winter supply of fuel, the constant lack of which at intervals had been the primary cause of the factory's difficulties. Further, he took immediate steps to make an exact inventory of all the stocks and equipment of the factory, and introduced a proper system of bookkeeping for all sales, purchases, etc. On his initiative also, through the union, he concluded a collective agreement with the workers—one of the first of such agreements in the whole of Russia.

The result of all this was that from the early months of his management a decided improvement in productivity set in. Then, after August, 1921, the output of the Dynamo began to exceed the estimate slowly but steadily month by month, by 15 percent, then by 20 per cent, then by 30 per cent, until now some of the departments actually exceed the pre-war output.

The summer of 1922, during which work has been improving rapidly, was utilised in the repair of broken roofs and windows, and in the redecoration of the factory and so on.

Before Ukhonov had taken control, juvenile workers had been allowed to work anywhere and without any methodical training, but in the interests of the young workers and of the factory Ukhonov soon put a stop to this, and organised a training workshop for the juveniles, supervised by the most highly-skilled workers. In this way the Dynamo is giving the young workers a real training, at the same time building up its own reserve of skilled labour.

Ukhonov has left nothing undone to improve the conditions of the workers. To improve the supplies of the workers after State supply had been abandoned, the question of co-operation among the Dynamo workers was raised. "We shall allow no spiders' webs here," said Ukhonov, and he at once proceeded to organise a co-operative tea and dining room, bakery, and grocery store. He also takes every opportunity to get other necessities for the co-operative at cheapest wholesale prices, from which the workers benefit directly.

Ukhonov wanted a farm for his workers, and he worried the Chief Electrical Board and the metal workers' trade union until they granted him one—not very good land, but he has done all he could to improve it, and the workers as usual responded and have gained great advantages from it.

The housing of the workers was bad. Ukhonov took this matter in hand as soon as the factory, by its increased output, had got together enough funds, and taking house after

house he had them repaired and redecorated, and most of his workers are now decently accommodated.

On the initiative of Ukhanov the Dynamo has adopted several elementary and secondary schools, a kindergarten for thirty workers' children, a creche for twenty-five, and a factory school—probably the very first in Moscow—for sixty scholars. And, in addition, Ukhanov provided the Education Commissariat with accommodation and equipment for the first model school in Moscow for sixty-five boys of twelve to fourteen years of age. But all his successes have not changed Ukhanov or made him boastful of his own prowess. On the contrary, he often recalls the trying days of the past with engaging frankness, telling of the difficulties and the way in which, with the help of the workers, they were overcome.

Some have asked why could not the old experts achieve what Ukhanov has done? The answer is clear; because, unlike them, Ukhanov had the interests of the factories, of the workers, of the whole country at heart.

*A Good Manager: Kuzma Tamanov,
the Red Director of the Simsk District*

Kuzma Tamanov is the son of a blacksmith, and only recently he was himself still a blacksmith. On the outbreak of the Revolution, Kuzma began to take a lively interest in public affairs—he attended proletarian meetings and circles, and finally joined the Red Army, where he proved himself a brave and able soldier.

On the return of the Urals to Soviet Russia, he became manager of a factory in the Simsk mountain district. The same energy that he had devoted to his early work, and then to the Revolution and to the Army, he now displayed in the economic sphere. The work was unfamiliar. He was seen to shake his fist at the ruined factory and mumble to himself, "I'll show you the worth of Kuzma's strength, you need not think you will stand idle any longer now I have you in hand." And Kuzma, as always, was as good as his word. All day and every day he was at the factory calculating, discussing, deciding what to do and how to do it—and in a very short time the chimneys began to belch forth thick black smoke—the factory was full of life and vigour again.

The central trust authorities, noting Kuzma's exceptional energy and abilities, handed over to him the management of three factories in the Simsk region. Some doubted whether he could manage—Kuzma had no doubts. He did not, like other managers, wait for the trust to supply him with bread and money; and yet, while other factories were at a standstill, his were in full swing—his workers were receiving full rations and money. How was that? Simply because he kept his eyes open and let nothing go to waste. In Kuzma's factories, for instance, there was a mass of material which, apparently, no one seemed to want—Kuzma sold it all and with the money obtained bread for his workers. As a result his workers could work well and complete all government orders on time.

At one time Kuzma's factories produced threshing machines in large quantities—the trust warehouses were full of them—but were unable to sell them. But Kuzma wanted money, he could not wait. With his customary decision Kuzma rode forth into the county and offered the threshing machines to the peasants.

The peasants scratched their heads thoughtfully. "Yes," they said, "we should like to buy them—but we have neither money nor bread. How can we?"

"I can wait for payment till the autumn," replies Kuzma.

"And where are the threshing machines?"

"At the factory."

"Oh, but that's so far—we can't fetch them—we have no horses."

"But I am not asking you to fetch them—I shall bring them along myself—only let's come to an understanding."

The conversation was short and to the point—Kuzma brought along the machines; and now in return endless peasant carts loaded with grain are coming to his warehouses, and he will have bread enough for his workers for the whole of the winter.

And so it is in everything—Kuzma calculates and foresees things where others sit and wait on events.

When the Commission comes to investigate the conditions of the factory, Kuzma talk and talks, but it is not so much his speech that convinces, as his *facts*—the presence of his iron, ploughs, bread, and so on—and the satisfaction and contentment of his workers.

Nor does he forget the cultural needs of his workers. One day the representative of the uyezd national education department called.

"Kuzma," he says, "give me money for the school."

"How much."

"Several milliards per month."

Kuzma strokes his beard thoughtfully; he cannot quite manage that, the factories are not yet sufficiently developed.

"Very well," he says, "I shall support the whole school, but only on condition that its economic administration is in my hands."

Thus Kuzma throws another serious and heavy burden on his own shoulders, but he does not mind—he loves and is not afraid of work—on the contrary, he strokes his beard with satisfaction, for he knows that while the children of his workers will now be well looked after, there will yet be no waste—under his watchful eyes there will be everything necessary, but not a single unnecessary electric lamp will be lighted, not a single extra faggot of wood burnt.

"My word is my bond," he mumbles, "and the school shall have everything it needs." And under his administration it will.

A Bad Manager: Fershtudt; Manager of the Saratov Manufacturing Works

Citizen Fershtudt, a typical bourgeois in appearance, has been manager of this factory since 1905, and since then he has ably exploited and terrorised the workers. The outbreak of the October Revolution found him in active hostility to the working class. He was dismissed and arrested. The Cheka, indeed, threatened to shoot him. Fortunately for him, however, as a result of family influence, Mr. Fershtudt was set free. When the need for business management of our factories came to the fore, Mr. Fershtudt pretended to be poor, modest, and quite neutral politically; he made proposals to the local authorities, which were accepted, and once more he was installed as director as though nothing had happened. True, a commissioner, a certain Myuller, was placed to control him, but by means of bribery he soon got this man to become his faithful henchman.

The position of the workers in the factory is most pitiable. The factory is situated about sixteen miles from the town, on the banks of the Volga. Near it are a number of swamps which never dry up and which, particularly in the summer, spread infection which kills off hosts of the working classes, particularly women and children. It would not require much to have these swamps cleared up, but then it is not human lives but gold which Mr. Fershtudt is after. It is quite a common thing for half of the workers to be laid up with malaria. The housing conditions of the workers there are, of course, terrible. Mr. Fershtudt recognises no laws of the R.S.F.S.R. relating to the protection of labour, particularly of juvenile and women's labour; neither the trade unions nor the factory workshop committees, nor the local Communist Party could do anything. Quite openly he called the trade unions a "band of murderers and scamps." By means of terror and bribery he gets rid of all opposition.

At last in August of this year, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection appointed a commission to inspect this factory. Fershtudt, however, would not allow the inspection to carry on its work, and refused to admit it into the factory.

The main reason why this Fershtudt has been tolerated so long by the local authorities seems to be that he has been successful in keeping the factory going and in making it pay. But the Soviet Government should have no need for successful administrators whose success depends on such abuses.

Russian Information and Review, Vol. 2, No. 12 (23 December 1922), p. 189, and No. 7 (18 November 1922), pp. 110-111.



LENIN EVALUATES THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS

23 December 1922-4 January 1923

During his illness in late 1922, Lenin grew concerned over divisions among his lieutenants and the possibility of a split in the party. He dictated a series of notes focusing on the two related issues of the structure of the party, especially the Central Committee, and the character and rivalries among the party leaders. The second of these, dated 24 December, contains his famous assessments of the abilities and faults of various party leaders. An addendum to this, dated 4 January 1923, and the last of this series of related dictations, contains his assessment that "Stalin is too rude" and suggested that he be removed as General Secretary. It should be noted that this did not call for Stalin's removal from the other important party and state positions which he held. Much of Lenin's discussion, both of Stalin and of reorganizing the Central Committee, was directed toward Lenin's concern to prevent a party split growing out of the Stalin-Trotsky feud. The notes were intended to be read at a forthcoming party congress. They were not read at the Twelfth Congress in 1923 but were read at the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1924 which, closing ranks after Lenin's death in January, decided not to publish them. They were made public at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 as part of Nikita Khrushchev's attack on Stalin. Two further series of notes were dictated, one on the planning commission and one on the nationality question and the organization of the USSR—see below. The sequence of notes is as arranged in Lenin, Collected Works.

I

LETTER TO THE CONGRESS

I would urge strongly that at this Congress a number of changes be made in our political structure.

I want to tell you of the considerations to which I attach most importance.

At the head of the list I set an increase in the number of Central Committee members to a few dozen or even a hundred. It is my opinion that without this reform our Central Committee would be in great danger if the course of events were not quite favourable for us (and that is something we cannot count on).

Then I intend to propose that the Congress should on certain conditions invest the decisions of the State Planning Commission with legislative force, meeting, in this respect, the wishes of Comrade Trotsky—to a certain extent and on certain conditions.

As for the first point, i.e., increasing the number of C.C. members, I think it must be done in order to raise the prestige of the Central Committee, to do a thorough job of improving our administrative machinery and to prevent conflicts between small sections of the C.C. from acquiring excessive importance for the future of the Party.

It seems to me that our Party has every right to demand from the working class 50 to 100 C.C. members, and that it could get them from it without unduly taxing the resources of that class.

Such a reform would considerably increase the stability of our Party and ease its struggle in the encirclement of hostile states, which, in my opinion, is likely to, and must, become much more acute in the next few years. I think that the stability of our Party would gain a thousandfold by such a measure.

Lenin

December 23, 1922

Taken down by M. V.

II

Continuation of the notes.

December 24, 1922

By stability of the Central Committee, of which I spoke above, I mean measures against a split, as far as such measures can at all be taken. For, or course, the whiteguard in *Russkaya Mysl* (it seems to have been S. S. Oldenburg) was right when, first, in the whiteguards' game against Soviet Russia he banked on a split in our Party and when, secondly, he banked on grave differences in our Party to cause that split.

Our Party relies on two classes and therefore its instability would be possible and its downfall inevitable if there were no agreement between those two classes. In that event this or that measure, and generally all talk about the stability of our C.C., would be futile. No measures of any kind could prevent a split in such a case. But I hope that this is too remote a future and too improbable an event to talk about.

I have in mind stability as a guarantee against a split in the immediate future, and I intend to deal here with a few ideas concerning personal qualities.

I think that from this standpoint the prime factors in the question of stability are such members of the C.C. as Stalin and Trotsky. I think relations between them make up the greater part of the danger of a split, which could be avoided, and this purpose, in my opinion, would be served, among other things, by increasing the number of C.C. members to 50 or 100.

Comrade Stalin, having become Secretary-General, has unlimited authority concentrated in his hands, and I am not sure whether he will always be capable of using that authority with sufficient caution. Comrade Trotsky, on the other hand, as his struggle against the C.C. on the question of the People's Commissariat for Communications has already proved, is distinguished not only by outstanding ability. He is personally perhaps the most capable man in the present C.C., but he has displayed excessive self-assurance and shown excessive preoccupation with the purely administrative side of the work.

These two qualities of the two outstanding leaders of the present C.C. can inadvertently lead to a split, and if our Party does not take steps to avert this, the split may come unexpectedly.

I shall not give any further appraisals of the personal qualities of other members of the C.C. I shall just recall that the October episode with Zinoviev and Kamenev was, of course,

no accident, but neither can the blame for it be laid upon them personally, any more than non-Bolshevism can upon Trotsky.

Speaking of the young C.C. members, I wish to say a few words about Bukharin and Pyatakov. They are, in my opinion, the most outstanding figures (among the youngest ones), and the following must be borne in mind about them: Bukharin is not only a most valuable and major theorist of the Party; he is also rightly considered the favourite of the whole Party, but his theoretical views can be classified as fully Marxist only with great reserve, for there is something scholastic about him (he has never made a study of dialectics, and, I think, never fully understood it).

December 25. As for Pyatakov, he is unquestionably a man of outstanding will and outstanding ability, but shows too much zeal for administrating and the administrative side of the work to be relied upon in a serious political matter.

Both of these remarks, of course, are made only for the present, on the assumption that both these outstanding and devoted Party workers fail to find an occasion to enhance their knowledge and amend their one-sidedness.

Lenin

December 25, 1922

Taken down by M. V.

ADDITION TO THE LETTER

OF DECEMBER 24, 1922

Stalin is too rude and this defect, although quite tolerable in our midst and in dealings among us Communists, becomes intolerable in a Secretary-General. That is why I suggest that the comrades think about a way of removing Stalin from that post and appointing another man in his stead who in all other respects differs from Comrade Stalin in having only one advantage, namely, that of being more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more considerate to the comrades, less capricious, etc. This circumstance may appear to be a negligible detail. But I think that from the standpoint of safeguards against a split and from the standpoint of what I wrote above about the relationship between Stalin and Trotsky it is not a detail, or it is a detail which can assume decisive importance.

Lenin

Taken down by L. F.

January 4, 1923

III

Continuation of the notes.

December 26, 1922

The increase in the number of C.C. members to 50 or even 100 must, in my opinion, serve a double or even a treble purpose: the more members there are in the C.C., the more men will be trained in C.C. work and the less danger there will be of a split due to some indiscretion. The enlistment of many workers to the C.C. will help the workers to improve our administrative machinery, which is pretty bad. We inherited it, in effect, from the old regime, for it was absolutely impossible to reorganise it in such a short time, especially in conditions of war, famine, etc. That is why those "critics" who point to the defects of our administrative machinery out of mockery or malice may be calmly answered that they do not in the least understand the conditions of the revolution today. It is altogether impossible in five years to reorganise the machinery adequately, especially in the conditions in which our revolution took place. It is enough that in five years we have created a new type of state in which the workers are leading the peasants against the bourgeoisie; and in a hostile international environment this in itself is a gigantic achievement. But knowledge of this must on no account blind us to the fact that, in effect, we took over the old machinery of state from the tsar and the bourgeoisie and that now, with the onset of peace and the

satisfaction of the minimum requirements against famine, all our work must be directed towards improving the administrative machinery.

I think that a few dozen workers, being members of the C.C. can deal better than anybody else with checking, improving and remodelling our state apparatus. The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection on whom this function devolved at the beginning proved unable to cope with it and can be used only as an "appendage" or, on certain conditions, as an assistant to these members of the C.C. In my opinion, the workers admitted to the Central Committee should come preferably not from among those who have had long service in Soviet bodies (in this part of my letter the term workers everywhere includes peasants), because those workers have already acquired the very traditions and the very prejudices which it is desirable to combat.

The working-class members of the C.C. must be mainly workers of a lower stratum than those promoted in the last five years to work in Soviet bodies; they must be people closer to being rank-and-file workers and peasants, who, however, do not fall into the category of direct or indirect exploiters. I think that by attending all sittings of the C.C. and all sittings of the Political Bureau, and by reading all the documents of the C.C., such workers can form a staff of devoted supporters of the Soviet system, able, first, to give stability to the C.C. itself, and second, to work effectively on the renewal and improvement of the state apparatus.

Lenin

Taken down by L. F.
December 26, 1922

Lenin, Vol. 36, pp. 593-597.



LENIN ON THE NATIONALITY QUESTION AND FORMATION OF THE USSR

30-31 December 1922

The relationship between the Russian center (the RSFSR) and the nationalities, especially the larger ones which had formed Soviet Republics, was one of the key issues of late 1922 and early 1923 as the terms of the formation of the USSR were being worked out. At the same time Lenin was becoming alarmed at both Stalin's accumulation of power, see preceding document, and the behavior of Stalin and several of his associates among the leadership in the matter of Soviet Georgia. Having forced a key rewording in the articles constituting the USSR, see headnote to following document, he attempted to influence the shape of the new union and policies toward the minorities. This took the form of notes he dictated during his serious illness in late December 1922. Lenin had, since the revolution, been more considerate of nationality sensibilities than had Stalin and now made his strongest argument on their behalf, including the right of secession. This reflects the ambivalence in Lenin's thinking about the nationalities. The same Lenin had led the forcible de facto incorporation of some of these areas into the Soviet state at the end of the Civil War, had opposed decentralization of the party along nationality lines, was in general a centralizer, and even now pointed out that any negative effects of decentralization of the state apparatus "can be compensated sufficiently by Party authority."

[I]

*Continuation of the notes.
December 30, 1922*

THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITIES OR "AUTONOMISATION"

I suppose I have been very remiss with respect to the workers of Russia for not having intervened energetically and decisively enough in the notorious question of autonomisation, which, it appears, is officially called the question of the union of soviet socialist republics.

When this question arose last summer, I was ill; and then in autumn I relied too much on my recovery and on the October and December plenary meetings giving me an opportunity of intervening in this question. However, I did not manage to attend the October Plenary Meeting (when this question came up) or the one in December, and so the question passed me by almost completely.

I have only had time for a talk with Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who came from the Caucasus and told me how this matter stood in Georgia. I have also managed to exchange a few words with Comrade Zinoviev and express my apprehensions on this matter. From what I was told by Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who was at the head of the commission sent by the C.C. to "investigate" the Georgian incident, I could only draw the greatest apprehensions. If matters had come to such a pass that Orjonikidze could go to the extreme of applying physical violence, as Comrade Dzerzhinsky informed me, we can imagine what a mess we have got ourselves into. Obviously the whole business of "autonomisation" was radically wrong and badly timed. It is said that a united apparatus was needed. Where did that assurance come from? Did it not come from that same Russian apparatus which, as I pointed out in one of the preceding sections of my diary, we took over from tsarism and slightly anointed with Soviet oil?

There is no doubt that measure should have been delayed somewhat until we could say that we vouched for our apparatus as our own. But now, we must, in all conscience, admit the contrary; the apparatus we call ours is, in fact, still quite alien to us; it is a bourgeois and tsarist hodge-podge and there has been no possibility of getting rid of it in the course of the past five years without the help of other countries and because we have been "busy" most of the time with military engagements and the fight against famine.

It is quite natural that in such circumstances the "freedom to secede from the union" by which we justify ourselves will be a mere scrap of paper, unable to defend the non-Russians from the onslaught of that really Russian man, the Great-Russian chauvinist, in substance a rascal and a tyrant, such as the typical Russian bureaucrat is. There is no doubt that the infinitesimal percentage of Soviet and sovietised workers will drown in that tide of chauvinistic Great-Russian riffraff like a fly in milk.

It is said in defence of this measure that the People's Commissariats directly concerned with national psychology and national education were set up as separate bodies. But there the question arises: can these People's Commissariats be made quite independent and secondly: were we careful enough to take measures to provide the non-Russians with a real safeguard against the truly Russian bully? I do not think we took such measures although we could and should have done so.

I think that Stalin's haste and his infatuation with pure administration, together with his spite against the notorious "nationalist-socialism," played a fatal role here. In politics spite generally plays the basest of roles.

I also fear that Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who went to the Caucasus to investigate the "crime" of those "nationalist-socialists," distinguished himself there by his truly Russian frame of mind (it is common knowledge that people of other nationalities who have become Russified overdo this Russian frame of mind) and that the impartiality of his whole commission was typified well enough by Orjonikidze's "manhandling." I think that no

provocation or even insult can justify such Russian manhandling and that Comrade Dzerzhinsky was inexcusably guilty in adopting a light-hearted attitude towards it.

For all the citizens in the Caucasus Orjonikidze was the authority. Orjonikidze had no right to display that irritability to which he and Dzerzhinsky referred. On the contrary, Orjonikidze should have behaved with a restraint which cannot be demanded of any ordinary citizen, still less of a man accused of a "political" crime. And, to tell the truth, those nationalist-socialists were citizens who were accused of a political crime, and the terms of the accusation were such that it could not be described otherwise. Here we have an important question of principle: how is internationalism to be understood?

Lenin

December 30, 1922

Taken down by M. V.

[III]

Continuation of the notes.

December 31, 1922

THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITIES OR "AUTONOMISATION" (Continued)

In my writings on the national question I have already said that an abstract presentation of the question of nationalism in general is of no use at all. A distinction must necessarily be made between the nationalism of an oppressor nation and that of an oppressed nation, the nationalism of a big nation and that of a small nation.

In respect of the second kind of nationalism we, nationals of a big nation, have nearly always been guilty, in historic practice, of an infinite number of cases of violence; furthermore, we commit violence and insult an infinite number of times without noticing it. It is sufficient to recall my Volga reminiscences of how non-Russians are treated; how the Poles are not called by any other name than Polyachishka, how the Tatar is nicknamed Prince, how the Ukrainians are always Khokhols and the Georgians and other Caucasian nationalists always Kapkasians.

That is why internationalism on the part of oppressors or "great" nations, as they are called (though they are great only in their violence, only great as bullies), must consist not only in the observance of the formal equality of nations but even in an inequality of the oppressor nation, the great nation, that must make up for the inequality which obtains in actual practice. Anybody who does not understand this has not grasped the real proletarian attitude to the national question, he is still essentially petty bourgeois in his point of view and is, therefore, sure to descend to the bourgeois point of view.

What is important for the proletarian? For the proletarian it is not only important, it is absolutely essential that he should be assured that the non-Russians place the greatest possible trust in the proletarian class struggle. What is needed to ensure this? Not merely formal equality. In one way or another, by one's attitude or by concessions, it is necessary to compensate the non-Russians for the lack of trust, for the suspicion and the insults to which the government of the "dominant" nation subjected them in the past.

I think it is unnecessary to explain this to Bolsheviks, to Communists, in greater detail. And I think that in the present instance, as far as the Georgian nation is concerned, we have a typical case in which a genuinely proletarian attitude makes profound caution, thoughtfulness and a readiness to compromise a matter of necessity for us. The Georgian who is neglectful of this aspect of the question, or who carelessly flings about accusations of "nationalist-socialism" (whereas he himself is a real and true "nationalist-socialist," and even a vulgar Great-Russian bully), violates, in substance, the interests of proletarian class solidarity, for nothing holds up the development and strengthening of proletarian class

solidarity so much as national injustice; "offended" nationals are not sensitive to anything so much as to the feeling of equality and the violation of this equality, if only through negligence or jest—to the violation of that equality by their proletarian comrades. That is why in this case it is better to overdo rather than underdo the concessions and leniency towards the national minorities. That is why, in this case, the fundamental interest of proletarian solidarity, and consequently of the proletarian class struggle, requires that we never adopt a formal attitude to the national question, but always take into account the specific attitude of the proletarian of the oppressed (or small) nation towards the oppressor (or great) nation.

Lenin

Taken down by M. V.
December 31, 1922

[III]

Continuation of the notes.
December 31, 1922

What practical measures must be taken in the present situation?

Firstly, we must maintain and strengthen the union of socialist republics. Of this there can be no doubt. This measure is necessary for us and it is necessary for the world communist proletariat in its struggle against the world bourgeoisie and its defence against bourgeois intrigues.

Secondly, the union of socialist republics must be retained for its diplomatic apparatus. By the way, this apparatus is an exceptional component of our state apparatus. We have not allowed a single influential person from the old tsarist apparatus into it. All sections with any authority are composed of Communists. That is why it has already won for itself (this may be said boldly) the name of a reliable communist apparatus purged to an incomparably greater extent of the old tsarist, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements than that which we have had to make do with in other People's Commissariats.

Thirdly, exemplary punishment must be inflicted on Comrade Orjonikidze (I say this all the more regretfully as I am one of his personal friends and have worked with him abroad) and the investigation of all the material which Dzerzhinsky's commission has collected must be completed or started over again to correct the enormous mass of wrongs and biased judgements which it doubtlessly contains. The political responsibility for all this truly Great-Russian nationalist campaign must, of course, be laid on Stalin and Dzerzhinsky.

Fourthly, the strictest rules must be introduced on the use of the national language in the non-Russian republics of our union, and these rules must be checked with special care. There is no doubt that our apparatus being what it is, there is bound to be, on the pretext of unity in the railway service, unity in the fiscal service and so on, a mass of truly Russian abuses. Special ingenuity is necessary for the struggle against these abuses, not to mention special sincerity on the part of those who undertake this struggle. A detailed code will be required, and only the nationals living in the republic in question can draw it up at all successfully. And then we cannot be sure in advance that as a result of this work we shall not take a step backward at our next Congress of Soviets, i.e., retain the union of Soviet socialist republics only for military and diplomatic affairs, and in all other respects restore full independence to the individual People's Commissariats.

It must be borne in mind that the decentralisation of the People's Commissariats and the lack of co-ordination in their work as far as Moscow and other centres are concerned can be compensated sufficiently by Party authority, if it is exercised with sufficient prudence and impartiality; the harm that can result to our state from a lack of unification between the national apparatuses and the Russian apparatus is infinitely less than that which will be done not only to us, but to the whole International, and to the hundreds of

millions of the peoples of Asia, which is destined to follow us on to the stage of history in the near future. It would be unpardonable opportunism if, on the eve of the debut of the East, just as it is awakening, we undermined our prestige with its peoples, even if only by the slightest crudity or injustice towards our own non-Russian nationalities. The need to rally against the imperialists of the West, who are defending the capitalist world, is one thing. There can be no doubt about that and it would be superfluous for me to speak about my unconditional approval of it. It is another thing when we ourselves lapse, even if only in trifles, into imperialist attitudes towards oppressed nationalities, thus undermining all our principled sincerity, all our principled defence of the struggle against imperialism. But the morrow of world history will be a day when the awakening peoples oppressed by imperialism are finally aroused and the decisive long and hard struggle for their liberation begins.

Lenin

December 31, 1922

Taken down by M. V.

Lenin, Vol. 36, pp. 605-611.



FORMATION OF THE USSR:
DECLARATION OF UNION AND TREATY OF UNION
30 December 1922

Work to transform the nominally independent Soviet Republics into a single state had progressed under Stalin's direction in 1922. By the end of the year this resulted in the convening of the first Congress of Soviets of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in Moscow on 30 December. It was composed of members of the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets and of the congresses of soviets of the Ukrainian, Belorussian (White Russian) and Transcaucasian Republics. It approved a Declaration of Union and a Treaty of Union. 1922 thus became one of the three dates commonly given for the formation of the USSR—the other two being 1923, when the constitution was developed and most of the practical steps taken, and 1924, when the new constitution was formally adopted. The treaty contained one potentially important change in wording which had been put in at Lenin's insistence to replace Stalin's original terminology: in clause one of the treaty it states that the republics "hereby conclude a treaty for their union into a single united state....," whereas Stalin's original had provided for treaties between republics "for their formal entry into the RSFSR...." The distinction was important to Lenin and to many representatives of the minority nationality areas for it preserved the claim that the new state was a true federation and not merely the revival of the old Russian empire with autonomous regions. Practical implications of the difference were few from the Stalin era until the end of the 1980s when they became important in providing a basis for claims of various republics of a right to separate from the USSR.

DECLARATION OF UNION

Since the formation of the Soviet Republics the world has been divided into two camps—the capitalist and the Socialist.

In the capitalist camp reigns national hostility and inequality, colonial slavery, chauvinism, national suppression, pogroms, and imperialist brutality.

Here, in the Socialist camp, is to be found mutual confidence and peace, national freedom and equality, and the tranquil community and fraternal co-operation of peoples. The attempt of the capitalist world through long decades to settle the problem of nationalities by the joint methods of the free development of peoples and the exploitation of man by man, has proved to be fruitless. On the contrary, the skein of nationalist contradictions is becoming more and more entangled, and threatens to overwhelm capitalism itself. The bourgeoisie have proved incapable of bringing about the co-operation of nations.

Only in the camp of the Soviets, and under the proletarian dictatorship round which is rallied the majority of the population, has it been found possible to root out national persecution, to create conditions for mutual trust, and to lay the foundations of fraternal co-operation. Thanks solely to this fact were the Soviet Republics able to beat off the internal and external attacks of world imperialism, to bring the civil war to a successful conclusion, to render their existence safe and sure, and to proceed to the work of peaceful economic construction.

But the years of war were not without their heritage. The ruined fields and idle factories, the breakdown of production and the exhaustion of economic resources which follow from the war, render the isolated efforts of the separate Republics towards economic reconstruction inadequate. The revival of the economic life of the country has proved impossible as long as the Republics lead a divided existence.

Furthermore, the unsettled state of international relations and the danger of new attacks render imperative the creation of a common front by the Soviet Republics against a capitalist encirclement.

Finally, the very structure of the Soviet power, which is international in its class character, urges the working masses of the Soviet Republics along the path of union into one Socialist family.

All these considerations imperatively demand the union of the Soviet Republics into a single State, powerful enough to ensure internal economic prosperity, security from foreign attacks, and the free development of her peoples according to their nationality.

The will of the peoples of the Soviet Republics, expressed in the recent Congresses of their Soviets, which unanimously adopted the decision to create a Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, is a reliable guarantee that the Union is a voluntary union of equal peoples, that entry into the Union is open to all Socialist Soviet Republics, either already in existence or to be formed in the future, that the new united State is a fitting consummation to the peaceful Communism and fraternal co-operation of peoples begun in October, 1917, that it will form a firm bulwark against world capitalism, and will be a decided step towards the union of the workers of all countries into a World Socialist Soviet Republic.

Declaring this to the whole world, and affirming the unshakable foundations of the Soviet power as expressed in the constitutions of the Socialist Soviet Republics in whose name we are empowered to act, we, the delegates of these Republics, acting within the scope of the powers conferred upon us, resolve to put our signatures to the Treaty for the creation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

THE TREATY OF UNION

The Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (R.S.R.S.R.), the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (U.S.S.R.), the White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic (W.R.S.S.R.) and the Transcaucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republics (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia), hereby conclude a treaty for their union into a single united State, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, on the following basis:

1. The competence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, exercised by its supreme organs, shall include:

- (i) Representation of the Union in international relations.
- (ii) Alteration of the frontiers of the Union.
- (iii) Conclusion of treaties for the acceptance of new republics into the Union.
- (iv) Declaration of war and conclusion of peace.
- (v) Floating of foreign State loans.
- (vi) Ratification of international treaties.
- (vii) Establishment of regulations for internal and external trade.
- (viii) Establishment of the general plan, and regulation, of the national economy of the Union, and the conclusion of concessionary agreements.
- (ix) Regulation of transport and posts and telegraphs.
- (x) Organisation of armed forces of the Union.
- (xi) Ratification of the Union State budget; establishment of currency and credit systems, and of taxation systems for the Union, the Republics, and the localities.
- (xii) Establishment of the general principles of land distribution and exploitation, and of the exploitation of the mineral wealth, forests, and waterways throughout the whole territory of the Union.
- (xiii) Union legislation on migration and settlement.
- (xiv) Establishment of the principles of court structure and procedure, and also civil and criminal legislation for the Union.
- (xv) Fundamental labour legislation.
- (xvi) Establishment of general principles of national education.
- (xvii) Adoption of general measures of national health protection.
- (xviii) Establishment of systems of weights and measures.
- (xix) Organisation of Union statistics.
- (xx) General legislation as to the civil rights of foreigners.
- (xxi) General amnesty regulations.
- (xxii) Veto of any decisions of Soviet Congresses, Central Executive Committees, and Councils of People's Commissars of the republics of the Union, which infringe the Treaty of Union.

2. The supreme authority of the Union shall be the Congress of Soviets of the Union, and, between congresses, the Union Central Executive Committee.

3. The Union Congress of Soviets shall be composed of representatives of the town Soviets in the proportion of one delegate for every 25,000 electors, and of representatives of the provincial Congresses of Soviets on the basis of one delegate for every 125,000 inhabitants.

4. The delegates to the Union Congress of Soviets shall be elected at the provincial Congresses of Soviets.

5. Ordinary Union Soviet Congresses shall be summoned by the Union Central Executive Committee once a year; extraordinary Congresses shall be summoned by the Union Central Executive Committee either upon its own initiative or on the demand of at least two of the constituent Republics.

The Union Central Executive Committee

6. The Union Congress of Soviets elects the Central Executive Committee, consisting of representatives of the united Republics, in proportion to the population of each, to the total number of 371 members.

7. Ordinary sessions of the Union Central Executive Committee shall be held three times a year; extraordinary sessions shall be summoned by resolution of the Presidium of the Union Central Executive Committee or upon the demand of the Union Council of People's Commissars or of the Central Executive Committee of one of the constituent Republics.

8. The Union Congresses of Soviets and sessions of the Central Executive Committee shall meet in the capitals of the constituent Republics in turn, in an order to be established by the Presidium of the Union Central Executive Committee.

9. The Union Central Executive Committee shall elect a Presidium, which shall be the supreme authority in the Union in the intervals between the sessions of the Union Central Executive Committee.

10. The Presidium of the Union Central Executive Committee shall consist of 19 members, four of whom, one for each of the Republics, shall be appointed by the Union Central Executive Committee as its chairmen.

The Union Council of People's Commissars

11. The executive organ of the Union Central Executive Committee shall be the Union Council of People's Commissars, consisting of:

The Chairman of the Union Council of People's Commissars.

The Vice-Chairmen of the Union Council of People's Commissars.

The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

" " " " War (and Marine).

" " " " Foreign Trade.

" " " " Transport.

" " " " Posts and Telegraphs.

" " " " Workers' and Peasants Inspection.

" " " " Labour.

" " " " Food.

" " " " Finance.

The Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council.

General Provisions

12. For the purposes of ratifying revolutionary legislation on the territory of the Union, and for co-ordinating the activities of the united Republics in the struggle against counter-revolution, there shall be established in the Union Central Executive Committee a Supreme Court, with the functions of a supreme body for court control, and in the Council of People's Commissars a section of the State Political Department, the chairman of which shall participate in the Union Council of People's Commissars in an advisory capacity.

13. The decrees and orders of the Union Council of People's Commissars shall be binding upon all the united Republics and shall be carried out throughout the territory of the Union.

14. The decrees and orders of the Union Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars shall be printed in the languages of the united Republics (Russian, Ukrainian, White Russian, Georgian, Armenian, and Turkish).

15. The Central Executive Committees of the united Republics may lodge protests against the decrees and orders of the Union Council of People's Commissars with the Presidium of the Union Central Executive Committee, but must not suspend their execution.

16. The decrees and orders of the Union Council of People's Commissars may be set aside only by the Union Central Executive Committee and its Presidium. The acts of the Councils of People's Commissars of the individual republics may be set aside by the Union Central Executive Committee, its Presidium, and the Union Council of People's Commissars.

17. The execution of Orders issued by the People's Commissars of the Union may be suspended by the Central Executive Committees of the united Republics, or their presidia, only when they do not correspond with the decisions of the Union Council of People's Commissars or Central Executive Committee. In such cases the Central Executive Committee of the united Republic, or its Presidium, shall immediately inform the Union Council of People's Commissars and the appropriate Union People's Commissar.

18. The Council of People's Commissars of each of the united republics shall consist of:

The Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman.

The Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council.

The People's Commissar for Agriculture.

"	"	"	"	Food.
"	"	"	"	Finance.
"	"	"	"	Labour.
"	"	"	"	Home Affairs.
"	"	"	"	Justice.
"	"	"	"	Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.
"	"	"	"	Education.
"	"	"	"	Health.
"	"	"	"	Social Welfare.
"	"	"	"	Nationalities.

and, in a consultative capacity, the representatives of the Union Commissariats for Foreign Affairs, War, Foreign Trade, Transport, and Post and Telegraphs.

19. The Supreme Economic Council and the People's Commissariats for Food, Finance, Labour, and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the united Republics shall be immediately subordinated to the Central Executive Committee and the Councils of People's Commissars of the united Republics, but shall be guided by the instructions of the appropriate Union People's Commissars.

20. The republics entering into the Union shall have their own budgets, which shall form an integral part of the general Union budget, and shall be approved by the Union Central Executive Committee. The revenue and expenditure sides of the budgets of the Republics shall be drawn up by the Union Central Executive Committee. The list of revenues, and the amount of each, forming part of the budgets of the united Republics, shall be determined by the Union Central Executive Committee.

21. A uniform civilian status shall apply to all citizens of the united Republics.

22. The Union shall have its own flag, coat of arms, and State seal.

23. The capital of the Union shall be Moscow.

24. The united Republics shall modify their constitutions as required by the present treaty.

25. The Union Congress of Soviets is the only competent body for the ratification of, alteration or addition to, the Treaty of Union.

26. Each of the united Republics retains its full liberty to leave the Union if it so desires.

Moscow, December 30, 1922.

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GLOSSARY

The glossary is intended to assist those unfamiliar with Russian terminology of the period; many specific institutions are identified in headnotes to documents in which they are mentioned.

All-Russian—term often used to denote an institution which pertained to the entire RSFSR (Russian republic), such as in "All-Russian Congress of Soviets" or "All-Russian Cheka." Used especially after implementation of the constitution creating the RSFSR in 1918.

artel—artisan or agricultural cooperative.

CC (TsK)—Central Committee (of the Communist Party).

CEC (TsIK)—Central Executive Committee (executive of the Congress of Soviets). See also VTsIK.

Cheka—The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution and Sabotage; the political police until 1922.

commissar (sometimes commissioner, commissary)—used to denote revolutionary officials in 1917, became the official term for the main government department heads in the Soviet government, used until 1946, as in "People's Commissar of Agriculture." Equivalent of Minister (European) or Secretary (American).

Constituent Assembly—assembly elected by general popular vote with right to determine future of Russia. Elected in November 1917 and dispersed by Bolsheviks following first meeting in January 1918.

Constitutional Democratic Party (Constitutional Democrats, Kadets)—the major Russian liberal party.

CPC—See Council of People's Commissars.

Council for Labor and Defense (STO)—important council of the early Soviet government, responsible especially for coordinating economic and military issues.

Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom, CPC)—title of government established after Bolshevik Revolution; used until 1946, when replaced by term Council of Ministers.

desiatina—traditional Russian land measurement; one desiatina = 2.7 acres or 1.09 hectares.

ECCI—Executive Committee of the Communist International.

duma—(1) the State Duma, the parliament from 1905-1917 (especially if capitalized); (2) name of city councils before the revolution.

factory committee (fabkom, fabzavkomy)—committee of workers in a factory, powerful in the early part of the revolution.

Glavki (sing. Glavk)—central administrative committees or directorates; used especially in economic departments. "Glav" at the beginning of a title usually suggests a central administrative department for that activity and is commonly translated as "chief" or "main."

Glavlit—Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing.

Glavpolitprosvet—see politprosvet.

Goelro—State Commission for the Electrification of Russia.

Gosplan—State Planning Commission.

GPU—State Political Administration. Political police from 1922-1923.

- guberniia**—province, the main administrative subdivision of the Russian empire and of the Soviet state until 1929.
- Gubkom**—Guberniia committee of the Communist Party.
- hectare**—metric land measurement, equals 2.47 acres.
- Izvestiia**—without a qualifier refers to the official newspaper of the Petrograd Soviet and then after the October Revolution of the Soviet government; many local soviet newspapers also tended to be named *Izvestiia*.
- Kadets**—See Constitutional Democratic Party.
- Komsomol**—Communist Youth League.
- kulak**—More prosperous peasant, generally able to hire labor; applied pejoratively by Bolsheviks to any peasant opposing their policies.
- Left SRs, Left Socialist Revolutionaries**—see Socialist Revolutionaries.
- Mensheviks**—main Russian Marxist party in opposition to Bolsheviks.
- Menshevik-Internationalists**—left wing of the Mensheviks, often cooperated with the Bolsheviks.
- Narkompros**—People's Commissariat of Enlightenment, or, alternatively, of Education (translations vary).
- NEP**—The New Economic Policy introduced in 1921; also the era of NEP, i.e., the 1920s.
- Obkom**—Oblast committee of the Communist Party.
- obshchina**—traditional Russian peasant commune.
- oblast**—large administrative subdivision used in some regions instead of guberniia; roughly a province.
- OGPU**—Unified State Political Administration. New name for the political police introduced in 1923 along with the formation of the Soviet Union.
- okrug**—large administrative unit, usually subdivision of an oblast, equivalent to an uезд in a guberniia. Certain other types of administrative units also were called okrug, such as some military districts.
- Party**—used, with or without capitalization, to mean the Communist Party, as in "the party intends to...."
- People's Commissariat**—the chief administrative departments of the Soviet government; see commissar, above.
- Politburo**—Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party; effectively the key leadership body.
- Politprosvet**—Political Educational Committee (of Narkompros).
- Pood**—See pud.
- Pravda**—central official paper of the Communist Party; some local Bolshevik papers used the title also.
- Proletcult (Proletkult)**—Union of Proletarian Cultural-Educational Associations.
- pud (pood)**—Russian measure of weight, equaling 36.11 lbs. or 16.38 kilograms.
- Rada**—lit., Ukrainian equivalent of "soviet." Usually refers to the Ukrainian Central Rada set up in Kiev during the Revolution and which proclaimed itself the government for Ukraine after the Bolshevik Revolution.
- raion**—smaller administrative subdistrict in some rural areas; also in some larger cities.
- raikom**—raion committee of the Communist Party.
- Revolutionary Tribunals**—special courts set up to expedite revolutionary justice and to deal with important political cases; there also were special revolutionary tribunals for the press and other purposes.
- RKP(b)**—Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the party name after the name change of March 1918 until 1925.
- RSDRP**—Russian Social Democratic Labor Party; without further clarification can refer to either the Bolsheviks or Mensheviks, or, less frequently, to smaller groups.

- RSDRP(b)**—Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviks), the usual designation for the Bolsheviks before the change of party name in 1918.
- RSFSR**—Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic; official name of the new state under constitution of 1918. Later terms were reversed—Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic. Middle word translated variously as Federal, Federative or Federated.
- Selkom**—village committee of the Communist Party.
- SNK**—Russian initials for Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom); used infrequently in translations.
- Socialist Revolutionaries**—peasant oriented revolutionary party, largest party in 1917 and in the Constituent Assembly. The left wing emerged in late 1917 as a virtual separate party, the Left SRs, and cooperated with the Bolsheviks during the first months after the October Revolution.
- Sovdeplia**—term used to designate area under Soviet control during the Civil War, often pejoratively.
- Soviet**—council in Russian. Used both as a short form name of the government (or for reference to its institutions, policies, etc.), and to refer to a variety of other institutions which use that term in their title, ie., call themselves a council.
- Soviet of People's Commissars**—alternative translation of Council of People's Commissars (soviet = council).
- Sovnarkom**—Commonly used abbreviation for Council of People's Commissars, based on first syllable of each word (in Russian). See Council of People's Commissars.
- SRs**—See Socialist Revolutionaries.
- STO**—Soviet for Labor and Defense. See Council for Labor and Defense.
- subbotnik**—special days of voluntary work without pay for the good of society, which later became largely mandatory; lit., "Saturdays."
- Tsektran**—Central Committee for Transportation.
- TsIK**—Central Executive Committee (executive of the Congress of Soviets).
- TsK (CC)**—Central Committee (of the Communist Party).
- uezd (uyezd)**—administrative subdivision of a guberniia.
- verst (versta)**—0.66 mile.
- Vesenka**—Supreme Council of the National Economy; also called VSNKh and the Supreme Economic Council.
- volost**—rural administrative units within the uезд.
- VSNKh**—Supreme Council of the National Economy; also called Vesenka and the Supreme Economic Council.
- VTsIK**—All-Russian Central Executive Committee, although often referred to simply as the Central Executive Committee, TsIK or CC.
- zemstvo**—pre-revolutionary elected local and regional government institutions, especially in rural areas, with limited powers; abolished by the Bolsheviks.
- Zhenotdel**—Women's Department of the Communist Party.

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